

International Joint Research Project 2011
Studies Series 11-04

Denuclearization of North Korea: Focusing on the ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation



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Korea National Defense University
The Research Institute for National
Security Affairs

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Printed: November 2011

Published: November 2011

Place of Publication: The Research Institute for National Security Affairs

Address: Korea National Defense University 205 Susaek-dong, Eunpyung-gu, Seoul

Tel: 02-300-4213 / Fax: 02-309-9878

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I. Introduction

Despite geographical proximity and ideological cohesion, trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan was not considered as a feasible policy option in the region during the Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War, a prospect for its realization was still low because lingering unsettled issues between South Korea and Japan such as territorial disputes over Dokdo, distortion in history textbooks, and compensation for wartime comfort women repeatedly continued to block serious pursuit of its realization by either side of governments. Even the fact that both South Korea and Japan were robust allies of the U.S. did not help much in overcoming the differences over those issues and forming a tripartite alliance among them. That is why only a “virtual,” not formal, alliance among three was usually suggested as a possible security arrangement to promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia.¹⁾

The emergence of North Korean nuclear development issues in the early 1990's, however, changed the view and pursuit of trilateral cooperation among three countries. It was so because policy-makers in three countries finally come to realize that either persuasion or pressure would hardly have a chance to succeed in dealing with the recalcitrant leaders of the North Korean regime without close consultation and strong collaboration among them. The first product and agent of such cooperation is the Korea Energy Development Organization(KEDO), which was established to implement part of deals made in the Geneva Framework Agreement.

1) Ralph A. Cossa, “U.S.-ROK-Japan: Why a “Virtual Alliance” Makes Sense,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Summer2000)

The next example of such a cooperation was the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). As a more institutionalized and consolidated form of trilateral cooperation among three countries, it was created because of North Korea's continuing pursuit of nuclear and missile development even after agreed settlement in Geneva in 1994. During the Noh Moo-hyun Administration, however, the perception and actual degree of trilateral cooperation diminished due to the Administration's emphasis on engagement policy toward North Korea and on hard-line policy toward Japan over historical and territorial issues. But a changing regional security environment in 2000's has rekindled the necessity of and rationale for the trilateral cooperation again. That is, the rise of China and its increasing endorsement of the North Korean regime have made three countries re-examine the importance of trilateral cooperation for their own security as well as peace and stability in the whole region.

Given such a growing importance of trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, this study aims at first examining the possibility of trilateral cooperation to denuclearize North Korea. To do so, this study will review critically past experiences of trilateral security cooperation among three countries from three different countries' perspectives. Based on such historical review and evaluation of previous trilateral cooperation, this study will then probe the current conditions for trilateral cooperation. After that, this study will conclude with suggestions for future policy collaboration among three countries to stop and deter North Korean nuclear development.

II. A South Korean View on Trilateral Cooperation

This chapter will examine the possibility and effectiveness of trilateral cooperation among South Korea, U.S. and Japan from a South Korean view. As noted above, there are many possible areas of trilateral cooperation among three countries that can contribute to enhancement of peace and security in the region as well as the world. Given the subject of the whole study, however, this chapter will focus mainly on areas relevant to denuclearizing North Korea. In doing so, this chapter will first review the past experiences of trilateral cooperation relating to North Korean nuclear development, and then, probe the prospect for and feasibility of trilateral cooperation to denuclearize North Korea in the future.

1. South Korean Policy Toward Trilateral Cooperation

Cooperation among three countries has fluctuated over time within a limitation. South Korea's commitment to trilateral cooperation was shaped by three main factors. First, the U.S. initiative significantly affects Seoul's participation in trilateral efforts. The U.S. strategic preeminence in the region allows the U.S. leadership to design and guide attempts to terminate North Korea's nuclear activities. Second, South Korea's policy toward North Korea matters. Over the last two decades, South Korea demonstrated variations across administrations in terms of its policy priorities, approaches, threat perceptions, and measures. These policy differences among governments have an impact on South Korea's commitment to

trilateral setting. Third, the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan influences the contour of triangular collaboration. Due to bitter historical memory, South Koreans are very sensitive to Japan's policies, attitudes, and behaviors. Sometimes, Japan's rigid and hard-line policy toward North Korea narrows the space for cooperation with the United States and South Korea. Given negative historical legacy, the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan remains precarious and volatile.

Trilateral relations are attributed to three factors discussed. It is meaningful to point out that tripartite cooperation has demonstrated variance over time within a limitation. Three countries have participated in cooperation because of common strategic objectives, alliance structure, and shared political, economic and value system. It is these commonalities that basically maintain and strengthen cooperation among three actors. Converging strategic interest is one of the most important drivers. North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities pose threat to three countries. That is an underlying reason why three countries cooperate to reduce and eliminate those capabilities. Given this fundamental basis for cooperation, the cooperation had revealed a fluctuated pattern over time according to the change of the U.S. initiative, South Korea's policy, and South Korea and Japan relations.

1) The first nuclear crisis and burgeoning of trilateral cooperation

The first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered by North Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) in March, 1993. In order to manage the crisis situation, the U.S. had bilateral talks with the North, while having bilateral

policy consultations with its allies of South Korea and Japan. The U.S. played a leading role to cope with the first nuclear challenge. South Korea admitted the U.S. leadership without complaining its absence in the talks on North Korean nuclear issue. With the Agreed Framework concluded, the U.S. intensified cooperation with South Korea and Japan for sharing cost which is required to supply rewards to the North. The U.S.'s need for burden-sharing catalyzed trilateral collaboration among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. South Korea assumed a lion's share of cost in building LWRs.

The top policy priority of South Korean government was to avoid an escalation of the crisis into an all-out war on the Korean peninsula. In this vein, Seoul preferred negotiation rather than confrontation. Meanwhile, the most urgent task for Washington was to stop nuclear activities in Pyongyang. Seoul supported Washington's bilateral talks with Pyongyang. The Kim Young Sam administration was cooperative in putting the agreement into action. Kim Young Sam administration seems to show inconsistency in policy toward the North, oscillating between cooperation and confrontation. The administration maintained consistency in pursuing peaceful resolution of North Korea's nuclear problem. Japan also perceived serious threat from Korean peninsula. Further, there were few conflicting issues between South Korea and Japan. Tripartite cooperation was promoted by a strong U.S. leadership, South Korea's support for the United States and priority on negotiation option, Japan's cooperation with the U.S., and little confrontation between South Korea and Japan.

Three parties agreed to formulate an organization for supplying LWRs to the North. The KEDO was established in 1995, which is in charge of constructing LWRs in the North. This was a beginning of institutionalized

cooperation among three actors with regard to implementation of the agreement. There were several trilateral talks at senior levels. For instance, talk at ministerial level took place in November 1995. Apart from tripartite talks, the U.S. and South Korea proposed a four-party meeting with China and North Korea to discuss a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. This multilateral approach is predicated on the premise that North Korea could give up the nuclear adventure in exchange for security assurance. This endeavor failed to build a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

2) Sunshine policy and strengthening of trilateral cooperation

While the Kim Young Sam administration's policy toward the North is characterized by inconsistency, President Kim Dae-jung maintained engagement policy toward the North during his tenure.²⁾

Under Clinton leadership, the U.S. government continued to pursue engagement with North Korea and jointly financed rewards to the North with helps from South Korea and Japan. Although leadership changed in Seoul, President Clinton was still in power. The Clinton administration determined to eliminate North Korean nuclear program on the basis of the Geneva Agreed Framework. For the United State, two tasks are to be achieved for success of nuclear settlement on the Korean peninsula. The one is to enforce and monitor North Korea's freezing of nuclear activities. The other is to compensate for North Korea's obligations by incentives. The Kim Dae-jung government had maintained close policy coordination

2) For more details on sunshine policy, see Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg eds., *Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges* (Seoul : Yonsei University Press, 1999); Chung-in Moon, Masao Okonogi, and Mitchell B.Reisseds. *The Perry Report, the Missile Quagmire, and the North Korean Question: The Quest of New Alternatives* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2000)

with the United States.

The Clinton administration launched a review of North Korean policy, appointing William Perry as the U.S. North Korean policy coordinator and special advisor to the President and Secretary of State. The policy review resulted in the “Perry Report” which reflected consultations with allies: South Korea and Japan. The report proposed a comprehensive strategy including two-paths. The first path has to do with complete cessation of all nuclear and missile activities. If North Korea does not accept the first path, the U.S. and its allies would have to take the second path which is associated with ensuring security and containing threats. This nullifies a new comprehensive approach to negotiate with the North. The new strategy combined a comprehensive negotiation with containment, stressing coordination among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Since 2001, Bush administration took a hard-line policy toward North Korea.

Three factors mainly affected South Korea's stance toward and involvement in triangular relationship, which include the U.S. policy toward the North, Kim Dae-jung administration's sunshine policy toward the North and Japan. Kim government took a soft-line policy toward North Korea, so called sunshine policy. A couple of basic pillars upheld the engagement policy of Kim's government. The Kim's government puts priority on a peaceful coexistence rather than on a reunification. Reconciliation and peaceful coexistence are prerequisite for national reunification. President Kim's assumption is that increasing inter-Korean interactions drive North Korea's desirable changes such as structural reform and opening to outside world, which are favorable to reunification. In this context, the Kim's government stressed political and military confidence building, military tension reduction, economic interactions, and social and

cultural exchanges.

Second, the engagement policy relies on the conviction that cooperation is more effective than confrontation in dealing with the North. In this line of reasoning, the priority lies in avoiding war on the Korean peninsula. Given peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the two Koreas can maximize mutual interests by enhancing cooperation. The engagement policy revitalized inter-Korean relations, culminating in a inter-Korean Summit in June, 2000. Over all inter-Korean interactions had been on the rise under the Kim government. For instance, Pyongyang strikingly agreed to open its Geumgang Mountain to South Korean tourists.

Third, the government considered North Korea's nuclear problem as the most urgent issue to be solved in a peaceful manner, perceiving that North Korea would utilize its nuclear program as a leverage for negotiation to get what are in need. On the basis of this perception, the government was confident that the nuclear issue could be resolved by talks between the U.S. and South Korea. While South Korea played a complementary role, the United States led the talks and implementation of the Agreed Framework. The government also emphasized the policy coordination between South Korea and the United States, judging that trilateral cooperation also help end the nuclear program in the North. The engagement policy contributed to promoting trilateral collaboration to some degree.

With a sunshine policy toward North Korea, the administration was also aimed at removing negative historical legacies and open a new era with Japan. The President Kim visited Japan in 1998 and concluded a joint declaration for the partnership.³⁾

3) "Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html> (accessed on 19 December, 2011) .

Two countries made a progress in improving bilateral relation. In the declaration, both sides agreed that the Agreed Framework and KEDO were effective mechanisms for preventing North Korea from advancing its nuclear capacity. While admitting the importance of close bilateral policy coordination toward the North, they emphasized the need to bolster policy consultation at various levels.

Against this backdrop, trilateral attempts to facilitate cooperation advanced under the Kim Dae-jung administration. After several tripartite meetings at high levels, the TCOG was created in 1999, while the four-party talks terminated without any meaningful outcome.

Growing informal interactions, at last, led to a framework of consultations among three countries.⁴⁾

Trilateral contacts had not been limited to the TCOG format. Three country's consultations took place in sidelines of multilateral formats. Under the Kim administration, the progress in trilateral cooperation was possible mainly because of the following factors: a strong U.S. leadership, Seoul's close coordination with Washington, and the Kim administration's engagement policy toward North Korea and reconciliation policy with Japan. Then, a North Korean missile test in 1998 further promoted the cooperation among three parties, entailing also the U.S. policy review toward North Korea by Perry.

3) Roh Moo-hyun Administration

For the first time, the Roh administration announced publically a national security strategy, titled by "Peace, Prosperity and National Security."⁵⁾

4) For 13 months from creation, the TCOG convened 14 times.

One of the main national security objectives is to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This objective can be achieved by solving North Korea's nuclear problem and building a peace regime. The Roh administration proposed its own policy toward North Korea named 'Peace and prosperity policy.' The new policy is aimed at laying the groundwork for a peaceful unification by settling peace and pursuing co-prosperity on the Korean peninsula. In his inauguration speech in February, 2003, the President Roh reiterated that North Korean nuclear problem should be settled in a peaceful way through negotiation and military tension should be prevented from escalating. In addition, president Roh strongly demonstrated his willingness to coordinate with the U.S. and Japan for solving the nuclear issue through dialogue. In a nutshell, president Roh wanted to fix the nuclear problem by negotiation on the basis of trilateral collaboration among three actors.

In the meantime, Bush administration could not trust North Korea. Assistant secretary Kelly's visit to Pyongyang triggered what we called the second North Korean nuclear crisis. The United States suspected that North Korea had a clandestine uranium enrichment program, violating the Agreed Framework. All of a sudden, the framework was in jeopardy at the end of 2002. The executive board of the KEDO met in New York and decided to stop delivering fuel oil to North Korea in November, 2002. At last, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. The Agreed Framework was no more useful in ending North Korean nuclear activities. The Bush administration tried to take advantage of pressure and incentive simultaneously. This approach is somewhat different from the

5) National Security Council, the Republic of Korea, *Peace, Prosperity and National Security* (March 2004).

former administration due to a relative stress on sticks. To eliminate North Korea's nuclear program, the U.S. and China devise a multilateral format of negotiation in which all the related six countries participate in. The first six-party talk was held in Beijing in August 2003.

The Roh administration's foreign policy is different from those of the previous administrations, which reflected the rise of China. While admitting the importance of trilateral cooperation, Roh government recognized the need for collaboration with China, Russia, and EU. With a policy initiative of Northeast Asia pursuing co-prosperity, the government wanted to play a leading role in enhancing regional cooperation. An ambitious policy is characterized by South Korea's active and independent role as a regional balancer. In anyway, it seems to be clear that the strategic landscape in 2003 was totally different from that of 1994 due to growing China. China became a regional power which significantly contributes to forging regional security environment. Hard-line policy of the Bush administration and growing China affected South Korea's foreign policy in general and approach to North Korea's nuclear program. As the six-party talks started, China became a main actor in the multilateral nuclear negotiation. As China grows, South Korea's strategic option was more complicated and constrained by China factor.

The relationship between South Korea and Japan was not in good shape under the Roh administration. The bilateral relationship was influenced by such issues like territorial disputes, distortion of history in textbooks, Yaskuni shrine visits, and comfort women. That is, leading Japanese politicians frequently made provocative statements on such sensitive issues and ended up with infuriating South Koreans. While recognizing the need for cooperation, leaders of two countries often found themselves difficult

to pursue it because of domestic politics of both countries. Overall tension in the bilateral relationship was the main obstacle in boosting closer cooperation in a trilateral setting. Japan had summit meetings with North Korea twice in 2002 and 2003. After the two summit meetings, however, Japan's relation with North Korea was exacerbated due to the issue of abductees. Japan cannot move even one step forward without progress of abduction issue. Trilateral relations were affected by the bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo and Japanese policy toward Pyongyang under the Roh administration in a negative manner.

Despite unfavorable conditions, trilateral cooperation was led by a shared strategic objective to eliminate North Korean nuclear programs. Even though the TCOG became informal by removing media procedures, three parties convened the TCOG quite often to coordinate their policies to develop a joint strategy before the six-party talks. Trilateral gatherings also took places in other various multilateral meetings such as APEC, ASEAN+3, and ARF. Apart from the TCOG, high level meetings were held on need basis.

4) Lee Myung-bak Administration

With the end of 10 years liberal government, the Lee Myung-bak government's North Korea policy underwent a dramatic change. The new government presented a North Korea policy initiative named by the 'Denuclearization, Openness, 3000.' The outline of the policy is that if North Korea forgoes nuclear program, South Korea would help North Korea's economic development to the extent that annual per capita income reaches 3,000 dollars. In sharp contrast with the two previous governments, the proposal consists of three essential components.⁶⁾

The first one is a rigid linkage between nuclear issue and economic exchanges and assistance. The Lee government assessed that North Korea could afford military spending on conventional and strategic weapons (nuclear and missile) with unconditional economic assistance from the former governments. In order to induce the North to give up nuclear program, the Lee government strictly connected obligation of dismantlement with economic rewards. This linkage raised the criticism that inter-Korean relations could not move forward without the resolution of the nuclear problem. Responding to the criticism, the new government contends that as some progress is made, South Korea can start helping North Korea's economic development.

The second pillar of the new doctrine is concerned with policy initiative. The Lee government's stance is that North Korea takes initiative first and then, South Korea responds to North Korea's actions. This indicates sharp contrast with former government which enjoyed taking initiative to improve relations with the North. The former government expected a spill-over effect of economic interactions on political and military sectors. As a result, inter-Korean relations have been in an impasse since the inauguration of the new government. In responding to new government's policy, North Korea became hostile and belligerent toward South Korea by conducting nuclear and missile test and military provocations, while continuing nuclear activities. The third core component of the new North Korea policy is the concept of reciprocity. Inter-Korean interactions should be reciprocal. The Lee government's position is that the South cannot give aids and assistance to the North that keep strengthening nuclear and missile capacities.

6) Sachio Nakato, "South Korea's Paradigm Shift in North Korean Policy and Trilateral Cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and Korea," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 17, No.1(2008)

The hard-line policy of the Lee government is devised to precipitate the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program by putting strong pressure on the North. In this context, trilateral coordination becomes more important than ever. North Korea's hostility toward the South developed into military provocations. Tripartite collaboration was enhanced by such provocations of the North as nuclear and missile tests and conventional military provocations. Since December 2008, the six-party talks stalled and North Korea keeps advancing its nuclear capability. To cope with the stalemate of the six-party talk, trilateral consultations are badly required. It is evidenced that the Lee government's new policy seems to require closer relationship among three countries.

The Obama administration has been preoccupied with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and financial crisis since its inauguration in 2009. It adopted an approach of 'strategic patience' to the nuclear problem of North Korea. While maintaining a close coordination with South Korea and Japan, the United States does not take an action until North Korea demonstrates its sincerity in ending its nuclear development. As China's influence on nuclear grows, the United State and South Korea need to have policy coordination with China. China factor begins to affect trilateral relations among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. If trilateral cooperation is not compatible with cooperation with China, it could not generate positive outcome in nuclear negotiation. The shifting strategic dynamics in Northeast Asia make trilateral efforts complicated and delicate. The United States, however, wants to augment trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan as a foundation for solving North Korea's nuclear problem.

In comparison with Roh administration, the Lee government's relations with Japan became better. Looking for the future-oriented relationship with

Japan, President Lee proclaimed that he would not demand apology for the past to Japan anymore. Sincerity of Japan is considered to be more important than apology. Both countries made efforts to avoid confrontation and enhance friendship. After North Korea's military provocations in 2010, the bilateral relationship was strengthened to the extent that Japanese observers from the military participated in ROK-U.S. military exercises and vice versa. Several factors affect the expansion of cooperation among three countries. First of all, the Lee government's new policy toward North Korea facilitated triangular collaboration. The cooperation also increased as South Korea improved relations with the United States and Japan. Given the change of China's influence and role, three countries should take into account China's position in order to accommodate common interests by four countries in Northeast Asia.

Table 1. Levels and Impact of Trilateral Cooperation by South Korean Administration

Administration	Policy Toward North Korea	Level of Cooperation	Impact of Cooperation
Kim Young Sam (1993–1997)	Incoherent	Forming of cooperation: Establishment of the KEDO	Contribution to implementing the Agreed Framework
Kim Dae-jung (1998–2002)	Sunshine policy (engagement policy)	Increase in cooperation : Creation of the TCOG	Helping capacity-building in nuclear negotiations through policy coordination and intelligence exchanges
Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2007)	Peace and Prosperity policy (engagement policy)	Weakening of cooperation : Frictions due to textbook issues, territorial disputes and Shrine visit	Complementary to the Six-party talks
Lee Myung-bak (2008–)	Mutual benefits and common prosperity policy	Regaining a momentum for cooperation: (The rising concern for the rising China)	Not much conducive to resuming the Six-party talks

III. An American View on Trilateral Cooperation

Since the end of the cold war, North Korea's development of nuclear capabilities and other provocative behaviors have served as a catalyst for enhanced security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, although the primary structure for U.S. security relations in Northeast Asia has been managed through a parallel set of bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea, respectively. Despite early U.S. attempts to form a regional security organization in Northeast Asia with Japan and South Korea at the core, the U.S. led 'hub and spokes' security structure served U.S. interests well during the cold war.⁷⁾ However, the post-cold war period has consistently been characterized by a growing need to address regional security in Northeast Asia—especially in response to North Korean provocative actions—by strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. This cooperation has proceeded despite ongoing differences over historical and territorial issues between South Korea and Japan. The most recent and strongest example of how North Korean provocations have served as the basis for strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, is an unprecedented December 6, 2010 joint statement by the foreign ministers of the three countries at a meeting held in Washington, DC, two weeks after North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 22, 2010.

7) Yasuyo Sakata, "Origins of the U.S.-ROK Alliance as a 'Regional Alliance'-U.S. Policy on Asia-Pacific Collective Security and the Formation of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, 1953-54," *Gunsa (Military History)* (Seoul: Institute for Military History Compilation, Ministry of National Defense), no. 57 (December 2005), <http://www.kuis.ac.jp/icc/member/kenkyuin/sakata/profile.htm>.

This chapter will provide a review of developments in U.S. policy toward North Korea and its impact on prospects for the development of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea since the end of the cold war. In the course of conducting this review, the chapter will provide a critical examination of the stages in of U.S. policy toward North Korea over the course of the past two decades including consideration of the extent to which various policy measures, including the application of sanctions and incentives toward North Korea, have been supported by policy coordination among the three countries. Then, the chapter will attempt to draw some observations regarding the extent to which policy coordination among the three has been effective in influencing North Korean behavior and options.

1. U.S. Policy Toward North Korea and Trilateral Cooperation

Over the course of two decades, the United States has tried a variety of policy approaches designed to impede or reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons pursuits. These policy approaches have been exhaustively reported by several excellent accounts detailing the specifics of U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea during this period.⁸⁾ All of these approaches have required careful coordination with South Korea, although at times there have been significant gaps in perception and preferred policy approach among the allies. Japan also has national security interests in the peaceful resolution of tensions on the Korean peninsula, and has been involved to

8) These works include Mike Mazaar, *North Korea and the Bomb*, Leon Sigal, xxx, Mike Chinoy, xxx; Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*; Joel Wit, Dan Poneman, and Robert C. Gallucci, xxx. Also relevant to this review is a recently published piece by Noland and Haggard reviewing two decades of economic statecraft toward North Korea.

varying degrees in coordination of policy toward North Korea, including serving as a support and logistical base in the event of a renewed full-scale conflict on the Korean peninsula.

Under the Clinton administration, the 1990s was a period of growing harmonization of trilateral policy among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, both as a result of the escalation of regional tensions during the first nuclear crisis and as part of a multilateral approach to meeting North Korea's energy security needs in return for a freeze and eventual dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program under the terms of the bilaterally negotiated Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994. Following North Korea's launch of a multi-stage rocket over Japanese territory on August 31, 1998, trilateral policy coordination was initially severely tested but ultimately further enhanced through the establishment of the TCOG. The Taep'odong launch coincided with historic efforts by Kim Dae Jung and Keizo Obuchi to set aside historical differences between South Korea and Japan in favor of a forward-looking South Korea-Japan relationship. The enhancement of trilateral engagement served as an effective counterweight to North Korean tension-escalation strategies and provided a firm basis upon which to freeze North Korea's program through the incentive of construction of light water reactors in North Korea.

However, during the Bush administration, a tougher approach to dialogue with North Korea and the unraveling of the Geneva Agreed Framework in late 2002 over revelations that North Korea was seeking a covert uranium enrichment program as an alternative means by which to pursue nuclear capabilities coincided with rising frictions between Japan and South Korea as a result of disputed content of Japanese history textbooks and a renewed focus on conflicting territorial claims to Dokdo/Takeshima Island in the

East Sea/Sea of Japan. These circumstances led to the dissolution of TCOG and the near simultaneous establishment of Six Party Talks, a forum that diplomatic efforts led by China but did not provide a basis for nurturing trilateral policy coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The environment surrounding trilateral policy coordination soured further in the second Bush administration as a result of Japanese views that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill did not coordinate sufficiently with Japan and that Hill was too active in pursuing direct talks with North Korea. A clear lack of unity among the United States, Japan, and South Korea developed during the Bush administration regarding policy toward North Korea; North Korea was able to advance its nuclear program significantly at a time of relative disunity among the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Table 2: Levels and Impact of Trilateral Coordination by U.S. Administration

U.S. Administration/Approach	Level of trilateral coordination	Impact on policy toward North Korea
First Clinton administration (1993-1994): bilateral engagement/deal-making	“taxation without representation”; reluctant buy-in by allies	Established framework for ostensibly containing and eventually ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons development
Implementation of Deal: Establishment of KEDO (1994-1997) and political neglect	Institutionalized, guiding presence on KEDO’s board	Slow but steady technical progress toward building LWRs
Second Clinton administration	Initially threatened political sustainability of Japan’s	Taepodong test expanded footprint of North Korean

U.S. Administration/Approach	Level of trilateral coordination	Impact on policy toward North Korea
(1998-2000): Appointment of special envoy for U.S. Policy toward North Korea; highest level direct engagement in 2000	contribution, establishment of TCOG bound U.S.-Japan-ROK together in unprecedented policy coordination	threat to Japan, but North responded negatively to establishment of KEDO; seemed to move toward rapprochement with ROK/US in 2000
First Bush administration (2001-2004): “malign neglect”	Trilateral coordination broken over J/ROK textbook, territorial disputes	North Korean nuclear breakout; withdrawal from IAEA, reprocessing
Second Bush administration (2005-2008): reengagement through regional and bilateral approach—Six Party Talks/US-DPRK talks	J/ROK disputes deepen; Japan frustrated by US-DPRK engagement	Six Party Joint Statement (2005) First North Korean nuclear test (2006) Six Party Implementing agreement (2007) Breakdown of talks (2008)
Obama administration (2009-2010): strategic patience	Emphasis on close coordination with allies; solidarity in responding to North Korea	North Korean missile test and second nuclear test; conventional provocations; charm offensive and pledge to return to six party talks unconditionally

The Obama administration has emphasized the importance of alliance coordination with South Korea and Japan, respectively, in response to North Korean provocations, and has sought to revive U.S.-ROK-Japan policy coordination, but difficulties in U.S.-Japan relations and Japan’s preoccupation with domestic politics following the historic political leadership transition from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to Democratic

Party of Japan (DPJ) have resulted in fitful progress. However, North Korean provocations in 2010 provided a convenient reminder to the new DPJ political establishment the U.S.-Japan alliance serves common strategic objectives and shifted the focus of alliance conversations away from challenging internal issues such as the resolution of the Futenma Replacement Facility and planned U.S. troop relocations to Guam. The various policies the United States has pursued, the relationship to trilateral coordination, and North Korea's response are summarized in Table 2.

1) First nuclear crisis: Catalyst for improved contingency planning and trilateral support for KEDO

The first nuclear crisis served as a catalyst for two forms of enhanced coordination among the United States, South Korea, and Japan. First, the North Korean nuclear crisis itself led to the establishment of unprecedented trilateral defense consultations among the United States, Korea, and Japan. Prior to 1993, all three countries had been involved in separate and uncoordinated bilateral negotiations with North Korea. In addition, lack of adequate consultation regarding their respective policies on North Korea fed mistrust. For instance, South Korea responded suspiciously to LDP kingpin Shin Kanemaru's sudden trip to Pyongyang in 1991 and his apparent attempt to open ties with North Korea by sidestepping normal governmental processes involving the Japanese bureaucracy. Following the North Korean announcement in March 1993 that it would withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty, the three countries began to hold trilateral meetings, but this occurred in the context of an unprecedented U.S. decision to respond to the UN Security Council's call for concerned parties to negotiate directly with North Korea over the nuclear issue, a decision

that for the first time bypassed South Korea on an issue that South Korea deemed critical to its own security. The Clinton administration's decision to negotiate with North Korea directly necessitated active bilateral policy coordination with both its Northeast Asian allies, and it also catalyzed trilateral policy meetings on North Korea for the first time. For the U.S. this type of "trilateral cooperation had been the cornerstone of American strategy for dealing with North Korea...[and] securing support from Seoul and Tokyo would be the first act in the unfolding drama of building a multilateral coalition supporting sanctions."⁹⁾ Furthermore, U.S. plans to defend South Korea and defeat North Korea relied on support from United States Forces Japan, its military assets there, as well as cooperation and support from Japan.¹⁰⁾ Operationally, the U.S. requested the use of its bases in Japan as a staging area for military forces to be deployed to Korea, as well as various forms of rear area logistical support. The U.S. also sought SDF support in minesweeping Korean waters and in possible implementation of sanctions.¹¹⁾

However, as tensions escalated, and the U.S. began to prepare for the possibility of hostilities, the limitations of such cooperation became evident. Japan's constitution constrained its participation to a supporting role, and banned direct contributions to such trilateral cooperation. Any tangible support for combat operations not related to Japan's defense would violate the latter's ban on collective self-defense. It was even questioned whether Japan could allow U.S. forces to use its bases in Japan for

9) Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute Press, 2004, p. 193.

10) James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism: Improving U.S.-Japan-Korea Cooperation to Manage Complex Contingencies, Potomac Books, Inc., 2005, p. 4

11) Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea (London and New York: Sheffield Centre for Japan Studies/Routledge, 1999), pp.93-94

contingencies in Korea. Fortunately, diplomatic cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and Japan, fortified efforts by President Jimmy Carter, who was able to broker a deal with Kim Il Sung in June 1994 to diffuse the crisis.¹²⁾ This experience led to a strengthening of the legal basis for Japan to engage directly in support operations for U.S. forces in areas surrounding Japan, a development that indirectly strengthened the capabilities of the allies to work together in response to further escalation of the North Korean crisis.

In October 1994, direct negotiations between the United States and North Korea resulted in the “Agreed Framework” that required North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities in exchange for two Light Water Reactors (LWR) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational consortium formed by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, was responsible for financing and constructing the LWRs. The agreement also called for full normalization of political and economic relations between North Korea and the United States.¹³⁾

The inclusion of Japan and South Korea as part of the governing board of KEDO was designed to involve South Korea and Japan directly in the implementation of the Agreed Framework both in recognition of the fact that these states were the ones most directly affected by North Korea’s pledge to freeze and abandon its nuclear development efforts and that the United States needed both South Korea and Japan to pay for the LWR project. Eventually, South Korea pledged to play a “central” role in the project while Japan agreed to play a “significant” role, but it took many

12) Wit, p. 194.

13) “Chronology of U.S.-North Korea Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#1994>

months following the establishment of KEDO for these commitments to be quantified. The fact that the United States had negotiated the terms of the agreement with the North directly in the absence of either South Korean or Japanese representatives struck a raw nerve, as did the image of the U.S. Secretary of State soliciting allied contributions necessary to make the project viable. Another downside of this unique governance arrangement was that KEDO implementation lagged as the governments lost interest, and the interface between KEDO as an international organization and the respective governments led to many bureaucratic and political work delays. Nonetheless, the establishment of KEDO bound the United States, Japan, and South Korea together institutionally in an unprecedented fashion on an energy security project designed to assure that North Korea remained a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS).

Though the U.S., South Korea, and Japan worked together to implement the Agreed Framework, their respective policies on North Korea thereafter again came into conflict. Shifts in the domestic political landscape in Japan and Korea and discontent within the U.S. Congress regarding the Agreed Framework again created tension in policy coordination in 1998, as a Republican Congressional majority continued to attack funding for KEDO and questioned whether President Clinton's authorization of funds for the supply of heavy fuel oil was justified by North Korea's performance. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama attempted to restart normalization talks with North Korea, a move that was not welcomed by either Washington or Seoul. Japan also felt discontent with the proposal by U.S. President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young-Sam for four-party talks between the United States, South Korea, North Korea and China.

2) Post-Taepodong : Conflicting policy approaches and the establishment of TCOG

The election of Kim Dae Jung as president of South Korea in 1998 marked a major shift in policy towards North Korea from confrontation to reconciliation. Touting the “separation of politics from economics,” Kim Dae Jung supported the launch of a tourist project at Mount Kumgang by the Hyundai corporation and sought every opportunity to promote inter-Korean exchanges; the North accepted South Korean visitors but continued to severely restrict the number of North Koreans able to visit the South. Accordingly, Seoul advocated for Tokyo to show greater flexibility on the issues of the kidnapped Japanese and move forward with normalization. President Kim’s pursuit of his “Sunshine Policy” made Korea more inclined to lift sanctions on North Korea and provide it with additional aid and assistance than were U.S. and Japan, another factor that complicated trilateral policy coordination.

Conflict among South Korea, Japan, and the United States was initially exacerbated by North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong rocket over Japan. Tokyo adopted a hard-line that halted all food aid and withheld contributions to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a step back from commitments outlined in the Agreed Framework. Meanwhile, President Kim Dae Jung continued to seek engagement that culminated in the realization of a historic inter-Korean summit meeting, and the Clinton administration advocated maintaining the TCOG framework while pursuing dialogue through the four-party talks.

Ultimately, the U.S. and Korea persuaded Japan to continue its support for KEDO. In addition to this sustained policy coordination, the launch also promoted strengthened military cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and

South Korea. In October 1998, Japan and Korea agreed to greater security cooperation, including increased defense exchanges and consultations. Japan also revised the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, and in August 1999 agreed to a joint research program with the U.S. on Theater Missile Defense (TMD).

Although the Clinton administration worked hard to keep the Agreed Framework alive, the Taepodong launch led U.S. Congress to demand an interagency review of U.S. policy on North Korea, and confirmation that the latter was complying with the framework's provisions. Consequently, former Secretary of Defense William Perry was given this responsibility as North Korea policy coordinator. Perry sought both to conduct a review of the current policy and to create a comprehensive strategy. Understanding that the success of any U.S. policy required support from Korea and Japan, Perry worked to institutionalize cooperation by creating the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).

The comprehensive approach advocated by Perry was in line with Kim Dae Jung's efforts to promote improved inter-Korean relations that culminated in his June 2000 visit to Pyongyang, which resulted in an inter-Korean joint declaration that established a framework for improved inter-Korean relations, a foundation for which was enhanced trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK coordination through TCOG. When Kim Dae Jung returned from Pyongyang, he declared that the summit had drastically reduced the possibility of renewed military conflict on the peninsula. In line with the inter-Korean declaration, his administration pursued policies that promoted greater economic, cultural, and social interaction between the two Koreas; however, the inter-Korean relationship fell short in two significant respects. First, inter-Korean exchanges proved to be one-way exchanges, with

growing numbers of South Koreans able to visit the North as part of the Mount Keumgang tourism project, humanitarian assistance delegations, and the development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but only a handful of North Koreans were allowed to visit South Korea. Second, economic, cultural, and social exchanges were accompanied by only the most superficial steps in addressing core security issues on the peninsula, which were not addressed by the 2000 Joint Declaration. Following dramatic improvements in the level of U.S.-DPRK dialogue at the end of the Clinton administration characterized by DPRK General Cho Myong-rok's visit to Washington in July of 2000 and a return visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in October of 2000, the Bush administration reversed course, rebuffing Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and revealing considerable skepticism toward the possibility that Kim Jong Il could be a worthy negotiating partner.

3) Bush Administration Establishment of Six Party Talks and the Breakdown of TCOG

The effects of the shift in policy from Clinton to Bush were starkly illustrated during Kim Dae Jung's early visit to Washington in March of 2001, only two months following President Bush's inauguration. Although Kim Dae Jung had come to Washington to persuade President Bush to support reconciliation with North Korea and potentially to pave the way for a second inter-Korean summit meeting with Kim Jong Il, it became clear that Presidents Bush and Kim had very different visions and policies for dealing with North Korea. These differences festered for about a year, until President Bush finally decided to send Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific James Kelly to Pyongyang, in part to confront North

Korea over covert efforts to make highly enriched uranium. Further exacerbating the inconsistency in approach among the allies, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in September of 2003, a month prior to Assistant Secretary Kelly's visit to Pyongyang, and brought back with him four Japanese nationals who had been abducted in the 1970s and were held in North Korea. The return of these four abductees to Japan had the unintended effect of paralyzing and hardening Japan's policy toward North Korea by drawing extensive public attention to the plight of abductees and deep suspicion that North Korea had not yet fully come clean on the whereabouts of remaining Japanese nationals being held involuntarily in North Korea. At the same time, South Korean abductees from the Korean War had not even been officially acknowledged by the ROK government. Meanwhile, the atmosphere between South Korea and Japan soured as a result of Prime Minister Koizumi's insistence on visiting Yasukuni Shrine and deepening tensions over history textbook issues. The situation deteriorated as North Korea has continuously made progress in developing a nuclear capability. An independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations released at that time assessed that "Whatever Pyongyang's motivations, recent events point to North Korea becoming a more capable—and avowed—nuclear state. The United States has not yet found a way to prevent this eventuality."

The Bush administration supported the establishment of the Six Party Talks since President Bush categorized the North Korea problem as a "regional problem" and his administration sought to avoid direct bilateral talks with North Korea. At the Six Party Talks, the Bush administration sought "comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, while North Korea sought a "reward for

freeze” of its nuclear development efforts, with no assurance that such a reward would lead to dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability. Although the establishment of the Six Party Framework was intended to isolate North Korea and pressure it to reverse its nuclear program, the talks suffered from a lack of cohesion among the members and had the effect of marginalizing U.S.-Japan-ROK centered trilateral coordination. As the Japan-ROK mood turned sour, the TCOG mechanism was jettisoned by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Japan was stymied by the abduction issue and unable to play a significant role in diplomacy with either Korea; meanwhile, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration expanded economic ties with North Korea even while coordinating on the nuclear issue with the United States.

The second Bush administration attempted to more actively utilize the Six Party framework as a means by which to develop a regional consensus in favor of North Korea’s denuclearization, successfully negotiating a six party joint statement in September of 2005 that called for normalization of diplomatic relations among all parties, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the provision of economic development assistance to North Korea, and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. The viability of the Joint Statement rested in part on a mutually agreed ambiguity regarding questions surrounding whether or not and when North Korea might be able to pursue a peaceful nuclear program; in retrospect, it is clear that another important aspect of the Joint Statement was that it implicitly recognized North Korea’s nuclear capacity while at the same time committing the North to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Follow-on negotiations were derailed by North Korean objections to a U.S. Treasury advisory against a Macao-based bank, Banco Delta Asia,

concerning money laundering and illicit activities alleged to have involved North Korean accounts. In light of this pressure, the North Koreans walked away from the talks in November of 2005.

North Korea's October 9, 2006, test of a nuclear device proved to be a catalyst for renewed six party negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program. The Bush administration attempted to utilize North Korea's rhetorical commitments to denuclearization embodied in the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement and to capitalize on regional solidarity opposing North Korea's test as the framework by which to revive tangible North Korean steps toward denuclearization. A combination of renewed six Six Party Talks and stepped up U.S.-DPRK bilateral negotiations with North Korea led to the establishment of a February 13, 2007, Implementing Agreement which was designed to put initial steps toward denuclearization on a fast-track. In the February 13, 2007, Implementing Agreement, the North Koreans pledged to disable and declare their existing nuclear facilities within sixty days in return for the provision of one million tons of energy assistance from the other parties to the talks. In a separate bilateral arrangement, the United States allowed frozen assets held by Banco Delta Asia to be returned to Pyongyang. Implementation of the agreement was dragged out through the end of the Bush administration and was marred by controversies over the scope of the North Korean declaration of existing nuclear facilities and North Korean unwillingness to accept measures necessary to verify the correctness of North Korea's declaration. Another casualty of U.S. insistence on pursuing direct talks with the North was the erosion of trust between the United States and Japan. The situation between the two countries became particularly difficult as the United States shepherded through a UN Resolution condemning the

2006 North Korean missile tests at the UN Security Council. However, the United States ended up making concessions to China that watered down the resolution more than the conservative Abe government wanted to see, raising questions in Japan regarding whether when push comes to shove the United States is more likely to side with China or Japan. These anxieties played themselves out as Special Envoy continued pursuit of negotiations with North Korea that even led to measures that Japan opposed, including North Korea's removal from the terrorist list and the repeal of the Trading With the Enemy Act. The solidarity that had developed a decade earlier among the United States, South Korea, and Japan with the establishment of TCOG had been wiped away.

4) North Korea's Early Challenge to the Obama Administration

Rather than taking conciliatory measures as a means by which to open the way for a new relationship with the Obama administration, North Korea appears to have placed every possible obstacle in the way of renewed dialogue at the beginning of 2009, or at least to have taken measures that would push the Obama administration toward implicit recognition if not explicit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. First, prior to President Obama's inauguration the DPRK Foreign Ministry explicitly stated that there is no linkage between normalization of U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relations and North Korea's denuclearization.

Second, the North Koreans embarked on the launch of a multi-stage rocket under the rationale that North Korea has a right to pursue a peaceful satellite launch on April 5, 2009, only hours prior to a major speech by President Obama in Prague on the need for global nuclear arms reductions. North Korea's rationale for its test was rejected by the Obama

administration and other parties, resulting in a UN Presidential Statement condemning the April 5, 2009 launch as a violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718, which had imposed restrictions on North Korean missile launch capacities following North Korea's 2006 nuclear test.

Third, North Korea responded with outrage to this condemnation, pledging to walk away from the Six Party Talks and threatening to conduct a second nuclear test, which it did on May 25, 2009. These provocations posed a direct challenge to the credibility of the Obama administration and required a firm response, precluding prospects for early diplomatic engagement with North Korea. The Obama administration worked energetically at the United Nations first to secure a UN Presidential Statement and subsequently to gain unanimous support for UN Security Council Resolution 1874 condemning North Korea's nuclear test and has attempted to spearhead implementation of financial and shipping sanctions against North Korea following the test. North Korea's provocations have underscored the need for international cooperation to respond to North Korea's challenge to regional and global stability and have directly flouted the Six Party Talks as a venue for addressing North Korea's nuclear program. The Obama administration also placed consultations with Japanese and South Korean allies as a priority over direct engagement with North Korea, with the result that the special envoy for North Korea traveled to Japan and South Korea as well as China for consultations on how to deal with North Korea far more than the United States reached out to talk to North Korea.

The Obama administration has handled well the initial challenges posed by North Korea's provocations through pursuit of a UN Resolution that not

only condemns North Korea's actions but also by promoting strict implementation of the resolution by UN member states. UN Security Council Resolution 1874 builds on the prior UNSC Resolution 1718 that followed North Korea's 2006 nuclear test. The resolution calls on member states to inspect any air or sea cargo destined for North Korea that is suspected of containing items related to North Korea's nuclear or missile programs and calls on member states to implement strict financial sanctions against financial transactions associated with the trade of such materials. The UN resolution, along with attempts to strengthen regional cohesion in support of implementation of the resolution by working closely with other members of the Six Party Talks, are necessary defensive measures designed to limit the negative effects of North Korea's provocations. The idea behind the establishment of a regional framework will ultimately provide the context for a return to more effective negotiations with North Korea, even if North Korea resists returning to the Six Party Talks. As a result, North Korea is increasingly likely to hear the same messages from its neighbors, regardless of whether the dialogue is occurring with Russia, South Korea, China, Japan, or the United States.

Despite passing the UN resolution, however, the United States, South Korea, and Japan came to find that despite their close coordination, sanctions implementation was less than effective as a result of China's decision to strengthen its strategic relationship with North Korea by promoting economic engagement with the North in an effort to reinforce North Korea's stability as Pyongyang faced an impending leadership transition. The combination of China's rising economic influence on Pyongyang and the reduced influence of the United States, Japan, and South Korea as a result of sanctions enforcement with North Korea has

made Beijing more relevant as a factor in managing the situation, but its differing approach to North Korea also provides space for North Korea to survive on its own.

A further jolt came with North Korea's artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong island on November 22, 2010. This shelling incident represented a significant escalation from previous events that resulted in civilian casualties in South Korea for the first time in decades. It also had the effect of temporarily reinvigorating U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination through the unprecedented issuance of a trilateral foreign ministers' statement unveiled at a joint meeting in DC that condemned North Korea's actions. This sort of trilateral coordination is not in China's interests, and the calculated effect of that meeting was to send both North Korea and China a preliminary message that a failure by China to cap North Korean provocative behavior could stimulate a reaction from the United States, Japan, and South Korea that some in Beijing might view as adverse to Chinese interests. Thus, trilateral coordination was conceived of not only as a means to show solidarity in response to North Korea, but also to send a message to China that further North Korean provocations are likely to simulate regional security developments that are not in China's interest.

2. Assessment of the importance and effectiveness of Trilateral Coordination

Based on the above discussion, trilateral coordination appears to correlate with more successful periods in management of policy toward North Korea, while breakdowns in trilateral coordination coincided with periods during which North Korea perhaps felt less restrained in its nuclear

weapons development pursuits. There are a variety of potential implications that might derive from this observation, which reflects correlation between the two circumstances, but not necessarily causality. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to consider a variety of measures designed to deepen trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea and that might also enhance the likelihood that China will also cooperate on North Korean issues. Another caveat related to this observation is that Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard have recently observed based on the history of efforts to dissuade North Korea from developing a nuclear capability that neither incentives nor sanctions have proved to be particularly effective in changing North Korea's calculations. Given these findings, it is difficult to determine the relative effectiveness of joint implementation of policies as a means by which to strengthen the effectiveness in denuclearizing North Korea. Nonetheless, if the purpose of policy coordination is to limit North Korea's alternatives in addressing outstanding issues by more effectively shaping the environment in which North Korea makes policy choices, it would appear that U.S.-Japan-ROK policy coordination is necessary but insufficient to influence North Korean behaviour. For this reason, another rationale for enhanced U.S.-Japan-ROK policy coordination lies in the potential for trilateral coordination as a foundation for more effective cooperation with China and Russia on a unified approach to dealing with North Korea.

The most developed case study for this approach might focus on the joint foreign ministers' statement of December 6, 2010, through which the United States, Japan, and South Korea might be seen as the potential core of a multilateral security cooperation framework (with likely additional involvement and support from Australia) that would play a stabilizing and

socializing role in Asia similar to that of NATO in Europe. Trilateral cooperation might form the anchor of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

A variety of commentators have expressed support for moving in such a direction. Michael Auslin and Christopher Griffin have argued that trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea might be bolstered by the establishment of a Trilateral Security Committee that would “affirm and guide working-level negotiations among the three countries” based on a “common strategic vision” and focused on cooperation for humanitarian disasters, cooperative maritime security, and missile defense.¹⁴⁾ Mo Jongryn and Jo Hyeran argue that U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateralism would be more effective than a parallel bilateral alliance structure or a “virtual alliance,” which they regard as an insufficient platform from which to promote the level of cooperation needed to face common challenges. Mo and Jo also argue that as the “best anchor for Asian regionalism for the foreseeable future,” U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateralism provides a viable foundation for building regionalism in Asia, is a potentially effective tool for managing the foreign policy implications of domestic political changes in the three countries, and is particularly well suited to address specific functional issues, including management of the North Korean challenge.¹⁵⁾ Frank Umbach has argued that harmonization between the United States-Japan and United States-ROK “allow a greater bi- and trilateral security and defense co-operation towards the North Korean security challenges on the peninsula and significantly open a way for a much

14) Christopher Griffin and Michael Auslin, “Time for Tri-lateralism?” *Asian Outlook* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), no. 2, March 2008.

15) Jongryn Mo and Hyeran Jo, “Does the United States Need a New East Asian Anchor?: A Case for U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateralism,” <http://www.asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/482>.

closer relationship between Japan and South Korea.”¹⁶⁾

However, a major variable likely to influence the effectiveness of such trilateralism will be China’s response. In the case of policy coordination toward North Korea, unless enhanced trilateralism induces greater Chinese cooperation and solidarity with the other three, the challenge of bringing forward a united front sufficient to influence North Korea’s nuclear choices is likely to fail. Given the fact that China appears to have decided to pursue a strategy that prioritizes North Korean stability over reform and denuclearization, the agenda for joint action among the United States, South Korea, China, and Japan is likely to be so limited that the prospects for achieving meaningful progress on denuclearization are low, while the prospects for successfully managing crisis might be marginally higher.

Turning to more specific functional cooperation as a potential means to build up U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination both as a means by which to encourage China to remain onside in its dealings with North Korea and to enhance the effectiveness of the three countries in responding to North Korean provocative actions, one might consider the following specific policy measures as means by which to strengthen a coordinated trilateral response to North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. In fact, the grounds for trilateral cooperation are likely to improve as a result of North Korea’s continued missile modernization efforts because the combination of a nuclear capability and an enhanced delivery capability will be to expand North Korea’s threat in ways that will have direct impact on both South Korea and Japan. This circumstance reinforces the already existing historical security linkages between Korea

16) Frank Umbach, “The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance.” This chapter was originally presented at the conference “Japanese and German Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective,” Tuebingen, September 21-23, 1998.

and Japan in which a secure and friendly Korean peninsula is critical to Japan's security.

There may be trilateral measures that the United States, Japan, and South Korea feel that they should take together as a result of their own convergence of interests, regardless of China's response. The motivations for pursuing such measures may include defensive measures to mitigate against the effectiveness of North Korea's threat capacity, deterrence measures designed to signal resolve and readiness so as to limit North Korean options for pursuing provocations, and risk management measures to limit negative exposure to potential future North Korean provocations. For instance, the United States, South Korea and Japan, in the course of conducting joint bilateral exercises, have invited each other as observers, indirectly sending a signal of trilateral solidarity against potential aggression by North Korea. Joint exercises conducted under the Proliferation Security Initiative to counter potential North Korean proliferation as well as continued intelligence and surveillance cooperation regarding potential illicit cargos as part of enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 are two examples of activities that might be carried out along these lines. A further step that might be taken to signal unanimity of purpose and common values might be for the human rights envoys of the three nations to meet and coordinate approaches on human rights and humanitarian issues. Although the North would likely see such a step as provocative, such coordination might also send a clear signal regarding the necessity of addressing such issues as part of normalization of relations with North Korea.

IV. Japanese Policy Towards North Korea and Trilateral Cooperation

This chapter attempts mainly to analyze Japanese policy toward North Korea and Japanese views on trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan.¹⁷⁾ Just like in South Korea and the U.S. described above, different Japanese administrations have pursued different policies toward North Korea and also taken different stances on trilateral cooperation among three countries. In fact, since most Japanese administrations have perceived threats from North Korea seriously, they have attempted to alleviate the threats either bilaterally or trilaterally. Until late 1990's and early 2000's, however, Japanese administrations largely preferred a bilateral approach to North Korea rather than multilateral ones including trilateral cooperation. Thus, there had been 11 rounds of meetings between Japan and North Korea for normalization of their bilateral relations prior to 2002 when the first historic visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Pyongyang, and all of which have failed. But they still show how eagerly both Japanese administration and North Korean regime paid attentions to enhancing their bilateral relations. As a matter of fact, it is only after launch of a 'Taepodong' missile over Japanese islands when Japanese administration realized finally the necessity and importance of trilateral cooperation in dealing with North Korea.

Since then, Japanese policies both toward North Korea and on trilateral cooperation have been influenced mainly by two factors: one is its

17) Unlike the other two chapters above, this chapter is not written by a Japanese scholar and so, it should be noted that this chapter presents an interpretation of Japanese North Korean policy and Japanese views on trilateral cooperation.

domestic politics and the other is its relationship with the U.S. Interestingly, however, Japanese domestic politics mostly hindered the progress toward closer relationship with North Korea and trilateral cooperation, whereas the U.S. factor was largely conducive to trilateral cooperation. Eventually, only the recent changing security conditions in Northeast Asia has made Tokyo appreciate fully the importance of trilateral cooperation to deter and defend North Korean misbehavior and provocations.

1. Failed Normalization Negotiations with North Korea in the Early 1990's

As a defeated party to the World War II, Japan is not allowed constitutionally to use its armed forces with an exception for self-defense and also limited to cooperate with others for collective defense. While Japan was able to become one of the most advanced economic powers under the U.S. security umbrella during the Cold War era, its diplomatic status was not recognized as high as its deserved economic power. As the Cold War ended, thus, Japanese government began to pay more attention to becoming a “normal state” that can use its own armed forces and gaining its proper diplomatic standings. Negotiating normalization of its relationship with North Korean government was also part of such efforts.¹⁸⁾ It was a typical economic diplomacy during the Cold War to acquire a wider diplomatic recognition and influence.

18) On this normalization negotiation, see Jung Hwa Shin, “Continuity and Change of North Korean Policy in Japan,”[Korean] *Journal of Japan Studies*, Vol.30. (2009), pp.86-107 and Young Chul Chung, “The Past and Present of North Korea-Japan Relations,”[Korean] *Journal of North Korea Studies*, 9:1, pp.381.

Since the North Korean regime was eagerly seeking financial sources for implementing its newly-announced, limited economic liberalization at the time, it was also willing to start negotiations with expecting of large monetary compensation from Japan for its wrong- doings during the colonial rule. Eight rounds of negotiations between January 1991 and November 1992, however, failed to reach to an agreement. North Korea insisted on compensation-first and normalization-later, while Japan argued for normalization-first and compensation-later. As the result, they could not find any compromising point to narrow the gap.

Despite the failure of normalization negotiations, Japanese government had to provide economic assistance to North Korea as part of a deal included in the Geneva Framework Agreement, which was negotiated and signed between the U.S. and North Korea. According to that Agreement, Japan became a financial contributor to the KEDO. The decision to participate in the KEDO was made because of not just Japanese deference to its alliance with the U.S., but also its political instability of an eight-party coalition government at the time.

2. Historic Summit Meeting and the Rise of Thorny Abduction Issue

During the latter half of 1990's, Japan had gradually consolidated legal bases to increase its overseas military engagement by accepting positively the Clinton Administration's request for expansion of Japanese Self-defense Force's role in regional and global security matters. Both a revision of the Defense Guidelines in 1995 and a new Joint Security Declaration between the U.S. and Japan in 1996 were concrete outcomes of such efforts. In

addition to them, Japan also passed a few new laws in 1998 that allowed its extended military roles in regional contingency situations including those of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the North Korean test of Tapodong missile in the same year provoked and intensified further Japanese perception of North Korean threats and led Japan to join co-development theater missile defense programs with the U.S. In short, the growing threats posed by North Korea helped Japan's conservative government to strengthen its military power and also to become a "normal" state.

Then, 9.11 terrorist attacks in 2001 raised even more an already-heightened Japanese concern about its national security due to North Korean threats. Utilizing such a sensitive moment, the Prime Minister Koizumi pursued to broaden even further its involvement in security matters abroad and also sought to deal with North Korean threats bilaterally. As a result, Koizumi visited to Pyongyang for the first time and held a historic summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in September 2002. The meeting produced a Pyongyang Declaration, which promised Japanese provision of economic aid and assistance to North Korea after normalization of their relationship and also, confirmed the necessity of solution of North Korean nuclear and missile development issues through dialogue and collaboration of concerned parties in the region. Besides, the Declaration also contained Kim Jong-il's acknowledgement of the charge of North Korean abduction of Japanese civilians and guarantee of prohibition of its re-occurrence.

Unlike Koizumi's expectation, the Japanese public reaction to the Declaration was mainly concentrated on the abduction issue. Shocked by the fact, offered during the summit, that five survived and eight died out of thirteen, Japanese public angrily reacted with harsh criticisms of the

North Korean regime's inhumanity and demanded vehemently more thorough investigation on lives of the abductees and their full return. Due to so intensely aggravated public opinion, the Koizumi government had no choice but to acquiescing to the public demand and changing its policy position toward a more hard-liner's. In fact, it was a dramatic turn of policy direction for Koizumi government. The outcome of the summit that Koizumi had once thought earlier so successful that could be used as a platform for him to play a more active and leading role in regional security matters, turned out to be too a formidable obstacle to be overcome. Since then, thus, Japanese negotiations with North Korea on any issues cannot make a progress without settling down of the abduction issue first or at least satisfactorily enough to meet the volatile expectation of Japanese general public.

3. Policy of the Democratic Party of Japan

In September 2009, a historic change in Japanese modern politics occurred. A more than fifty-year-long ruling of the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) had ended and the Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ) took the power of government. While its priority was placed more on domestic reforms, the first Prime Minister of DPJ, Hatoyama emphasized that his foreign policy would cherish more friendship with neighboring Asian countries and pursue a more equal and autonomous relationship with the U.S. With a re-kindled focus on multilateral security architectures in East Asia in the later part of 2000's, Hatoyama's initiative drew a wide and enthusiastic attention. The short span of his tenure, however, hindered a serious and persistent pursuit of such a policy and so, could not produce

any meaningful outcome. And eventually, the political instability, resulted from frequent changes of prime minister following Hatoyama's, has not only made a heightened expectation for the DJP's new foreign policy short lived, but also paralyzed any DPJ's attempt later to play a leading role in diplomatic affairs.

In addition to domestic political instability, the other important factor that has obliterated the DPJ's ambitious and more liberal foreign policy was a changing security condition in the region, namely the rise of China. In fact, the rise of China has been an object of heated debates since the mid-1990's.¹⁹⁾ After witnessing China's more than a-decade-long, two-digit annual economic growth, however, no one can deny anymore by the mid-2000's that China is on its way to being a next super-power. Only a controversy lied on what kind of super-power it would be. Chinese leaders continued to maintain that it would rise peacefully and remain so.

But other countries, especially the U.S. and Japan in the region have been suspicious of China's intention by pointing to its continuous build-up of military capabilities as well as efforts to increase its diplomatic influence over the world beyond the region. Furthermore, China's display of a series of more assertive behavior on regional security issues last year has confirmed and raised concerns of the two countries even more. Facing

19) On the rise of China, see see John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19:1, pp.149-168; Jeffrey W. Legro, "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power," *Perspectives on Politics* 5:3 (September 2007), pp.515-534; Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order," op.cit.; David M. Lampton, "The Faces of Chinese Power," *Foreign Affairs* 86:1 (Jan/Feb 2007); Evans S. Medeiros, *China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification* (RAND, 2009); Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'," *Survival* 48:2 (Summer 2006), pp.,17-36; and Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84:5 (Sept.-Oct. 2005).

such a situation, hence, the U.S. and Japan have been seeking to find ways of soft-balancing or hedging unexpected Chinese challenge or threat to their important interests in the future. Tightening their alliance's cohesion is one of them. The other is networking of the U.S. allies in the region. In other words, they attempt to link and strengthen the ties between or among the countries that are presently allied with the U.S. Establishment of the Strategic Dialogue among the U.S., Australia, and Japan is a prime example.

Japan usually plays a major driving role in the task of alliance networking in the region. That is why Japan has recently shown a strong interest in both bilateral and trilateral military cooperation with South Korea and the U.S., and urged the South Korean government to increase its participation in military cooperation as such. As a result, in 2010 South Korean naval officers participated as observers in a joint military exercise between the U.S. and Japan, while officers of Japanese maritime self-defense force were also allowed to do the same thing reciprocally. Moreover, due to such strong urge by Japanese government, Lee Myung-bak Administration, which has maintained a more closer stance toward Japan than the previous Noh Administration, is also currently considering to increase the level of military cooperation with Japan through signing of General Security of Military Information Agreement(GSOMIA) and Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement(ACSA).

In sum, unlike the DPJ's originally-declared stance, its present foreign and security policy is not so different from that of conservative LDP's. It is so because of the continuous domestic political instability and the rise of China. Its policy toward North Korea is still as a hostage of the abduction issue and its alliance relationship with the U.S. is getting

stronger again. Only a difference is its policy toward South Korea. Whereas the previous LDP was reluctant to strengthening its military ties with South Korea, the DPJ shows far greater eagerness to increase bilateral military cooperation with South Korea and to link ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances.

V. Conclusion

Based on the above review on the past experience of trilateral cooperation and evolving policy stances of three countries toward trilateral cooperation, this section will examine the possibility of future trilateral cooperation and then, propose some policy suggestions to pursue trilateral cooperation.

1. Current Conditions for Trilateral Cooperation

Around last two decades since the North Korean nuclear problem emerged, many and various attempts have been pursued to secure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. It turns out, however, that North Korean military provocations and nuclear programs have always gotten in the way and blocked the road to reconciliation and cooperation between two Koreas.

In fact, almost all the possible measures have been tried by South Korea thus far in order to end North Korea's nuclear weapons development and military provocations. Several rounds of inter-Korean, tripartite, and six party talks were convened and produced some notable achievements, but ends up with more limitations mostly. Negotiations sometimes made progress, but eventually were not able to solve the problems completely. The Six party talks are stalled since December 2008. Instead of participating in negotiations, North Korea conducted nuclear and missile tests in 2009 and carried out unprecedented military provocations toward South Korea in 2010. North Korea attacked South Korean navy corvette,

killing 46 sailors. Furthermore, North Korea bombarded a South Korean island where civilians reside, which is the first incident of such nature since the Korean War. It resulted in killing of two marines and two civilians. South Koreans were intimidated and disappointed by North Korea's aggressive behavior. The military tension, of course, was elevated although it fell short of war.

Inter-Korean relations remained unchanged because North Korea has not apologized for its provocative behavior to South Korea. However, South Korea currently attempts to be more flexible toward North Korea, while maintaining principles in inter-Korean relations. Meanwhile, the United States, China, North Korea began to be active in resuming the 6 party talks. Recent development sends mixed signals in enhancing trilateral cooperation

1) South Korea's flexible policy toward North Korea

Recently, it is detected that South Korea's stance toward North Korea gets flexible. Signals for reconciliation of the two Koreas loom. First, South Korea recently pledged 'a principled but flexible' policy toward North Korea after. Secondly, hard line former minister of Unification was replaced by a less hard line figure. Thirdly, new minister emphasized the official channel of communication with the communist country and promised to try to establish it. Furthermore, representative of the ruling party visited Kaesung industrial complex. That can be interpreted as an indication to be flexible to 24th May measure. Fourthly, South Korea resumed humanitarian aid to North Korea. South Korea decided to authorize the resumption of medical aid to Pyongyang through WTO worth of \$6.94 million. Then, vaccines were delivered to the North through

international relief agencies in the South worth of \$942,300. Finally, both Koreas had two talks for denuclearization. All in all, inter-Korean relations seem to thaw recently.

Apart from the nuclear issue, the North and South failed to settle down North Korea's provocative behaviors. While Seoul demanded apology for attacking Chungan warship and shelling Yeonpyungdo, Pyongyang refused to apologize. Furthermore, it did not admit its responsibility for those provocations. This constitutes insurmountable obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation. South Korean government is faced with pressure from South Koreans who were embarrassed, disappointed and upset by North Korea's bad behavior.

2) The prospect of the Six-party talks

A three step approach to reconvening the Six-Party Talks is in progress. The two Koreas hold denuclearization meeting twice. It is speculated that preliminary measures were discussed at the bilateral talks. South Korea demands three preconditions for the return to the Six-Party Talks: suspension of all nuclear activities including uranium enrichment program; moratorium on nuclear and missile test; and allowance of IAEA inspectors to nuclear facilities. North Korea's position is in stark contrast to South Korea. The reclusive country wants to resume the Six-Party Talks promptly without preconditions for the talks, maintaining 'commitment to commitment' and 'action to action.'

After two rounds of talk for denuclearization, both parties was not completely satisfied and reached agreement. The two actors, however, admitted they had constructive discussions on denuclearization. This is a positive indication that the first step is proceeding. Following the North-

South dialogue, North Korea and the U.S. had two talks to deal with reconvening the Six-Party Talks. The United States is known to ask same requirement for the talk and added one more condition that improvement of inter-Korean relations should precede to the talk. The both sides did not conclude the talk as they want but expressed a certain degree of satisfaction.

Despite the fact that the two preceding stages take time, it is encouraging that recent bilateral contacts between the two Koreas and North Korea and the United States are sure to promote favorable atmosphere for the Six-Party talk. Even though efforts for resumption of the six-party talks are led by South Korea and the United States, the two countries maintain close policy coordination with Japan to strengthen negotiation capability with North Korea. Japan cannot be isolated from policy consultation concerning the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.

3) U.S. policy toward North Korea's nuclear program

With South Korea, the United States demands to the North Korea preliminary measures for restarting the six-party talks. For the United States, preliminary measures are necessary for North Korea to demonstrate its sincerity on nuclear dismantlement. Three preconditions for the return to the Six-Party Talks include suspension of all nuclear activities including uranium enrichment program, moratorium on nuclear and missile test, and allowance of IAEA inspectors to nuclear facilities. North Korea's position is in stark contrast with North Korea. The reclusive country wants to resume the Six-Party Talks promptly without preconditions for the talks.

At the same time, the United States promised to North Korea various

incentives in exchange for nuclear dismantlement, which include political, diplomatic and economic rewards. Rewards to North Korea consist of economic assistance, diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan, and energy supply. South Korea, the United States, and Japan share the approach to North Korea's nuclear settlement. In terms of agenda setting, agreement, and implementation, close consultations among three countries are necessary at the six-party talks. In order to stop North Korea's nuclear activities, trilateral cooperation must continue to play a complementary role to the six-party talks.

4) Relationship between South Korea and Japan and the China factor

Although stumbling blocks on the relationship between South Korea and Japan remain intact, the Lee administration has pursued to maintain a friendly relationship with Japan. As a result, many have criticized the Lee administration for not responding more adamantly to Japan's provocative behaviors and stances on territorial disputes, history textbook, shrine visit, and comfort women. The Lee administration seemed to have tolerated quite well the growing complaints of South Korean people until recently. As approaching to an end of his tenure and facing a declining popularity of his administration, however, the President Lee recently shows a sign of change in his stance toward Japan. One example of such a change is his strong urge of Japanese government to take more positive stance on solving the wartime comfort women issue during his summit meeting with the Prime Minister Noda.

A more daunting barrier to enhancing the bilateral relation between South Korea and Japan is Japanese domestic politics. With recent Japanese

political instability caused by frequent leadership change and economic downturn, Japanese government cannot afford to ignore political pressure from nationalists who are extremely sensitive to historical and territorial issues. For domestic political purposes, thus, some Japanese high ranking officials and leading politicians have occasionally made statements. But they have caused strong reactions and infuriation by South Koreans and deteriorated the relationship between two countries. In the same vein, Japanese domestic politics significantly affects its policy toward North Korea, too. In dealing with North Korea, Japan has been excessively captivated by an abduction issue to the extent that Japan cannot move one step forward in its relation with North Korea without settlement of the issue.

In the meantime, there are also catalysts for bilateral collaboration between South Korea and Japan. Both countries have a common perception of threats of North Korea with a little difference, thereby sharing strategic objectives and approaches in many aspects. Both countries aim to remove North Korean nuclear programs in a peaceful manner. Because of sharing of that ultimate goal, two counties can cooperate and mobilize all available resources to achieve the goal together. It is this foundation which makes both South Korean and Japanese governments commit to collaboration more solidly. Even if there is no high level security cooperation arrangement between two countries, they are allies of the United States. The two sets of alliance with the United States also lay a common ground for promoting bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Japan.

As China's influence grows, China becomes one of main factors, which affects trilateral collaboration among South Korea, Japan, and the United

State. First of all, the cooperation should not be in conflict with China's strategic interests, approaches, and objectives. The reason is that the goal of trilateral cooperation is eliminating North Korea's nuclear capabilities and the goal cannot be accomplished should China take a negative stance to trilateral activities and agreements. China has the strongest influence on North Korea as an ally, which helps North Korea survive. Fortunately, China also wants to eliminate North Korean nuclear programs in a peaceful way. It is likely that China can promote and constrain trilateral relations. In this vein, the United States, South Korea, and Japan had frequent meetings to coordinate policies toward North Korea's nuclear issue.

2. Policy Suggestions for Trilateral Cooperation

Recent discussions on trilateral cooperation recommended that the scope of cooperation among three countries should be expanded beyond North Korean nuclear issues, mentioning non-traditional security threat such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, natural disaster, epidemics, crisis management, maritime security, economic relations, failed states, and others. Focus of this study, however, is on trilateral cooperation to achieve the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. As Table 3 shows, various approaches, goals, and measures are demanding collaboration among three countries. To meet North Korea's nuclear challenge, the two main approaches should be taken simultaneously. The best approach is to remove nuclear arsenal by peaceful negotiations. Should negotiation fail, deterrence and defense is the only available option in addressing North Korea's nuclear threat.

Table 3. A Framework for Trilateral cooperation

Approach	Goal	Measure
Deterrence	Defense	Missile defense
Negotiation	Reward	Peace treaty
		Normalization
		Economic cooperation / Assistance
		Humanitarian aid
	Lifting Sanction	
	Pressure	Multilateral sanction
		Unilateral sanction
Human rights		

Nuclear deterrence rests on the three elements: extended deterrence, conventional striking, and missile defense. While bilateral alliance is related to extended deterrence and conventional striking, missile defense seems to be associated with trilateral cooperation. South Korea, however, hesitates to join the missile defense program, taking into account strategic need and China's response. Toolbox for negotiation demands coordination among three countries. As incentives, there are several policy options such as peace regime, diplomatic normalization, economic cooperation and assistance, humanitarian aid, and removal of sanctions. For pressure and punishment, sanctions and human rights cards can be utilized.

1) Missile Defense

Missile defense is regarded as a venue for trilateral collaboration by the United States and Japan. In fact, the launch of North Korea's multi-stage Taep'odong rocket in August of 1998 served as a catalyst for more active

pursuit of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. Nonetheless, North Korea's April 2009 multi-stage rocket launch at least underscored the possibility of joint monitoring and intelligence cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea given that each country has assets available for such purposes.

Nonetheless, South Korea has for a couple of reasons not been actively involved as a third partner in the development of missile defense. South Korea has a differing set of strategic needs in this area from those of the United States and Japan, given that North Korea's short range missiles are the primary threat to the South, while longer-range or multi-stage rocket launches comprise a threat that is of greater concern to Japan and the United States. South Korea doesn't need to have medium and high altitude interceptors unlike Japan and the U.S. Because North Korean missiles deployed along the frontline can strike Seoul in a short time of 2-3 minutes. Furthermore, South Korea cannot afford cutting-edge interceptors and early warning radar system.

In principle, it should be possible for South Korea to join in missile defense cooperation with the United States and Japan as a self-protective measure against North Korean missile development. However, another factor related to the pursuit of missile development in the region is China's objection to the development of such a course. China's objections may give some in South Korea pause, especially since the direct benefits of missile defense and types of missile defense that are needed differ.

A related question is whether pursuit of missile defense, either bilaterally or trilaterally, can serve as a catalyst for more active Chinese efforts to impose restraint on North Korea, if indeed China has the capability to do so. Certainly, China's skepticism regarding the rationale for expanded

missile defense cooperation in the region suggests that China's own security calculations are affected by such a project, even if it is targeted specifically to North Korea. But it is harder to prove a causal relationship between missile development and enhanced effectiveness of Chinese restraint on North Korea.

As discussed, South Korea's position is different from those of the two countries. Apart from the joint cooperation between the United States and Japan, South Korea tries to construct its own type of ballistic missile defense capability. The Ministry of National Defense revised National Defense Reform 2020, which was completed by the former government. The newly revised one would meet an increasing strategic requirement for coping with North Korean missile threat. Seoul seems to put a priority on allocating military budget to capacity-building of monitoring, tracing and intercepting cruise and ballistic missiles from Pyongyang.

A Korean-version missile defense system is under construction, including a missile defense command and control structure of the AMD (Air and Missile Defense)-Cell, the early warning radars and AWACs (Airborne Warning and Control System), and anti-ballistic missiles such as PAC-2, SM-6. The Korean missile defense system reflected South Korean security conditions and budget restraints. The AMS-Cell is a missile defense command and control center which will play a pivotal role in detecting and attacking missiles from North Korea. Prompt detection and precision attack will determine performance of a Korean style missile defense.

2) Building Peace Regime

One of incentives that will require careful coordination not only among South Korea, United States, and Japan, but will also require China's

involvement will be building peace regime on the peninsula. But this discussion, if it were to ever develop, would likely be principally among the two Koreas, China and the United States, presenting another challenge to trilateral coordination among South Korea, the United States, and Japan: although the United States, Japan, and South Korea share substantially the same hopes and vision for peace and stability on the peninsula, Japan's absence from talks on peace regime, even despite its direct interest in ensuring that the peninsula remains a favorable environment for Japan's security, could result in some frictions or tensions among South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

For this reason, any concrete movement toward peace and confidence building on the Korean peninsula would likely require prior understanding both between the United States and South Korea and with Japan, if the ultimate outcome of a peace building process involving reconciliation on the Korean peninsula is to also achieve regional stability. In fact, the ultimate outcome of such a process would likely require accompanying strategic understandings and structures among all parties in Northeast Asia in order to ensure that peace on the Korean peninsula also results in regional stability.

3) Economic Cooperation Measures

Economic incentives and cooperation may be used trilaterally to induce North Korean cooperation and integration with the outside world. However, thus far it is hard to argue that economic cooperation measures have been effective as a quid pro quo with North Korea to achieve specific political or diplomatic objectives. Instead, the question is whether economic engagement efforts can be used to achieve internal economic transformation

within North Korea and North Korea's integration with the international community. A major obstacle to the use of economic engagement for such purposes has been North Korea's own unwillingness to view economic incentives from others as requiring North Korean concessions or quid pro quos. In addition, there are serious political obstacles in South Korea, the United States, and Japan to the use of economic cooperation as a mechanism for engaging with North Korea absent a resolution of the nuclear question.

At the same time, South Korea has actively utilized economic cooperation as a carrot as part of a vision for how South Korea would engage with a denuclearized North Korea. It is likely that if the six party joint statement, for instance, were implemented, Japan and the United States would move toward diplomatic normalization, a process that would relieve obstacles to economic engagement by those two countries with North Korea. In the case of Japan, economic engagement with North Korea would presumably include the provision of up to \$10 billion in loans and assistance to North Korea, in line with the amount of economic assistance that Japan offered to South Korea in the context of diplomatic normalization in 1965. The United States would be unlikely to offer specific economic benefits to the North, but would be instrumental in enabling North Korea to access loans and grants from international financial institutions.

Moreover, an economic cooperation based approach by the South Korea, United States, and Japan would be in line with China's preferred approach to dealing with North Korea. Such an approach would be designed to effect North Korea's economic transformation gradually and would presumably diminish or eliminate the conflict between North Korea and its neighbors. But concerted economic engagement with North Korea would have to

require a level of transformation to be effective that would surely threaten the current North Korean leadership. It would also carry with it risks in the initial stage of the process that the leadership may find ways to subvert the aims of economic engagement by using cash to strengthen its capacities to threaten neighbors, both through the expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities. The additional risk lies in the possibility that resources intended to promote economic change in North Korea might be subverted so as to prolong the life of the North Korean regime, without bringing about fundamental changes.

In a sense, these risks are reflected in the current reality as long as China pursues economic engagement, regardless of the policies of South Korea, Japan, and the United States. But it is very hard for South Korea, the United States, and Japan to pursue such policies without firm assurance that they will result in the neutralization of the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

4) Economic aid and Humanitarian Assistance

Under normal circumstances, economic aid and humanitarian assistance would not necessarily be linked to diplomatic strategy or coordinated as part of an approach to North Korea, but the historical record shows that in the North Korean case, economic aid and humanitarian assistance have been closely linked to diplomatic strategy toward North Korea among South Korea, Japan, and the United States and that failures to coordinate respective approaches have resulted in frictions or irritation among the three countries. Therefore, the questions of whether to tie humanitarian assistance to improved political relations and how to coordinate approaches to humanitarian assistance among South Korea, the United States, and

Japan have been questions that have drawn considerable time and attention among policymakers.

On principle, humanitarian aid should be based on need, not political circumstances, yet North Korea's insistence on linking aid to political dialogue has meant that aid decisions toward North Korea are inherently political. In addition, the nature of inter-Korean relations as well as Japan-DPRK relations has also meant that aid decisions are difficult to disassociate with politics. At different points in time, there may be a need to broad coordination of the three countries policies on aid and assistance toward North Korea, but the nature of these decisions is viewed through differing political contexts in each country, making it difficult to coordinate too closely on anything other than the overall direction and timing of assistance.

China has not been an active participant in aid coordination discussions at a multilateral level, despite the fact that there is also an international dimension to aid delivery to North Korea to the extent that the UN World Food Program has taken the lead as a primary delivery mechanism for such assistance. China's assistance has primarily been bilateral and has been used in support of its own national objectives and conditions vis-à-vis North Korea.

From the perspective of humanitarian response, one might argue that enhanced coordination of assistance to North Korea would be highly valuable in the event of a renewed food crisis in the country. But the fact that each country has used bilateral assistance for its own purposes suggests that there will always be inherent limits in the extent to which it is possible to expect close coordination of humanitarian policies toward North Korea.

5) Sanctions and Interdiction

Sanctions may be coordinated trilaterally in an attempt to punish or deter North Korea. Coercive measures authorized under UN Security Council resolutions condemning North Korea's missile and nuclear test include international sanctions and interdiction measures designed to deter North Korean proliferation of nuclear-related materials. The purposes of the measures are both punitive and designed to deter North Korean proliferation activities, including North Korean nuclear and missile development. Since they are measures authorized under UN resolutions, China has agreed to the language of the resolutions and has an obligation to implement sanctions measures authorized under the resolutions. On this basis, one might expect China to undertake efforts to implement the sanctions, but it appears that China has interpreted its obligations under the resolutions narrowly or has failed to tighten its own monitoring efforts sufficiently to guarantee or effectively deter North Korean trade in items banned under the resolutions.

South Korea, the United States, and Japan, as nations most likely to be directly affected by North Korean nuclear developments or nuclear proliferation, have a special motivation for trilateral coordination to ensure effective implementation of the authorized sanctions and the effective interdiction of North Korean nuclear-related materials. All three countries should reiterate their commitment to implement the resolutions and strengthen their capacities and monitoring efforts accordingly. Just as the Yeonpyeong Island shelling resulted in a joint statement from foreign ministers of the three countries, one might expect solidarity and coordination at the UN to strengthen counter-proliferation and sanctions measures in line with implementation of the UN Security Council

resolutions. Each country individually has undertaken national efforts to enforce sanctions, in Japan's case going beyond what is necessary to comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Trilateral coordination no doubt enhances the likelihood of effectiveness of sanctions implementation.

But trilateral implementation of sanctions may ultimately prove to be insufficient if China's narrow interpretation of the resolutions leaves space for North Korea to escape punishment intended under the resolutions. This is in fact what appears to be happening based on the two reports of the panel of experts tasked with monitoring implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874. Moreover, since China has made a decision in the summer of 2009 to view its relationship with North Korea as a strategic relationship, the likelihood that China will aggressively enforce or implement sanctions under the UN resolutions is low. As a result of differences in the level of priority accorded to implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, there will be limitations in the effectiveness of the sanctions as an instrument to achieve either punishment or deterrence of North Korea.

In addition to implementation of specific sanctions on North Korea that might go beyond the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolutions, South Korea, the United States, and Japan are all participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a multilateral voluntary institutional arrangement dedicated to enhancing cooperation to block supply of illicit nuclear and fissile materials. This form of cooperation among these three countries and others who have joined PSI is designed to aggressively implement counter-proliferation activities within the constraints of international law. PSI has shown some possible deterrent effects in combination with the

UN Security Council resolutions, particularly as it has related to the tracking of North Korean suspicious shipments to Myanmar and other countries. There have been two public cases in which U.S. tracking of North Korean shipments to Myanmar has resulted in a decision by North Korean ships to return to port without completing cargo deliveries.

However, the effectiveness of PSI is limited to the active and voluntary participation of its membership, which to date does not include China. Active monitoring of North Korean maritime shipments consistent with PSI has achieved some effects in terms of deterring North Korea suspicious shipments, but more could be done with China's active cooperation and participation in PSI. The same conclusion might hold for implementation of financial sanctions designed to deter North Korean trade suspected of involving fissile materials. PSI appears to have shown limited results, but those results would be enhanced if China were a direct participant in these activities, augmenting the effects of trilateral/multilateral coordination.

북한 비핵화 : 한 · 미 · 일 3자 협력을 중심으로

김영호, 이석수, 스콧 스나이더

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북한 비핵화 : 한·미·일 3자 협력을 중심으로

김영호, 이석수, 스콧 스나이더

제1장 서론

- 1990년대 초 북한의 핵비확산협정 탈퇴선언으로 야기된 1차 핵위기가 도래한 이래 북한 핵폐기를 위한 다양한 방안들이 동원되었으나 현재까지 북한 핵프로그램을 철폐하는데 실패
- 북한 핵문제 해결을 위한 접근방식으로는 강압접근방식과 온건접근방식이 존재
 - 강압접근방식은 군사공격, 제재 등의 방법을 동원
 - 온건접근방식은 평화협정 체결, 경제협력 및 원조제공, 인도적 지원, 외교정상화 등 방안을 활용
- 한국, 미국, 일본, 중국 등 관련국들은 ‘협상과 대화를 통한 북한 핵문제의 평화적 해결’이라는 공통된 입장을 견지
- 북한 핵문제의 협상을 통한 평화적 해결을 위해 미국과 그 동맹국인 한국과 일본의 3자 협력이 대단히 긴급
 - 단순화하면 북한 핵협상은 북한의 핵폐기 의무와 그에 대한 관련국(6자 회담 회원국인 한국, 미국, 일본, 중국, 러시아 등)의 보상을 상호교환하는 구도를 형성
 - 대 북한 협상을 유도하고 협상 시 협상력을 제고하기 위한 방안의 하나로 3자 협력이 매우 중요

- 북한 핵문제 해결을 위한 3자 협력은 협상의 단계에 따라 다양한 필요성을 제기
 - 북한이 협상에 응하지 않을 경우, 3자 간에 조율된 유인수단과 압박수단을 활용해서 북한이 회담에 응하도록 유도
 - 북한이 회담에 응할 때, 최상의 협상안을 마련하기 위해 3자간에 긴밀히 정책을 공조
 - 북한과 협상안에 합의 시, 협상안에 명시된 유인책을 북한에 제공하기 위해 3국이 협조
 - 북한이 핵/미사일 시험발사 등과 같은 도발 시, 3국이 철저한 공조 하에 경제제재와 같은 조치를 단행

- 이처럼, 북한 핵문제를 협상을 통해 평화적으로 해결하는데 한, 미, 일 3자협력의 영향이 지대

- 그동안 미국이 3자 협력에 가장 적극적 입장을 견지하고 주도적으로 논의하고 추진
 - 학계에서는 한, 미, 일 3국간 협력관계를 '실질적(virtual)' 동맹, '준동맹(quasi-alliance)'으로 격상시켜야 한다고 주장
 - 그러나 미국은 한국 및 일본과 양자동맹체제를 유지하고 있으나 한국과 일본이 역사문제, 영토분쟁 등으로 관계를 발전시키기 어려운 상황을 인정

- 냉전시대에도 공산진영의 군사적 위협에 대응하기 위한 능력을 제고하는 측면에서 한, 미, 일 3자 협력을 강조

- 최근 3자 협력에 대한 논의가 활기를 띠면서 3자 협력의 범위를 확대하자는 주장이 대두

- 한, 미, 일 3국의 안보·군사협력 강화 필요성이 제기되는 한편, 3자 협력의 이슈를 북한 핵문제에 제한하는 것이 아니라 북한의 급변사태(contingency), 북한의 재래식 군사도발을 포함, 비확산, 대테러, 자연재해, 위기, 전염병, 해상안보, 경제, 실패국가 등으로 확대할 것을 주장
- 본 연구는 논의의 범위를 3자 협력을 북한 핵문제 해결을 위한 방안으로 제한
- 냉전이 해체되고 북한 핵문제가 대두되면서 3자 협력에 대한 전략적 필요성이 증대
- 90년대 3자 협력의 전략적 필요성이 제네바 핵합의 이행과정에서 구체화
 - 1994년 합의한 대로 북한에 경수로 2기를 제공하기 위해 한, 미, 일, EU는 한반도에너지개발기구(KEDO)를 창설
- 1999년 한, 미, 일 3국이 북한 핵문제를 효과적으로 해결하기 위해 3자 협력의 제도화 수준을 격상
 - 1999년 3국은 북한 핵문제에 대한 3국 정책공조를 위한 협의를 위한 창구로서 3자 대북정책조정감독그룹(TCOG)을 구성
- 부시 행정부 출범 이후 대북강경정책을 채택함에 따라 3자 협력이 다소 위축
- 북한의 핵 및 미사일 시험발사, 재래식 군사도발 등으로 인해 3자 협력의 필요성이 증가하고 3자 협력 노력이 증가
- 특히 오바마 행정부가 3자 협력에 적극적 관심을 표명하고 일본도 3자 협

력에 대해 적극적 입장으로 선회

- 본 연구의 목적을 북한 핵문제 해결을 위한 3자 협력에 대한 한, 미, 일 3국의 입장을 고찰하고 3자 협력의 정책적 효율성을 제고하는 방안을 모색하는 것으로 설정
- 본 연구는 크게 네 부분으로 구성
 - 첫째, 한국의 입장
 - 둘째, 미국의 입장
 - 셋째, 일본의 입장
 - 마지막으로 관련방안의 효율성 제고를 위한 정책제안

제2장 한국의 입장

- 세 가지 주요요인이 한국의 3자 협력에 대한 입장과 정책을 결정
 - 첫째, 미국의 입장과 주도권, 둘째, 한국정부의 대 북한정책, 셋째, 한국과 일본의 양자관계
 - 물론 전반적 전략환경, 북한의 태도 및 행동 등 변수도 영향을 미치고 있으나 언급한 세 가지 요소의 영향력이 큰 것으로 파악
- 김영삼 정부는 미국의 클린턴 행정부와 정책 공조를 추진하였으나 양국 간 다소 마찰도 발생
 - 클린턴 행정부는 북한 핵문제를 북미문제로 파악하고 북미 양자협상을 추진
 - 김영삼 정부는 북한 핵문제 협상에서 배제되었으나 최우선 목표로 북한 핵문제의 평화적 해결을 설정하고 북미합의와 북미합의 이행을 전적으

로 지원

- 김영삼 정부의 대북정책은 일관성이 결여되어 대북 ‘널뛰기’정책이라는 비판에 직면
 - 취임 직후, 민족보다 우선하는 것은 없다며 비전향 장기수 이인모를 조 건 없이 송환하는 파격적 화해정책을 추진
 - 한편, 북한의 NPT 탈퇴 및 핵 위기 조성에 대해 매우 강경하게 대처
- 김영삼 정부(1993-1997) 당시 KEDO 구성을 통해 3자 협력이 가시화 되 었으나 4자 회담(남북한, 중국, 미국), 한미 정책공조 등과 병행
- 김영삼 정부는 미국이 북한 핵문제 해결을 적극적으로 주도하여 1994년 제네바 핵합의를 도출하고 이를 이행하던 시기로서 3자 협력은 3국 간 핵 합의 보상제공 비용 분담을 논의하고 이를 이행하는데 집중
- 김대중 정부는 클린턴 행정부와 긴밀하고 우호적인 관계를 유지하면서 북 한 핵문제의 평화적 해결을 위해 공조
 - 클린턴 행정부는 제네바 핵합의에 입각한 북한 핵문제 해결을 원칙으로 설정하고 핵합의 이행 및 북한의 태도 및 행동 변화에 대비하기 위해 적 극적으로 한, 미, 일 3자 협력을 추진
 - 유사한 정치성향을 지니는 두 정부는 정책이전에 이념적 유대감을 견지 하면서 대북 정책과 3자 협력을 조율
- 클린턴 행정부는 북한 핵문제 해결을 위해 3국 협력이 긴요하다는 인식하 에 3국 정책을 협의하고 조율하는 3자 회의를 수시로 개최하고 TCOG를 창설하는 등 3자 협력을 적극적으로 주도하고 김대중 정부는 이에 적극 협조

- 김대중 정부는 이전 보수 정부와 달리 대북 포용정책을 일관적으로 추진
 - 대북 포용정책을 기조로 하는 햇볕정책은 남북한 대립보다는 협력을 추구하고 남북한 교류협력을 통해 남북이 평화적으로 공존하며 궁극적으로 실질적 남북한 통일을 지향
 - 특히 북한 핵문제에 대해서는 협상을 통해 평화적으로 해결한다는 확고한 의지를 보유했다

- 김대중 정부는 특히 일본과 관계개선을 위해 노력
 - 김대중 대통령은 1998년 일본 후쿠다 총리와 한일 정상회담을 개최하고 한일 양국의 과거사에서 벗어나 미래지향적 관계를 구축할 것을 선언함에 따라 한일관계 발전의 토대를 마련

- 미국의 주도, 한국 정부의 대북 정책, 한-일 관계 등 3자 협력에 영향을 미치는 세 가지 요인을 검토할 때, 김대중 정부가 가장 호의적인 3자 협력조건을 구비

- 진보적 노무현 정부는 출범과 더불어 2차 북한 핵위기라는 복잡한 대북 핵 협상상황에 직면
 - 2002년 미국 동아태차관보 켈리의 미국 방문에서 북한의 우리농 농축프로그램에 대한 문제를 제기
 - 부시 행정부는 북한이 제네바 핵합의를 위반하면서 은밀히 고농축 우라늄 프로그램을 추진하고 있다고 거의 확정적으로 의심
 - 미국과 북한은 서로 제네바 핵합의 위반을 비난하면서 2차 핵위기 상황을 초래

- 미국의 부시 행정부는 대북 포괄적 접근을 주장하였으나 클린턴 행정부와 차별화를 위해 좀 더 강경한 대북 정책을 추진

- 북한이 제네바 핵합의를 위반했다고 주장하면서 대북 중유지원을 중단하고 북한은 NPT에서 탈퇴함으로써 미국과 북한의 대립과 긴장이 고조
- 노무현 정부는 한미동맹 재조정을 모색
 - 기본적으로 한미동맹을 재조정해서 한국의 정책적 자율성(autonomy)을 높일 수 있기를 희망
 - 중국이 급부상하고 있는 동북아 안보상황을 고려, 한국이 균형자 역할을 통해 동북아에서 제2의 냉전이 도래하는 것을 저지하는 방안을 적극적으로 탐색
- 미국의 대북 강경정책, 한국의 자주적 방위능력 강화와 한미동맹 재조정 모색, 중국의 부상 등으로 인해 한미 공조가 조금 이완되는 결과를 초래
- 부시 행정부의 대북 강경정책과 한미 동맹재조정에 대한 협의 등에 따라 미국의 3자 협력 주도력이 다소 약화되었으나 한국과 미국은 3자 협력 증진의 필요성에 공감하고 3자 협력을 증진하기 위해 지속적으로 노력
- 노무현 정부의 대북 ‘평화변영정책’은 햇볕정책과 마찬가지로 대북 포용 정책으로서 남북관계를 개선하고 핵문제를 평화적으로 해결하는 것을 목표로 설정
- 이에 따라 노무현 정부는 한, 미, 일 3국의 협력에 적극 참여해서 대북 핵 협상을 증진시키고자 노력
- 노무현 정부는 일본 정부와 과거사 문제, 역사 교과서 문제, 독도문제, 야스쿠니 신사참배 등 한일 갈등 이슈가 빈번히 대두됨에 따라 한일관계의 발전을 도모하기 어려운 상황에 직면

- 김대중 정부가 미래지향적 한일관계 구축을 목표로 한일관계를 개선한 반면, 노무현 정부에서는 한일 갈등국면이 자주 발생
- 노무현 정부가 남북한 관계진전을 통해 핵문제 해결에 좀 더 적극적 역할을 지향하면서 대북 핵협상에서 한국의 역할과 영향력이 증대
 - 한국과 북한 당국자 간 빈번한 접촉이 3자 협력과 6자 회담에서 한국의 역할을 제고
- 2차 북한 핵위기 도래로 3자 협력의 역할이 변화
 - 제네바 핵합의 이행체제 하에서 3자 협력은 먼저, 북한의 핵합의 이행상황과 태도 및 행동 등에 대해 3국이 협의하고 긴밀한 정책공조를 유지하는 방안으로 기능
 - 2차 핵위기와 제네바 핵합의체제 붕괴로 인해 핵문제 해결을 위한 협상창구로서 6자 회담이 신설
- 2003년 6자회담이 신설되자, 6자 회담이 주도적 역할을 하는 한편, 3자 협력은 6자 회담에서 한미일 협상력을 제고하기 위한 보조적 역할을 수행하는 것으로 변화
- 결과적으로 한미관계의 재조정, 부시 행정부의 대북 강경정책, 한일관계의 긴장, 6자 회담의 출범 등으로 인해 3자 협력이 역할 변화와 함께 다소 위축
- 이명박 정부는 부시 행정부와 우호적 관계를 유지하고 한미동맹을 강화
 - 보수적인 이명박 정부와 부시 행정부는 기본적으로 유사한 정치이념을 공유
 - 이명박 정부는 노무현 정부 하에서 한미관계가 악화되었다는 평가에 입

각, 한미동맹 강화를 최우선 과제로 추진

- 따라서 이명박 정부는 미국과 긴밀한 우호관계를 유지하면서 대북 핵협상을 위한 6자 회담과 3자 협력에서 미국의 주도적 역할에 협조
- 이명박 정부는 대북 포용정책이 북한이 핵능력을 강화하는데 부분적으로 기여했다는 평가에 기초해서 북한의 핵폐기 노력을 강력히 촉구하고 남북 관계의 상호주의원칙을 강조하는 대북 정책을 지향
- 이명박 정부는 노무현 정부 하에서 손상된 한일관계를 다소 개선
- 이명박 정부는 한미공조 강화, 대북 강경정책 선회, 한일관계 개선 등으로 인해 3자 협력의 호의적 상황을 조성
- 특히 북한의 핵 및 미사일 시험발사, 핵활동 재개, 군사도발 등이 3자 협력의 새로운 모멘텀을 제공해서 3자 협력을 강화

제3장 미국의 입장

- 미국은 1994년 제네바 핵합의 체결 이후 대북 협상력과 핵합의 이행 협조를 위해 3자 협력을 적극 주도하면서 TCOG을 창설
- 부시 행정부는 대북 핵협상의 새로운 채널로서 6자 회담을 출범시키고 3자 회담을 부수적으로 활용하는 정책으로 전환
- 오바마 행정부는 북한의 잘못된 행동을 보상할 수 없다는 원칙을 고수하

면서 전략적 인내라는 정책을 견지

- 2008년 12월 이후 6자 회담이 중단된 상황에서 북한 핵문제 해결을 위해 오바마 행정부는 긴밀한 3자 협력의 필요성을 강조
- 북한의 천안함 및 연평도 도발 이후 한, 미, 일 3자 협력이 더욱 강화되어 3국은 긴밀한 협의와 정책 공조를 진행

제4장 일본의 입장

- 냉전 해체 이후 일본은 일북 국교정상화를 추진하면서 미일 양자회담에 치중
- 북한 핵문제 부상 이후 일본은 KEDO에 참여해서 제네바 핵합의의 원만한 이행을 위해 재정적으로 기여
- 2000년대 초 남북한 및 미북의 양자접촉이 강화된 상황에서 고이즈미 총리는 다시 일북관계 개선을 위한 독자적 노력을 전개
 - 2002년 일북 정상회담을 개최해서 핵과 미사일 문제, 일본인 납치문제, 경제협력 및 지원 등을 논의
- 정상회담 이후 북한의 일본인 납치문제가 최대 정치현안으로 대두되어 일본의 대북정책의 강경화를 촉진
- 북한의 핵과 미사일 위협을 완화·제거하고 중국의 부상을 견제하기 위해 3자 협력에 보다 적극적으로 참여

제5장 결론 : 정책제안

- 북한 핵문제에 대한 접근방식은 크게 억지와 협상으로 분류
 - 억지는 재래식 억지와 핵 억지가 있으며 북한 핵 억지를 위한 방안은 확장적 억지, 방어, 기습타격능력 등을 포함
 - 북한이 핵프로그램을 보유하고 있는 상황에서 비핵보유 국가인 한국과 일본은 미국의 '확정적 억지' 보장이 필요
 - 또한 북한 핵위협을 억지하는 방안으로 미사일 방어가 필요
 - 재래식 억지를 위한 능력을 우선 양자동맹체제에 의존
 - 북한 핵문제 해결을 위한 다른 접근방식은 협상으로서 이는 유인과 강압의 방안을 포함
 - 유인책은 평화협정체결, 국교정상화, 경제협력 및 원조, 인도적 지원 등을 포함
 - 강경책은 경제제재와 차단 등을 포함
 - 한국, 미국, 일본은 북한이 핵을 폐기하도록 핵 협상력을 제고하기 위해 다양한 방안에 대한 협의와 공조를 진행할 필요성 증가
- 중국의 부상으로 인해 3자 협력의 조건이 급격히 변화
 - 이전에는 북한을 대상으로 3자 협력의 효율성을 극대화하는 방안을 강구하는 것으로 충분
 - 현재 대북 핵협상에서 중국이 차지하는 비중과 영향력이 증가해서 북한과 함께 중국도 3자 협력의 대상으로 고려
 - 중국의 이익을 침해하지 않아야 한, 미, 일 3국의 정책공조와 협력이 효율성을 확보

- 본 보고서는 3자 협력의 효율을 높이기 위한 정책방안으로서 평화협정 체결, 경제협력, 경제 및 인도적 지원, 제재 및 차단을 설정
- 북한은 핵폐기 조건으로서 한반도 평화협정 체결을 꾸준히 요구하기 때문에 핵협상 진행에서 평화협정문제가 중요하게 부상
 - 평화협정을 남북한, 미국, 중국이 논의한다는 기본형식은 불변
 - 이러한 구도 하에서 자칫 일본이 소외감을 느껴 3자 협력이 이완될 수 있는 가능성 잠재
 - 따라서 형식적 구도를 유지하되 일본과 긴밀한 협의를 통해 한미의 대북중 협상력을 강화하고 일본과 3자 협력 증진의 계기로 활용
- 3자 협력 구도 하에 대북 경제협력을 협의하고 및 조율
 - 3국이 북한과 공동으로 경제협력을 추진하는 데 아직 여러 가지 장애가 존재
 - 양자적 구도에서 경제협력을 개별적으로 추진될 가능성이 높다는 점을 감안해서 양자간 관계의 경제협력도 3국 간에 최대한 조율될 수 있도록 노력
 - 북한과 양자관계 틀에서 진행되는 경제협력도 북한 핵문제 해결에 도움이 되는 방향으로 3국이 협의 및 조율하는 것이 필요
- 경제지원 및 인도적 지원
 - 북한 핵무기개발프로그램 보유와 북한 경제난이 대 북한 경제지원 환경을 조성
 - 북한이 핵개발을 포기하지 않는 한 대 북한 경제지원을 무조건적으로 제공하는 데 어려움 상존
 - 북한이 핵을 포기하도록 유도하면서 북한이 경제난을 극복할 수 있도록 지원하는 방안을 3국이 협의 및 모색하는 것이 필요

○ 경제제재 및 차단

- 군사옵션을 배제할 경우, 경제제재는 북한을 강압할 수 있는 유일한 효과적 방안
- 경제제재는 UN을 통한 제재와 일방적 제재의 유형이 동시에 존재
- 중국이 국제적 제재 합의에 동참할 때 제재 효과를 강화
- 일방적 제재의 경우에도 북한 핵문제 해결에 도움이 될 수 있도록 3국이 공조
- PSI와 같은 차단방안도 북한을 압박할 수 있는 효과적 옵션이 될 수 있도록 협의

유의사항

1. 본 연구보고서 내용은 연구진의 개인적인 견해이며 소속 기관의 공식적인 견해가 아닙니다.
2. 본 연구보고서는 정책입안시 참고자료로만 활용하고 타 기관에 불필요한 자료유출을 삼가하여 주시기 바랍니다.

국제공동연구프로젝트

인쇄일	2011년 11월
발행일	2011년 11월
발간등록번호	11-290412-000077-10
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