

Integration and Distribution: Two Tenets of the United States Defense/Military Strategy Against China

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Abstract

What are the tenets of the U.S. defense and military strategies against China? While there have been many works analyzing the U.S. defense and military strategies, they seem to be short of identifying the common themes that synthesize the U.S. defense and military strategies. In this study, I propose that the United States defense and military strategy against China comprises two central tenets: integration and distribution. Integration is employed at the strategic level to deter China's ambition and overwhelm its military capabilities. It is manifested in initiative such as the U.S. Integrated Deterrence, the Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), and Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI). On the other hand, distribution is pursued at the operational level to paralyze Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD) and achieve military objectives. It characterizes initiatives such as the Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), along with the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). The findings of the study offer implications for South Korea, including the increased likelihood of US demanding South Korea to implement integration and distribution, China's response to enhance its capabilities, and the U.S. approaches in terms of North Korea's A2/AD.

Key Words: *integration, distribution, US strategy against China, US operational concepts*

Introduction

In 2022, the United States released some important strategic documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which could be characterized by one sentence: all are concerned about China. For example, the NSS explains the U.S. strategy against the People's Republic of China (PRC) with three axioms: to invest in the foundations of its strength domestically, to align its efforts with the network of allies and partners, and compete responsibly with the PRC to defend U.S. interests.¹⁾ They were already revealed by the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his speech at the George Washington University several months before the release of the NSS.²⁾ In comparison to the U.S. foreign policy toward China, however, it is relatively hard to understand the bottom line of the U.S. defense strategy against China. Although the defense documents seriously address the China issues, the U.S. defense strategy against China has not been elucidated in those documents and remarks by high-ranking officials in defense and security fields, which, at best, imply it should be in line with the concept of "Integrated Deterrence."

Then, what are the U.S. defense and military strategies against the PRC's defense strategy of active defense³⁾ and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)?⁴⁾ I argue that strategic integration and operational distribution are the two main features of the strategy.⁵⁾ Although the apparent meanings of the two concepts seem to be

1) The White House, "National Security Strategy"(October 2022), p. 24.

2) Antony Blinken, "The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China"(May 26, 2022), U.S. Department of State (<https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>, accessed on January 22, 2023)

3) M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

4) China had allegedly adopted the concept of A2/AD in the mid-1980s, while the United States was reported to use the term first in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, it did not clearly mention A2/AD was the strategy of China. But it might be plausible that it considered China given the Office of Net Assessment's involvement in the QDR and its assessment of China threats. On the other hand, in the *Annual Report on The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2000*, area denial was not used whereas anti-access was mentioned once for information operations, not sea denial. For a more literature review on A2/AD, see Nick Impson, "The Next Warm War: How History's Anti-Access/Area Denial Campaigns Inform the Future of War," *Small Wars Journal* (January 14, 2020) (<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/next-warm-war-how-historys-anti-accessarea-denial-campaigns-inform-future-war>, accessed on March 25, 2024) and "An Anti-Access History Lesson," *The Diplomat* (May 25, 2012) (<https://thediplomat.com/2012/05/an-anti-access-history-lesson/>, accessed on March 25, 2024).

5) The idea of two pillars of the U.S. defense strategy against China was originally proposed by Captain Soonkun Oh, who has worked as the Korean military attaché at the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Honolulu.

incompatible, they share an underlying orientation: more is better. After reviewing pertinent studies and developing a theoretical framework, the article proceeds to examine the integration of U.S. defense strategy by looking into the Integrated Deterrence and other sub-capstones regarding integration such as the Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI), and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMDM). Then, it explores distribution by focusing on Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), along with sketching the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). The article concludes with a summary of the main arguments and some implications for South Korea.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The conventional wisdom is inadequate in identifying the core elements of the U.S. military strategy against the People's Republic of China. This is because the U.S. defense and military strategy against China has been understudied in the academic community, although it has been of interest to policy researchers. Even though there are very few studies on the topic, they can be divided into three groups by their distinct approaches. First, the inclusive approach views the United States' defense and military strategy against China as a component of the country's national security strategy or general defense and military strategy.⁶⁾ In this context, while the strategy may be applicable to China, it is uncertain whether it is specifically directed at the country. The second approach is concerned with the military balance between the United States and China, focusing on military capabilities rather than strategies.⁷⁾ The third approach pays particular attention to a specific subject, such as the Taiwan contingency and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s modernization.⁸⁾ Nevertheless, all these research focuses neglect

6) See Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, "Dilemmas of Deterrence: The United States's Smart New Strategy Has Six Daunting Trade-offs," *The Marshall Papers* (CSIS), 2024; Dan Grazier, "A Rational China-Oriented Military Strategy," *Project on Government Oversight*, 2023; Terrence K. Kelly, James Dobbins, David A. Shlapak, David C. Gompert, Eric Heginbotham, Peter Chalk, and Lloyd Thrall, "The U.S. Army in Asia, 2030-2040," *RAND Corporation*, 2014.

7) See Graham Allison and Jonah Glick-Unterman, "The Great Military Rivalry: China vs the U.S." *The Harvard Belfer Center*, 2021; Thomas H. Shugart III, "Trends, Timelines, and Uncertainty: an Assessment of the Military Balance in the Indo-Pacific," *CNAS*, 2021; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Evolving Strategies in the U.S.-China Military Balance," *CSIS*, 2016.

8) See Derek Grossman and John S. Meyers, "Minding the Gaps: US Military Strategy toward China," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2019, pp. 105-121; Ashton B. Carter and Jennifer C. Bulkeley, "America's Strategic Response to China's Military Modernization," *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* vol. 9. no. 1. (Winter 2007), pp. 50-52; Luke P. Bellocchi, "The Strategic

the underlying maxim of the strategy.⁹⁾ To fill the gap between those research approaches, the article aims to focus on the fundamentals of the U.S. defense and military strategy against China.

To add another stone to the tower of existing research accomplishments, we should start by thinking about simple ways to counter Chinese A2/AD. Penetrating into the anti-access by China is possible only when the United States possesses the overwhelming power. To do so, Washington should enhance its forces and capabilities to the fullest extent. Two heads are better than one, and two hands are better than one. In addition, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Thus, integration of capabilities is more desirable than just aggregation of them. The difference between the concentration of force or “mass,” which has been one of the fundamental principles of war for a long time,¹⁰⁾ also illustrates the concept effectively. The most recent example is the “whole-of-government approach” employed by the United States.¹¹⁾ Furthermore, Washington’s consolidated power on its own or with its allies may play a pivotal role in prompting China to change its strategy from active defense to a more defensive one. Indeed, the United States can impede China’s assertive implementation of A2/AD in advance.

Meanwhile, unlike concentrated forces, dispersed forces can afford to move freely around an area without being interrupted. The logic of random dispersion in the ecosystem, a superior strategy for survival,¹²⁾ can be applied to the military environment. Furthermore, the widely distributed military forces may increase the likelihood of identifying potential weaknesses in Chinese A2/AD capabilities. In response, China should allocate a greater proportion of its resources to maintain

Importance of Taiwan to the United States and Its Allies: Part Two – Policy since the Start of the Russia-Ukraine War,” *Parameters* 53, no. 3, 2023; Michael R. Pompeo and Bryan Clark, “A New Strategic Concept Could Be Useful in the US Military’s Defense of Taiwan,” *The Hill* (April 2, 2024); Matt Salmon and Shay Stautz, “American Power and the Defense of Taiwan,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (March 9, 2023).

- 9) Some Korean researchers explored US strategy against China in terms of operational concepts, but they did not touch on an overarching conception of them. See Youngguen Choi and Hanbyeol Sohn, “Military Strategy against China of the Trump Administration,” *Krins-Quarterly* Vol 4, No.3, 2019, pp. 91-130; Inhyo Seol, “Indo-Pacific Military/Alliance Strategy and Defense Posture under the Biden Administration,” *Krins-Quarterly* Vol 7. No. 2, 2022, pp. 123-151. Although Kim (2020) analyzed the U.S. military strategy against China under the Trump administration by employing “competitive strategy” and “cost-imposing,” they cannot cover the strategies at the operational level. Taehyun Kim, “Trump’s US Military Strategy against China: Competitive Strategy and Cost-imposing,” *National Strategy* Vol 26, No 2, pp. 35-63.
- 10) David Evans, “Concentration of Force. In: War: A Matter of Principles.” *RUSI Defence Studies Series*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), pp. 70-79.
- 11) For the security side of this approach, see Brett Doyle, “The Whole-of-Nation and whole-of-Government Approaches in Action,” *InterAgency Journal* Vol. 10, No.1, 2019, pp.105-122.
- 12) Rinaldo B. Schinazi, “Does Random Dispersion Help Survival?” *Journal of Statistical Physics* 159, 2015, pp. 101-107.

the A2/AD posture corresponding to the distribution of U.S. forces. Although these concepts are not novel, the notions of integration and distribution are noteworthy in the context of China's strategies of active defense and A2/AD. It seems plausible that the United States is pursuing a counter-military strategy towards China with this in mind. In essence, the U.S. defense and military strategy against China is predicated on two notions: integration to thwart its ambition and distribution to survive Chinese attacks and mount counterattacks. We examine these arguments in the following examples.

Integration to Deter and Overwhelm

The term integration has been drawing much attention among security students since its repeated mentions of "Integrated Deterrence" by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III. However, the concept itself was nothing new because many similar approaches to cooperation and collaboration and the whole-of-the-government approach have been stressed in various strategies of the United States. In addition, at the operational level, jointness has been a long-term goal for the military. As discussed above, no one questions the importance of concentrating all efforts to secure national interest and achieve a national goal. The point is that the United States needs to integrate all efforts to deter and overwhelm China's military capabilities at this moment.

Integrated Deterrence

Since the inauguration of the Biden administration, U.S. defense officials have raised integrated deterrence as an important defense strategy. In 2021, U.S. Defense Secretary Austin formalized integrated deterrence as a key concept for the next defense strategy, emphasizing that the concept of deterrence is a cornerstone of the U.S. defense strategy.¹³⁾ In addition, the logic of integrated deterrence was elaborated on in the remarks by senior U.S. defense officials including Colin Khal, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Gregory M. Kausner, the Deputy Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Melissa Dalton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. In particular, Colin Khal stressed that integrated deterrence aimed to suppress pacing threats by China.¹⁴⁾ As such, integrated deterrence had been expected to be

13) C. Todd Lopez, "Defense Secretary Says 'Integrated Deterrence' Is Cornerstone of U.S. Defense," *DoD News* (April 30, 2021); Terri Moon Cronk, "DOD Official Says Concept of Integrated Deterrence Is Call to Action," *DoD News* (September 28, 2021).

14) Jim Garamone, "Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence," *DoD News* (June 2, 2021).

established at all levels of national strategy such as national security strategy, defense strategy, and military strategy, and China is at the center of this initiative.

Although the origin of the term integration has been ambiguous, the emergence of the term seems to be in line with the current trend and efforts of borrowing a lot of technological innovation represented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the defense sector.¹⁵⁾ The emergence and emphasis of the term integrated deterrence is also understandable in this respect. Thus, the key is how the concept was constituted in the defense area. The meaning of integrated deterrence was first unveiled in the official documents of the 2022 NDS and its Fact Sheet followed by the 2022 NSS. Even though integrated deterrence is the core of defense strategy, it is also mentioned in the 2022 NSS. It implies that the concept is relevant beyond the scope of defense. The 2022 NSS describes the term integrated deterrence as “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.”¹⁶⁾ In addition, the NSS presents five areas to be integrated: 1) integration across domains including military and non-military domains; 2) integration across regions such as the critical regions for the U.S. and its homeland, 3) integration across the spectrum of conflict close to the threshold of armed conflict, 4) integration across the U.S. Government from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions, and 5) integration with allies and partners.¹⁷⁾

In addition to integration in these areas, the 2022 NDS elucidates the ways and targets of integration. According to the strategy, integrated deterrence promotes the U.S. to “more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate,” making any competitor considering the press for advantage in one domain aware that the U.S. can respond in many others as well.¹⁸⁾ When it comes to the ways to deter, it suggests four elements: deterrence by denial, deterrence by resilience, deterrence by direct and collective cost imposition, and role of information in deterrence.¹⁹⁾ The use of deterrence by denial allows occupying territory and developing an asymmetric approach to deter a threat. Deterrence by resilience ensures the capability to resist, fight, and recover quickly from disruption of network and infrastructure. Deterrence by cost imposition imposes huge costs over benefits perceived by the enemy. Lastly, by sharing information, the United States can

15) For example, the U.S. military employs the term agile and resilience. Sometimes this tendency provokes controversy over rhetoric. Frank G. Hoffman, “The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success,” *Institute for National Strategic Studies* (March 31, 2020).

16) The White House, “National Security Strategy”(2022.10.), p. 22.

17) Ibid.

18) U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy,” (2022.10.27), p.1.

19) U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy,” pp. 8-9.

signal its intent and capabilities to the enemy correctly and effectively, thereby deterring a threat. The 2022 NDS identifies six targets to deter,²⁰⁾ including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The first two targets are the homeland and strategic attack, respectively. To deter attacks against the homeland, the 2022 NDS stresses the cost-imposing on potential attackers, while urging Washington to modernize nuclear capabilities including extended deterrence to deter strategic attacks. For four potential adversaries, it takes similar but different efforts. The 2022 NDS encourages the United States to formulate new operational concepts and advanced warfighting capabilities against China while cooperating with NATO to deter Russia. For North Korea, the 2022 NDS asserts interoperability with South Korea along with other measures, whereas it concerns Iran's gray zone operations.

In the following year of the 2022 NDS release, the 2022 National Military Strategy (NMS) provides more specifics on its implementation at the operational level. It stipulates that the Joint Force's contribution to Integrated Deterrence is "combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent."²¹⁾ Although there have been some criticisms about its ambiguity stemming from the lack of operationalization of integrated deterrence at the Joint Staff,²²⁾ the 2022 NMS is helpful to eradicate the doubts to some extent. Implementing the Integrated Deterrence strategy requires identifying the central military problem, setting the central idea of strategic discipline with ways of campaigning and building warfighting advantage, conducting ten Joint Force tasks, and finally achieving strategic objectives to defend the homeland, deter attack, prevail in conflict, and modernize the force.²³⁾ The central problem is how to address the pacing challenge of the PRC. The solution to the problem depends on the theory of success, which is to "exercise Strategic Discipline to continuously calibrate Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning and rapidly building warfighting advantage to deter now and reduce future risk."²⁴⁾ Ten tasks

20) U.S. Department of Defense, "2022 National Defense Strategy," pp. 9-10.

21) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy 2022," (2023.5.8.), p.3. More interestingly, it distinguishes integrated deterrence from Integrated Deterrence by describing that "The NDS strategic approach employs three strategic ways (integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage) to foster Integrated Deterrence." Ibid, p. 3.

22) James Cartwright et al., "Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum," *The Atlantic Council* (June 8, 2023).

23) These tasks are different from the roles of the Joint Force suggested by the Joint Concept for Competing because the roles are not limited to implementing integrated deterrence. They are to deter aggression, prepare for armed conflict if deterrence and competition fail to protect vital U.S. national interests, counter adversaries' competitive strategies that threaten U.S. national interests, and support the efforts of interorganizational partners. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Competing," (February 10, 2023), p.24.

24) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy 2022," p.4.

conducted by the Joint Staff include strengthening homeland defense, enhancing deterrence, preparing to win, integrating Joint Force and combined efforts, leveraging opportunities in campaigning, reinforcing diplomacy, prioritizing concepts and resources, building a resilient Joint Force, and integrating capabilities rapidly.²⁵⁾

Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2)

The second example of the spirit of integration is CJADC2. The CJADC2 is understood as a sort of update to the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2).²⁶⁾ The JADC2 aims to advance Joint Force's command and control (C2) capabilities that are essential to support U.S. national security interests,²⁷⁾ including having competitive advantage over China.²⁸⁾ JADC2 serves the Joint Force Commander to have effective C2 in performing real-world mission tasks. The key is to ensure the faster cycle of information and decision of the commander than that of the adversary. The cycle is composed of three stages: 1) "Sense" which refers to the integration of information across all domains and the electromagnetic spectrum; 2) "Make sense" which alludes to the understanding of the operational environment; and 3) "Act" which implies deciding and disseminating.²⁹⁾ The JADC2 strategy has five lines of efforts: 1) establishing the JADC2 data enterprise to seize, maintain, and protect information and decision advantage for accelerating decision-making; 2) establishing the JADC2 human enterprise to use effectively Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning tools; 3) establishing the JADC2 technical enterprise to have secure and worldwide communications networks with sufficient speed and bandwidth; 4) integrating Nuclear C2 and Communications with JADC2; and 5) modernizing mission partner information sharing.³⁰⁾ These efforts are guided by principles such as enterprising designed and scaled information sharing, securing, data and interoperability standards-driven, resilience in a degraded environment, utility of effort in capability development, and delivering JADC2 capabilities with speed.

25) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy 2022," p.5.

26) Jordan McDonald, "DOD's JADC2 Concept is Now CJADC2," *GOVCIO* (October 18, 2023) (<https://govciomedia.com/dods-jadc2-concept-is-now-cjadc2/>, accessed on April 2, 2024).

27) U.S. Department of Defense, "Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy" (March 2022), p.3

28) Ironically, China makes efforts to build its own JADC2. Stew Magnuson, "SPECIAL REPORT: China Pursues Its Own Version of JADC2," *National Defense* (July 13, 2023) (<https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/13/china-pursues--its-own-version-of--jadc2>, accessed on March 31, 2024).

29) U.S. Department of Defense, "Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy," pp. 4-5.

30) U.S. Department of Defense, "Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy," pp. 5-7.

The term “combined” was added to the upgraded version of CJADC2 to emphasize the importance of the combined efforts with international partners and different military commands under one umbrella.³¹⁾ While JADC2 itself is originally based on the concept of integration, the addition of the term combined adds more emphasis on integrating. This emphasis is consistent with the trend of integration in the private sector.³²⁾ Furthermore, it might be caused by the fact that each service wants to have its own JADC2.³³⁾ For example, the U.S. Army hosts a joint experiment of Project Convergence focusing on the integration of capabilities between operational military development headquarters, which had tested to integrate Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force systems.³⁴⁾ The Air Force runs the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) to build a digital infrastructure to enable sharing of information and provide situational awareness to the Air Force, Space Force, and joint forces.³⁵⁾ The Navy also has its own Project Overmatch to develop and deliver an operational architecture to support maritime and expeditionary operations.³⁶⁾

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)

Discussion on the IAMD preceded the rise of integrated deterrence. For example, the concept of the IAMD was implemented even during the Second World War and the Cold War.³⁷⁾ However, it was in the 2010s when the IAMD became important regarding China’s expansion in the region. The establishment of the Pacific Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center on October 1, 2014, substantiates the increasing importance of the IAMD.³⁸⁾ Hence, when it comes to

31) Jordan McDonald, “DOD’s JADC2 Concept is Now CJADC2”; Jaspreet Gill, “Return of CJADC2: DoD officially moves ahead with ‘combined’ JADC2 in a rebrand focusing on partners,” *Breaking Defense* (May 16, 2023) (<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/return-of-cjadc2-dod-officially-moves-ahead-with-combined-jadc2-in-a-rebrand-focusing-on-partners/>, assessed on March 20, 2024).

32) Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “Joint Integration Emerging as the Solution for CJADC2,” *The Hudson Institute* (September 30, 2023) (<https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/joint-integration-emerging-solution-cjadc2-bryan-clark-dan-patt>, accessed on April 4, 2024).

33) Mark Pomerleau, “Military services ‘not aligned’ on JADC2 efforts, Air Force official warns,” *Fedscoop* (July 26, 2022) (<https://fedscoop.com/military-services-not-aligned-on-jadc2-efforts-air-force-official-warns/>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

34) Mark Pomerleau, “Military services ‘not aligned’ on JADC2 efforts, Air Force official warns,” *Fedscoop* (July 26, 2022) (<https://fedscoop.com/military-services-not-aligned-on-jadc2-efforts-air-force-official-warns/>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

35) *Ibid.*

36) *Ibid.*

37) Kenneth R. Dorner, William B. Hartman, and Jason M. Teague, “Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific,” *Air & Space Power Journal* 29, no. 1 (January–February 2015), pp. 64–65.

38) “PACAF establishes Pacific IAMD Center,” *Pacific Air Forces* (November 14, 2014)

countering China's A2/AD, the IAMD presented by INDOPACOM, especially the IAMD Vision 2028 in 2018, is noteworthy.³⁹⁾ Although the concept of IAMD has shown in many documents,⁴⁰⁾ INDOPACOM's version of the IAMD directly targets China. The IAMD is usually defined as "the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland and United States national interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary's ability to create adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities"⁴¹⁾ Based on this definition, INDOPACOM's IAMD went further to pursue a network architecture that "all Allies and partners can share and any sensor, any shooter in the region can leverage to thwart an incoming threat" by proposing "a regional integrated and interoperable fire-control architecture and an advanced joint and combined IAMD battle management and engagement coordination system."⁴²⁾

Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI)

The CNI may not be an obvious example of integration in the U.S. defense strategy against China because the term CNI is not found in any official document regarding defense strategy, including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.⁴³⁾ In addition, no official definition of CNI has been offered by the Department of Defense.⁴⁴⁾ Moreover, the CNI can be a threat, a phenomenon, and a measure at the same time, depending on how it is understood.⁴⁵⁾ Nevertheless, the CNI can be

(<https://www.pacaf.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/591097/pacaf-establishes-pacific-iamd-center>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

- 39) Lynn Savage, "USINDOPACOM's IAMD Vision 2028: Integrated Deterrence toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," *Air & Space Operations Review* Vol. 1, No. 2, (Summer 2022), p. 42.
- 40) U.S. Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment, "Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)," (2023); U.S. Army, "Army Air and Missile Defense 2028," (March 2019); NATO, "NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence," (Jun 13, 2023) (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8206.htm, accessed on April 6, 2024). In particular, the Joint Chief of Staff explained that IAMD is "one where all capabilities - defensive, offensive, kinetic, non-kinetic - are melded into a comprehensive Joint and combined force capable of preventing an adversary from effectively employing any of its offensive air and missile weapons." The Joint Chief of Staff, "Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020," (December 5, 2013), p.5.
- 41) Kenneth R. Dorner, William B. Hartman, and Jason M. Teague, "Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific," p. 63.
- 42) Lynn Savage, "USINDOPACOM's IAMD Vision 2028: Integrated Deterrence toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," p. 43.
- 43) Doreen Horschig and Nicholas Adamopoulos, "Conventional-Nuclear Integration to Strengthen Deterrence," *CSIS* (October 4, 2023).
- 44) Gregory Giles, "Conventional-Nuclear Integration: Avoiding Misconceptions and Mistakes," *War on the Rocks* (August 21, 2021) (<https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/conventional-nuclear-integration-avoiding-misconceptions-and-mistakes/>, accessed on March 31, 2024).

an example of the U.S. integration strategy against China because the concept is reflected in the U.S. nuclear strategy that considers China's nuclear capabilities seriously. For example, in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review clearly states that "this NPR underscores the linkage between the conventional and nuclear elements of collective deterrence and defense."⁴⁶ Furthermore, its 2018 version records that "integrating and exercising all instruments of power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries integrate their military capabilities."⁴⁷ In practice, the CNI is included in the guidelines of the U.S.-Republic of Korea nuclear deterrence cooperation in 2023.⁴⁸ The CNI has been regarded as "a range of logistical and operational issues that arise when conventional and nuclear forces are operating in the same area of responsibility; being justified on the grounds that Russia, China, and North Korea have developed hybrid nuclear-conventional strategies; efforts to improve the ability of the U.S. and its allied forces to continue to operate in an environment that has been degraded by nuclear use; efforts to develop strike and command, control, and communications (C3) systems that can perform both conventional and nuclear mission."⁴⁹

In sum, as discussed earlier, the finding shows that the key concept of integration is a common theme of the U.S. defense and military strategies against China as evidenced in the defense strategy of integrated deterrence to sub-strategies such as network strategy, CJADC2, missile defense strategy of IAMD, and nuclear strategy of CNI.

Distribution to Survive and Fight Back

While integration is the core at the strategic level, distribution is the key at the operational level. In particular, the use of the concept of distribution aims to counter Chinese A2/AD directly. Thus, strategies and tactics carrying out distribution operations serve to complement the integrated deterrence on the one hand and are employed when the integrated deterrence fails on the other hand.⁵⁰

45) Justin Anderson and James R. McCue, "Deterring, Countering, and Defeating Conventional-Nuclear Integration," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Spring 2021), p. 31.

46) U.S. Department of Defense, "2022 Nuclear Posture Review," p. 1.

47) U.S. Department of Defense, "2018 Nuclear Posture Review," p. 21.

48) The White House, "Joint Press Statement on Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting," (December 16, 2023).

49) Adam Mount and Pranay Vaddi, "An Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture," *Federation of American Scientists* (2021), pp. 4-6. On the other hand, the CNI contributed to the post-Cold War emphasis on minimizing the U.S. nuclear role and a nuclear-free world, which, in turn, elevated the importance of conventional military power. It is also important to note that adversaries to the U.S. have increased the threat of tactical nuclear use as a means to overcome their disadvantage in conventional power against the U.S.

Such strategies and tactics include Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). They have been developed to counter Chinese A2/AD under the concept of Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) during the Trump administration. However, they are still effective under the new defense strategy of Integrated Deterrence because their core mission of countering Chinese A2/AD remains unchanged.⁵¹⁾ In this regard, they share a similar nature with integration. Nevertheless, the characteristics of distribution set it apart from the concept of integration because integration is interpreted at the operational level differently than that at the strategic level. The intent of distribution here is to survive first, as discussed earlier in the theoretical framework, and then attack to paralyze Chinese A2/AD capabilities.

Agile Combat Employment (ACE)

One example that reflects the concept of distribution is the U.S. Air Force's ACE.⁵²⁾ It is "an operational concept that supports joint all-domain operations (JADO)" and also "a proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power."⁵³⁾ In particular, "agile" indicates the ability to "outpace adversary action through movement and maneuver to achieve commander's intent."⁵⁴⁾ The Air Force aims to incorporate and coordinate ACE across the service to increase survivability and resilience in some tasks such as supporting Joint Warfighting Concept.⁵⁵⁾ In this vein, ACE is essentially a survival strategy to avoid or survive attacks from adversaries and to continue operating in the theater despite these attacks.⁵⁶⁾ Five core elements constitute the framework of ACE: posture, C2, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Of the five elements, posture, C2, and movement and maneuver are more closely related to distribution.

Posture serves as the starting position for other elements because "[f]orces

50) Charles Pope, "Kendall Outlines 'Operational Imperatives,' Choices During Think Tank Appearance," *United States Space Force* (<https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2904727/kendall-outlines-operational-imperatives-choices-during-think-tank-appearance>, accessed on March 20, 2024); Andrew Feicker, "Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)," *Congressional Research Service* (April 22, 2021), p. 1.

51) This was confirmed by the Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on May 24, 2022, during my visit to INDOPACOM.

52) Strictly speaking, ACE has been developed by PACAF. James A. Leftwich et al., "Advancing Combat Support to Sustain Agile Combat Employment Concepts," (2023), *RAND*, p. 5.

53) U.S. Air Force, "Agile Combat Employment (Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21)" (2022), p. 1

54) *Ibid.*

55) PACAF Unclassified Briefing during my visit to PACAF on May 24, 2022.

56) Patrick Mills et al., "Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts," (2020), *RAND*, p. 1.

must be able to rapidly execute operations from various locations with integrated capabilities and interoperability across the core functions.”⁵⁷⁾ In terms of distribution, it relocates theater-assigned and follow-on forces to positions of advantage to implement support operations and increases the number of distributed locations that an enemy should target without massing personnel at locations within the reach of the enemy’s weapons.⁵⁸⁾ The distributed operations should support dispersed forces with sufficient critical operational resources. After all, the increased quality and quantity of distributed locations by ACE provides operational benefits to allies and partners while adding political and operational challenges to adversaries.⁵⁹⁾ Operating locations can be largely divided into enduring locations and contingency locations. The former is composed of main operating bases (MOB), forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security locations (CSL), whereas the latter includes semi-permanent contingency locations (SCL), temporary contingency sites (TCL), and initial contingency locations (ICL).⁶⁰⁾

C2 of ACE has a framework that consists of centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution because ACE requires mobile, survivable, secure, and sustainable communications.⁶¹⁾ Movement and maneuver are related to agility that enables dispersed operations to complicate adversaries’ targeting by either redistributing forces to multiple locations or redistributing forces within an established air base. Distribution, including the movement of forces to predetermined locations and the flow of dispersed forces back to an enduring location, allows friendly forces to maintain operational momentum through distributed control.⁶²⁾ Although survival by distribution is important, attack is also another part of ACE. For example, it needs to aggregate forces originating from different dispersed sites to deliver fires from all domains to attack a common target.⁶³⁾

Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO)

As seen from the word “distributed,” the DMO has more obvious features of distribution than others. The concept of DMO can be traced back to the idea of distributed lethality discussed in “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Security (Version 2.0)” in 2018.⁶⁴⁾ Despite its evolution over the past few years, however,

57) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 6.

58) Ibid.

59) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 7.

60) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 13.

61) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” pp. 7-8.

62) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 9.

63) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 12.

there have been no specific unclassified definitions of DMO. Although a 2022 document from the Chief of Naval Operations refers to DMO as “the Navy’s foundational operating concept,”⁶⁵) this foundational concept seems to have yet to be conceptualized. However, unofficial working definitions are available to better understand the brief of DMO. To be sure, it is “the operating concept of the Department of the Navy for using U.S. naval forces in combat operations against an adversary, particularly China, that has substantial capabilities for detecting and attacking U.S. Navy surface ships with anti-ship missiles and other weapons.”⁶⁶) One senior official said that it is “geographically distributed naval forces integrated to synchronize operations across all domains.”⁶⁷)

Distribution is expected to have five contributions: to better accomplish the mission against a distant or distributed adversary; to improve maneuver options to gain a positional advantage to assault or engage more effectively with direct or indirect fires; to minimize the effects of enemy fires; to impose costs and induce uncertainty; to reduce traces to avoid detection.⁶⁸) In the end, those contributions allow the naval forces to enhance battlespace awareness and influence; generate opportunities for naval forces to achieve surprise, to neutralize threats, and to overwhelm the adversary; and impose operational dilemmas on the adversary.⁶⁹)

The DMO has key features of hard-to-find, hard-to-kill, and high lethality. First, it disperses Naval forces over a larger area within the theater of operation, making it harder for an adversary to detect and target them. Second, it spreads the Navy’s sensors and weapons across a wider array of ships and aircraft, reducing the fraction of them that would be lost when any ship or aircraft of the Navy is destroyed. Third, the DMO enables a greater use of longer-range weapons, unmanned vessels, and unmanned aircraft in support of the first and the second features. Last, it uses resilient communication links and networking technologies to knit the resulting widely dispersed force of manned and unmanned ships and aircraft into an integrated and coordinated force to survive attacks from the enemy and ensure resilience.⁷⁰) In short, DMO pursues “the massing and convergence of fires from distributed forces, complicating adversary targeting and decision-making,

64) Tom Clarity, “Distribute DMO to Tactical Commanders,” *Proceedings* Vol. 149 (January 2023).

65) Chief of Naval Operations, “Navigation Plan 2022,” p. 8.

66) Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept” (February 27, 2024), *Congressional Research Service*, p. 1.

67) Edward Lundquist, “DMO Is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea,” *Seapower* (2 February 2021) (<https://seapowermagazine.org/dmo-is-navys-operational-approach-to-winning-the-high-end-fight-at-sea>, accessed on March 2, 2024).

68) “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO),” *Marines* (August 2, 2021) (<https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708130/distributed-maritime-operations-dmo>, accessed on March 10, 2024).

69) Edward Lundquist, “DMO Is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea.”

70) Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept,” p. 1.

and networking effects across platforms and domains.”⁷¹⁾ Having echoed to these features, the Navy suggests six enablers for DMO: 1) expand distance with long-range precision fires across all domains and increased survivability; 2) leverage deception to degrade enemy surveillance and increase uncertainty; 3) harden defense to disrupt attacks and keep naval forces survivable; 4) increase distribution with smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms; 5) ensure delivery with resilience of logistics; and 6) generate decision advantage to accelerate decision cycle to out-sense, out-decide, and out-fight ant adversary.⁷²⁾ Based on these features and enablers, the Navy has transformed its acquisition programs to be associated with DMO. The key is to have more ships that are less expensive in line with the concept of DMO.⁷³⁾

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)

Although the U.S. Marine Corps is a stakeholder of DMO, they have their own operational concept of EABO. Coupled closely with the Navy’s DMO, EABO was developed as an approach to warfighting that could mitigate the A2/AD threats posed by China.⁷⁴⁾ In line with DMO, EABO supports integrated yet distributable naval formation to secure sea denial and sea control.⁷⁵⁾ EABO refers to “a form of expeditionary warfare that involve the employment of mobile, low signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain naval expeditionary forces from a series of austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore within a contested or potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment.”⁷⁶⁾ Given this statement, EABO can be characterized by stand-in engagement, mobile distribution, persistent survival, low signature, integrated naval force, and cost-effective advantages.⁷⁷⁾ In particular, the mobile and distributable feature of EABO allows a force to adapt and

71) Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, Pt. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and the Future of Naval Warfare,” *Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC)*, (February 23, 2023.) (<https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-1-defining-distributed-maritime-operations-and-the-future-of-naval-warfare>, accessed on April 4, 2024).

72) U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, “Navigation Plan 2022,” p. 8.

73) See Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service* (August 31, 2023).

74) Brian Kerg, “A Summary of Changes in the New EABO Manual,” *Proceedings* Vol. 149(July 2023). (<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/summary-changes-new-eabo-manual>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

75) Department of the Navy and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition),” p. 1-1.

76) Department of the Navy and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition),” (May 2023), p. 1-2.

77) “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition),” (May 2023), p. 1-4.

regenerate more quickly whereas imposing difficult choices on adversaries. It has lethal and survival capability to enable naval and joint campaigning in all domains during distributed operations.⁷⁸⁾

Multi-Domain Operation (MDO)

Although the U.S. Army's MDO has a long history allegedly evolved from Air-Land Battle doctrine in 1982⁷⁹⁾ and is also designed to counter Chinese A2/AD,⁸⁰⁾ its relevance to the concept of distribution is not apparent. According to the Army's Field Manual (FM) Operations (2022), MDO means "the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders."⁸¹⁾ It might be because the armed conflict of ground forces between the U.S. and China is less likely to occur. Nevertheless, MDO has the feature of distribution in terms of agility. That is the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), which is designed to "operate in a distributed fashion while retaining the ability to deliver effects that create opportunities for joint force exploitation."⁸²⁾ The Army originally planned to create five MDTFs: two aligned to the Indo-Pacific region; one aligned to Europe; one stationed in the Arctic region and oriented on multiple threats; and a fifth MDTF aligned for global response. However, it is reported that one more MDTF will be installed in the Indo-Pacific region, probably in Japan.⁸³⁾

Conclusion: Implications for South Korea

Contrary to the U.S. foreign policy of the U.S. that puts forward clear principles against China, U.S. defense and military strategies are relatively ambiguous about China, despite the large portion of description about China in strategy documents. By interpreting the 2022 NDS and operational concepts of the services, I argue that U.S. defense and military strategies against China have two tenets: integration at the strategic level and distribution at the operational level.

78) "Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition)," (May 2023), p. 5-1.

79) Brandon C. Kasubaski, "Exploring the Foundation of Multi-Domain Operations," *Small Wars Journal* (November 13, 2019) (<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/exploring-foundation-multi-domain-operations>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

80) Andrew Feickert, "Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)," *Congressional Research Service* (January 2, 2024), p. 1.

81) Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations (October 2022), p. 1-2.

82) FM 3-0 Operations (October 2022), p.4-18.

83) Andrew Feickert, "The Army's Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)," *Congressional Research Service* (March 25, 2024), p. 2.

My argument is substantiated by various concepts such as Integrated Deterrence, CJADC2, CNI, IAMD, ACE, DMO, EABO, and MDO. Furthermore, these two tenets share the notion that more is better. Integration requires more resources to deter and thwart China's ambition in peacetime and offensive measures in wartime, while distribution needs more locations to survive China's attacks and neutralize China's A2/AD. It is, however, important to note that operational distribution occurs when deterrence by integration fails.

In practice, the key is how the U.S. military incorporates those tenets into its operations in the real world. Despite the prevailing consensus on the importance of jointness, it is still challenging to assess the extent to which the U.S. military effectively implements it. Similarly, the integration and distribution of resources may be a laudable goal to be achieved at some future point in time, rather than a practical use in the present. Furthermore, inadequate integration may result in ineffectiveness and chaos in the field. Conversely, the distribution of forces is a risky proposition because it entails the acceptance of a weakened posture, which may be defeated by an adversary.

The two tenets provide implications for South Korea. First, at the strategic level, based on the idea of integration, the U.S. will demand more involvement from South Korea in many areas other than traditional defense areas. Given the transforming security environment where the scope of security is expanding from traditional military affairs to economy, technology, and cognitive influence, it is anticipated that South Korea will assume a more prominent role and make a greater contribution. Enhanced security cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan may be an example of this integration. Thus, it is imperative that South Korea be prepared to contribute to the alliance by enhancing its capabilities in various sectors, including defense, depending on its national interests.

Second, at the operational level, the United States might be much more likely to ask South Korea to allow the former more access and use of bases and ports in the latter, which may aid the United States in implementing its operational concepts. For instance, the Jeju Naval Base could be a potential site for U.S. military maneuvers against China in the region in the near future. In addition to the matter of locations, the United States will urge South Korea to initiate discussions about interoperability, intercompatibility, and interchangeability in not only equipment and gear but also data links and network systems between the two countries. It is conceivable that the shared AI could be employed in operations between the alliances when CJADC-2 is introduced to both militaries. Given that South Korea relatively lacks expertise in advanced technology, including AI, there is a risk that South Korea may depend on the United States excessively.

Third, all those demands can lead to changing the constitution of the United States Forces Korea (USFK). The potential expansion of the USFK's role has been a subject of considerable debate. The Army-oriented USFK may gradually have

more missions for ACE, DMO, and EABO, let alone MDO. For example, USFK has recently replaced the A-10 Thunderbolts with the Apaches helicopters of the AH-64E.⁸⁴⁾ The A-10s were operated by the Air Force, while the Apaches are under the command of the Army. This indicates that the USFK has more air fighters to fill the gap by retiring the A-10, which could be employed for ACE against China.

Building on the implications in the South Korea-U.S. relations, further implications can be derived in a broader context. First, it would be prudent for South Korea to monitor China's response to the United States' measures regarding integration and distribution. It is evident that China is endeavoring to fortify its active defense and A2/AD capabilities through a multifaceted approach, encompassing the construction of military bases in the South China Sea and the deployment of aircraft carriers, as well as the expansion of its influence over other countries that may potentially provide the United States with bases. China has pledged to the Pacific Islands Countries (PIC) that are of strategic significance due to their geographical locations in the Pacific between the United States and China, by providing security assistance and economic incentives. For example, China has signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, which paved the way for its military presence in the Islands.⁸⁵⁾ For South Korea, which implements its Indo-Pacific strategy concerning countries in the region, including those PICs, China's efforts to impede the US strategies should be of significant concern. Moreover, South Korea is no exception to China's strategies because it shares a sea border with China.

Second, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine provides a compelling illustration of the efficacy of integration and distribution. South Korea should not miss lessons from the war with regard to integration and distribution. It is Ukraine that employs A2/AD tactics, intentionally or unintentionally, against Russia using sea drones.⁸⁶⁾ Because the Russian military is unable to comprehend the concept of distribution, it is often crippled by Ukraine, despite the asymmetry in military capabilities. On the other hand, it is also Ukraine that benefits from integration with other states. Ukraine has directly engaged in combat against Russia alone. However, it has been fighting the war against Russia along with its partners such as the United States who have provided financial assistance and war resources. In addition, the interchangeability issue of military equipment and weapons, including artillery shells, has been raised from the beginning of the conflict.

84) Sang-ho Song, "U.S. Forces Korea launches permanent Apache helicopter unit," *Yonhap News* (May 18, 2022).

85) Brian Harding and Camilla Pohle, "China's Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the Pacific Islands," *Unites States Institute of Peace* (July 21, 2022).

86) Andrew E. Kramer, "In a Tough Year on Land, Drones Give Ukraine Some Success at Sea," *The New York Times* (December 20, 2023).

Third, it is recommended that South Korea should actively embrace and pursue advances in defense science and technology. The United States faces the ironic challenge of requiring highly distributed forces with integrated capabilities. Much of this challenge can be addressed by deploying advanced technologies of futuristic command and control, shared information in the cloud, and, eventually, operations by AI.⁸⁷⁾ For instance, data from disparate locations, services, and allies can be integrated and migrated to a single cloud. This data will then be processed by an AI, which will determine the optimal distribution of forces. In the absence of this technological literacy in South Korea, it is unfeasible to construct a system that is used to realize integration and distribution for defense.

Fourth, South Korea must consider the United States' approaches to A2/AD as a point of reference, given that North Korea is developing A2/AD capabilities. Although South Korea possesses greater naval and air power than North Korea, the latter employs asymmetric warfare tactics, including the use of missiles and drones that can constitute A2/AD, which can paralyze the supremacy of South Korean forces.⁸⁸⁾ In particular, the distribution of forces to survive the initial strike by North Korea is of critical importance for South Korea in order to effectively counter the attack using integrated capabilities within South Korean forces and with its ally, the United States.

Finally, the protection of military bases is of paramount importance, as the lack of adequate defense at these facilities represents a significant obstacle to the distribution and survival of forces. Despite the increase in South Korea's defense budget in the Yoon Suk Yeol administration to implement the "three-axis" plan to counter the growing North Korean threat, particularly in regard to its missile capabilities, the protection of bases does not appear to be a significant concern. It is true that the three-axis plan places a clear emphasis on the defensive side, as it encompasses strike (Kill Chain), air defense (Korea Air and Missile Defense, KAMD), and retaliation (Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, KMPR). Consequently, efforts have been made to develop air defense capabilities, including the M-SAM and L-SAM systems. This plan is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the protection of military bases. Nevertheless, it is evident that further consideration is required in order to enhance the protection of military bases and naval vessels from the distribution perspective.

[Received: May 7, 2024; Revised: May 8, 2024; Accepted: June 13, 2024]

87) Charles Cohen, "AI in Defense: Navigating Concerns, Seizing Opportunities," *National Defense* (July 25, 2023); Peter Selfridge, "Modernizing Defense for the Digital Age," *SAP News Center* (February 23, 2024).

88) Kiljoo Ban, "Tracing North Korea's A2/AD Strategy and Security Implications," *Peace Studies Vol. 30, No. 1*, pp. 113-147.

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