



Alliance Modernization and the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance

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Highlights from the 2025 RINSA/KNDU International Security Conference

Jessica Taylor



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Professor, Department of Strategic Studies, Korea National Defense University

Alliance modernization, which was largely a political slogan during Trump’s first term, is now becoming far more likely to be implemented in concrete and practical ways under a second Trump administration, especially given his strong emphasis on burden sharing and expanded allied responsibility. Redesigning roles and posture is a logical response to U.S. resource constraints and China’s expanding A2/AD capabilities, yet it also introduces significant risks, including deterrence gaps, misperceptions, and heightened uncertainty during the transition. These risks are not hypothetical; they could materialize if changes to U.S. force posture, OPCON arrangements, or extended-deterrence signaling are misread by North Korea or misunderstood by the South Korean public. Because multiple modernization pathways—from gradual adjustment to rapid, politically charged restructuring—carry different levels of instability, South Korea must prepare for a wide range of scenarios while actively shaping the process.

1. Introduction

Alliances rarely rest on complete convergence of national interests. Even close partners diverge in priorities and domestic constraints. A strong alliance expands common interests while managing differences through institutional mechanisms and sustained dialogue. Its strength lies in the capacity to adjust disagreements without eroding trust.

Strategic transitions heighten the risk of weakening alliances. Short-term frictions often arise even when long-

term goals are aligned, and if left unmanaged, these tensions can erode political confidence. The present security order exemplifies such strain: the U.S.-China rivalry has become structural, while Russia, Iran, and North Korea coordinate strategically to challenge Western influence. The post-Cold War alliance system, built for another era, is now under pressure to adapt.

The ROK-U.S. alliance faces similar imperatives. Shifting power balances, new technologies, and evolving regional threats require recalibration of roles and commitments.

President Donald Trump's long-standing emphasis on allied burden-sharing and self-reliance is likely, in his second term, to evolve into formal policies of "alliance modernization." The idea is to redistribute roles and costs—encouraging allies to build autonomous defense capabilities while the United States provides limited but decisive support when needed.

Alliance modernization entails huge risks and challenges. However, if unavoidable, we should recognize opportunistic factors. Its outcome depends on whether the two sides can minimize risks, overcome challenges, and exploit emerging opportunities. At this turning point, experts and policymakers in both countries must define the logic, structure, and public understanding of modernization to preserve deterrence and alliance credibility, which we have accomplished for several decades.

2. Analyzing Alliance Modernization

Under a second Trump administration, alliance modernization would move from political rhetoric to strategic planning. It seems that what remained as a transactional approach during his first term has evolved into a coherent defense and military strategic vision. The United States aims not only to ease its burdens but to construct a more sustainable deterrence framework suited to changing power realities.

Two structural dynamics drive this transformation: limited U.S. capacity and an enduring "multi-war" environment.¹⁾ The combination of long-term U.S.-China rivalry, the Ukraine war, and Middle Eastern instability reveals that Washington can no longer maintain large-scale interventions on multiple fronts. Meanwhile, closer coordination among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran amplifies pressure on the U.S. deterrence system. These conditions make traditional "preponderance-based deterrence" reliant on forward dominance, increasingly untenable, and push U.S. strategy toward "denial-based deterrence," which ensures that any aggression fails to meet its goals rather than relying on constant superiority.²⁾

China's expanding A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capability underscores this shift. Advances in long-range precision strike systems have rendered U.S. forward bases such as Okinawa, the northern Philippines, and Pyeongtaek more vulnerable to surprise first strikes.³⁾ The possibility of losing critical assets early in a conflict threatens deterrence credibility and invites miscalculation. To counter this, the United States is dispersing forces, enhancing mobility, and

prioritizing survivability over static forward presence. The goal is to ensure that sufficient forces survive initial attacks to deny adversaries their objectives.

Within this logic, allies must assume greater responsibility for territorial defense. The United States intends to maintain limited but decisive enabling roles while allies provide the first line of deterrence.⁴⁾ This new division-of-labor model requires allies to develop self-reliant capabilities integrated with U.S. command, control, and reinforcement systems. Properly implemented, it sustains deterrence while allowing Washington to avoid overstretch.

For South Korea, this shift implies that U.S. Forces Korea will evolve from a symbolic tripwire to part of a more flexible, networked deterrence structure. Dispersal of assets across the region would not signal withdrawal, but adaptation to the new situation. It would, however, require stronger Korean leadership in deterrence, greater interoperability with U.S. systems, and continued credibility of combined readiness. If successful, deterrence could be maintained across both the Korean Peninsula and other regional areas while reducing escalation risks. Ultimately, alliance modernization could represent not retrenchment but optimization—aligning commitments with available resources and a changing threat environment.

3. Prospects for Future Development

A second Trump administration would likely pursue an alliance policy marked by competing internal lines and deliberate ambiguity.⁵⁾ Within the administration, multiple factions—ranging from traditional hawks to isolationists and fiscal conservatives—would compete for influence, none enjoying lasting dominance.⁶⁾ Trump himself would blend these views pragmatically to preserve flexibility and bargaining leverage.

For allies, this ambiguity creates uncertainty; for Washington, it offers negotiating space. The most likely course would be a gradual, managed transition, with roles redefined through consultation and phased implementation. Some U.S. Forces Korea missions could shift to the ROK Armed Forces while deterrence and operational continuity are maintained. This process would require meticulous calibration and mutual transparency.

A less balanced path could emerge if Washington concentrates overwhelmingly on China and Taiwan,

1) In Hyo Seol, "Simultaneous Multi-War Situations and South Korea's Security Strategy," *Peace Studies*, No. 32, Vol. 2, 2024, pp. 43-72.

2) Elbridge Colby, *The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict*, Yale University Press, 2021.

3) Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell, *Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests*, Defense Priorities Report, July 9, 2025.

4) Alexander Velez-Green and Robert Peters, *The Prioritization Imperative: A Strategy to Defend America's Interests in a More Dangerous World*, The Heritage Foundation Special Report, Aug. 1, 2024.

5) In Hyo Seol and Hackyoung Bae, "Prospects for Trump's Second Term Foreign Strategy and Alliance Policy through the Analysis of the First Term: Focused on Implications for South Korea," *The Korean Journal of Area Studies*, No. 42, Vol. 3, 2024, pp. 1-34.

6) Bruce Klingner, "The U.S.-ROK Alliance under the Trump and Lee Administrations" (presentation, Korea Policy Forum, GW Institute for Korean Studies, George Washington University, 2025).

relegating the Korean Peninsula to a lower priority. Rapid restructuring without sufficient preparation could produce deterrence gaps and embolden North Korea. A third, politically volatile trajectory could arise if Trump links alliance issues directly to economic or technological bargaining, using commitments as leverage over cost-sharing, trade, or high-tech supply chains. Such linkage would risk public controversy and short-term strain.

Still, large-scale force adjustments face institutional limits in the United States. Congressional oversight and bureaucratic inertia would constrain abrupt changes. Multiple outcomes are therefore possible. Seoul must prepare for diverse scenarios, strengthening autonomous deterrence and engaging Washington continuously to ensure modernization serves mutual strategic interests.

4. Risks, Challenges, and Opportunities

Alliance modernization carries tangible risks, beginning with perception. Many South Koreans might view modernization as a dilution of U.S. guarantees. If restructuring coincides with contentious negotiations over defense costs or trade, anxiety could grow into political polarization or anti-American sentiment. Questions about extended deterrence credibility could intensify if operational control transition or adjustments to U.S. posture are seen as precursors to withdrawal. Such perceptions could invite North Korean miscalculation.

Practical challenges are also substantial. Redesigning combined defense arrangements, defining U.S. reinforcement scales, and integrating new operational concepts and technologies all require careful coordination. Institutional structures built over decades cannot be altered easily, and joint planning remains incomplete. Without thorough preparation, reform could inadvertently produce instability.

Yet modernization also presents valuable opportunities. If managed transparently and incrementally, the ROK-U.S. alliance could become a model of adaptive transformation with which the United States would pursue regionally and globally from now on. For Washington, success in Korea would demonstrate that modernization can sustain deterrence efficiently. For Seoul, it would ensure a predictable, phased transition under clear mutual guarantees while firmly demanding that the United States provide all necessary support without reservation to ensure the success of the modernization during and after the transition.

The conditions for success are clear. Extended deterrence must remain visible through regular strategic deployments and combined exercises. Public communication must convey that modernization enhances rather than weakens the alliance. Both governments should view risks as manageable, challenges as tools for improvement, and opportunities as pathways to institutionalization.

South Korea's advanced conventional power, strong defense industry, and progress toward operational control transition make it a capable partner. By leveraging these strengths, Seoul can shape modernization outcomes that safeguard

national interests while reinforcing deterrence credibility and regional stability.

5. Conclusion

Alliance modernization should be understood as renewal rather than retrenchment. It must adapt the ROK-U.S. partnership to a transformed strategic landscape and reflect South Korea's enhanced capacity and status. The process demands prudence to sustain deterrence and trust, and ambition to build an alliance fit for future challenges.

Its success rests on several fundamentals. Roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined so that each side understands its obligations. Interoperability should deepen across doctrines, systems, and decision-making. Public trust must be maintained through transparency and consistent explanation. Without these elements, modernization could cause misunderstanding and instability; with them, it can reinforce deterrence while expanding Korea's strategic autonomy.

If guided wisely, alliance modernization will mark a constructive phase of evolution rather than decline. It will represent an intentional step toward a more resilient and balanced partnership. Through this process, the ROK-U.S. alliance can enter a new stage of structural maturity—one grounded in mutual confidence, enduring deterrence, and shared responsibility for peace and stability in the decades ahead.

Professor Seol In-hyo graduated from Seoul National University's Department of International Relations in 1999 and awarded a doctorate in Diplomacy in 2011 from the Graduate School of Department of International Relations at the Seoul National University. He served as a visiting researcher at the University of Maryland's CIDCM Institute, and in 2012, he served as a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Seoul National University and a post-doctoral researcher at Yonsei University. Since 2013, he has worked at the Division of Defense Strategy of the Korea Institute for National Defense(KIDA) and researched the U.S. defense and military strategy, and the ROK-U.S. alliance, and served as the head of the current defense issues analyses team from 2018 to 2021. In 2017, he served as a visiting fellow at the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) INSS, and served as a director of the Defense Division of the Korean International Political Science Association, and an advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As of 2022, From 2021 to 2022, he worked as an administrator(a staff member) of the Blue House Security Office. He is a professor of military strategy division at the Korea National Defense University(KNDU), since 2022. He has also served as the director of the Nuclear/WMD Response Research Center of the Research Institute for National Security Affairs(RINSA) at the Korea National Defense University.

Highlights from the 2025 RINSA/KNDU International Security Conference

Jessica Taylor

Fellow, Atlantic Council IPSI, PhD candidate, Princeton University

This year's International Security Conference focused on the deteriorating regional security environment, regional perspectives on prospects for the second U.S. Trump administration's National Security Strategy and challenges for the modernization of the ROK/US alliance in the evolving security environment. While there was overall concern among presenters surrounding the uncertainty of Trump's strategic outlook, there was also overall agreement that the best way forward for U.S. regional allies and partners is to strengthen security ties with the U.S. to maintain regional stability amid China's rise. This dynamic provides a few challenges but also opportunities for modernizing the ROK/U.S. alliance. Moving forward the U.S. will need to strengthen its enduring commitment to the region to better allow its allies to implement security policies in line with the U.S. despite the threat of retaliation from China.

Amid mounting concerns surrounding the strengthening of China and North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities, this year's KNDU/RINSA international security studies conference brought together some of the foremost experts on East Asia security to provide insights on the strategic outlooks of regional states. Central to the discussion was the prospects for the trajectory of regional alliances and partnerships with the United States ahead of the release of the second Trump administration's National Security Strategy (NSS). To varying degrees, the sentiment of the region's states leaned towards apprehension and concern due to the uncertainty of whether the Trump administration's strategic outlook would continue the U.S. administration's prioritization of the Indo-Pacific theater.

Yet, despite the apprehension, the conference's experts' recommendations leaned towards regional states continuing to strengthen their alliances and partnerships with the United States to maintain the stability and growing economic prosperity of the region. In this light, the conference included in-depth discussions on what the likely Trump administration's approach to the Republic of Korea (ROK) - U.S. alliance will be and provided recommendations for the nascent ROK Lee administration. Herein, I provide a synopsis of the overall takeaways from the conference and a summary of my discussant remarks in response to the panel that covered the challenges to modernizing the ROK-US alliance amid the deteriorating regional security environment.

Prospects for the Trump 2.0 NSS and the implications for East Asia

In his presentation remarks, Mr. Adam Farrar, previous

Special Advisor to Vice President Kamala Harris, amplified recent media reports that the second U.S. Trump administration may prioritize its focus on its own hemisphere, which would be a departure from recent U.S. administrations.¹) Mr. Farrar pointed to the Trump administration's recent operations in the Caribbean as some of the indicators of this coming shift.

I concur with Mr. Farrar's assessment that the Trump administration's delay in the release of its NSS is likely due to disagreements within the administration on what should be the administration's top strategic security priorities. Reportedly, some senior officials within the administration are advocating for the administration to focus on the United States' own backyard while seeking to deemphasize the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to the United States. Advocates of this view reportedly seek to lower tensions with China through the decrease of U.S. military involvement in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, there are indicators that the Trump administration will continue to focus on the strategic stability of the Indo-Pacific. For instance, President Trump's recent visit to the region highlighted the importance of the U.S. relationships with its allies and partners.²) The visit was also buttressed by U.S. senior officials' visits to the region and their accompanying remarks substantiating this outlook. Significantly, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, for instance, emphasized the significance of the region amid his

1) Paul McLeary and Daniel Lippman, "Pentagon plan prioritizes homeland over China threat," <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/05/pentagon-national-defense-strategy-china-homeland-western-hemisphere-00546310>

2) Alexandra Hutzler, Michelle Stoddart, and David Brennan, "Trump arrives in South Korea for final stop of Asia tour, high-stakes meeting with Xi" <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-japan-2nd-stop-asia-tour-high-stakes/story?id=126904467>

recent visit to South Korea.³⁾

Furthermore, the Trump administration has continued Biden administration initiatives to further multilateral cooperation in the region, such as the strengthening of trilateral ROK, Japan, and U.S. security cooperation and AUKUS. However, these signals amid the absence of a declared Trump administration national security strategy have not resulted in mounting apprehension among key U.S. regional allies and partners.

ASEAN's strategic outlook

In his address, Dr. Chang Jun Yan of Nanyang University discussed the general strategic outlook of ASEAN states as the second Trump administration has gotten underway. A key component of his remarks was his stressing that as the Trump administration moves to impose steep tariffs on even its closest of allies, the United States is arguably losing the trust of its regional allies and partners that the United States remains dedicated to upholding the region's stability. As such, ASEAN states are increasingly hedging between strengthening security cooperation with the United States while seeking to avoid confrontation and maintain economic ties with China.

Despite these concerns, Dr. Chang proclaims that ASEAN states assess that their best bet is to continue security cooperation with the United States to secure the region's strategic stability in the midst of a deteriorating security environment. The strongest example of this approach among ASEAN states would be the recent efforts of the Philippine and U.S. governments to strengthen and modernize their alliance. From Manila, President BongBong Marcos has noted that a conflict across the Taiwan Strait would likely involve the participation of the Philippines. His comments notably come as the Philippine-U.S. alliance seeks to strengthen cooperation through various measures such as the U.S. development of military installations and U.S. military rotations in the Philippines despite pushback from China.

Japan's Strategic Outlook

Relatedly, Dr. Narushige Michishita, Vice President at Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), proclaimed that Japan is doing less hedging in realizing the strategic threat China poses to Japan's national security. Instead, he noted that China's strengthening nuclear and missile capabilities are driving Japan's deteriorating threat perception. His assessment came amid China's threatening

3) Surina Venkat, "Hegseth tells China's defense chief US will 'stoutly defend its interests'" <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5582809-hegseth-china-defense-indo-pacific/>

rhetoric in response to Japan's new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's statements, whereas she professed that Japan would likely be involved in the defense of Taiwan in the event Taiwan was attacked.⁴⁾ Therefore, amid concerns for Japan's security and regional security, Japan and the United States have moved to continue to strengthen their alliance. In addition, as the Trump administration is likely to request that its allies do more towards their own defense, Japan has increased its defense budget and made efforts towards increasing its defense capabilities.

Tangentially, Dr. Michisita provided insights on Japan's reaction to the ROK's advancing military capabilities. He noted that while Japan supports the ROK's obtaining a nuclear-powered submarine, Japan would not be in support of the ROK obtaining an indigenous nuclear weapon capability. As such Japan is likely closely assessing whether ROK-U.S. efforts to modernize the alliance will help to quell the ROK's public growing support for a ROK indigenous nuclear weapon capability in response to the ROK's deteriorating security environment.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Overall, when considering regional states' approach to strengthening their alliances and partnerships with the U.S., the ROK is assessed to fall on the spectrum between the ASEAN states and Japan. Whereas South Korea is assessed as wanting to strengthen its alliance with the United States, South Korea is also seen as moving cautiously amid concerns for antagonizing China. As the Trump administration is likely to levy significant demands on the ROK towards modernizing its alliance with the United States, a significant portion of the conference focused on the challenges of modernizing the ROK-U.S. alliance.

To date, the Trump administration has indicated that modernization efforts need to include, but are not limited to, the ROK taking more of a lead in its own defense on the Korean Peninsula in response to the North Korean threat.⁵⁾

With this in mind, to set the stage for discussions on the Trump administration's motivations to call for the modernization of the ROK/US alliance, Dr. Lami Kim, of APCSS, provided framing remarks in her personal capacity. She stressed that much of the driving force for modernizing the alliance is that the U.S. under the Trump administration is seeking for its alliances to be more balanced, particularly following the economic strength of its regional allies and partners.

4) Koh Ewe, "What to know about China and Japan's escalating spat over Taiwan," <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crklvx2n7rzo>

5) Michael Lee, "U.S. calls to 'modernize' alliance with South Korea may put Seoul-Washington ties at a crossroads," <https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-07-09/national/politics/US-calls-to-modernize-alliance-with-South-Korea-may-put-Seoul-Washington-ties-at-a-crossroads-/2349027>

To provide a ROK perspective, Dr. In-hyo Seol's presentation identified the challenges to modernizing the ROK-U.S. alliance. Dr. Seol pointed to factors such as the increased risk of simultaneous conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia, as well as the growing cooperation among North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran as key motivators for modernizing the ROK-U.S. alliance. In this environment, Dr. Seol argued that the deteriorating security environment provides an opportunity for the ROK to take the lead in the defense of the Korean Peninsula. His assessment comes as the nascent ROK Lee administration seeks the return of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) of ROK forces from the United States.⁶⁾ However, discourse fails to address how efforts to modernize the ROK-U.S. alliance will also address how the allies could possibly work together to simultaneously deter North Korea and China. With these issues in mind, there are some additional areas that I assess that the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to consider.

For one, while it's significant that the ROK and U.S. governments are furthering discussions on a flexible role for U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, absent from the discussion is the Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO) privileges of military installations and territory in the ROK that the U.S. forces would require to operate within and from the ROK in support of armed conflict outside of the Korean Theater of Operations.⁷⁾ Furthermore, I offered that as the ROK continues to obtain advanced military capabilities, also missing from the discussion is whether the ROK would move to work with the U.S. to deter not only North Korean but also Chinese aggression. Increasingly, these debates will also extend to the growing ROK-U.S. cooperation surrounding shipbuilding and Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) cooperation. Strengthening cooperation in these areas in peacetime lends to questions about whether the ROK would also be willing to extend similar cooperation amid an armed conflict, particularly with China.

However, as indicators point to the U.S. pushing the ROK to take more of a lead on the Korean Peninsula while the U.S. is likely to focus on China, ROK security experts question whether the U.S. commitment will weather additional moves by China to punish South Korea for its efforts to strengthen its alliance with the United. In this light, in particular amid Japan's concerns that the ROK may eventually seek to develop its own indigenous nuclear weapon capability, some ROK experts call for the U.S. to strengthen its displays of commitment to the ROK's defense. For instance, as part of the conference's ROK Alliance Policy Roundtable, Ms. Mi Sook Lee, Editorial Writer for MunhwaIlbo, called for the U.S. to increase its deployments of U.S. strategic assets to the ROK in support of alliance exercises.

6) Hwang Joo-young, "Lee proposes wartime OPCON transfer by 2030," <https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10553383>

7) Soo-Hyang Choi, "Hegseth Says US Forces in South Korea Have Regional Flexibility," <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/hegseth-says-us-forces-in-south-korea-have-regional-flexibility/ar-AA1PLmjv>

The panel on South Korea closed with a robust presentation on UNC by Professor Baek Soon Lee, former ROK Ambassador to Australia. Professor Lee noted how ROK public support for the possible future expansion of UNC has significantly ebbed and flowed over the years. While some panel commentators displayed support for an expansion of UNC as South Korea's military capabilities, others strongly refuted efforts to expand UNC. Furthermore, debate about the future of UNC amid an official end to the Korean War also sparked debate among the panelists. Going forward, UNC will likely need to increasingly be a part of the ROK-U.S. alliance modernization discussion, particularly among efforts to transfer wartime OPCON to the ROK and likewise question surrounding the future of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).

Considerations for the Trump administration 2.0

While it remains to be seen whether the Trump administration will continue recent U.S. policy aims of pivoting to Asia, it is clear that the Trump administration will seek for all of its allies to take a greater share of the burden for their own defense. Thus, as allies simultaneously seek to strengthen their security ties with the U.S. amid rising concerns about China and North Korea to varying degrees, the U.S. should seek ways to ensure that allies have the political capital to make the best decisions for its alliances with the United States.

However, what was abundantly clear from the conference's panelists is that the Trump administration's policies in areas beyond security have the ability to greatly hinder or facilitate the ability of allied governments to support U.S. security policies in the region. Arguably, the Trump administration's moves to increase tariffs and further America First policies hinder U.S. ally governments' ability to risk implementing U.S. security initiatives that China views as against their interest. Thus, if the Trump administration will indeed continue efforts to maintain stability in the region, the U.S. will need a more integrated security approach to the region; one that understands that economic matters can impact efforts to increase security cooperation. Absent a shift in its approach in short order, the Trump administration not only risks not furthering its eventual NSS but also a further deterioration of the region's security environment.

Jessica Taylor is a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI), a Logistics Readiness officer in the U.S. Air Force Reserve and a PhD candidate in Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs Security Studies program. Jessica has over twenty years of public service in the U.S. government serving in civil service, U.S. Air Force activity duty and U.S. Air Force reserve roles in the U.S. State Department and in the U.S. Department of Defense. Her most recent roles include serving as a geopolitical advisor on the headquarters staffs of United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea. And she recently served as a Senior Advisor to the U.S. State Department's Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security where she focused primarily on Korean Peninsula security issues. Jessica holds a Bachelors of Arts in Biology from Baylor University, and a Master of Science in Foreign Affairs from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. While at Princeton University her PhD dissertation will focus on the driving forces that motivate U.S. Indo-Pacific ally decision making in response to U.S. requests for operational flexibility.



RINSA, KNDU
1040, Hwangsancheol-ro, Yangchon-myeon, Nonsan-si
Chungcheongnam-do, 33021, Rep. of KOREA
Tel : +82-41-831-6414
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