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
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I-1	Negotiation Strategies for Denuclearization of North Korea -- 1 Jaechun Kim (Sogang University)
I-2	Analyzing North Korea's Denuclearization Negotiation: Focusing on Structure and Dynamics ----- 15 Kyengho Son (Korea National Defense University)
II-1	US Extended Deterrence in the Korean Peninsula after NPR 2018: Comparison with the NPR 2010 ----- 35 Hyun-Wook Kim (Korea National Diplomatic Academy)
II-2	Comparison of Extended Nuclear Deterrence between Europe and Asia Challenges and opportunities for extended deterrence in the age of Trump ----- 49 Emmanulle Maître (Strategic Research Foundation)
II-3	Rethinking of the Extended Deterrence in Europe and Asia: As alike as two peas in a pod or as different as chalk and cheese? ----- 69 Yunmi Choi (Korea National Defense University)
III-1	The Impact of NK nuclear capability on the region and the regional prospect of strategic stability ----- 89 Tae-Hyung Kim (Soongsil University)

III-2	China's regional governance strategy in Northeast Asia and implications on the Korean peninsula -----	105
	Alice Ekman (French Institute of International Relations)	
III-3	The Impact of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons -----	121
	Hanbyeol Sohn (korea National Defense University)	
IV-1	A Thought on North Korea's Nuclear Strategy -----	141
	Kang Choi (The Asan Institute for Policy Studies)	
IV-2	North Korean Nuclear Capability and Nuclear Strategy ----	149
	Taehyun Kim (korea National Defense University)	



Negotiation Strategies for Denuclearization of North Korea

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Negotiation Strategies for Denuclearization of North Korea

I. Introduction

At the time of writing this report, denuclearization talk with North Korea seemed to have hit the dead-end. Early in 2018, North Korea expressed its willingness to come to the denuclearization talk with the US. South Korea's national security advisor Chung Eui Yong personally relayed this message to the American President Donald Trump in early May, after which Trump spontaneously decided to hold the summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun in June. Subsequently, negotiations between the US and North Korea have been under way to determine the roadmap of North Korea's denuclearization and the timetable for it. Initially, the Trump administration was upbeat about the prospect of swift denuclearization of North Korea. American national security advisor John Bolton even mentioned that it would be possible to apply "Libyan model" of denuclearization to North Korea. This so-called Libyan model encountered serious resistance from North Korea, and given the complexity of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles programs, the US came to realize that it was not technically viable to complete the denuclearization process as Libya did in 2014. North Korea was adamant about following the step-by-step gradualist approach to denuclearization to which the Trump administration eventually agreed. Nonetheless, the US and North Korea have yet to decide which country will have to take which step first. The objective of this report is to recommend negotiation strategies that can guide North Korea into the path of denuclearization.

To recommend negotiation strategies for North Korea's denuclearization, it is necessary to assess the motivations behind North Korea's decades-long nuclear weapons program. It is also important to analyze the reasons why North Korean regime decided to come to the negotiation table in early 2018. What follows is the analysis of objectives of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and factors that compelled North Korean regime to engage in denuclearization talk with the US. Against the backdrop of such analysis, this report recommends negotiation strategies for North Korea's denuclearization.

II. Objectives of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

The majority of explanations identifies the end of the cold war and security threats that North Korea felt after the end of the cold war as the major cause of the North Korea nuclear crisis. They claim that the demise of the Cold War international order posed an existential threat to the communist North. When the Cold War came to an end, South Korea quickly normalized diplomatic relations with Russia and China in 1990 and 1992, but the North was not able to mend fences with the US. After losing Soviet patronage, the North had no option but to turn to nuclear weapons program to ensure the regime survival. Most experts seem to agree that North Korea's aspiration to secure regime survival has driven their nuclear weapons and missiles program. Interestingly, this explanation is identical with North Korea's official explanation. North Korean regime insisted repeatedly that their nuclear weapons program is to protect their regime from hostile policies of the US, more specifically to deter military attack of the imperialistic Americans. Therefore, North Korea took great pains to convince the international community that their nuclear weapons program is defensive in nature.

But there is something wrong about this explanation. First, North Korea's nuclear program goes way back, as early as 1950, long before the cold war ended. Second, North Korea obtained enough of deterrent capabilities against the US several years ago when they successfully tested atomic bombs and short and medium-range ballistic missiles. That is to say, North Korea obtained at least minimum deterrent capabilities against the US during the 2000s. The nuclear weapon North Korea tested in September 2017 was a hydrogen bomb. Hwasong 15 North Korea test-fired in November 2017 was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the range of reaching the entire territory of the US. This calls into the question the defensive nature of North Korean nuclear program. A growing number of experts believe that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is offensive in nature. North Korea's nuclear weapons are not targeting the US; rather they are aiming South Korea. The objective of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs is not just to deter first military strike against the North but also to incapacitate the South, because the richer and freer Korea in the South poses a fundamental threat to the poorer and repressive North.

The founding father of the North, Kim Il-sung said, on several occasions, that “to prevail in the second Korean War, North Korea should develop military capabilities with which it can prevent the intervention of the US.”¹⁾ Obtaining military capability to prevent American participation in the Korean peninsular conflict has been consistently an important part of North Korea’s strategy since the Korea War ended in 1953. With nuclear weapons in their hands, North Korea believes they can gain substantial strategic advantages over the South. For starters, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ICBM can weaken the US alliance commitments to the South by placing the US in a dilemma-like situation where the US may have to risk L.A. to come to the rescue of the South in case of major military conflicts on the Korea peninsula. Nuclear-free South Korea will not be able to act assertively to retaliate against the nuclear North’s conventional military provocations. If this latter explanation is valid, normalization of the relationship between North Korea and the US will come short of denuclearizing North Korea. Peace agreement between North Korea and the US will not be good enough of incentive to disarm North Korea. The ongoing nuclear negotiation with the North is a testing ground for competing explanations of North Korea’s nuclear intentions.

III. What Brought North Korea to Negotiation?

North Korean regime had long refused the “denuclearization” talk. What the regime wanted was “arms reduction” talk with the US as equal nuclear powers. Nevertheless, North Korean regime changed this position and decided to come to “denuclearization” talk in early 2018, although what the North means by denuclearization is different from the notion of denuclearization adopted by the US and South Korea. What changed their mind? What brought the North to the negotiation table? Some pundits say that their decision to come to the denuclearization negotiation was a part of their master plan. North Korea declared that they completed “nuclear power” last year when they successfully tested Hwasong 15. With the confidence of nuclear power, North Korea

1) Michael J. Zagurek, Jr., “A Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul and Tokyo: The Human Cost of War on the Korean Peninsula,” 38th North, <http://www.38north.org/> 2017/10/mzagurek100417/(Search Date: 2018. 1. 5).

now wants to complete the other part of *Byongjin* strategy, which is economic development. What is troubling with this explanation is that the explanation cannot explain why North Korea agreed to hold “denuclearization” talk instead of “arms reduction” talk. It cannot explain why North Korea raised the stake by testing hydrogen bomb and ICBM to the extent that they invited “maximum pressure” campaign of the US. Besides, if nuclear weapon is the source of North Korea’s confidence, it is less likely for the North to give up the nuclear weapons.

Second line of explanation emphasizes the importance of “maximum pressure” campaign of the US. Maximum pressure has been multi-dimensional in nature to the extent that DIMEFIL(Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement) entered the vernacular of American foreign policy making circle.²⁾A recent Bank of Korea report shows that the North Korean economy suffered a sharp decline in 2017. That sharp decline was a sign that the maximum pressure particularly in the form of economic sanction on North Korea was taking effect. North Korea’s economy had been steadily improving by more than 3 percentage points annually measured in terms of GDP, since Kim Jong Eun came into power. But in year 2017 when the pressure of international sanctions had been at its height, North Korea’s GDP decreased by 3.5 percentage points, and this was the worst performance since 1997 when North Korea suffered 6.5 percentage negative growth. North Korea’s mining industry was hit hard by the export restrictions, and also restrictions on oil imports had been very painful. Above all, China’s participation in the sanction had been very crucial, since 90 percent of North Korea’s trade is China dependent. It seems quite certain that sanctions and economic woes that they caused had been one of the most important reasons why they came to the negotiation table. North Korea’s economy was not on the verge of bankruptcy because of the sanctions, but it was obvious that the economy was experiencing downward trend because of sanctions. If the situation continued, the economy could end up in bankruptcy. This concern for the economy must have brought North Korea to the denuclearization talk.

2) North Korea was becoming diplomatically due to DIMEFIL. European countries joined the campaign to isolate the North diplomatically. Mason Richey, “New Developments in North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Implications for European Security,” Policy/Brief (Institute for European Studies), 2016/11 (May 2016), p.2

If the concern for the economy has compelled the North to come to the negotiation table, it is important to keep the sanctions regime intact. However, stakeholder countries have different views about the objectives of sanctions and the means to achieve them. To keep the sanctions effective, it is very important for the major stakeholder countries to sort out these differences. Now that North Korea has come back to the negotiation table, China claims that the international community should ease the sanctions. To Chinese, denuclearization is not an immediate concern of Chinese. China favors a long and drawn-out process of denuclearization. Nonetheless, China favors a speedy approach to establish a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. By accelerating talks to declare an end to the Korean War and to sign a peace treaty that can replace armistice deal, Beijing can weaken the ROK-US security alliance and roll back American military assets from South Korea including United States Forces in Korea (USFK). The objective of sanction to the US is to break the will of North Korea and steer the North into the path of denuclearization. The US does not intend to bring down the regime in North Korea by maintaining sanctions, but the US certainly wants the North to come clean about the nuclear weapons program. South Korea's position is that North Korea will have to make sincere efforts to denuclearize, but Seoul also wants to restart inter-Korean economic cooperation projects that have been suspended due to escalated tension over the Korean peninsula. Unlike the US, South Korea is more prepared to move forward with building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula regardless of the progress in North Korea's denuclearization. South Korean government claims that North Korea's intention to denuclearize is sincere, but remains silent on how the international community can measure North Korea's sincerity. Given the differences concerning the objectives of sanctions and sincerity of North Korea, it is important for the stakeholder countries to have discussion channels to sort out these differences. Otherwise, nuclear negotiation with North would bring about positive outcomes.

It is particularly important for ROK and the US to coordinate policies with regard to North Korea more closely to keep the sanctions regime effective. The position of the US at this stage is not to lift sanctions. North Korea will have to take meaningful steps toward denuclearization first. Only then, will the US contemplate about easing sanctions. Officially, South Korea's policy is the same as the US, but South Korea is more prepared

to declare an end to the Korean War than is the US. There is a sign that the relation between the US and South Korea is in disarray because of the differences of opinion as to when to ease sanctions. South Korea should not move fast toward concluding a peace treaty unless North Korea takes meaningful steps toward denuclearization.

IV. Maximum Pressure as BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)

If the maximum pressure had compelled North Korea to change the course in nuclear weapons policy and to come to the negotiation table, the US should have had the upper hand during the course of negotiation. To borrow from the language of negotiation theory, the party that holds BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) should have more advantage in dictating terms of negotiation.³⁾ In this nuclear negotiation between the US and North Korea, it was the US that holds BATNA. If the negotiation between the two countries breaks down, the US could continue maximum pressure, but the North would have to return to the path of nuclear weapons and missiles, which could ruin their economy. This means that the US at least holds a “better” alternative than the North to a negotiated agreement or settlement. But the Trump administration was not able to capitalize on this advantage during the negotiation with North Korea. By finally agreeing on to hold on-again, off-again summit with the North, when the two countries were not able to work out differences with regard to the roadmap and timetable of denuclearization, the Trump administration frittered away an important opportunity to make a real progress in North Korea’s denuclearization.

Now that North Korea refuses to take any meaningful steps first toward denuclearization, what should be the negotiation strategies to denuclearize the North? First, it is important to maintain maximum pressure campaign until there is a real progress in denuclearization of North Korea. Previous negotiations with the North failed because the promise of “regime guarantee” by the US was not good enough of a leverage to

3) Walter T. Fisher, Melvin C. Ury and William E. Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 3rd edition (Penguin Book, 2011), pp.9-15.

change North Korea's nuclear weapons policy. As pointed out earlier in this report, North Korea's nuclear weapons are not to end American hostile policies; they are to incapacitate South Korea. The promise of regime guarantee was not able to incentivize the North into giving up their nuclear weapons. Therefore, during the previous negotiations in early 1990s and mid-2000s, North Korea's intention remained unchanged.⁴⁾ Rather, this time, it was the disincentive in the form of maximum pressure that changed the North's behavior. Particularly, economic sanctions proved to be effective leverage against the North. It is very important for the maximum pressure in the form of economic sanctions to remain intact to steer the North into the path of denuclearization.

Second, it is important for South Korea to stay with the US in efforts to maintain maximum pressure. In order to expedite inter-Korean exchanges and economic cooperation projects, the Moon Jae-In government requested exemptions from some international sanctions against the North. International sanctions regime against the North is already in a state of disarray because of China and Russia are siding with North Korea. If South Korea loses interests in North Korea's denuclearization and concentrates only on inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, the sanctions regime against the North could collapse, in which case it would be difficult, if not impossible, to denuclearize the North. South Korea will have to assume more proactive role to lay out the roadmap of denuclearization and timetable for it and to encourage the US and other stakeholder countries in Northeast Asia, instead of expediting the inter-Korean cooperation that requires circumvention of sanctions against the North.

Third, it might be useful to reinstall mini-multilateralism of 6 party talk ilk to coordinate the differences between stakeholder countries in dealing with North Korean nuclear issue. To change North Korea's behavior and negotiated settlement of their nuclear weapons program, it is important for the stakeholder countries to stay firmly united against the North. Mini-multilateral frameworks can bring pressures to the North Korean regime with regard to nuclear weapons program. China's participation in this

4) Elizabeth Phillip, "Resuming Negotiations with North Korea," North Korea Nuclear Policy Brief (June 24, 2016), p.4

mini-multilateral venues seems to be crucial to bring about a negotiated settlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles program.

V. Suggestions

- Shoud-Nots:
 - Do not recognize the North as nuclear state. Do not lift sanctions, unless there is a progress in denuclearization.
 - Half-measures would not work! Do not repeat past policies. Do not offer major incentives (first) to North Korea. It is the same as repeating the vicious cycle of the past.⁵⁾
 - Unless North Korea takes measurable steps to denuclearize, do not work sign a peace treaty.

- Should 1.
 - South Korea should continuously increase its own deterrence capability such as KMD (Korean Missile Defense), Kill-Chain, and KMPR (Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation).
 - South Korea and the US should cooperate more closely for nuclear deterrence. South Korea should gain more access to the operations of the US nuclear capabilities and make better use of the US 'extended deterrence'.
 - 'Nuclear Strategic Planning Group (NSPG),' Northeast Asian equivalent of Nuclear Planning Group in Western Europe, may be needed for a better coordination and concrete plans of nuclear deterrence.

5) North Korea has played the chicken game. Brinkmanship can work for the weaker player in international bargaining. Thomas C. Shelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Harvard Uni., 1960), p.200.

- Should 2. Maintain Pressures
 - Continue and strengthen the international sanctions on the North, unless the North takes the meaningful step toward denuclearization. Make sure to keep China in these efforts.
 - South Korea should exercise caution when initiating economic projects with the North so as not to undermine international sanctions against the North.
 - Make the North think that their nuclear weapons are useless. Deny the strategic advantages that come with nuclear weapons.
 - Make North Korea feel that there is nothing to gain but everything to lose with nuclear weapons. Make the North feel that the international community is vehemently against their nuclear weapons.

- Should 3. Work on Nuclear Diplomacy
 - With all the limitations, nuclear diplomacy can provide avenues through which the international community can manage North Korean nuclear problems. It also allows us to assess the North's intentions.⁶⁾
 - Caveats: Do not just resume talks for the sake of talks. Do not let the North buy time.
 - Nuclear diplomacy does not necessarily have to take the form of 6 party talk, but if China wants 6 party, the US should think about resurrecting it in more serious manner.
 - Diplomatic coordination between South Korea, the US, and China seems to be particularly important.
 - Aside from nuclear talk, South Korea should try to open arms reduction talk with the North. If North Korea changes behavior and takes steps to denuclearize, the international community may propose CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) measures.

6) Elizabeth Phillip, "Resuming Negotiations with North Korea," North Korea Nuclear Policy Brief (June 24, 2016), p.4

The suggestions included herein can be summarized as follows in <Table 1>.

APPEASEMENT	HALF MEASURES: Re-engagement with Old Incentives and Old Diplomacy	PROPER MEASURES: New-engagement with Strengthened Deterrence and Pressures	EXTREME MEASURES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nuclear Disarmament Talk with the North - 'Peace Treaty' - 'Denuclearization' Deal without Progress in Denuclearization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Providing Incentives in the Hopes that Good Behavior would Follow - Resumption of Economic Projects - Resumption of 6PT for Just Talking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start Nuclear Diplomacy with Clear Strategic Orientation - Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence - Maintain International Pressures (through Sanctions) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - South Korea's Own Nuclear Weapons Development Program - Deployment of the US Tactical Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula - Preemptive Strikes on the North's Nuclear Sites

[Table 1] Policy Options for North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Problem

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- Walter T. Fisher, Melvin C. Ury and William E. Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 3rd edition (Penguin Book, 2011), pp.9-15.
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I-2

Analyzing North Korea's Denuclearization Negotiation: Focusing on Structure and Dynamics

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Analyzing North Korea's Denuclearization Negotiation: Focusing on Structure and Dynamics

I. Introduction

It is true that negotiating with North Korea especially about denuclearization would not be an easy work. After the success of two consecutive summits, inter Korea and North and U.S., dialogue with North Korea have reached to impasse.¹⁾ As a result, South Korea dispatched a special envoy to break out current situation and get some fruitful results. As expected, the envoy brought some concrete agreements which can be regarded as important milestones on inter-Korean relationship, like the date of the third summit, as of September 18 to 20, between the two Koreas. However, it is still unclear if the summit can change the current situation and lead North Korea to denuclearization. Pessimism is prevalent over the negotiation with North Korea.

This is not a new phenomenon. The world has experienced a lot of failures in talking with North Korea. Since the first nuclear crisis in 1994, neighboring countries have tried to stop the North Korean nuclear program through negotiations. The Six Party Talk would symbolize failed efforts which had been failed due to North Korean withdrawal from the dialogue. Even some agreements were made, all agreements ended up with disillusion about North Korean sincerity and disappointment of participants. Unfortunately, the less hope for negotiation with North Korea, the more dangerous situation we have. Some new approaches should be devised to make North Korea stay at negotiating table.

The negotiation with North Korea should be considered in two dimensions. First, structure of the negotiation; the number of players. It is not a bilateral talk. There are four members who involve in the dialogue in direct and indirect ways. The U.S. and North Korea are major participants sitting at the table, however, South Korea plays

1) While this paper was under developing, South Korea and North Korea had the third summit and declared September Pyongyang Declaration on September 19, 2018.

an important role, as a driver in accordance with South Korean government's expression.²⁾ More precisely, North Korea have talks in turn, first with South Korea then with the U.S. In addition, although it has not worked in direct ways, China should be considered as a player. China has a complicated position in the negotiation; in one side it has great influence on North Korea over the negotiation, and it has competition with the U.S. over the politics of the peninsula while it has trade conflict with the U.S. as well as confrontation in South China Sea and different understanding of Taiwan. The negotiation should be understood throughout this structure.

The structural factor can decide the overall direction of the negotiation. It is conceivable that if North Korea and the U.S. have good wills to continue a dialogue, the negotiation can go smoothly. In contrast, if one of the participants wants to avoid the negotiation, the talks cannot move forward. At the same time, South Korea and China can play an important role. These two countries can facilitate or spoil the dialogue according to their own desires. To understand general direction of the negotiation, structural factor should be examined focusing on the will of four players.

Secondly, the negotiation has its own dynamics. Generally, negotiations have two main components: intention and attitude. Intention is the main thrust that keeps the negotiation on going. Without intention, no negotiation will be possible. Attitude involves strategy and tactics of participants for negotiation. At the same time, attitude consists of specific culture and tradition to deal with foreigners which are embedded in history. Attitude can affect the progress of negotiation; if strategy and tactics are good, negotiations will go smoothly, however, the vice versa negotiations will be stuck in soon.

In this sense, negotiations with North Korea should be examined in the aspects of intention and attitude. If North Korea can accept denuclearization with the exchange of security as its leaders repeatedly emphasized, the negotiation will reach to a success. In contrast, if North Korea does not have a real intention to abandon nuclear arms, the dialogue will end in vain. In addition, good strategy will enhance the negotiation.

2) Some raise questions as a mediator role of South Korea, in that South Korea is under direct North Korean nuclear threat.

This will work even under the situation that North Korea has not an idea to be denuclearized, at least North Korea can attract counterparts to a negotiation table. On the other hand, although North Korea has a real intention to denuclearization, bad strategy hinders bringing positive results. It is plausible that North Korea adopts bad attitude inherited from its history.

This paper argues that North Korea will pursue different goals if North Korean announced intention cannot be supported by its attitudes. Long history of North Korean tradition of negotiations including the Armistice Negotiation, proves that North Korea can seek negotiations as a different tool of competition.³⁾ North Korea had used the Armistice Negotiation to earn times to rebuild military strength during the Korean War. Negotiation itself was used as a tool for its national goal. Because of North Korean use of the negotiation, the Armistice Negotiation took more than two years to be concluded. It is conceivable that North Koreans may use denuclearization negotiation for their national goal rather than denuclearize their country. This will cause the change between goals and tools and discrepancy of understandings about the goal of the negotiation between North Korea and counterparts. This paper will carefully pay attention to this change and discrepancy.

This paper attempts to analyze structure and dynamics of the denuclearization negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea to enhance the understanding of future development. By focusing on the structure, this paper will provide general directions of the negotiation in various conditions. By looking into the structure, this study will suggest a large picture to better understand the large picture of the negotiation. At the same time, by examining dynamics, intention and attitude of North Korea in depth, this paper explores the reality of the negotiation. Specifically, this paper explores the possibility of different understanding of denuclearization negotiation goals between North Korea and counterparts. With these efforts, this paper will contribute to the shape of sound strategies and tactics for dialogues with North Korea.

3) C. Turner Joy, who had been the head of delegation of the U.N forces during the Armistice Negotiation from 1951 elaborated his observation in this context in his memoir *How Communist Negotiate* (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1955).

II. Structure of the Negotiation

The negotiation structure is simple; two players and two related countries which can be facilitators or spoilers. In the structure, players can have positive or negative position for the progress. Regardless of real intention for denuclearization, positive position means a stance to proceed negotiation and vice versa. In this situation, the two players can have a mind to proceed or stop the negotiation. The best case will be the situation that the U.S. and North Korea have positive positions. However, if both have negative positions, this will lead the talks to impasse. In some cases, each part can have different positions; the U.S. can have a positive one while North Korea retains a negative one and vice versa. One important thing is the U.S. has bigger influence against North Korea.

For the surrounding members, South Korea and China can be expected to play as facilitators or spoilers. The best situation will be the case that two countries can support the negotiation for the success. However, the two countries can also be spoilers based on various reasons like domestic politics. In addition, each country can play a different role, i.e. South Korea can play a role of a facilitator and China can be a spoiler, of course the opposite case will be possible. Like the U.S., China is a more significant actor compared to South Korea in terms of the size and magnitude of influence.

Combinations of possible cases of four countries will be twelve occasions based on each stance of the countries excluding negative-negative combinations of players of dialogue which will bring no progress to the negotiation. There are some assumptions that regulates the combination reflecting ongoing current situation. The U.S. cannot be easily motivated to begin a dialogue with North Korea but will lose motivation easily. China can affect North Korean stance using its leverage and can harm U.S.' motivation by using North Korea. The combinations will be like below:

	1	2	3	4
A	PPFF	PPFS	PPSF	PPSS
B	PNFF	PNFS	PNSF	PNSS
C	NPFF	NPFS	NPSF	NPSS

[Table 1] Possible Combinations of Four Countries,

Legends: the order of combination is the U.S., North Korea, China, South Korea, for the U.S. and North Korea are Positive(P) or Negative(N), for China and South Korea are Facilitator(F) or Spoiler(S).

Group A, B, C show variations of dialogue patterns. In Group A, the U.S. and North Korea have positive stance to continue the negotiation. In Group B, the U.S. has a positive position, but North Korea has negative one, and the Group C shows the opposite case. Columns show different combinations of the roles of surrounding countries. Column 1 has two facilitators while Column 4 has two spoilers. Column 2 represents cases which China play a role of a facilitator and South Korea of a spoiler. Column 3 has China as a spoiler and a facilitator.

Generally, Group A has favorable situations compared to B and C. Conditions of Group B would be better to the conditions of Group C in that the U.S. has bigger influence over North Korea. In the same sense, Column 1 has the most favorable situation, next one is Column 2, and then 3. Column 4 would be the least favorable one due to the lack of facilitating actors. The most favorable combination would be A1, PPF and the least one would be C4, NPSS.

The table has some important implications. The combination A3, PPSF would have great impact on the developments. If China continues to spoil the negotiation the U.S. may lose motivation to continue the dialogue. Then the situation will move directly to Group C, exactly to B3, PNSF which have difficulties to move forward. At least, the situation would be changed into Group B, exactly B3 PNSF which North Korea has negative stance. Even, the situation can go directly to NN situation that no country tries a dialogue. Therefore, China's behaviors should be monitored not to undermine the momentum of the negotiation and to avoid sudden visit of impasse.

Situation of Group B requires some thoughts in terms of maintaining stability. In this situation, the U.S. may force North Korea to remain at a negotiating table using military or non-military measures. Because the U.S. may feel the necessity of talks to denuclearize North Korea, the U.S. will make efforts to continue the dialogue. This will lead the U.S. to take some economic measures to induce North Korea first, move to more forceful measures like strengthening sanctions, and to take military measures to compel North Korea. Recent announcement of Secretary of Defense, James Mattis to resume joint military training would be an example of the U.S. military options.

Specifically, combination B3, PNSF has more chances of the U.S.' strong measures to

overcome China's obstacles blocking the progress of the negotiation. Interestingly, this group offers North Korea some opportunities to pursue unilateral benefits. PNFF combination will allow North Korea to ask compensation to come to the negotiating table, because every country is eager to promote negotiation. In addition, PNFS combination will have the same situation, because China's supportive influence overcome South Korea's movement to hinder the negotiation. Even North Korea can benefit PNSF combination by blaming China for the deadlock of the negotiation.

Situation of Group C also needs careful consideration. It will motivate North Korea to conduct armed provocation to create conditions for negotiations. In this situation, North Korea may adopt extreme measures to compel the U.S. to join a negotiation. Because North Korea has small leverage toward the U.S., North Korea will willingly relegate to military measures to give impression to the U.S. that it may need engagement to manage situation. Series of missile launches including Hwasong-15 which can reach to the continent of America in 2017 can be understood in this context. In this sense, Group C has potential for military tension that may be caused by North Korea.

In summary, the structure of the negotiation shows that maintaining PPF combination is very important. PPF may have little change to the negotiation but PPSF will bring dramatic changes to the negotiation process. Based on this, it is conceivable that China's role is critical to the success of the denuclearization talk. China can turn North Korean stance to N as well as the U.S. too. China's spoiling behaviors can bring NN combination that no country does not agree to negotiation: PN combination or NP combination. In PN combination the U.S. may take measures to attract North Korea to the negotiating table, and in NP combination North Korea may conduct military provocation to force the U.S. to remain at the dialogue. In this sense, the NP combination may cause serious military tension in the peninsula compared to PN combination.

III. Dynamics of the Negotiation: Intention

North Korea's real intention for denuclearization negotiation can be identified analyzing conditions of North Korea, public announcements, and real behaviors. By looking into

these factors, North Korean intention can be understood. If North Korean behaviors follow public announcements under same conditions, the announcements can be regarded as true intention, however, if North Korea shows difference between announcement and behaviors the true intention should be found.

Kim Jung-un initiated denuclearization negotiation based on dire economic and diplomatic situations that North Korea faced in 2017. According to a news report from *Nikkei*, in October 2017 Kim Jung-un ordered to begin a talk with the U.S. by mentioning that the U.S. and China are trying to suffocate the republic at an expanded cadre meeting of Korea Workers' Party (KWP).⁴⁾ This report provides important clues about North Korean true intention for the negotiation. First, North Korea felt threat from the international sanctions designed by the U.S. Specifically, the cooperation of China to the UN sanctions was a big shock to North Korea despite a long tradition of friendly relationship between North Korea and China.

In February 2018, Kim Jung-un wrote a letter to local party members that there would be no more another Gonanui Hanggun (Arduous March).⁵⁾ The Arduous March left painful memories to North Korean people with lack of food and no help to survive. Based on sources, more than 300, 000 to 2 million people died with hunger and hunger related disease.⁶⁾ The letter was sent before North Korea dispatch special envoy to South Korea to celebrate the Winter Olympic Games. According to the news report, North Korea was at a critical situation that local party leaders reported the resumption of the march because China cut the flow of grains to North Korea and the trade of North Korean minerals.⁷⁾ As a new leader, Kim Jung-un needed a dramatic change to get escape from chronic economic disaster. Another Arduous March would mean the crisis of his

4) Lee Seung-ho, "Kim Jung-un 'Mijungi Buk Apsalharyo Handa' myo Jinanhae 10wol Daehaw Junbi Jisi [Kim Jung-un Ordered a Dialogue with the U.S. by Mentioning 'the U.S. and China Are Going to Kill the North'," *Joongang Ilbo*, April 16, 2018, mnews.joins.com (Accessed April 16, 2018).

5) "Kim Jung-un Nodongdang Jojige Japilpyunji...Je2ui Gonanhanggun Eupda [Kim Jung-un Sent a Hand-writing Letter ...There would be no more another Arduous March]," May 6, 2018 *Yeonhap News* (<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2018/05/06/0200000000AKR20180506012000073.HTML>, Accessed May 7, 2018).

6) ROK Statistics Agency announced the exact number of deceased by hunger would be 330,000 citing UN data on November 23, 2010.

7) Ibid.

ruling. Facing at severe economic situation, Kim Jung-un should reduce concerns of his people about the revival of the disaster.

Second, North Korea has been under increasing military pressure from the U.S. In May 2017, the U.S. deployed three carrier battle groups to the Korean waters for the first time. In the next month, H.R. McMaster, National Security Adviser, mentioned that President Trump ordered his staff to prepare military options to deal with North Korean nuclear program.⁸⁾ In addition, the U.S. B-1B conducted a surprise flight over northern part of NLL with escorts of Japanese Self Defense Force's fighter jets in September 2018.⁹⁾ Most strikingly, *Telegraph* reported that the U.S. is preparing a bloody-nose option in December 2017.¹⁰⁾ The bloody-nose option was revealed after North Korea launched Hwasung-15 which can reach to continent America in November 2017. With this increasing military pressure, Kim Jung-un seriously might have considered the way to secure the safety of his regime.

Finally, North Korea has almost finished its development of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of 2017, Kim announced that North Korea was at the final stage of ICBM and would finalize nuclear program, and in 2018 he declared the success of nuclear capability throughout his new year's address.¹¹⁾ North Korea may have confidence with the success of its nuclear program. Minister of National Unification, Cho Myung-gyun mentioned that "the finish of nuclear development might have motivated North Korea" at an interview with KBS on May 1, 2018.¹²⁾ In other words, confidence as a nuclear

8) No Min-ho, "Mi NSC Bojowaguan Trump Daebuk Gunsa Options Junbijisi [U.S. National Security Adviser, Trump Ordered to Prepare Military Options to North Korea]," *New Daily*, June 30, 2017 (Accessed July 3, 2017).

9) Lee Yong-il, "Mi B-1B Jeontugideul Simyae NLL Neomeoga Donghae Gonghaesang Bihaeng [American B-1Bs Passed over NLL and Flew over the High See of the East Sea at Midnight]," *Hangyere*, September 24, 2017 (www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/america/812332.html, Accessed September 25, 2017).

10) Kim Seong-tak, "Young Enron Mi Bloody-nose Daebuk Gunsajakjeon Maryon [A U.K. Media Reports 'the U.S. is Preparing a Bloody-nose Option,'" *Joongangilbo*, December 22, 2017.

11) "Kim Jung-un Bukhan Nodongdang Wiwonjang Yuksong Sinnyunsa Jeonmun [Full Version of Kim Jung-un, Chairman of KWP, New Year's Address]," *Joongangilbo*, January 1, 2018 (<http://news.joins.com/article/22250044>, Accessed January 9, 2018).

12) Look *KBS News 9*, May 1, 2018.

power was one of the reasons to start a negotiation.

Under this situation, Kim announced a new year's address to initiate movements to establish different characteristic of inter-Korean relationship. He emphasized the significance of the Winter Olympic Games as the national pride; he well understood the value of the games as the venue for the rapprochement between the two Koreas. Kim Jung-un took initiatives for the denuclearization from the beginning. Seo Hun, Korea National Intelligence Chief, revealed his sense he got while he met with Kim as a special envoy to Pyongyang. Based on Seo Hun at Kim Jung-un made up his mind to make fundamental decisions about the future of nuclear, missiles, and determined to realize peace regime before the end of the year in March 10, 2018.¹³⁾ Seo Hun's remark proves that Kim Jung-un has the initiative of the negotiation.

Chairman Kim's idea appeared to KWP's new strategic resolution. Before the Panmunjom declaration, KWP adopted new strategic resolutions on April 20, 2018. At the KWP's 7th term 3rd plenary meeting, party members evaluated the Parallel Policy as a great victory and agreed with new policy to focus on economic developments.¹⁴⁾ They made the change of policy clear that they already achieved the strong country in terms of philosophy and military. In the same context, they argued that they will need no additional nuclear test, missile launch for tests, and the test site. They emphasized that they will turn the direction to response the desire of the world to realize a nuclear free world based on the foundation which had made North Korea secure.¹⁵⁾ The KWP's new strategy hints that North Korea will adopt its nuclear arms as a state level tool to bring economic prosperity. Following this line, the denuclearization negotiation has high possibility to be turned as a powerful tool for North Korean national goal.

13) Kang In-seon, "Kim Jung-un Haekgwa Pyunghawcheje Yeonnae Keun Gadak Jabul Sanggak [Kim Jung-un Is Trying to Make Fundamental Decisions before the End of the Year]," *Chosunlibo* (http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/03/10/2018031000131.html, Accessed March 10, 2018).

14) O Jung-seok, "Buk, Saeroun Jeonryaknoseon 'Bihaekhwa Euigusim Mot Puloe [North Korea's New Strategic Resolution 'North Korea Was Not Able to Clear Suspicion about Denuclearization]," RFA, April 25, 2018 (Accessed April 25, 2018).

15) Ibid.

North Korea disclosed its intention for denuclearization at the summit with President Moon Jae-in on April 27, 2018, Panmunjom declaration. At the summit the two leaders agreed with denuclearization like below:

South and North Korea confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. South and North Korea shared the view that the measures being initiated by North Korea are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agreed to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities in this regard. South and North Korea agreed to actively seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.¹⁶⁾

At the declaration, the eventual goal was set to realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and complete denuclearization was inserted as a major way to reach the goal.

Chairman Kim's intention was welcomed and reaffirmed at the first North-U.S. summit on June 12, 2018 in Singapore. North Korea and the U.S. agreed to move for denuclearization under the terms of Panmunjom Declaration. The two sides just put article 3, Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, instead of adding new requirements to show the support of denuclearization intention of North Korea. The North-U.S. summit specified North Korea as responsible to work for denuclearization.

Before the summits, North Korea's aggressive attitude to begin denuclearization was tangible. The KWP changed its strategic ways to stop nuclear development and the leader showed strong will to South Korea. As a result, North Korea pledged denuclearization to South Korea and the U.S. To outside observers, North Korea's severe economic situation as well as security condition gave enough impression that North needed negotiation for survival. In addition, North Korea's success of developing strategic nuclear weapons seemed to boost North Koreans to initiate denuclearization talks.

16) *The Korea Times*, "Panmunjom Declaration Full Text," https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/731_248077.html (Accessed May 1, 2018).

IV. Dynamics of the Negotiation: Attitude

After the two consecutive summits, no significant actions for denuclearization happened. In fact, North Korea detonated Punggyeri nuclear test site in advance of the summit with President Donald Trump on May 24, 2018. However, the explosion was conducted with the attendance of small numbers of foreign reporters without any nuclear experts from international organizations or relevant countries. Unlike North Korean expectation, it raised the suspicion of covering nuclear facilities by destroying the test record of nuclear developments. On top of that, it lost its meaning because Mr. Trump cancelled the expected summit due to harassing language of a letter from North Korean officials, though it later resumed.

The U.S. has asked North Korea to follow general denuclearization process in various names: CVID, PVID, and FFVD, or Libya Style and Trump Style. The core of denuclearization process consists of reporting of nuclear inventory, verification, and dismantlement. All these three steps have important meanings. The inventory should include already manufactured war heads and delivery vehicles, facilities relevant to produce nuclear weapons including research labs, and materials that can be used for war heads. The inventory should contain nuke of past, present and future. Verification is the mean to check the status of nuclear program based on the inventory. At the same time, verification requires to find out additional nuclear programs that were not reported. Dismantlement will be the final measure to complete denuclearization.

Based on common sense, the first step would be the report of nuclear inventory of North Korea. However, the inventory has not been handed over to the U.S., and this raises the question of the sincerity about North Korean intention for denuclearization. The situation was getting more acerbated whenever newly appointed Secretary of State former CIA director Mike Pompeo returned with empty hands. Even Choi Sun-hee, North Korean Director for U.S. Affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs, condemned the U.S. that they did everything that should do, and now it's your turn to do something.¹⁷⁾ Eventually, Mr. Trump cancelled Pompeo's fourth visit to Pyongyang to press North Korea.

17) July 4, 2018, *Dongailbo*.

Instead of submitting nuclear inventory, North Korea has requested the guarantee of its regime like the change of the armistice to a peace agreement followed by the declaration of the end of the Korean War. It was included in five requests before the realization of North-U.S. summit around April 11, 2018.¹⁸⁾ The five requests were almost about military affairs, for instance not to deploy strategic nuclear assets to the Korean Peninsula. Again, at the third visit of Secretary Pompeo, North Korea made a bold request for the declaration of the end of the Korean War as a prerequisite condition.¹⁹⁾

North Korean behavior to demand the declaration of the end of the Korean War may seem to be compatible with the conditions that North Korea has had. As mentioned before, North needs to escape military pressure from the U.S. In addition, North Korean ask of U.S.' action would be natural in the context of North's approach for the negotiation. Chairman Kim mentioned that North Korea would take gradual or step-by-step approach for denuclearization at the meeting with Xi Jinping during his first visit to China in the last March.²⁰⁾ As a leader of a country under a threat, Chairman Kim pursued the declaration of the end of the Korean War.

In this sense, North Korean negotiation for denuclearization can be regarded as a tool for its national goal. Unlike the U.S. and expectations of other countries, North Korea regards the denuclearization talk as a method to get national security and economic stability by nullifying sanctions and military pressure. In contrast, the U.S. pursues the negotiation to denuclearize North Korea because of the significance of nuclear arms in the region. South Korea also definitely needs to get rid of North Korean nukes to maintain national security.

18) Seong Yon-chol, "Buk, Bihaekwa Daega 5gaean Miguge Jesihatta [North Suggested Five Requests in Return for Denuclearization Negotiation]," *Hangyere*, April 13, 2018 (<http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/840412.html>, Accessed April 15, 2018).

19) "Bukhan Bihaekwa Jogoenuro Jongjeonseoneoneul Yoguhatta [North Korea Demanded the Declaration of the End of the Korean War as the Condition for Denuclearization]," *Huffpost*, July 20, 2018 (https://www.huffingtonpost.kr/entry/story_kr_5b5188a7e4b0fd5c73c3e9d7, Accessed July 21, 2018).

20) Yun Kook-han, "Kim Jung-un Wiwonjangui Dangyejeok Bihaekwa, Mibuk Jeongsanghoidam Haeksim Jangjeom Jeonmang [Chairman Kim Jung-un's Step-by-Step Approach Will Be a Hot Issue During Upcoming North-U.S. Summit]," *VOA Korea*, March 30, 2018 (<https://www.voakorea.com/a/4323857.html>, Accessed April 1, 2018).

As was mentioned before, North Korea has proved its understanding of nuclear weapons as a tool for national goals throughout the decision of the KWP 7th term 3rd plenary meeting. The decision confirmed the victory of the Parallel Policy and explained the change of direction as the result of firm foundation of strong military capabilities achieved by nuclear arms.²¹⁾ As long as North Korea regards nuclear weapons as their effective tool, North would not willing to dismantle them like the wishes of the U.S. Because tools should be remained at hands and not to be abandoned. This can be supported by North Korea's actions, so called, 'proof of *Jinsim* (real heart)' had focused on demolishing old facilities like Punggyeri test site and missile launch pad at Dongchangri. North Korea should have no option but to hold their nukes as available tool to achieve national goals, so it would retain past, present, and future nuclear weapons. Even at the September Pyongyang Declaration, North Korea did not reveal its intention to submit the nuclear inventory. Instead of that, North Korea promised to dismantle Dongchangri and Yeongbeyond nuclear facilities.²²⁾

North Korea has another favorable condition caused by China's change of attitude toward North Korea and the U.S. Until the end of 2017, China had joined international sanctions and cooperated with the U.S. to stop the nuclear program of North Korea. However, China shifted its stance before the beginning of the North-U.S. summit. Mr. Xi had made an effort to leave North Korea under China's influence by conducting unusual summit diplomacy with Chairman Kim. Mr. Xi and Kim had three summits unprecedented times in the history of North - China relationship.²³⁾ This change might have allowed North Korea to return to traditional strategic situation, strong ties with China against the U.S. Under this situation, North Korea can raise the value of nuclear weapons as an important tool for its national goal without concern of American military attack.²⁴⁾

21) Whole article at www.minzokilbo.com (Accessed April 30, 2018).

22) *The Korea Times*, September Pyongyang Declaration Full Text, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/09/103_255848.html (Accessed September 21, 2018).

23) They had three summits in March, May and June.

24) Mr. Trump complained China's attitude to back North Korea's stubborn stance toward denuclearization while ordering not to visit Pyongyang to Pompeo for his 4th trip. Kang In-seon, "Trump Junge Jilyotta, Kim Jung-un Xi Jinpingge Chohu Gyunggo [Mr. Trump Became Sick and

V. Conclusion

North Korea may have a different view of denuclearization negotiation. For North Korea, denuclearization does not have a priority, instead guarantee of national security and economic stability have higher priority. North Korean leader and people may try to achieve these goals using their already made nuclear weapons. It is very hard to discern if North Korea really wants to abandon its nuclear programs. There is a long history of North Korea's failures to meet expectations for trust. At the same time, there are still ongoing disputes about the real intention of North Korea even among experts.

In this context, this paper argues that North Korea looks denuclearization negotiation as a tool for its national goal instead of aim. Unlike the U.S. and South Korea which pursue denuclearization as an imminent national goal. This discrepancy will bring a lot of differences between the North Korea and the U.S. North Korea will try to hold nuclear arms as possible means and the U.S. try to dismantle them. North Korea will delay time as possible, but the U.S. will not agree with that. North Korea will require every available request for its benefits not going directly to denuclearization, and the U.S. will not consume time with unnecessary things.

South Korea's role will be clear under this situation. South Korea should play a role to change the perception of North Koreans toward denuclearization negotiation from tools to goal. If North Korea realizes that denuclearization would be better option than holding nukes with minimal gains, North Korea may start to abandon nuclear bombs following denuclearization process. South Korea should use wisdom not to give compensation for negotiation but to provide real vision for nuclear-free North Korea.

However, there is a pitfall in the structure of the negotiation. Negotiation can be interrupted easily by the intervention of China. That intervention has malfunction to worsen security environment of the peninsula not just blocking the dialogue. In some cases, it would cause serious armed provocation by North Korea, and it could bring

Tire of China, He Made a Final Warning to Kim Jung-un and Xi Jinpingl," Chosun.com, August 27, 2018, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/08/27/2018082700271.html (Accessed August 27, 2018).

some tension to the region made by the U.S. Therefore, the Chinese intervention should be managed carefully to continue the momentum of the negotiation.

In addition, there is a room for North Korea to benefit without moving to negotiation. In this situation, North Korea may strengthen its view on denuclearization negotiation as a tool for national goal. South Korea, as a result, deal with the situation carefully and try to change the perception of North Korea of the negotiation from a tool to a goal.

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II-1

US Extended Deterrence in the Korean Peninsula after NPR 2018: Comparison with the NPR 2010

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US Extended Deterrence in the Korean Peninsula after NPR 2018: Comparison with the NPR 2010

Introduction

This essay examines current security situation in the Korean Peninsula and the current nuclear strategy of the United States. After the publication of the NPR early this year, the nuclear strategy of the US has changed substantially compared with the NPR 2010. In 2010, with the Obama Administration's initiative to make the world free of nuclear weapons, the 2010 NPR stipulated five objectives of US nuclear weapons policies: preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism; reducing the role of US nuclear weapons; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels; strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. An important characteristic of these objectives is that the US provision of extended deterrence¹⁾ to its allies and partners is premised on the understanding that the United States will also pursue disarmament. The Obama initiative to reduce the role of nuclear capabilities in the 2010 NPR reflected changes in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War. It is, however, not easily reconciled with the US extended deterrence policy towards its regional allies, as it involves the United States by reducing its nuclear deterrence capabilities and developing its conventional strike capabilities. Especially with the North Korea testing its nuclear weapons three times (2013, 2016), it was not at all clear how conventional forces can substitute for a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in the defense of South Korea.

With the NPR 2018, the US is now bolstering its nuclear capabilities, with non-strategic nuclear capabilities bolstered. Even though the objective countries would be Russia and China, this nuclear strategy is not well reflecting ongoing security scenery in the Korean

1) For the concept of extended deterrence, refer to John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security*, Oxford University Press, 1982.

Peninsula. Unlike the year 2017, North Korea now comes up to a détente with South Korea. It also initiated its negotiation with the United States. So-called peace/denuclearization process between the US and North Korea makes the NPR 2018 a irrelevant doctrine at least in the Korean Peninsula.

Historical Review of US Extended Deterrence to South Korea

The US provision of extended deterrence to South Korea was based upon the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea signed on 1 October 1953, after the Korean War armistice agreement of 27 July 1953. Article 3 of the Defense Treaty stipulated that 'each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes'.

When hostilities concluded, President Eisenhower introduced tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea while simultaneously reducing the number of US soldiers in Korea from 325,000 to 85,000 in 1955.²⁾ Since then, the United States has provided a cumulative total of about \$34 billion worth of military assistance and military sales to South Korea.³⁾ During the latter part of the Vietnam War, President Nixon further reduced the number of US soldiers in South Korea. The withdrawal of the 7th infantry division was completed in 1971 and the United States provided \$1.5 billion to modernize the Republic of Korea armed forces and establish the ROK-US Combined Field Army.

In response to the withdrawal of US forces, President Park Chung Hee began to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Although South Korea ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975, the program ended only with President Park's assassination in 1979. Meanwhile, in order to stop South Korea's nuclear weapons program, the United States

2) William T. Tow, "Reassessing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 3, 1, 1991, pp. 179-218.

3) SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971, pp.146-147.

decided to provide an explicit nuclear umbrella to South Korea, which was documented in the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 1978.

At the end of the Cold War, President H W Bush withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to encourage the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. South Korea supported the US policy, in the hope that these measures would bring about the denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula. The result was the signing of the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula in 1991. Since then, however, North Korea has tested its nuclear bombs twice, in 2006 and 2009. In response, the SCM reemphasized US extended deterrence and the provision of the nuclear umbrella to South Korea in 2006.

In the 'Joint Vision for the Alliance' adopted during a summit meeting in June 2009, the US and ROK presidents reemphasized the role of extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, in coping with North Korean WMD. In the midst of a series of North Korean provocations in 2010 (the *Cheonan* incident and Yonpyong Island attack), the US Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of Defense agreed to establish the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee in the 42nd SCM on 8 October 2010. The two countries held the first high-level meeting in March 2011 and the second meeting in November 2011.

The 2010 NPR and the Extended Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

The 2010 NPR stipulated that the security environment has changed in the post-Cold War period. It stated that the changes in post-Cold War threats made it necessary for the United States to change its policy of extended deterrence, thus reducing the role of nuclear deterrence and enlarging the functions of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense mechanisms. This signified that deterrence by punishment based on nuclear capabilities is changing to deterrence by denial based on a missile defense system and conventional power projection.⁴⁾ This change in the configuration of extended deterrence gave rise to concerns as to whether the US attempt to strengthen

extended deterrence while reducing the role of nuclear weapons can be successful on the Korean peninsula.

Is the decreasing emphasis on the nuclear deterrent a problem for South Korea? Would not the reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence decrease the credibility of US assurances to defend South Korea? This is despite the fact that, in the Joint Vision statement on June 16, 2009, the two presidents of the United States and ROK reaffirmed the robustness of US-South Korean security cooperation, specifying that 'the continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the US nuclear umbrella'.⁵⁾

The role of extended nuclear deterrence, as opposed to conventional weapons, in reassuring an ally was particularly important to South Korea. In the Korean peninsula, nuclear weapons exist in North Korea but do not exist within the territory of South Korea. This makes the South Korean people feel vulnerable to North Korean threats. After the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, polling showed that more than 67 percent of South Korean people approved of the idea of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. What is more astonishing was that even in 2005, prior to any North Korean nuclear test, 66.5 percent already approved the development of South Korea's own nuclear program. Many South Korean experts and policy-makers especially became concerned about the effects of the reduction in the salience of extended nuclear deterrence in the NPR 2010 after North Korea's *Cheonan* and Yonpyong Island attacks. For the South Korean people, nuclear weapons provide huge psychological security against the North Korean nuclear threat.

The probability that North Korea would actually use its nuclear weapons to attack South Korea is minimal. Rather, the problem comes from its use of nuclear weapons in blackmailing and intimidating South Korea. The mere existence of its nuclear weapons

4) For an explanation of the concepts of deterrence by denial and punishment, refer to Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*, Princeton University Press, 1961, pp.14-16.

5) 'Joint vision for the alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,' White House press release, 16 June 2009 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea

can bolster the North's conventional attacks on the South by making the South's retaliation against the North unthinkable. Nuclear weapons thus embolden North Korean to use conventional weapons, an example of what strategic studies theorists call the stability/instability paradox. This so-called 'nuclear-backed coercion' was used by the North to extract concessions from South Korea.⁶⁾ As demonstrated by the *Cheonan* ship incident and Yonpyong Island provocation, North Korea was free to pursue its low-level provocations due to cover from its nuclear capabilities. Kim Jong-il would have been confident that neither South Korea nor the US would retaliate militarily for the attacks on the *Cheonan* and Yonpyong Island. In the Korean peninsula only the North has nuclear weapons, there is no mutual vulnerability and no purely bilateral strategic stability, and the result, at least as shown in 2010, was the North's escalating provocations. Some voices in South Korea therefore advocated the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons to South Korea in order to strengthen strategic stability between the North and South.⁷⁾

The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea was undertaken during the George H.W. Bush Administration. The Bush government did not want to talk directly with North Korea about the nuclear issue, but instead withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea so that the two Koreas would sign the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991. However North Korea's ongoing development of its nuclear program violated the Joint Declaration and imperiled strategic stability on the Korean peninsula.

If nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea, this would have two effects. First, South Korea would, in effect, have a locally positioned nuclear deterrent against North Korea, restoring full strategic stability to the Korean peninsula. Second, as both Koreas would in effect possess nuclear capabilities, they would be able to start the denuclearization process from an equal basis. However, this scenario was highly unlikely for many reasons, including the Obama Administration's initiative to make the world

6) Scott Snyder, "Finding a Balance between Assurances and Abolition: South Korean Views of the Nuclear Posture Review."

7) Cheon Seong Whun, "Dual-Track Policy to denuclearize North Korea and strengthen nuclear umbrella," *National Strategy*, 16, 1, 2010 (in Korean).

free of nuclear weapons, the dangers associated with a potential nuclear arms race between two Koreas, and the likely negative responses of neighboring countries including a possible nuclear arms race in the region.

Without the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, Seoul would need to find other ways to ensure it can be confident in the solidity of extended nuclear deterrence guarantees from the United States. Only US extended nuclear deterrence could provide strategic stability not only between two Koreas but also between North Korea and the United States. The reduction of extended nuclear deterrence foreshadowed in the 2010 NPR and the surrounding US policy debate thus could become a serious policy problem and loophole if applied formulaically to the complex and specific regional situation of the Korean peninsula.

Building Extended Deterrence until 2017

Over the past years, the ROK and US governments have made strenuous efforts to strengthen US nuclear and extended deterrence and the ROK-US combined deterrence capabilities. During the annual Security Consultative Meetings (SCMs) held at the Pentagon, the US and South Korea agreed to strengthen combined response capabilities to prepare for a wide range of situations on the Korean Peninsula. And during the 44th SCM, both governments decided to develop a bilateral strategy for tailored deterrence against North Korean WMD threats. The decision was to lay out various types of the means for North Korean WMD delivery and devise countermeasures for each type, thereby developing strike capabilities against Pyongyang's WMD provocations. It was agreed by both parties that the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee is to finish developing countermeasures by 2014. Additionally, the ROK and United States agreed to construct the kill chain of the ballistic missile defense against the North Korean ballistic missile threats in the fastest way possible. For reference, the kill chain system consists of target identification, force dispatch to target, decision and order to attack the target, and finally the destruction of the target. Drawing upon lessons learned from a series of North Korean aggressions including the sinking of Naval Corvette *Cheonan* and shelling of border islands Yonpyong, the ROK and US agreed to establish a "combined operational plan"

against North Korea's localized provocations. In the 46th SCM, Seoul and Washington reaffirmed that two allies' combined defense posture remains strong. They also agreed to form the 2ID /ROK-US Combined Division in wartime and U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) during peacetime.

Furthermore, the two allies agreed to enhance the conditions conducive to wartime OPCON transfer, agreeing to adopt a "conditions-based approach" in proceeding the transfer. In a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by a US defense secretary and South Korean defense minister, the three conditions for OPCON transfer were spelled out. According to the deal, the eventual transfer will come once the security environment in the region allows for a stable transition, when the ROK military is equipped with core military capabilities, complemented and sustained with the aid of the US military, to take the lead in the ROK-US combined defense. And the ROK military should be ready to counter North Korean nuclear and missile threats at an early stage in the event of local provocations or all-out armed confrontation based upon its core response capabilities (i.e. the provision and operation of US extended deterrence and strategic capabilities). Additionally, the two allies agreed to integrate the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the Counter-missile Capability Committee (CMCC) into the new Deterrence Strategy Committee. And after Pyongyang test-fired an ICBM, the South Korean government announced that it will proceed with the THAAD deployment.

Despite the joint efforts noted above, a growing number of Koreans started to question the credibility of US extended deterrence capabilities after Pyongyang conducted 4th and 5th nuclear tests. Due to North Korea's enhanced nuclear and missile capabilities, the nuclear divide between the two Koreas has begun to gradually widen. There have been calls for the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to the ROK and Seoul's nuclear armament. During the 48th SCM in 2016, Seoul and Washington agreed to establish an "Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), and to identify additional measures to strengthen US extended deterrence to address such concern. And it has been concurred by Moon and Trump during their summit that the EDSCG will be regularized.

North Korea is striding towards nuclear missile technology, and successful development of long-range nuclear missiles appears to be within its reach. In the face of intensifying North Korean nuclear threats, strengthening ROK-US combined deterrence should be considered a key factor in dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea.

NPR 2018

There are four significant features of the NPR in 2018. First, it strengthened nuclear deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis Russia and China. Its evaluation of the current security scenery is that there needs a bolstered nuclear capabilities due to current threat environment and future uncertainty. One significant uncertainty and threat comes from competition with strong power states. For example, Russia attempts to modify European regional geopolitics through its threat of nuclear first use. Russia thinks that the US does not have willingness to counterattack with its strategic nuclear weapons vis-à-vis Russia's threat of tactical nuclear weapons. China also emboldens its sphere of influence in the South China Sea area.

Second, the 2018 NPR takes a flexible, tailored nuclear deterrent strategy. This strategy is relevant to the new replacement program of the US nuclear triad system. The US needs tailored nuclear deterrent strategy in order to respond to Russia's threat of limited nuclear first use. It requires diverse delivery system and explosion degrees. It requires more flexibility in nuclear triad system.

Current nuclear triad system consists of SSBN (Submersible ship, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear Powered) equipped with SLBM (Submarine-launched ballistic missile); ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile); and ALCM (air-launched cruise missile). The 2018 NPR lays out plans to modernize nuclear triad system. ALCMs will be replaced with long-range stand-off cruise missiles. DCAs (dual capable aircraft) will be replaced with forward-deployable, nuclear-capable F-35s.

Third, the 2018 NPR heightens the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. It provides the negative security assurance principle. That is, the US would not use nor threatens to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon states which abide by duties

of NPT. This is the same principle as of the 2010 NPT. But the 2018 NPT provides the exception of the negative security assurance. That is, only in the extreme circumstance which is necessary for the defense of the United States, its allies and its friends, the US can think about the use of nuclear weapons. There is an additional exception. If there is a significant non-nuclear strategic attack, the US can use nuclear weapons. This attack would be on the civilians of the US and its allies and on the infrastructure of the US and its allies, and also on the command control, warning and assault evaluation facilities.

Concerning the nuclear first use, the 2018 NPR states that the US never has adopted the nuclear no-first-use policy, and that this policy cannot be justified in the current threat environment. It states that in order to address the situation in which the US would might respond to threats with nuclear weapons, there should be an ambiguous position of the United States on its nuclear no first use policy.

Fourth, the US will improve its non-strategic nuclear capabilities. Now, Russia uses its limited nuclear first use policies in order to take a favorable position against the United States. Russia perceives that its diversity of the non-strategic nuclear system can guarantee coerciveness over the United States in a threat situation. The 2018 NPR argues that making the US nuclear option flexible including low-yield nuclear weapons would be very important to guarantee credibility of deterrence capabilities in order to respond to regional provocations. This would heighten redline of using nuclear weapons, and give enemies perception that nuclear crisis cannot be heightened, which would result in lowering possibility of nuclear usage. In a short-term perspective, the US will make the low-yield option possible by improving SLBM warheads already existing; in a long-term plan, the US would begin making a nuclear SLBM (sea-launched cruise missile). Unlike DCA, low-yield SLBM, warheads and SLCMs necessitates allies' support for the deterrence effect. This strategic change implies a return to a flexible response strategy during the Cold War period. By developing a usable nuclear weapon system, the US intends to bolster its substantial nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Regional Implications of the 2018 NPR

The 2018 NPR considers Russia as a serious threat. It states that Russia uses a strategy of escalating to deescalate by its limited nuclear-first-use. There should be a tailored strategy through nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis Russia's nuclear-first-use strategy or threat.

Concerning China, the NPR argues that the US-China military conflict could evolve into a nuclear war in the near future. There should be a strategy to prevent China from misjudging that it can increase its interests by limited use of nuclear weapons. In order for this strategy, the US needs to possess more nuclear options vis-à-vis China.

This confrontational nuclear strategy would make the future US-China and US-Russia relationship negatively. Not only NPR but other government documents like NSS, NDS clearly looks at Russia as a competitor and threat. The US posture towards China also looks very negative, but it is rather unclear what specific nuclear strategy would follow in dealing with China.

The US perception on the North Korean nuclear long-range missiles was very serious. It states that the North Korean nuclear development is the most immediate and dire proliferation threat. It also emphasized that North Korea's nuclear attack on the United States or on its allies would result in the annihilation of the North Korean regime. It reaffirmed the US policy objective of the CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement), and that there would be no modification of the US policy of not accepting North Korea as a nuclear state.

The NPR also stresses the importance of the missile defense system. The US and its allies possess capabilities to shoot the missiles from North Korea, defense and attack capabilities. It also argues that the US has capabilities of early alarm system and attack capabilities necessary to lower the missile capabilities of North Korea even before it launches the missiles towards the US territory.

One of the most important features of the NPR is the subsequent effect of the low-yield non-strategic nuclear capabilities of the US on North Korea. That is, if the US develops or modernizes tactical nuclear weapons, this would be bolstering the US extended

deterrence to South Korea. North Korea threatens the US with its long-range nuclear missiles, and at the same time threatens South Korea with its conventional weapons and short or medium-range nuclear missiles. There are no counter-attack capable nuclear capabilities of the United States. When North Korea attacks South Korea with conventional weapons or short-range nuclear missiles, the US has no proportional nuclear capabilities to counter-attack. Non-strategic nuclear capabilities of the US can contribute to its nuclear extended deterrence capabilities to its allies, especially South Korea.

Comparison between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs

The 2010 NPR was based upon the Obama government's initiative to make the world free of nuclear weapons. Due to the change in the global environment which was full of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, it posed North Korea and Iran as major threats. On Russia and China, the Obama government attempted to pursue strategic stability with Russia and China. Specifically, it attempted to pursue transparency in Chinese military modernization and strategic intentions. In the year 2010, the US with its economic distress, needed its cooperation with China and Russia. President Obama's personal ideological tendency also necessitated more focus on Iran and North Korea, thus preventing these states from proliferating their nuclear capabilities.

In the year 2018, the US begins to perceive different security environment. That is, despite ongoing efforts of the United States to decrease the US nuclear capabilities and roles, other states, like Russia and China, was increasing their nuclear threats and threatening the United States. This comes up with a very much bolstered active nuclear strategy. In order for stronger nuclear deterrent, the US aims to modernize its nuclear weapons and facilities. It also specifically provides situations in which the US virtually can use its nuclear weapons. It enlarges the scope of nuclear usage.

Conclusion: Current US–North Korea Dialogue and the US extended deterrence

With a détente between South and North Korea initiated with the Pyongchang Olympics early this year, the hostile relationship between the US and North Korea has changed to a favorable one. Last Year, North Korea continuously tested its ICBM and nuclear capabilities, heightening tensions in the Korean peninsula. This entailed the US maximum pressure on North Korea. Kim Jong Un, North Korean leader, changed his policy early this year. So-called Byungjin policy (simultaneously pursuing nuclear capabilities and economic development) was being undertaken. In his new year speech this year, Kim Jong Un made it clear that he would stop his policy of nuclear pursuit which was completed in the year 2017, and this year he would swift it to economic development. He also announced that if the US can guarantee regime security of North Korea, he would willingly give up nuclear capabilities. This made the North-South Summit in April 27th and the US-North Korea Summit in June 12th.

The peace and denuclearization process is evolving now, but there exists conflict of interests between the US and North Korea. North Korea requests the regime security provided by the United States first, by the declaration of the end of the Korean War, as the US requests that there should be initial denuclearization move first by North Korea. The End of the Korean War Declaration entails many problems, according to the United States. What North Korea argues is complete denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, which includes not only dismantlement of the nukes in the North but also the USFK in South Korea. According to North Korea, denuclearization in the Korean peninsula should include stopping US-ROK joint military exercises, US extended deterrence to South Korea and ultimately complete withdrawal of the US forces in South Korea.

Under this circumstance, there emerge concerns in the United States that current peace/denuclearization process would possibly weaken the US extended deterrence to South Korea. What if the current move to the Peace Treaty would weaken the US-ROK alliance, with no substantial outcome of denuclearizing North Korea? What if South Korea and the United States would take different stances towards the North? What would be the future of the US–South Korea alliance? These questions are the concerns that remains within the elite groups in the US and conservative elites in South Korea.

II-2

Comparison of Extended Nuclear Deterrence between Europe and Asia Challenges and opportunities for extended deterrence in the age of Trump

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Comparison of Extended Nuclear Deterrence between Europe and Asia

Challenges and opportunities for extended deterrence in the age of Trump

Introduction

Extended deterrence is a key components of strategic stability worldwide. It is therefore not surprising if the recent remarks of President Trump, criticizing his partners' domestic policies, showing little appetite for institutionalized alliance mechanisms and implying that his support of allies might be conditional provoked such reactions in Europe and in Asia.

Extended (nuclear) deterrence is a difficult process which requires confidence that a state would put his survival at risk for the defense of indirect security interests. During the Cold War, several models were built in that regard. A very explicit and integrated system with a nuclear sharing mission was built within NATO. In Asia on the contrary, extended deterrence guarantees were given bilaterally and offered less possibilities for Asian partners to influence the policy made by Washington. Some important features have evolved over time, such as the forward deployment of nuclear weapons which has been massively reduced in Europe and eliminated in Asia.

The two models remain very different today, with regards to institutionalization but also because of the nature of the relationship of allies between themselves. It is noticeable however that both region are facing a similar set of challenges. First, they are confronted to rising nuclear tensions in their regional environment. Second, and as crucial, they need to address the question of the political reliability of the American guarantees. Transatlantic and transpacific shared interests are still predominant but are sometimes masked by conjectural disagreements. The parallel examination of extended deterrence in Asia and Europe show that while military requirements are well-considered

and given priorities by Washington to reassure allies, the political commitment is still perceived with a level of doubt in both region and should therefore be given more attention by the American administration.

1. European and Asian perspectives on extended deterrence in the age of Trump

1.1. Differences of the two models

Although they have been developed under comparable circumstances in the early years of the Cold War, the Asian and European models of extended deterrence present differences that call for caution when comparisons are attempted. These differences concern both the structure of the American protection and the characteristics of the protégés themselves.

The most evident divergence between the two models is clearly the existence of an organized structure in Europe with formalized consultations on the definition and implementation of extended deterrence.¹⁾ With NATO, European allies have the opportunity to play a role in defining the Alliance's nuclear policy, through their participation to the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), and are consulted on how it is being carried out. They play a role in fulfilling this mission. Five countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) still host nuclear weapons on their territories and provide bombers to carry them, which means that they not only maintain the infrastructures for basing those assets but also dedicate a part of their air forces to the nuclear mission and train their pilots and technicians to this particular task. Other countries participate in an indirect way by taking part in supporting this equipment, and especially in SNOWCAT²⁾ procedures which are dedicated to refueling nuclear-weapon carrying aircrafts, or suppressing or disrupting enemy air defense³⁾.

1) David S. Yost, "US Extended Deterrence in Nato and North-East Asia," in Bruno Tertrais, ed., *Perspectives on Extended Deterrence*, Recherches & Documents, n°3/2010, 2010.

2) Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Tactics

3) Managing Change, NATO's Partnerships and deterrence in a Globalised World, NATO Supreme Allied

Globally speaking, NATO allies have over the years requested a say in how extended deterrence is being defined, and tried to avoid complete dependency on US policy, a request which is partially met with the current NATO procedures.

Asian extended deterrence is based on bilateral agreements with Japan and the Republic of Korea and lacks any formal structure, an absence which is often regretted among Asian allies⁴). The NPG is often perceived especially as an important tool to make sure that allies are fully consulted on the policies framed to defend their sovereignty⁵). This Group's importance must not be neglected but should not be overstated. In a context of a crisis and in existential matters such as nuclear deterrence, formal mechanisms may not play a crucial role compared to informal consultations and bilateral communications⁶). It is often reminded that France's absence from NATO's NPG would not prevent its leaders from consulting deeply with their nuclear allies in Washington and London in case of a crisis, while key decisions would probably not be taken according to the procedures defined in peacetime for this group. Also, efforts have been made to promote dialogues between Washington and its Asian allies on extended deterrence over the last couple of years.

In the same way, the presence of forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe is a very visible difference between the two situations. Japan has not hosted nuclear weapons on its territory since the restoration of its sovereignty over Okinawa in 1972. The last nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea were withdrawn in the wake of President George H. Bush's Presidential Nuclear Initiatives in the 1990s, as a gesture of goodwill in the context of the end of the Cold War and following the military assessment that in the new strategic environment, conventional deterrence was sufficient to defend the Seoul. It was also presented as a bargaining chip to induce the DPRK to abandon its

Command Transformation, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Villa Guasta Villani, Bologna, Italy, 21-22 June 2011

- 4) Pilat, Joseph F. "A Reversal of Fortunes? Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe and East Asia." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 39, no. 4, 2016.
- 5) Tsuruoka, Michito. "The NATO vs. East Asian Models of Extended Nuclear Deterrence? Seeking a Synergy beyond Dichotomy." *The Asan Forum*, June 2016.
- 6) Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose, Hans M. Kristensen, and Simon Lunn, *Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture*, NTI, January 2018.

nuclear program.⁷⁾

Even if it has always been and is still controversial in Europe, the forward deployment of the gravity bombs B-61 is currently perceived by the 29 States leaders as an asset which reassures on the seriousness of Washington's protection and gives the allies a concrete involvement in the nuclear mission. This function was regularly evoked by the politicians and experts calling for the returning nuclear weapons to South Korea in recent years.⁸⁾ Beyond this symbolical and political role, the military value of this forward presence remains however limited in the eyes of most specialists.⁹⁾ As it is, it is generally recognized that other components of the American arsenal, not located in Europe, may offer better guarantees for the protection of the continent as they are better suited for the penetration of the Russian airspace, in particular submarine-launched missiles or stand-off cruise missiles.¹⁰⁾ These weapons naturally also concur to extended deterrence in Asia which tends to minimize the strategic importance of the forward deployment.

Finally, the two models mostly differ in the perception of the allies among themselves. For the most part, European allies exist as an integrated community within the European Union and have recognized both in the framework of NATO and the EU shared values and interests. Emphasizing their commonalities, European nations insist on their interconnections and interdependences to display a sentiment of solidarity in case of a crisis. Japan and South Korea are not in a similar positions: their working together with the United States is a matter of circumstances rather than a reflection of a mutual attachment. The two countries strongly feel the scars of a difficult past and evoke only slowly a desire to build a strong trilateral mechanism in spite of evident shared interests regarding the DPRK or China.

7) Emmanuelle Maitre, "Vers le redéploiement d'armes tactiques en Corée du Sud ?," *Bulletin n°48, Observatoire de la dissuasion*, FRS, novembre 2017.

8) Pilat, Joseph F, op. cit.

9) Petr Suchy and Bradley A. Thayer, "Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," *European Security*, vol. 23, n°3, July 2014.

10) Amy Woolf, "Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons," *CRS Report for Congress*, No. RL32572, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 2011

1.2. Similar preoccupations in the 21st century

Extended deterrence is therefore evolving in a very different environment in the two regions, which forbids applying the same processes or presenting hasty comparisons. But these divergences do not hide similarities that are probably growing and are leading European and Asian allies to face the same challenges. In particular, both regions have to face stakeholders willing to challenge the status quo by force, to resort to hybrid forms of warfare, and who are favoring ambiguity in their nuclear postures and arsenals.¹¹⁾

The first and long-lasting preoccupation concerns the credibility of the American guarantee. Doubts over the willingness of Washington to honor its commitments in case of a crisis and to put at risk its cities and population to restore the sovereignty of allies has long been questioned, and has been answered by similar tools on both regions: political declarations, adaptation of the US nuclear policy and capacities, deployments of American troops on the ground, participation to joint exercises. Traditionally during the Cold War, this fear of abandonment was doubled with a dread of being neglected in bilateral relationships between Washington and Moscow. This is still true today. Europeans are anxious that the current American administration could overlook their interests in an attempt to improve its relationships with the Kremlin. Japan and South Korea have expressed their fears of seeing their security compromised by President Trump's attempts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula unilaterally, or by his willingness to act without any consultation with his Northeast Asian allies.¹²⁾

The second concern visible for both regions is the current debate on the burden-sharing of extended deterrence. Disagreements on the extent to which the United States should be expected to contribute to the defense of its allies have been ongoing for years,¹³⁾

11) Tsuruoka, Michito, "NATO's Challenges as Seen from Asia: Is the European Security Landscape Becoming Like Asia?" *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, Vol. 25, n° 1, 2016.

12) Brad Glosserman, "Decoupling and Divergences Among Allies: New Deterrence Dilemmas in Northeast Asia," A Conference Report From The US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 17, n°14, September 2017.

13) Hans Binnendijk, "Friends, Foes, and Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink." *RAND Corporation*, 2016.

but have acquired a new visibility with President Trump's decision to make it a public claim. By requesting formally an increase in the contribution of Allies to their own defense, and by displaying his preference for transactional arrangements, he has let on that the American protection was no longer a given but ought to be deserved by specific monetary contributions. The catchphrase "why should American taxpayers pay for the protection of Europe/Japan/South Korea" gives therefore similar concerns for both groups of partners.

For some allies especially, such as Japan, Germany or the Netherlands, another key concern is the reconciliation between security imperatives, solidarity with other Allies and political needs to respond to their public opinion's lack of appetite for nuclear weapons. For these countries, hawkish postures that emphasize the role of deterrence and development of new weapons are hard to defend publicly and can provoke reactions against the extended deterrence policy. There is therefore a shared interest in promoting conciliatory measures that take into account the objectives of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and to refrain from moves considered as provocative by the disarmament community.

This factor may play a greater role under the Trump administration: the more benign image of the previous President, his well-received stance in favor of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, combined of course with the increase of the nuclear threat on both continents, had made the question of political acceptability less sensitive in these countries¹⁴.

Despite these sources of concern, European and Asian allies (with the exception of independent nuclear powers naturally) are both in a situation of dependency vis-a-vis Washington and recognize the lack of substitute for the American alliance. Therefore, despite the current disagreements between partners and the doubts expressed on the strength of the US commitment, which have for the most part been long-standing features of extended deterrence, there is little to be done for the protégés. The occasionally mentioned plans for the development of a national nuclear force in

14) Yukio Satoh, "Japan's Responsibility Sharing for the U.S. Extended Deterrence," *Discuss Japan: Japan Foreign Policy Forum*, n°19, March 2014.

Germany,¹⁵⁾ Japan or South Korea¹⁶⁾ remains quite unrealistic at this stage and are not considered serious considerations in the current circumstances.

Given these elements of commonalities, it is not surprising that the inflexion to US nuclear policy made by the Trump administration in its first two years have provoked some level of similar reactions, even if some important differences have also been observed between but also within the two zones.

2. Extended deterrence in the light of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)

Given this skepticism, it is understandable and visible that the framers of the 2018 NPR had a willingness to make it a key reassurance document for allies in Europe and in Asia. On the campaign trail, Donald Trump had been very casual about the way he talked of NATO¹⁷⁾ and Asian allies, and even as President, he hinted that Allies should do more for their own defense and reiterated his belief in “America First.” From the reading of the NPR, it seems that the Department of Defense leadership at least wanted to reassure on the solidity of existing alliance systems. The word “Allies” has been counted 127 times in the final document.¹⁸⁾ This effort has been very well received on both continents, even if public recognitions have been scarce. It must be noted however that if this document managed to reassure, it fail to take into account a few important preoccupations of American partners. This explains for instance why nobody in Europe reacted with the Japanese Prime Minister’s enthusiasm to the publication of the NPR, who lauded it as “clearly articulating the U.S. resolve to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence and its commitment to providing extended deterrence

15) Ulrich Kühn, Tristan Volpe and Bert Thompson, « Tracking the German Nuclear Debate », Resource Page, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, updated, 15 August 2018, <<https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/07/tracking-german-nuclear-debate-pub-72884>>

16) David Sanger, Choe Sang-Hun and Motoko Rich, “North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons,” *The New York Times*, 28 October 2017.

17) “Trump worries Nato with ‘obsolete’ comment,” *BBC News*, 16 January 2017.

18) Kori Schake, “Assessing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: Regional Threats Panel,” CSIS, 2 March 2018.

to its allies including Japan”.¹⁹⁾ On the contrary, the few official reactions in Europe have been rather critical with for instance the German Foreign Minister warning that “the solution must not be to simply join the nuclear arms race”.²⁰⁾ Three remarks can be made on the impact of the NPR on extended nuclear deterrence.

2.1. A welcomed emphasis on the solidity of nuclear deterrence

With the publication of the NPR in January 2018, the positive language on the solidity of the US commitments towards its allies has been a welcomed step everywhere after months of interrogation on the positioning of the administration on this regard.²¹⁾ Concerning the Atlantic link, what was especially well perceived was an appreciation of the Russian threat which is globally in line with European perception, and the strong American commitment to meet this threat at all levels. It is useful to remember that this American support was not taken for granted as Chancellor Merkel for instance said repeatedly that Europe could not depend on the US protection only²²⁾.

In Northeast Asia also, the threat perception of the regional environment was also shared to a large extent, with especially the recognition of the danger represented by the “continued development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.”²³⁾

This convergence of official and declaratory policies is especially true in the case of France which has appreciated the fact that the 2018 NPR is probably more in line than ever with the French conception of nuclear deterrence.²⁴⁾

19) The Release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), (Statement by Foreign *Minister Taro Kono*), *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 3 février 2018.

20) Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel on the publication of the US nuclear posture review, Federal Foreign Office, 4 February 2018.

21) Gustav Gressel, “The draft US Nuclear Posture Review is not as crazy as it sounds,” *ECFR*, 19 January 2018.

22) Patrick Donahue, “Merkel Tells Beer Tent Rally Europe Must Plot Its Own Course,” *Bloomberg*, 28 May 2017. “*The times when we could fully rely on others are to some extent over — I experienced that in the last few days*”

23) Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Kono, op. cit.

24) François Géré, “La Nuclear Posture Review 2018”, *IFAS*, 18 February 2018.

However, officials and non-officials alike have noted that the NPR would probably not be considered sufficient to alleviate all doubts on the solidity of extended deterrence: President Trump has been known for declarations contradictory to the officially stated policy and in the field of deterrence, the ultimate power lies in the decision of the US President. Thus, the aftermath of the Brussels NATO Summit fueled fears that Donald Trump may be ready to disregard NATO to fulfill his ambitions of improving his bilateral relations with Moscow. His eagerness to meet with President Putin and his casual mention of NATO Article V legitimated these fears.²⁵⁾ In Asia, the Singapore Summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jung-un was seen with caution in Japan especially, where there is a fear of decoupling between American and Japanese interests if the US administration manages to convince the DPRK to renounce to its long-range ballistic missiles.²⁶⁾ Though more optimistic about the negotiation process, Seoul was taken aback by the unilateral cancellation of joint annual exercises with the American forces described as uselessly provocative.²⁷⁾

2.2. The emphasis on low-yield nuclear weapons

Although it is probably not the main issue of the document, a lot of debate on the NPR has focused on the so-called low-yield nuclear weapons and their consequence for extended deterrence.

In Europe, the assessment on the necessity to develop new tools to counter a Russian strategy described as “escalate-to-de-escalate” is not unanimously shared. However, a number of officials from various countries, but also experts, agree with the need to fill a gap on the escalation ladder and to improve deterrence thanks to more discriminate and survivable weapons.²⁸⁾ In Asia, the re-introduction of sea-launched low yield

25) Megan Specia, “Montenegro: What to Know About the Tiny NATO Ally Trump Slighted,” *The New York Times*, 19 July 2018.

26) Valérie Niquet, “Les conséquences du sommet de Singapour sur les équilibres régionaux, » *Bulletin n°55*, Observatoire de la Dissuasion, FRS, July 2018.

27) Eric Schmitt, Pentagon and Seoul Surprised by Trump Pledge to Halt Military Exercises, *The New York Times*, 12 June 2018.

28) Gustav Gressel, op. cit.

capable weapons has been seen rather positively as a more flexible option to deter China and North Korea. Interestingly, while the NPR clearly links the new capacities to Russia and as a way to push Moscow back in compliance with the INF Treaty, Asian allies have perceived that these weapons would be important assets in tailoring the deterrence posture in their region.²⁹⁾

Beyond this strategic evaluation of the ability of the current or prospective force structure to be effective against rising threats, the question of low-yield weapons has had other implications for partners in Europe and Asia.

Before the publication of the NPR, several conservative voices had publicly favored the development of ground-launched cruise missiles in reaction to the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, or at least the acquisition of forward-deployed missiles.³⁰⁾ Such propositions would range from politically improbable to highly controversial for allies which would be solicited to host the missiles or buy the aircrafts to carry them. Therefore, there was a visible relief among most partners that the Department of Defense put the priority on new submarine or ship-launched weapons, which do not require deployment or even participation of European or Asian allies and are therefore much less likely to generate an extremely unpleasant political debate domestically.

That being said, the discussion around low-yield weapons has drawn a lot of attention in European and Northeast Asian media and has been described among the general public as a sign that the Trump administration is lowering the threshold of nuclear weapon use, reviving the arms race of the Cold War and is running the risk of a nuclear conflagration. In Europe especially, the general discredit of the Trump administration, his irreverent comments about “the fire and fury” designed for North Korea or his call on Twitter for a new arms race tend to taint any document coming from his

29) Masashi Murano, “What the New US Nuclear Posture Means for Northeast Asia,” *The Diplomat*, August 29 2018.

30) Jennifer Rubin, “Is Trump Giving Putin a Pass on a Missile Deployment?,” *The Washington Post*, 9 March 2017, Matthew Kroenig, “Toward a More Flexible NATO Nuclear Posture: Developing a Response to a Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strike,” *Atlantic Council*, 2016 and Eric S. Edelman and Whitney Morgan McNamara, “U.S. Strategy for Maintaining a Europe Whole and Free,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2017.

administration with suspicion. Given the popular mistrust for the US President, it is harder for governments to display their solidarity with Washington, and in the context of nuclear policy, European leaders have therefore political interests in hushing their enthusiasm for the new Review.³¹⁾

European allies are also confronted to a specific issue: these new requirements seem to imply that existing and projected low-yield options (the B61-12 which should be deployed in Europe from 2020) hosted on the continent are of a limited use. Indeed, there is a clear admission in the NPR that the airborne weapons are vulnerable to adversary defensive measures. It may therefore become more difficult to advocate for the renewal of these systems in the future. The government of host countries such as Belgium and Germany are currently facing difficult battles with their Parliaments to procure new aircrafts able to participate in the nuclear mission and replace the current bombers. Strong opposition from civil society and an important part of the political spectrum is also expected when the adaptation of their respective airbases is made necessary by the deployment of the upgraded B61-12. The official admission that these weapons are not adequate to deter efficiently an attack on Europe may complicate the case for these new developments.³²⁾

2.3. The problem of arms control and disarmament

If extended deterrence is seen as an absolute imperative for a vast majority of European allies dealing with security issues, there is also a realization that the participation to a nuclear alliance must be politically acceptable. This is only possible if NATO is seen by its members as a responsible and constructive partner, a condition even more important in a time where the Alliance is fraught with internal difficulties and when anti-American and anti-NATO populist parties are on the rise in Europe. In many European countries, especially in the West, there is a strong popular demand for arms

31) Artur Kacprzyk, "Results of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review," *Bulletin*, PISM, n°29, 1100, 16 February 2018.

32) "Trump's Nuclear Posture Review: A New Rift between Europe and the US?," Policy Brief, Clingendael, February 2018.

control and disarmament, and governments reflect in a certain part this preference by pursuing an active policy in this matter.

While this issue is less relevant for South Korea, it is also very important in Japan where the antinuclear movement has historically been strong.

The lack of interest for arms control and disarmament of the 2018 NPR is a thorn for the many countries which are traditionally attached to a dynamic foreign policy on these issues.³³⁾ It is used as a powerful argument for nuclear abolitionists in Europe to show that the US is as guilty as Russia or China of provoking an arms race and that it does not take seriously its commitments in favor of disarmament.

Combined with the disagreement on the JCPOA and the rise of anti-NATO political movements such as the M5S in Italy, the NPR therefore entails potential difficulties in the political acceptability of extended deterrence among protégés in the future.

Extended deterrence has therefore evolved in mixed ways with the redefinition of the US nuclear policy: on the one hand on the strategic side there is a convergence of threat perception and a global agreement on a firm response to Russia's behavior, China's assertiveness and North Korea continuous threat. On the political side however, a NPR perceived as hawkish and deficient regarding arms control is a risk for the solidarity of the alliance and the acceptability of the shared nuclear mission in some key countries.

3. Preserving cohesion and a strong political link: the main challenge of extended deterrence today

3.1. The risks of diverging priorities

Recent years have shown that while the main interests of the United States and its allies remain globally identical, as visible with the global agreement on the threat description

33) Łukasz Kulesa, "The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review: a headache for Europe," European Leadership Network, 15 February 2018.

of the NPR, some diverging priorities or opposite political assessments can lead to disagreements. Although it is not a new phenomenon,³⁴⁾ these shows of disunion are exploited by adversaries and can introduce concerns on the credibility of support pledges and can lead to questioning the solidarity of the protector in the case of an attack.

In Europe, the disagreements among NATO partners can also devalue the sense of solidarity if it leads to antagonistic rhetoric and decisions. Oppositions concerning the Brexit, migratory issues, energy or economic interests have the power to fracture the links between partners and weaken their commitments to respond together to shared challenges. But the lack of consensus on the primary threats to Europe (seen as coming from the East for some members or the South for some others) is also a factor which may limit the ability of NATO to speak and act with one voice.

With regard to transatlantic relationships, trade issues, the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA or the Donald Trump's strong criticism of the lack of contribution of European allies to the defense of the continent are among the issues which could provoke a major rift and equally threaten the cohesion of the Alliance.

In Asia as well, the risk of "decoupling" is perceived with some anxiety: South Korea is regularly evoking fears that the US-North Korean crisis could lead to a situation where its security interests are jeopardized, and is therefore fearful of a too hawkish American posture that would put its population at risk without reflecting Seoul's preferences.³⁵⁾ On the other side, South Koreans also see with worries a too accommodating posture towards the North, as was shown by the prudent position adopted by many in Seoul following the Singapore Summit.³⁶⁾

In Japan too, the credibility of extended deterrence is weakened by the fear that the

34) Łukasz Kulesa, "Central Europeans and the Future of Extended Deterrence in Asia and the Middle East," in *The Future of NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture: Views from Central Europe*, edited by Łukasz Kulesa, Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 2012.

35) Choe Sang-Hun, "Allies for 67 Years, U.S. and South Korea Split Over North Korea," *The New York Times*, 4 September 2017.

36) Hans Schattle, "The view from Seoul: why the Trump-Kim 'deal' worries South Koreans," *The Guardian*, 12 June 2018.

US may withdraw to its immediate security concerns and strike a deal with China and North Korea that would leave the upper hand to these countries in framing the regional security environment. Specifically, there is a worry about a potential deal between Washington and Pyongyang that would curb the long-range ballistic missile program but allow the North Korean regime to preserve his medium range missiles, thus being able to threaten the Japanese islands.³⁷⁾

These concerns illustrate the major challenge for extended deterrence: threat perception may differ, priorities may diverge between protector and protégé and therefore create doubts on the strength of existing commitments.³⁸⁾ This constant difficulty of extended deterrence seems accentuated today with the policy and behavior of the US President Donald Trump.

3.2. The perception of a lack of reliability of the Trump administration

Contrary to his predecessors, President Trump has treated his allies rather harshly and has worried them with his choices of words and threats.

As mentioned, his disparaging comments about the role of NATO or the opportunity of Article V have startled Europeans, as well as his blunt criticism of their domestic policies, and public uproar on their lack of financial commitments to the defense of the Alliance. This sense of crisis increased during the Brussels NATO Summit in July 2018, when it was rumored that the President had threatened to withdraw from the Alliance if he did not obtain satisfaction.³⁹⁾ Whether or not this threat was actually mentioned or just a way of scoring points domestically, it increased the sense of disunion during the Summit. It even created fears on Capitol Hill, where US Senators introduced legislation that would prevent the President from leaving NATO without the Senate's consent.⁴⁰⁾

37) Sheila Smith, "What a U.S.-North Korean Summit Means for Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, 14 March 2018.

38) A reality reflected by the "Healey theorem": "it takes only 5% credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but 95% to reassure the Europeans" (Dennis Healey, *The Time of My Life*, London: Michael Joseph, 1989, p. 243).

39) David M. Herszenhorn and Lili Bayer, "Trump's whiplash NATO summit," *Politico*, 12 July 2018.

In the Pacific, concerns grew when Donald Trump acceded to a North Korean demand and cancelled the annual joint exercise with Seoul, but also when he appeared to toy with the idea of reducing the number of American troops deployed in South Korea.⁴¹⁾ Japan and South Korea have also been targeted by the President as countries that need to pay more for their defense, and the American protection has been referred to as dependent to increases in their respective contributions to the US basing troops on their soils.⁴²⁾

There is really on all sides a lack of trust for the policies of the Trump Administration that go beyond the more structural concerns on the evolution of priorities and the sustainability of shared interests. The way to address this challenge may be to “wait out” the end of this administration,⁴³⁾ but the impact of this lack of reliability of the American ally may be long-lasting in terms of extended deterrence.

3.3. Future issues

Other issues are likely to impact extended deterrence in both Europe and Asia in the short and medium term. In Europe, there are strong interrogations on the future of the shared nuclear mission. This subject may appear politically less divisive among allies on the principle, as all governments have today confessed their desire to maintain the existing arrangements, contrary to what was the case in the early 2010s. However, the replacement of dual-capable aircrafts, which remains to be decided in Belgium and Germany, will certainly prove controversial in these countries and their respective government may face opposition as they try to procure nuclear-capable bombers. Later on, the deployment of new weapons (B61-12) on the European bases may also be met

40) Sophie Tatum, “Bipartisan bill would prevent Trump from exiting NATO without Senate approval,” *CNN*, 26 July 2018.

41) Mark Landler, “Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea,” *The New York Times*, May 3, 2018.

42) Anna Fifield, “Donald Trump says U.S. is bankrolling Asian allies’ defense. That’s not really true.,” *The Washington Post*, 30 March 2018.

43) Abigail Tracy, “‘He Chooses The Hammer Every Time’: NATO Left Fuming As Trump Turns Toward Putin,” *Vanity Fair*, 13 July 2018.

with resistance. More globally, the antinuclear landscape, which is not highly active currently in Europe but remains popular according to opinion polls, may gain in importance as these events occur and may lead to renewed political opposition domestically and in Brussels.

Regarding policy, the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, adopted in Chicago in 2012, is still deemed appropriate to deal with the current level of threat, but might still be considered for revision as it approaches its ten years of existence. Any negotiation on NATO doctrine and language on nuclear issues would be potentially divisive according to the perception of threat and local political balance of the time.

The evolution of the INF Treaty crisis should also be followed carefully as the propositions of retaliation in kind, with the development of a new cruise missile, proposed regularly by the US Congress, could lead to a transatlantic crisis.

For South Korea and Japan, the debate on equipment will mostly concern missile defense with decisions to be taken by Seoul on the deployment of systems. The evolution of the negotiation process on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will also be of key importance, both as it will impact the threat assessment for the two countries but also condition the level of protection from America.

Conclusion

Despite important differences, extended deterrence in Europe and in Northeast Asia is increasingly confronted to similar challenges. This realization is a key to sustain dialogues between European and Asian partners, which are increasingly aware of the interdependence of the two mechanisms of extended deterrence. The health of one relationship is essential for the other, as any doubts on the credibility of the American commitment on one theater may create concerns on the other.⁴⁴⁾ For Washington, it is therefore essential to understand that Europe is very attentive to the strength of

⁴⁴⁾ Stephan Frühling and Andrew O'Neil (2017) Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 38, n°1, 4-25

extended deterrence in Asia, and vice versa. Direct dialogues between the two regions have also emerged and help develop a better understanding of the specificity of the two models. They are opportunities to exchange on best practices and brainstorm on similar response to common challenges. These strategic dialogues and exchanges should therefore be encouraged and developed in future years.

II-3

**Rethinking of the Extended
Deterrence in Europe and Asia:
As alike as two peas in a pod or as
different as chalk and cheese?**

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Rethinking of the Extended Deterrence in Europe and Asia: As alike as two peas in a pod or as different as chalk and cheese?

Introduction

Extended deterrence is a key element of the U.S. security strategy pursued to ensure international and regional order and stability. Since the Cold War, extended deterrence has also been served as an important vehicle for fostering a cohesive partnership of the United States with European and Asian allies. As the United States developed a post-war alliance system, the question of extended deterrence – the ability of U.S. military forces, particularly nuclear forces, to deter attack on U.S. allies and thereby reassure them – received greater attention. As notable differences and contrasts exist in terms of political, economic and military capabilities developed in different regional contexts, the perception of security environment as well as the history, institutional structure, and characteristics of extended deterrence in Europe and Asia are also different. Even after the end of the Cold War, both strategic and tactical weapons have been newly evolving to adapt to the different security conditions respectively.

Given these dissimilar circumstances, it is interesting to note that Europeans have recently shed light on the East Asian extended deterrence and vice versa. In particular, the fact that Asia's extended deterrence relationship has been exercised without including forward deployed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is considered more attractive compared to the NATO's risk-and-burden-sharing concepts which involve U.S. nuclear forces. Europeans are also increasingly looking to the Asia-Pacific, to U.S. actions there, and especially to the new long-range threat from North Korea to inform thinking about their own security. As one example reflecting European NATO allies' interest in East Asia, the NATO Secretary General recently visited Japan and South Korea for the first time ever NATO defense ministerial meeting focused on North Korea. NATO has recently

adopted “an approach” to Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, the East Asian allies have also been closely watching what the U.S. and NATO have been doing in response to Russia’s aggressive action in Europe. They are favorable to the NATO’s consultative structure and operational system. Encountering serious security concerns posed mainly by the North Korean nuclear ambition and more assertive rising power of China in the region, there is growing interest of East Asian allies in examining NATO’s multilateral as well as conservative framework.

As the global security landscape has been changing, the European and Northeast Asian security landscape is becoming more like each other. Particularly, both regions are confronted with rising nuclear tensions and address the question of the reliability of American political commitment to security guarantee. Despite the different nature of extended deterrence in Europe and Asia that has very different and to some extent controversial histories throughout the years, there has been rethinking of these relations in recent years.

This paper explores a range of essential debates on extended deterrence of Europe and Asia. Based on the common, but salient, topics arising recently in both regions within the context of pursuing extended deterrence, this paper examines similarities and differences of extended deterrence in Europe and Asia respectively. Then it concludes with some lessons to learn from each side that would lead the allies to view those of others as more suitable for meeting their current needs.

I. Credibility of Extended Deterrence in the Trump Era

Extended deterrence has been a central element of the U.S. security policy towards Europe and Asia. Since the Cold War, the US has constantly adapted to perceived threats and intended to deter any potential threats and adversaries. As part of an effective and robust security assurance, Washington has focused on a straight-forward deterrence concept: persuade any potential adversary that risks and costs of his proposed action far outweigh any gains that he might hope to achieve.¹⁾ In effect, the U.S. has been willing to threaten, or warn of, the use of nuclear weapons against any potential

aggressors of itself as well as its allies with the catastrophic damages and costs of a nuclear retaliatory strike against his homeland.

Nuclear deterrence also aims at preventing nuclear proliferation. The U.S. has pledged to protect its closest allies by deploying and providing its military assets in different regions of the world, *inter alia* in Europe and Asia. By doing so, Washington makes its allies feel less compelled to pursue a nuclear option. To make its deterrence credible, the U.S. built up the most powerful strategic and tactical forces, both nuclear and conventional. In addition, to achieve its strategic goal, the U.S. has also sought 'outer defenses' security system, through which the U.S. relies on its allies and coalition partnership. In this context, extended deterrence is understood as a 'package of security assurances' of the United States.²⁾

During the Cold War, the primary focus of deterrence was the Soviet Union. However, as the global security environment has evolved considerably complicated and multifaceted in the aftermath of the Cold War, potential threats that might be causing the risks of the U.S. vital interests have been expanded. Not only Russia but China also appeared to be a new rising power in the region. Furthermore, rogue states such as Iran, Syria and North Korea are eager to acquire non-conventional weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. As a result, the question of the credibility of extended deterrence received greater attention both in Europe and Asia.

As shown us the result of the U.S. recent efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, so-called 'a world without nuclear weapons' under the Obama's administration, that have led to the rearmament of potential nuclear threats, particularly Russia and China, it became difficult for Washington to avoid criticism. Accordingly, on the one hand, there have been many questions about the ability of the United States to suppress nuclear expansion and its willingness while making efforts to reduce it and, on the other hand, focusing on the modernization and technological development of nuclear weapons. Reflecting

1) Steven Pifer et al.. "U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges," *Foreign Policy*, BROOKINGS, 2010

2) Stefanie von Hlatky, "American Alliances and Extended Deterrence", in Stefanie von Hlatky and Adreas Wenger (eds), *The Future of Extended Deterrence*, Georgetown University Press: Washington DC, 2015, p.1

the failure of the nuclear strategy of the previous administration, the 2018 NPR clearly demonstrates how the Trump's administration considers modernizing nuclear power to be an important security strategy and a priority for U.S. defense policy.

1) European perspectives on the credibility of extended deterrence

Russia's annexation of Crimea that took place in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution turned into a crucial wake-up call for Europe. The Russian 'coup de force' came as a shock to NATO, and the significant increase of Russian military presence in the region became an important source of inspiration for Western Europe's trauma from the Cold War, expressing the danger of military confrontation in Europe. Against this backdrop, at the 2018 NPR, the United States identifies Russia as a potential aggression in Europe and affirms the 'return of great power competition'. It seems that the U.S. tends to find appropriate reasons for enhancing its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

For NATO's European members, Russia has been the world's most pressing security threats. Despite the fact that a key part of the NATO's agenda has exclusively remained on Russia, however, for much of his time in office, Barack Obama assumed Russia as a declining power so that he needed not to pay it much heed. Yet a weak, insecure, unpredictable country with nuclear capabilities turns out to be very dangerous, more so, in some ways, even than the Soviet Union was. Vladimir Putin has recently expressed his ambition to strengthen the army by supplying it with 'new generation weapons' and expected to watch Russia's biggest war games since the fall of the Soviet Union.³⁾ Putin's vows to beef up army as well as growing belligerence in Europe and worldwide have added fuel to NATO's desire to upgrade current capabilities and provide a more credible deterrence.⁴⁾ In fact, it is publicly said that Putin seeks new ways to scare the world every week in order to offset vulnerability at home with aggression abroad.⁵⁾

3) Reuters, "Russia's Putin inspects war games and vows to beef up army", Sep. 13, 2018

4) David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, "Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics", *RAND Corporation*, 2016

5) The Economist, "The threat from Russia: How to contain Vladimir Putin's deadly, dysfunctional empire", Oct 22ed, 2016, available at <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/10/22/the-threat-from-russia> (accessed on 3 August 2018)

According to an expert's analysis, as presently postured, NATO can hardly defend the territory in response to Russian preemptive attack on NATO's Eastern European allies that can be possibly carried out in 60 hours.⁶⁾ And such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited and merely negative option. The recent resurgence of Russia as a threatening force in Europe has therefore endowed the alliance with renewed purpose: enhancing solidarity and cohesion in the face of a new Russian threat; or pondering over adopting other protagonist options for Europe to avoid complete dependence on U.S. guarantee.

For European allies, the question of the credibility of American security guarantee has been the most prolonged and salient anxiety above all other concerns. Will the U.S. put its cities and population at risk to defend its allies to honor its commitment in case of crisis? The answer of American assurance to a great extent looms and remains skeptical. The belief that America is intertwining its fate with its most crucial in Europe and Pacific is already shaken up. Trump amplifies these doubts and erodes one of the most important pillars of the Western security architecture: 'preserving peace through deterrence'.⁷⁾

Given this skepticism, the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels managed dramatic agendas. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis pushed for his plan, known as "30-30-30-30", that would enable NATO to assemble a fighting force of 30 land battalions, 30 air fighter squadrons and 30 navy warships within 30 days of any threat in NATO territory.⁸⁾ This means a reinforcement of current NATO's capabilities and reaffirmation of a more credible deterrence. Nevertheless, Donald Trump expressed again his causal and disdainful views on NATO, calling allies "free-riders" who do not spend enough on defense.⁹⁾

6) David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson (2016), *op. cit.*

7) George Bush, 'Preserving Peace Through Deterrence', *The Times*, Nov. 21, 1983, archives available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/21/us/preserving-peace-through-deterrence.html>

8) Reuters, 'U.S. pushes NATO to ready more forces to deter Russian threat', June 5, 2018, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/nato-russia/us-pushes-nato-to-ready-more-forces-to-deter-russian-threat-idUSL5N1T729Z>

9) *The New York Times*, "As Summit Nears, NATO Allies Have One Main Worry: Trump", June 26, 2018, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/world/europe/trump-nato-summit-g-7.html>

Indeed, burden-sharing has been an important subject since NATO's foundation. Without exception all the U.S. presidents have expressed concerns about cost-sharing, but none have done so as bluntly as Trump does. Trump stresses the need for allies to pay their fair share to shoulder responsibility, to share burdens and for the institution to continue on the path of strengthening the Alliance. Trump focuses on the simplest, and most cited, of metrics for burden-sharing, the 2 percent guideline - the target that each member state should spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense. Although more NATO member states are on course to meet some of the internal defense spending goals set by NATO,¹⁰⁾ the debate on the burden-sharing remains as a significant and controversial preoccupation in line with European perspectives on the credibility of extended deterrence.

In the 2018 NPR, Donald Trump explicitly reaffirmed his willingness to ensure the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence, and also reiterated his commitment to providing extended deterrence to its allies.¹¹⁾ Ironically, however, Trump's foreign policy doctrine of 'America First' has never seemed to be eclipsed even in the realm of NATO's solidarity. Trump's plainly America-centered-nationalism brings another reason why European NATO members seem to be strongly doubtful about America's credibility. It is no secret that Trump has threatened to withdraw the U.S. from the NATO or to change its pivotal role in the alliance.¹²⁾ Even in the wake of Trump's implicit threat to pull out of NATO at the Brussels Summit in July and Trump-Putin Summit in Helsinki shortly thereafter, such strong sense of rumor and fears on dismantlement of alliance have flared up

10) See more details: Defense News, "Results are in: Here's how much NATO allies spent on defense in 2017", Mar. 15, 2018, available at <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/03/15/results-are-in-heres-how-much-nato-allies-spent-on-defense-in-2017/>

11) In fact, in the final document of 2018 NPR, the word "allies" appears to be counted 127 times. This was appreciated by both European and Asian allies as a good sign of the American willingness to preserve solidarity and reiterate the importance of alliance.

12) Trump has publicly told about his discontented views on the NATO. Lately, in his West Virginia campaign rally in August, he reaffirmed the possibility of US withdrawal from the NATO, saying that "Yes, I will leave if you don't pay your bills", and then he added that "You could see those checkbooks came out for billions of dollars." See for further details, Atlantic Council, "Trump Confirms He Threatened to Withdraw from NATO," Aug. 22, 2018, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/trump-confirms-he-threatened-to-withdraw-from-nato> ; and C-SPAN, Trump Campaign rally in Charleston, West Virginia, Aug. 21, 2018, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4745235/president-confirms-threatened-withdraw-nato-funding-levels&start=3030>

throughout Europe. While the U.S. has been playing a pivotal role in organizing international orders since the end of the World Wars, none can be sure about US's future determination whether or not to pull the U.S. membership out of the NATO. In fact, Donald Trump finally decided to leave UNESCO last October and the issue of pulling the U.S. membership out of the WTO is now under consideration. Reflecting the fact that Trump has called NATO "obsolete" and scolded other member countries for unfair burden-sharing, it is no longer impossible to imagine it could happen.

Such one-sided, egoistic and self-centered propulsion of Donald Trump is now shaking NATO's solidarity that has been formed over the past decades. For Europeans, there has been a strong desire to achieve its ultimate goal to "make one voice and act as one", which has bound the divergent views and opinions of European countries together. However, Trump has bickered with many of the U.S.' closest allies, including Germany, Canada and France, and there is growing concerns of significant cleavages witnessed within the European allies. At the Brussels NATO Summit, for example, the German Chancellor Merkel overthrew Trump's belligerent words saying that "We've been allies and partners, but now with Trump we are competitors, and he is implementing policies aimed against Europe."¹³⁾ Between Germany and France, there are also discussions about how to increase leverage on Washington, a new concept.

2) Asian perspectives on the credibility of extended deterrence

The question of the credibility of American commitment and willingness to provide extended deterrence capabilities is one of the serious concerns in Asia. Unlike European allies, for whom Russia is the most pressing threat, however, for the America's East Asian allies, North Korea and/or China pose the deepest security anxieties. The security condition in East Asia has evolved considerably since the time, four decades ago, when the region approached nuclear tipping point. China embarked in 1979 on a systematic and sustained program of self-strengthening that started in the economic system but is now bearing fruit in the military realm. Steadily, China is both acquiring conventional

13) The New York Times, "As Summit Nears, NATO Allies Have One Main Worry: Trump", op. cit.

power-projection capabilities and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. Beijing's growing military power fosters new anxieties, particularly in the context of perceptions of American over-extension or decline. North Korea also worked on its own nuclear weapons program and tested nuclear missiles launches six times including one in 2006, another in 2009 and in 2014, two nuclear explosions in 2016 alone, and one in 2017. Needless to say, North Korea's nuclear tests and the development of its long-range missile technology are raising grave security perils in East Asia.

Just as Europeans have doubts about the reliability of U.S. security assurance, among Asian nuclear deterrence allies, South Korea, in particular, is also skeptical about the U.S. guarantee of extended deterrence. More precisely speaking, South Korea's trajectory of nuclear anxiety was similar to the European sense of security treats and uncertainty about the U.S. deterrence. Even after the Korea War, South Korean had some doubts about American resolve to defend its territory against external attack, but the deepest anxiety occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. Prior to that time, South Korea was reassured by the mutual defense treaty and the deployment of, first, US troops and then tactical nuclear weapons on to the peninsula. Meanwhile, North Korea increased its armed provocations in 1970s. Soon thereafter, the Nixon Administration decided to withdraw one division from the peninsula without consulting Seoul, in spite of President Park Chung Hee's strong objection. Against this backdrop, President Park undertook a program of 'self-reliant national defense', but concluded that "building a sufficient conventional deterrent would be expensive and time-consuming."¹⁴ Consequently, a nuclear weapons program began in South Korea in the late 1970s, accordingly.¹⁵ This initiative had two drivers: Seoul's increasingly dire threat perception concerning North Korea and an apparent weakening of the U.S. security commitment. Although the initiative for a self-reliant nuclear program did not lead to a substantial progress in the end, the Korean peninsula had been under U.S. nuclear umbrella,

14) Richard C. Bush "The US Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views, and Implications," *Brookings Arms Control Series*, No.5, Brookings Institution, p.3; Joseph F. Pilat and Nathan E. Busch (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy*, Routledge: London, 2015, p.224

15) Sungjoo Han, "South Korea 1977: Preparing for Self-Reliance," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 18. No.1, 1978, pp. 45-47

including U.S. deployed tactical weapons, until early 1990s when the U.S. withdrew its nuclear weapons from Korea in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.

Considering this historical background, it is by no means surprising that there is recently growing call for the relocation of tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, especially from the conservative part, confronting with accelerated N. Korea's rush toward nuclear threats. As shown in the case of Europe, there also exists a vital question on the reliability of American commitment to defend its allies in East Asia: will the U.S. come to defend Seoul, even if Pyongyang could threaten Washington with a nuclear strike? Even an American expert and foreign-service officer also posed similar questions: "While South Korea and Japan are protected by their alliances with the U.S. and its nuclear umbrella, how long would that situation hold?"; "Would the South Korean people believe in a certain U.S. response?"; and he added that "Would proliferation stop with South Korea and Japan?"¹⁶⁾

The views on U.S. extended deterrence in East Asia, particularly South Korea and Japan, have similarities and differences. South Koreans tend to see North Korea as the primary target of deterrence and by and large do not regard China as a nuclear problem. These Koreans are not way too much worried about the implications of deep cuts for the American extended-deterrence commitment. Rather, their principal concern is whether Washington has the will to use nuclear weapons if deterrence fails.¹⁷⁾ Japan, on the other hand, is not irrelevant because a failure to denuclearize or otherwise constrain North Korea might lead Tokyo to pursue a nuclear option.

In order to understand why East Asian allies have different positions on extended deterrence, two things can hint clues. First, the reason that South Korea and Japan have different temperature in recognition of primary threats and degree of reliability

16) The Time, "Avoiding the temptation to do nothing", by Chris Hill, <http://time.com/north-korea-opinion/>

17) Richard C. Bush, 2011, p.9; For an extended discussion by a conservative scholar, see Taewoo Kim, "ROK-U.S. Defense Cooperation against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Strengthening Extended Deterrence," KINU-CNAS Research Paper, 2009. Dr. Kim approved of the reaffirmation of extended deterrence at the Lee-Obama summit but argued that the two countries should reinforce it through exercises, through inclusion of chemical and biological weapons and missiles, and through integrating extended-deterrence issues into allied war plans. He urged Washington not to undermine extended deterrence in the way it wrote the Nuclear Posture Review.

of U.S. extended deterrence capability stems from political tendencies in power. A range of different spectrum of views on extended deterrence may vary depending on political orientations. For instance, conservatives take the world as it is and worry about the credibility of US extended deterrence commitments. Progressives assesses that the nuclear umbrella is part of the problem and would prefer to find a way to reduce the dangers they see of being aligned with the United States in a nuclear world. Conservatives had long been in power in Korea; progressives are in power in Australia and Japan. Since the current government of South Korea entails liberal and progressive political tendency, it is likely to see a downside to the U.S. commitment to defend Korea with nuclear weapons if necessary; because they're leaning towards a rational choice theory of the security dilemma that North Korea can use the U.S. pledge as a pretext to delay its denuclearization and to stimulate its belligerent attitude. Second, the extended deterrence relationship between the United States and Asian allies has built upon bilateral agreement, unlike European model, which adopted a treaty based upon multilateral consensus among all member states.

II. Institutional Framework and NATO's NPG

1) NATO's NPG

The most evident divergence between the two regions is the institutional structure. Whereas in case of Europe there exists an institutional framework in which member states have formalized consultations on the definition and implementation of extended deterrence, there is no such planning and decision-making body system in Asia. This consultative framework is known as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), where all NATO member states, except France, participate in a series of consultation and decision-making on how to carry out extended deterrence. The NPG acts as the senior body on nuclear matters in the Alliance and discusses specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces.¹⁸⁾ The NATO's nuclear policy is kept under review and decisions are taken jointly when it needs to modify or adapt it in the light of new developments and to update

18) NATO, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_50069.htm

or adjust planning and consultation procedures.

The initial idea of creating the NPG came from the primary address of West Germany that remained confronted with the massive military threat of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁹⁾ West Germany insisted that nuclear weapons were central to its defense and that Bonn had a right to a strong, perhaps even decisive, voice in NATO's nuclear policies and wartime decisions. Washington thus offered Bonn a graduated entry into NATO's nuclear councils. Furthermore, operationally, Bonn served as the main host for American nuclear weapons in Europe, contributed to NATO's deterrence capability by supplying nuclear capable vehicles. In light of the institutional dynamics of policy making in NATO, Germany gained an important position in NATO's Nuclear Committee and its working group on nuclear planning, and later permanent participation in the Nuclear Planning Group. As a result, Germany would get greater access to policy-making and information on tactical nuclear forces deployed in Europe. German confidence that Washington would indeed use those weapons, if necessary, would grow.

Nuclear weapons give NATO allies a unique nature as well as complex dynamics.²⁰⁾ Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), only the U.S. is known to have provided weapons for nuclear sharing. And five other countries, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, are hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories and provide bombers to carry them as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy. Other countries participate in an indirect manner by taking part in various degrees of involvement in the support operations, for instance, known as SNOWCAT²¹⁾ which is dedicated to refueling nuclear-weapon carrying aircrafts, or suppressing or disrupting enemy air defense.

Nuclear sharing constituted only one part of the nuclear arrangement that enabled non-nuclear weapons states to participate in the execution, formulation and planning

19) Andreas Lutsch, "Merly 'Docile Self-Deception'? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in NATO," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 39, Issue 4, 2016, pp.535-558

20) Simon Lunn, "NATO Nuclear Policy: Reflection on Lisbon and Looking Ahead to the DDPR," in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (eds), *Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action*, Nuclear threat Initiative: Washington D.C., 2011, pp.24-51

21) Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Tactics

of NATO strategy. Compared to nuclear sharing, the involvement of non-nuclear allies in the field of nuclear consultation became even more important since the mid-1960s. The confidential consultations of the NATO NPG appear to have been a crucial instrument for balancing different views and interests surrounding the implementation of NATO-strategy, modernization issues and the enactment of nuclear arms control. From the outset, NPG discussions were characterized by “unusual intimacy in dealing frankly with mutual doubts and common problems.”²²⁾ Already in the early 1970s, the combination of all existing nuclear arrangements, and particularly the exclusivity of the NPG, gave rise to a perception that West Germany was “fully satisfied” with its position in the nuclear order and its ability to articulate views on nuclear matters.²³⁾

Country	Nuclear State	Nuclear Sharing	SNOWCAT	NPG	Nuclear Policy
Albania				x	x
Belgium		x		x	x
Bulgaria				x	x
Canada				x	x
Croatia				x	x
Czech Rep.			x	x	x
Denmark			x	x	x
Estonia				x	x
France	x				x
Germany		x		x	x
Greece			x	x	x
Hungary			x	x	x
Iceland				x	x
Italy		x		x	x
Latvia				x	x
Lithuania				x	x
Luxembourg				x	x
Netherlands		x		x	x

22) Telex from Cleveland to Clifford, 4/11/1968, The Nuclear Planning Group 1 of 3, NARA [National Archives and Records Administration, College Park] RG 59, box 1597, DEF 12 NATO (4/1/68).

23) Andreas Lutsch, “Nuclear Proliferation: International History Project”, NPIHP Working Paper No.5, 2015

Country	Nuclear State	Nuclear Sharing	SNOWCAT	NPG	Nuclear Policy
Norway			x	x	x
Poland			x	x	x
Portugal				x	x
Romania			x	x	x
Slovakia				x	x
Slovenia				x	x
Spain				x	x
Turkey		x		x	x
United Kingdom	x			x	x
United States	x			x	x
Total	3	5	7	27	28

[Table 1] Roles and Positions in the NATO's Nuclear Sharing Structure

* Non-nuclear (NPT) members: 25

Nuclear weapon members: 3

Nuclear Sharing members: 5

SNOWCAT members: 7

Non Nuclear-related role (other than participating in NPG): 13

2) Asia's proposal for NPG

Asian extended deterrence, on the contrary, is based on bilateral agreement with South Korea and Japan. Given the uncertainty about Chinese, North Korean, and US intentions, Asian allies have proposed the creation of a mechanism akin to the nuclear planning group in NATO, a body where the alliance's nuclear and non-nuclear powers discuss how nuclear weapons might be used in a conflict. However, the way how to apply such mechanism to Asia varies according to the different concept of national security interest.

For a Japanese version, an ambitious agenda of a nuclear planning group was proposed by some of Japanese specialist.²⁴⁾ First, it suggests to share doctrine regarding nuclear

24) Richard C. Bush, p.14 : "Expectations Out of Sync," pp. 11-12. James Schoff has also offered a fulsome proposal for a dialogue mechanism with Japan: a "Deterrence Policy Group." The goal over the long term, he argues, should be to take abstract and symbolic concepts of deterrence and translate them into a set of complementary capabilities with a nuanced understanding of each other's roles and responsibilities in various situations. See Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, pp. 55-56; pp. 28-29.

operations and targeting plans against North Korea and China. Second, a contingency planning by the two militaries, including nuclear warfare, were raised. Third, Japan is willing to Broaden the community of Japanese with which the United States consults, to include political leaders and experts. It is also urged the United States to strengthen its conventional and strategic capabilities deployed in Asia.

The Korean proposal for a nuclear planning group is of course a reference to the body created within NATO in the late 1960s to create greater coordination among alliance members on NATO nuclear weapons policy, including how nuclear weapons might be used against the Warsaw Pact. At the discussion of CSIS Pacific in 2009, there was an idea that proposed the creation of a nuclear planning group between the United States and the ROK. According to that proposal, the purpose would be to ensure that there were no gaps on the meaning of extended deterrence, specifically, the circumstances under which each country believes that the U.S. would and should use nuclear weapons.

But there is a larger, more conceptual question. That is, are NATO mechanisms that were appropriate for the specific set of circumstances that prevailed in Europe during the Cold War necessarily suitable for the very different context in East Asia today? Asian allies who are seeking an Asian version of NPG ignore the fact that the geopolitics and power asymmetries of Cold War Europe are different that those of contemporary East Asia and how conflict might occur. For one thing, the source of the Cold War extended deterrence problem was the fear of a massive and perhaps surprise Warsaw Pact conventional attack on NATO countries that together lacked the conventional ability to mount a defense. That was why the U.S. nuclear guarantee was necessary in the first place. Moreover, NATO had a dual problem. One was whether the United States would put itself at risk to defend Europe by employing its strategic nuclear weapons. The other concerned tactical nuclear weapons that were deployed in NATO countries in Europe and might be used in their defense in the event of a conflict. Both problems, but especially the latter, fostered questions of nuclear sharing, which in turn prompted consideration of the multilateral force, dual-key arrangements, and the Nuclear Planning Group. In Asia, the U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed only once to the Korean peninsula and were pulled out in 1991. Since then none of Asian countries have hosted U.S. nuclear weapons, so there is no necessity of raising a question of

sharing nuclear weapons.

So any such mechanism created with Australia, South Korea, and Japan is advised that it would have to be adopted to regional realities. In particular, it should be part of a larger multilateral effort to reassure China that it is not the object of containment and so reduce the salient of nuclear weapons in the China's security planning.²⁵⁾

III. Europe-Asia Relations in Extended Deterrence: Win-win or Zero-sum?

China, Russia, and North Korea are deemed to a great extent the major challenges that pose to U.S. regional extended deterrence relationship. Even though the three countries pursue different strategies, tactics and final goals, in terms of reshaping international and regional orders, and their interests are contradictory, they tend to support each other in opposing the US and its allies. Major conflict in the Asia-Pacific could strengthen Russia's position in demanding a new security architecture in Europe. Likewise, a conflict in Europe might likewise be exploited by China or North Korea. At least in theory, therefore, the future of US extended deterrence in Europe could be defined by a conflict in the Asia-Pacific or vice versa.²⁶⁾ Hence, U.S. allies from Europe and Asia seem to recognize that their security is indivisible, so that a success of U.S. extended deterrence in one region contributes to the security of U.S. allies in another region and that a failure in one region may beget failure in another region. It is also important to stress that there would be possibly meaningful European military support to Asian security and stability. Because, if the U.S. were to be attacked by North Korea, invocation of Article 5 would be of important political and symbolic value to the United States and also to Japan and South Korea.

Yet, their willingness to support each other is limited as their mutual partnerships focus mainly on uncontroversial, globally recognized and accepted challenges. While they are

25) "A Question of Confidence: The First U.S.-ROK Strategic Dialogue," *Issues and Insights*, vol. 9, no. 18 (September 2009), http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v09n18.pdf

26) Jacek Durkalec, "US Extended Deterrence in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific", Summary of Workshop Discussion, CGSR, November 13, 2017, p.2

willing to cooperate on North Korea, they are reluctant to strongly support each other politically.

Given the limited U.S. resources, U.S. allies seem to compete for U.S. attention and military resources. They tend to look primarily into negative consequences and risks associated with sharing the U.S. as a key ally, without putting greater attention into potential benefits. One of the reasons is their divergent security perceptions. While Japan has been concerned about some Russian activities in its neighborhood, it does not perceive Russia as a regional challenge. Similarly, Europeans tend to look at China mostly as an economic opportunity. European allies worried that the Obama re-balance to Asia would come at their expense, just as Asian allies worry that Russia's challenge to NATO will draw attention and resources away from East Asia. This zero-sum view is a barrier to improved cooperation among U.S. allies more generally.

IV. Conclusion

How best to mix nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is a matter of intense interest and debate in both regions. There are similarities in the mix of U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities committed to allies in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. security guarantees in both regions are underpinned by the full force of the U.S. strategic triad. Theater ballistic missile defense systems are forward-deployed in both regions. There are substantial U.S. and allied conventional forces in-theater, highly-proficient and experienced multinational integrated military commands, and regular demonstrations of surge capability.

It is important to understand that the East Asian security environment differs from that in Europe in two key respects. First of all, the US nuclear deterrent in Europe is embedded in the American commitment to the NATO alliance, particularly Article V of the Washington Treaty. By contrast, the United States has no parallel mutual alliance structure in East Asia. The US extended deterrent is based on bilateral relationships and agreements, so any nuclear debate there will be viewed mainly through a bilateral lens.

Second, the US nuclear commitment to Europe is underpinned in part by the presence

of US nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of NATO allies, some of whom maintain dual-capable aircraft that are equipped to deliver US nuclear weapons. The US never maintained such relationships with its Asian allies, under which it would make nuclear weapons available to them in the most extreme circumstances. Moreover, the US withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea during the Gorge H. W. Bush Administration. Given this circumstance, since the early 1990s, the US extended deterrent for its East Asian allies has been provided by US strategic nuclear forces, either deployed in the United States or aboard Trident ballistic missile submarines.

There are also notable differences. U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons are forward deployed in Europe, while they were removed from Asia at the end of the Cold War. In NATO, there is extensive integration of and participation by allies in nuclear force policy, posture and training, while in the Asia-Pacific, there is no nuclear sharing role for allies. At NATO, UK and French independent strategic nuclear forces are recognized as contributing significantly to overall alliance nuclear deterrence capabilities and are specifically cited as sources of independent nuclear decision-making that complicates a potential adversary's decision-making. In the Asia-Pacific region, there are no equivalent independent strategic nuclear forces.



The Impact of NK nuclear capability on the region and the regional prospect of strategic stability

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The Impact of NK nuclear capability on the region and the regional prospect of strategic stability

I. Introduction

In the late 2017 tension in the Northeast Asian region was substantially heightened due to Pyongyang's nuclear and a series of missile tests, including ICBM, and the Trump Administration's strong pledge of tough response. Yet thanks to the successful Pyongchang Winter Olympic Games, in which North Korea's top delegates participated, the regional tension was dramatically eased. After two summit meetings between South and North Korean leaders and the historic summit meeting between Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore, there has been great expectation of denuclearization of North Korea and henceforth the establishment of a peace regime in the Korean Peninsula. However, the much-hyped North Korea's denuclearization has been slow and unimpressive to many. Thus, uncertainty and unease regarding the prospect of the regional security environment continues. The Northeast Asian region is already filled with many harsh security challenges such as exclusive nationalism, history dispute, maritime territorial disputes, and the never-ending arms race to name a few. Among these the deepening Sino-US rivalry is the most challenging and tremendously impacting everything else in the region. Particularly, the strategic competition between the two great powers has been fierce and thus the strategic stability between the two is hard to expect. North Korea's nuclear ambition fuels further arms race and exacerbates the prospect of strategic stability in the region. In this paper I first lay out the current situation of strategic competition in the region focusing on the strategic arms race between the US and China. And then the general concept of strategic stability is explained and why and how the prospect of strategic stability between the two great powers is remote will be clarified. The impact of North Korea's nuclear capability on the regional strategic stability will be followed. I conclude the paper by suggesting some policy prescriptions.

II. The deepening strategic competition between the US and China in the Northeast Asian region.


China is rapidly rising and is seeking a rightful place in the international system. China's rise inevitably intensifies its challenge to the US hegemonic status and the existing global order set by the US. Based on astonishing economic growth, Beijing has been trying to transfer its economic power to military might. China's rise has been impacting the existing balance of power in the region and changing the regional structural dynamics. This tendency has caused serious concern that power transition might be going on, that could lead to a large scale conflict between the two giants as historically known as Thucydides Trap, which refers to a major conflict between a declining hegemon and a rising challenger.¹⁾ China is trying to reshape the regional structure and the overall relationships between them and the US by asserting the motto of the 'New Great Power Relationships,' and is not hiding to realize the 'Chinese Dream.' The Xi Jinping regime is making strenuous efforts to make it happen. Deeply concerned by Beijing's assertive approach in the region, Washington responded with 'Asia Rebalancing,' and now under the Trump Administration, 'Indo-Pacific Strategy.' China is specifically focusing its military modernization program on limiting and hampering the US power projection capability into the region by promoting Anti-Access/Area Denial(AA/AD) strategy. Responding to this threat, the US is devising a way to overcome China's AA/AD strategy, such as the Air-Sea Battle concept.²⁾

China is also paying a lot of attention to enlarging and upgrading its strategic force. As a part of sweeping military modernization program, Beijing changed the name of its strategic force from the Second Artillery Force to the PLA Rocket Force, and energetically developing its missile capability. To ensure its AA/AD objective PLA has developed and deployed such MRBMs and IRBMs as DF-21C, DF-21D, and DF-2 to target enemy communication, logistics centers and naval ships. China's missile modernization efforts also include MIRV capable ICBMs advanced long-range SLBMs.³⁾ Below is China's

1) Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

2) Air-Sea Battle Office, "Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges," Department of Defense, 2013.

current ballistic missile arsenal.




Source: Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. 2017. "Missiles of China," 2017⁴⁾

China is also increasing the size and modernizing its nuclear assets. Based on Assured Destruction nuclear doctrine, China has been trying to achieve credible deterrence capability. Recently, Beijing's nuclear strategy focuses on acquiring 'lean and effective' nuclear capability.⁵⁾ China now possesses about 280 nuclear warheads and is trying to develop Chinese style nuclear triad. See below for current nuclear warhead inventories of the nuclear powers.

3) US Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, "2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), June 2017; US Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China." Office of Secretary of Defense, 2017.

4) <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/> (Access on July 26, 2018)

5) Eric Heginbotham, et. al., *China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrence: Major Drivers and Issues for the US*. RAND, 2017.



Source: Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces (in 2018)."⁶⁾

Responding to Beijing's enormous development and upgrade efforts of its strategic assets, Washington is trying to stay at the top. For the US its awesome nuclear weapon capability is certain deterrence to any adversary. Furthermore, the US nuclear asset assures the US determination to provide extended deterrence to its allies in the region. Currently, the US has a plan to replace outdated B-52H and B-1B strategic bombers to B-21 throughout 2030s and 2040s. Long-served Minuteman-III ICBMs will be replaced by Ground Based Strategic Deterrence(GBSD) by 2028. The current Ohio-class nuclear submarine will also be replaced by the Columbia-Class Submarine by 2031. Despite fiscal constraints, the Pentagon requested whopping \$716 billion defense budget to prepare for military showdown with peer competitors like China.⁷⁾ Most of all, Washington made sure that nuclear weapons will remain key for its strategic superiority. Thus the US will continuously upgrade and improve its nuclear arsenal to deter and defeat, when necessary, adversaries at the time of the return of the great power competition.⁸⁾

⁶⁾ <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/> (Access on September 7, 2018)

⁷⁾ Tom O'Connor, "Russia and China Take On U.S. Military's Largest-Ever Budget That They Say Makes World Less Safe," *Newsweek*, August 15, 2018.

⁸⁾ US Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review," February 2018.

The fierce competition between the US and China in the strategic realm has no sign of abating. Actually, it has been getting intensified as seen above. As the strategic competition and great power arms race continues, the prospect of establishing strategic stability in the region, which could substantially ease tension as happened during the Cold War Era in the region, seems grim. Strategic Stability between the nuclear powers is defined as “a situation in which neither side, even in an intense crisis, has an incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons, because it recognizes that the other would still retain the capability to inflict a devastating retaliatory strike.”⁹⁾ Thus both sides will try to avoid a surprise attack that they surely know will bring nothing but disaster. The two super-powers understood the mechanism of strategic stability during the Cold War. The mutual understanding and abstinence allowed the two maintain stable condition and not hot war between the two despite many crises. The mutual recognition between the two superpowers further led to a series of strategic arms control, which contributed more stability in the strategic field. Yet it is questionable if the US and China can reach this level of mutual understanding of strategic stability any time soon.

Unlike Europe, where involved parties have accumulated ample experiences of arms control negotiations and practices based on strategic stability recognition, East Asia lacks any such experience except the short-lived Washington Naval Conference almost one hundred years ago. There have been some multilateral agreements like NPT, but never bilateral arrangements between key players. In spite of rising interests and pressure of strategic arms control in the region, it is unlikely there will be any strategic arms control dialogue between the US and China mainly due to the fact that they do not have mutual understanding of strategic stability. First of all, even though Beijing is rapidly catching up Washington’s strategic superiority, there is still a huge gap between the two powers: US has more than ten times of nuclear warheads than China. Thus, Beijing demands the reduction of Washington’s nuclear arsenal while they increase their own. But the US reduction of nuclear asset will make its allies doubt the US assurance of extended deterrence in the region.¹⁰⁾ 2018 Nuclear Posture Review Clearly

9) Elbridge Colby and Abraham Denmark, “Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations: A Way Forward,” A Report of PONI Working Group on US-China Nuclear Dynamics, March (CSIS), 2013, p. 8.

10) Robert Ayson, “Arms Control in Asia: Yesterday’s Concept for Today’s Region?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67(1), 2013.

indicates that it is not going to happen. Furthermore, transparency of each other's nuclear arsenal, one of the key requirements of strategic stability, is unlikely due to Beijing's belief of intentional strategic opacity policy as a weaker party of nuclear competition.¹¹⁾ Thus, asymmetric status of strategic assets between the two great powers and gross disagreements of interpreting strategic stability will greatly hamper their settlement on strategic stability.

Another obstacle is the rapid development of conventional capability for both sides. Besides overt strategic asset improvement, these two have been developing and upgrading such hi-tech conventional weapon systems as missile defense, hypersonic weapons, precision munitions, etc. The US is particularly concerned about China's vigorous investment and expansion of space and cyber ability, which could devastatingly disrupt the US power projection capability.¹²⁾ Conventional weapons are even harder to reach an agreement of limiting and controlling by the involved parties because of their inherent difficulty of measuring weapon's potential stability or instability.¹³⁾

Finally, the existence and activity of the third country makes the Sino-US strategic stability cooperation extremely daunting. In the Second Nuclear Age a nuclear power in confronting more than one nuclear state. Under this security trilemma, one country's action affects not only its main adversary but also an involved third party, thereby further complicates strategic calculation of these countries.¹⁴⁾ Nuclear-armed Russia and India certainly make the strategic relationships between the US and China more complicated. And here comes nuclear-armed North Korea. In the following section I will more closely look at North Korea's nuclear development efforts and its impact on the regional strategic stability.

11) Ibid.


12) Heginbotham, *China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 155-8. To respond China's threats in such diverse domains, the US military is devising a new security strategy called "Multi-Domain Battle."

13) James Steinberg and O'Hanlon, Michael, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

14) Gregory Koblenz, "Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age" (Council on Foreign Relations) Council Special Report No. 71, November 2014, pp. 20-1.

III. North Korea's nuclear capability impacting the regional strategic stability

Many experts agree that a prime motive of Pyongyang's nuclear pursuit is security, to deter US nuclear use and to match the US nuclear umbrella. Mazarr argues that, as in other cases of proliferation for political motives, perceptions of insecurity are the major driving force behind North Korea's nuclear ambitions.¹⁵⁾ Besides the security purpose, scholars also argue that nuclear weapons have been developed in North Korea for economic reasons, as a cheaper tool to achieve national security as well as useful bargaining chips to achieve normalization of relationships with the United States.¹⁶⁾ North Korea is also said to have tried to develop nuclear weapons not only as a tool of diplomacy to extract concessions through blackmail, but also for the purpose of regime survival.¹⁷⁾



Source: Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. 2017. "Missiles of North Korea," 2017¹⁸⁾

15) Michael Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 208-209.

16) Selig Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 201-203.

17) Han S. Park, *North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 134-140.

North Korea so far has conducted six nuclear tests and numerous missile tests. Years of North Korea's frantic efforts to strengthen nuclear capability seems to bear fruit recently as experts estimate that Pyongyang is likely to possess 20 to 100 nuclear warheads by 2020.¹⁹⁾ North Korea's delivery systems have also shown significant improvement after many attempts (quite a few of them failed) of flight-tests, especially ICBM version. Confronting against a lot stronger enemy, North Korea's nuclear deterrence strategy is likely to be based on assured destruction through continuing upgrade and increase of nuclear technology, a number of warheads and variance of nuclear delivery systems, according to a report.²⁰⁾ Yet there is a strong possibility that Pyongyang adopts an asymmetric escalation posture similar to the one that has been adopted by Pakistan to ensure to deter a US military action. As Bernstein argues, Pyongyang could adopt an "early use" strategy signaling that it would use nuclear weapons as early as necessary when it faces unacceptable danger for its regime security to deter a large scale combined forces response.²¹⁾ North Korea's possible EMP capable nuclear warhead attack is another serious concern. If they detonate a 10 kt warhead, EMP damage could spread as long as 930km radius.²²⁾

As in the case of India vs. Pakistan, the Korean Peninsula could also go through a perilous occurrence of stability/instability paradox. North Korea already has proven that it does not hesitate when they think it is a right time to launch a low-level conventional provocation without worrying much about the severe consequences, and Seoul and Washington had a hard time to stubbornly respond to such an occasion. Now emboldened by much strengthened nuclear capability Pyongyang's adventurism could continue. In response to North Korea's nuclear development efforts, and in order to deter and punish if necessary, Seoul has come up with the Three Pivot system, Kill

18) <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/> (Access on August 28, 2018)

19) Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn, "North Korea's Nuclear Future: Technology and Strategy," North Korea's Nuclear Future Series, US-Korea Institute at SAIS (2015).

20) Ibid.; Joseph Bermudez, "North Korea's Development of a Nuclear Strategy," North Korea's Nuclear Future Series, US-Korea Institute at SAIS (2015); Robert Carlin and Robert Jervis, "Nuclear North Korea: How Will It Behave?" *38 North*, November 2015.

21) Paul Bernstein, "5. The Emerging Nuclear Landscape," in Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry Kartchner (Eds.), *On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century* (Stanford University Press), p. 120.

22) William Graham, "North Korean Nuclear EMP Attack: An Existential Threat," *38 North*, June 2, 2017.

Chain, Korean Air Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korean Massive Punishing Retaliation (KMPR). Although it is entirely logical for South Korea to devise this system to deter and punish North Korea should deterrence fail, one should keep in mind that this system also has a risk of being misperceived by the North and further intensify their nuclear and other offensive weapon development efforts. Since the Kill Chain and the KMPR both have elements of preemptive attack, it might give impetus for Pyongyang to move first. The US, deeply vexed by the constant provocation by unruly North Korea, has reportedly devised plans for preemption as well.²³⁾ In response to the ongoing consideration of preemption by South Korea and the US, North Korea constantly threatens that it would not hesitate to unleash its nuclear weapons any time. As some observers argue, Pyongyang seems to demonstrate its resolve that nuclear option is wide open to deter or repulse the allied preemption or invasion.²⁴⁾ It is imperative to understand that threat of preemption or even preparation of preemptive strike is extremely destabilizing and likely to invoke further arms race.

Furthermore, even if there is growing concern that Pyongyang's much improved nuclear and missile capability is becoming a game changer to achieve its long-time revisionist goal of the US Forces withdrawal and unification of the Peninsula on her terms, this might be an excessive worry. It is hard to say that North Korea's addition of some nuclear assets to its weapons inventory significantly strengthens North Korea's security position vis-à-vis South Korea and the US. Thus, "as long as that alliance remains intact and the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains credible, North Korea's nuclear weapons will buy it regime-change insurance, a larger buffer against American conventional threats, and cover for limited conventional provocations — nothing more."²⁵⁾ Therefore, the best response to North Korea's nuclear and missile provocation still seems classic deterrence,²⁶⁾ which has been working well for decades, as well as maintaining the strong ROK-US alliance.

23) David Sanger and William Broad, "Downing North Korean Missile is Hard. So the US Is Experimenting," *New York Times*, November 16, 2017.

24) Jeffrey Lewis, "North Korea Is Practicing Nuclear War," *Foreign Policy*, March 9, 2017.

25) Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, "Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North Korea and the Lessons from Pakistan," *The Diplomat*, November 22, 2017.

26) Scott Sagan, "The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option," *Foreign Affairs*, 96/6 (Nov/Dec 2017), pp. 72-82.

However, it is certain that North Korea's nuclear and missile development makes the strategic stability issue between the US and China a lot more complicated.²⁷⁾ As shown above, the resolution of Sino-US strategic stability is extremely difficult enough. Adding this kind of complication and complexity does not help to ease security tension in the region.

China is not directly threatened by North Korea's nuclear development. But Beijing perceives the US and its allies' building of missile defense system and the deployment of strategic assets in what it considers its backyard as a threat. Even though the US constantly argues that it has neither intention nor capability to build a missile shield against the Chinese nuclear capability, Beijing is vigorously developing its strategic assets as an excuse to respond the US missile defense system and the deployment of strategic arsenal.²⁸⁾ Therefore, North Korea's nuclear and missile development efforts have certainly furthered the destabilizing impact on the regional strategic stability, since it has been causing threat perception change and impetus for further regional nuclear proliferation and arms race. The Trump's Administration promotes strong 'America first' policy and has shown tendency to see problems in bilateral terms and solve them bilaterally. Many in the US think North Korean nuclear and missile (especially ICBM) capability as a 'game changer.' Also, they have deep-seeded mistrust on North Korean regime. Thus the US has been trying the following to respond the North Korean nuclear threat: guaranteeing the US extended deterrence, upgrading the missile defense system, deploying strategic assets, developing new weapon systems and more aggressive strategy including preemptive strike. Yet the recent inflammatory remarks by Trump about the long-standing US allies in the region make the allies wonder if the US alliance commitment is conditional under Trump causing credibility and reassurance problem. In case of China, Xi Jinping has a firm grip of power and promotes to realize the 'Chinese Dream.' For China North Korea is still an important strategic buffer despite many mishaps done by Pyongyang. Beijing has been criticizing the US encroachment in the region

27) There is an argument that strategic competition between these two great powers allowed a room for Pyongyang to maneuver, and eventually acquire nuclear capability. Hongseo Park and Tae-Hyung Kim, "Great-Power Rivalry and the Nuclear Development of Weak States: The Cases of the Two Koreas," *Journal of Peace and Unification*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 2016).

28) Heginbotham, *China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 88-9, 95, 162.

and Chinese core interest areas using North Korean threat as an excuse. Therefore, there is a wide gap between two great powers on strategic issues and the cleavage has been widened as the battle intensifies in other areas such as the trade war.

However, The US and China have common interests of resolving North Korean nuclear problem. China has been agreeing with the US to remove the North Korean nuclear issue by joining maximum pressure. It is true that this common interest is not enough to narrow a crack between the two, since how and what procedure to take and how fast on North Korean nuclear issues are still too wide. Yet resolving North Korea's nuclear ambition could very well be the beginning of establishing regional strategic stability mechanism. Since the North Korean nuclear issue is one of few they could agree on, it might very well being a starting point to move on to build a more stable strategic framework in the region.

IV. Conclusion

The security condition of Northeast Asian region, which is already troublesome and complicated, has further worsened due to structural change and the emergence of strong men, and most of all Pyongyang's nuclear ambition. Understanding and practice of strategic stability in the region is deplorably lacking, and thus what is going on is security dilemma(trilemma) among nuclear powers. China, a weaker country in strategic area, has strong urge to catch up while the US has strong motive of staying (moving) ahead and keeping technological superiority. Therefore, the region is likely have an arms race rather than arms control for some time. Regarding Pyongyang's nuclear development efforts and its response, temptation of preemption seems looming large. Again, one should keep in mind that developing robust deterrent capability is important, but maintaining crisis stability and escalation control is as much important.

Under these gruesome circumstances, North Korea's seemingly serious intention about denuclearization is most welcome. Earlier this year's internal high-level meetings, declining influence of military vis-a-vis the Party, no more 'Byungjin,' and putting priority on economic development look to indicate they mean business. Kim Jong Un

also seems different from his father and grandfather about what kind of country he wants to rule and where North Korea should be in the world. In general, the removal of external security threat has been by far the most decisive factor leading technologically capable states to forswear nuclear ambition.²⁹⁾ That being so, coercion alone or changes in leadership may not be productive approaches: a lasting reversal of North Korean nuclearization may hinge on lessening the security threat and increasing economic integration. To make this happen, security guarantees and economic exchange would be the necessary first steps. Thus, the recent development could be something of a right direction. Yet the denuclearization is a lengthy and arduous process, should it occur at all. In the meantime, strong and robust readiness is certainly required in our part. Yet it is also true that North Korea's denuclearization attempt provides a rare opportunity for states in the region to work together. Especially for the two great powers, the US and China, this could be a step toward building strategic stability (and arms control and peace regime) in the region.

29) Mitchell Reis, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capability* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); T. V. Paul, *Power vs. Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).

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III-2

China's regional governance strategy in Northeast Asia and implications on the Korean peninsula

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China's regional governance strategy in Northeast Asia and implications on the Korean peninsula¹⁾

China's activism towards regional governance is rather new. Xi Jinping's coming into office marks an acceleration of initiatives regarding both regional economic and security governance. Hu Jintao (2002-2012) had already started to shape the framework of a neighborhood policy, to consolidate China's participation in various existing multilateral regional mechanisms (such as the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum - APEC) and position China as an active contributor to global governance reform in general terms. But China's ambitions to reshape the regional and international order have never been as high as under President Xi Jinping's leadership. Beijing seeks to lead the reform of global governance, and sees the coming years as a key period to achieve results. China has hosted a diversity of multilateral summits and forums in recent years (G20 in 2016, BRICS summit in 2017, etc.). It did not only reinforce its participation in existing institutions and summits but also, simultaneously, created new informal institutions in which it aims to play an active role, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as more informal multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the Belt & Road Summit of May 2018, or the "new security architecture in Asia".

China's activism increasingly seems to be shifting towards the construction of new cooperation mechanisms. Although they are numerous and of diverse formats, these mechanisms share one condition: they should not be based on any alliance system, according to Beijing, which is increasingly showing dissatisfaction with the current US military presence in the region, and any initiative that reinforces such presence - such as the deployment of the THAAD batteries on the ROK territory. This paper, which synthesizes an oral communication made during the ROK-France Strategic Dialogue 2018 (Paris, 28-29 May 2018), is analyzing China's regional governance strategy, initiatives taken over the last 5 years under this framework, and implications on the Korean peninsula.

1) *This text is the transcript of a presentation and has been written following the ROK-FRANCE Strategic Dialogue 2018, and is for internal use of the organizers only - please do not forward/publicize.*

“Belt & Road”: from economic diplomacy to global governance²⁾

According to China’s official communication, both economic and security governance are highly intertwined: regional economic governance is at the core of regional governance in general terms, and reforming it is a prerequisite to the reform of regional security governance. This approach echoes China’s official approach towards economic development, which is seen as a pre-condition to “regional peace and stability”. This official standpoint is framing Xi’s core initiative, the now well-known “Belt & Road” project, which is first and foremost an economic diplomacy project, but also has broader geostrategic implications, given the nature of the infrastructures concerned: the project aims at developing infrastructures which can have a strategic use, including transport (ports, airports, roads, railways, etc.), energy (pipelines, refineries, etc.), telecommunications & Internet infrastructures (submarine cables, data centers, etc.), among others.

OBOR as a multilateral cooperation platform

If OBOR is first of all a way of addressing short-term economic issues (overcapacities, economic slowdown, etc.), it is increasingly seen in Beijing as a tool to promote China’s global governance ambitions (creation of OBOR satellite institutions such as AIIB, OBOR informal multilateral cooperation mechanisms of various kinds – such as high-level annual OBOR forums³⁾, OBOR platforms for commercial dispute arbitration, etc.). The OBOR official action plan published in March 2015 explicitly calls for the creation of a “balanced regional economic cooperation architecture” and “new models of international cooperation and global governance”. In China, discussions emerged in recent years on how to promote “OBOR multilateral diplomacy”, and researchers are asked to analyze how OBOR could further promote the restructuring of global governance.⁴⁾

2) Part of this section is an updated version of some points initially developed in the report: Alice Ekman, Françoise Nicolas, John Seaman, *et al.*, “Three Years of China’s New Silk Roads: From Words to (Re)action?”, *Études de l’Ifri*, Ifri, February 2017.

3) For instance, China hosted in May 2017 in Beijing the “Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, a high-level gathering that was widely advertised by Chinese officials and media. And it had already organized before similar forums on its national territory and abroad, including in Europe (“Silk Road Forum” held in Madrid in 2016, in Warsaw in 2016, among other large scale forums).

4) Interviews, Beijing and Shanghai-based think tanks, 2015-2016.

The global governance dimension of the Chinese project is also becoming increasingly noticeable on the ground, as OBOR is now presented by Chinese officials as a multilateral “platform” for the gathering of senior domestic and international actors of various spheres (business, government administration, think tanks, etc.) and in various fields (construction, transport, energy, telecommunications, etc.). As summit diplomacy is one of the tools that Beijing is currently investing massively in, China is organizing an increasing number of large-scale international forums within and outside its national territory, including in Europe. It has already set up and hosted ministerial-level meetings under the OBOR banner in 2015 and 2016, and has organized a Silk Road summit in Beijing in May 2017, which gathered more than 20 head of states.

A multi-dimensional multilateral platform

Given that OBOR is designed as a work-in-progress project that can develop in a variety of directions, the potential for creating OBOR-related summits and cooperation mechanisms appears to be unlimited (be they general frameworks or focusing on specific industries – transport infrastructure, energy, telecommunications cooperation – or regions – Europe, Central Asia, South East Asia, now Africa.). In many respects, OBOR is a rather consensual topic to attract various international actors of interest to China, with whom more specific bilateral topics can be addressed on the side of the formal OBOR agenda.

Given the flexible nature of the implementation process, the scope of the project is currently expanding, both geographically and in terms of sectors involved. Chinese officials⁵⁾ mentioned in a first stage about “60 countries” involved in OBOR-related projects, but the latest official statements mention that “over 100 countries and international organizations have supported the initiative”.⁶⁾ So far, the precise list of these countries and organizations has not been released by the Chinese authorities,

5). Such as officials from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Interviews, Beijing, 2015-2016.

6). Such as Xi Jinping's speech at the United Nations Office in Geneva (official title: “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind”), 18 January 2017.

which continue to underline that “any country in the world is welcome to join”. Similarly, Chinese official communication initially mentioned a limited number of sectors involved (mainly development of the 4 types of infrastructure mentioned above), but today these sectors are diversifying, involving tourism, finance, and law, among others (no precise/exhaustive list has been released neither). In terms of public diplomacy, we are currently witnessing a “bridging” between OBOR and other key concepts and priorities of China’s diplomacy, such as “Community of Common Destiny” or “Great renewal of the Chinese nation”.

In addition, in the context of the development of OBOR, as well as following the United States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Xi Jinping is increasingly positioning China as the supporter of free-trade and globalization. Although domestic economic reform (such as reform of the State-Owned enterprises) and overall opening up of the Chinese market appears to move on at a slower pace than expected by foreign companies and states, Xi’s promotion of bilateral and multilateral FTAs is still on-going. For instance, he is still promoting the building of a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP),⁷⁾ although it remains unclear when it would actually be created, and to what extent it would be bridged with OBOR.

China will probably not institutionalize OBOR itself, as flexibility is at the core of the project, for both logistical and strategic reasons. But it will most likely create more “satellite” informal cooperation mechanisms or institutions around it, such as the AIIB. OBOR is now at the core of the new and informal institutional network China is currently building at regional and global levels.

In the coming years, the Chinese government is likely to continue to promote its OBOR strategy as a tool to create new international frameworks. Chinese officials and researchers are working on the implementation of ‘OBOR multilateral diplomacy’, see how they can bridge OBOR summits and forums with existing international summits and forums focusing on other topics. For Beijing, the link between old and new

7) Cf. Xi’s speech at the APEC CEO summit, in October 2017: «We should get into action, fully implement the Beijing Roadmap, move toward the FTAAP and provide an institutional underpinning for growing an open economy in the Asia-Pacific»

institutions is not a source of concern; it is naturally established via an alignment of their agendas with China's own national priorities. Beijing not only welcomes overlaps between the agendas of various institutions, but even encourages them. In particular, China has prioritized infrastructure development on its foreign and domestic policy agenda (as it is conscious of its assets in this sector, as well as the saturation of its domestic market), and has moved it up the agenda of as many multilateral institutions and informal fora as possible, often quite skillfully (as was the case with the BRICS' New Development Bank). Infrastructure development is now at the forefront of not only the BRICS agenda, but also the G20 and all OBOR-related fora. More often than not, it is also promoted as being 'complementary' to the initiatives of each counterpart – be it the 'Juncker Plan' with the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, or the 'Maritime Axis' with Indonesia.

Still, a gap exists between communication on complementarity and actual consideration and inclusion of other countries' plan and priorities in OBOR. For instance, China's has shown limited interest in South Korea's proposal to bridge OBOR with ROK's "Eurasia initiative" which would include a train line passing through North Korea, with the objective to promote regional economic integration that would eventually be contributive to the stability of the Korean peninsula. China's reaction is partly due to tensions that emerged between the two countries over the deployment of the US anti-ballistic missile system on the South Korean territory. It is also due to the fact that it was not directly of geostrategic interest for China. In general terms, Chinese initiatives are open to South Korea, as much as it is open to "any country in the world", according to the official line on the "inclusiveness" of OBOR. But in practical terms, China does not seem to consider South Korea as a key partner for regional governance, be it in the economic or security field.⁸⁾

8) Interviews and informal exchanges, Beijing and Seoul, summer 2017.

Security governance: China's long term ambition to reorganize the region

Rethinking Security in East Asia: China's conceptual activism

In addition to regional economic governance, China is also active in regional security governance, and first and foremost at the conceptual level. Shortly after his accession to power, Xi Jinping unveiled its 'Asia for Asians' security concept ('Asian community of common destiny'), and most of all advocated the establishment of a "new security concept", that could become a concept of reference beyond the region and should be, according to official communication⁹⁾, a "common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable security concept." It is still unclear what the concept actually means in concrete terms, but recent official documents¹⁰⁾ aiming at clarifying it emphasized the central role of the UN as well as the need to approach disputes through negotiations, among other principles.¹¹⁾

In addition to the promotion of a "new security concept", China's conceptual activism is characterized by an ambition to reconsider the way states interact with each other. Xi Jinping is promoting a « New type of international relations » (新型国际关系), in addition to the promotion of a « New type of major power relations » (新型大国关系),

9) Xinhua, 29 august 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-08/29/c_136565429.htm

10) Such as "China's position paper on the New Security Concept", <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm>

11) "An increasing number of countries wish to build national and international security on the basis of the following principles: --To conduct cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other widely recognized norms governing international relations, and give full play to the leading role of the United Nations;
--To peacefully resolve territorial and border disputes and other controversial issues through negotiations;
--To reform and improve the existing international economic and financial organizations and promote common prosperity in line with the principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit and common development;
--To place emphasis on non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes, in addition to the traditional security areas like preventing foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity;
--To conduct effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line with the principle of justice, comprehensiveness, rationality and balance, prevent the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, uphold the current international arms control and disarmament regime and refrain from arms race." *Ibid.*

which tries to position China as a major power on equal footing with at the same level as the United States. Beijing is promoting an adjustment of China's bilateral and multilateral relations according to its new power status. Beijing is also promoting, to some extent, a new methodology to conduct bilateral and multilateral exchanges. For instance, it is advocating a diversification of actors involved in the exchanges, increasingly associating foreign representatives from the private sector, think tanks, or political parties, among others. Xi Jinping has recently called for the development of "New model of Party-to-Party relationship", announcing that the Communist Party of China would invite 15 000 members of political parties of foreign countries to visit China for exchanges within the next five years.¹²⁾ This call is not specific to the region, but is likely to be implemented first and foremost towards regional actors, as China's diplomacy usually does.

At the same time, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and official researchers are increasingly referring to the concept of "tianxia" (天下- all under heaven), which indirectly refers to the establishment of a network of economic partnerships in which China would be the core, as it was the case under the tributary system era. Although it remains unclear to what extent the tributary system is actually a source of inspiration for the CPC and its current approach towards regional governance, the concept appears to be compatible with China's recent institutional initiatives (*see below*).

Reorganizing regional security governance: China's institutional initiatives

In addition to conceptual initiatives, China is also active at the institutional level. The White Paper on China's military strategy published in May 2015, for example, explicitly advocates promoting 'the establishment of a regional framework for security and cooperation.' Such a call was reaffirmed in October 2016, and detailed further in China's white paper on security cooperation in the Asia Pacific, published in January 2017.

This announcement follows a series of small-size initiatives, which, if bridged, could contribute to the shaping of a greater regional security framework. Among these

12) Xinhua, December 1, 2017.

initiatives: over the last four years, Beijing has been trying, under its presidency, to revive the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which includes more than 20 states (but excludes Japan and the US). It is at the CICA summit in Astana in May 2014 that Xi Jinping made his first general announcement for the building a « new Asia-Pacific security architecture». China has also been trying to consolidate the Xiangshan Forum, an annual Beijing-based regional security dialogue which it promotes as a potential alternative to the Shangri-La Dialogue. Although it did not take place in 2017 due, according to official communication, to the 19th Party Congress, it did take place on a rather large scale in 2016 and a greater-scale edition is planned to take place in the coming fall (2018), according to the organizers.¹³⁾

In practical terms, China aims at upgrading and building bridges between the many existing regional security institutions and mechanisms in which it has a significant say: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, mentioned extensively by Chinese speakers throughout the Xiangshan forum), the CICA (which China is currently trying to upgrade under its presidency, extended up to 2018), the ASEAN-centered meetings (ARF, ADMM+, etc.), among other multilateral mechanisms. China also considers as essential parts of this network the existing regional security forums (such as the Xiangshan forum itself) as well as the many other multilateral track 1.5 and track 2 forums, seminars and workshops that the country is planning to organize or co-organize in the coming years on the topic of regional security governance, both on its territory and abroad. Such bridging is rather flexible, and does not imply the creation of a new, formal, regional security institution *per se*.

Still, the institutional bridging process is usually following the same pattern - China's diplomacy proposing most of the time:

- More cooperation among Secretariats.
- An active shaping of the agenda, which encourages coordination among multilateral and national agendas, and most of all alignment with China's priorities as much as possible. This increasingly includes an integration of the « Belt and Road» label

13) Interview, PLA officials, February 2018.

in the multilateral discussions and final communiqués, or at least the inclusion of the “connectivity”/ “infrastructure development” topic.

- Significant financial contribution (CICA, SCO – China will make an additional contribution of 10 million RMB to the SCO, indicated Xi at the last summit in Astana in June 2017).

China's diplomacy is also increasingly proposing to regional actors:

- The development of regional and international security exchanges and dialogues as much as possible.
- The hosting and organization of regional security forums (such as the Xiangshan forum, but also new ones to be expected)¹⁴⁾
- Continued investment in sub-regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the 5th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) with Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam.
- The creation of a development bank in most institutions or multilateral cooperation frameworks in which China has a significant say (BRICS, SCO), in addition to the creation of a new ad-hoc development bank (AIIB).
- The creation of « think tank networks » under the institutions or cooperation frameworks (SCO, CICA, others).

The diversity of the initiatives clearly shows that for China, economic and security governance are strongly interrelated, and that an initiative in one field is conducive to an initiative in another. China considers economic partnership as the basis of this new regional security network, and it is ready to make full use of its economic leverage (economic sanctions or ‘gifts’) to support its position on what it considers issues of “core interests” (such as territorial dispute in the South China Sea) or to blame neighbors who are considering a reinforcement of security ties with the United States (such a

14) For instance, Xi Jinping declared at the SCO summit in Astana in June 2017: « China proposes to hold a defense security forum».

South Korea's deployment of the US anti-missile THAAD system on its territory).

China hopes to build this new security architecture in the Asia-pacific first and foremost with the support of Russia. Both countries share an ambition to build an architecture that becomes an alternative to the U.S.-led alliance system in the region. But China also counts on its Central Asian partners, who would not have to choose between Moscow and Beijing on this matter. In addition, China also aims at integrating ASEAN countries as much as possible in its regional governance initiatives, as well at integrating itself in ASEAN-organized forums and summits of various kinds.

All in all, what seems to guide China's approach towards regional governance is the current leadership's willingness to challenge the US leadership in the region. If, according to China's official communication, any country is welcome to join its new regional security architecture, including the US, Beijing also underlines strongly that the Asia-pacific should not be based on any formal alliance system - and certainly not the US one, which it considers illegitimate. The ultimate aim is to replace the US-led alliance system by a new structure which China sees more in line with its interests. Of course, China is fully aware that such restructuring can only be a long-term process, given the US overwhelming presence and influence in the region today, and China's limited security ties with countries in the region so far.

Synthetically analysis of China's current approach to regional governance

In a nutshell, China's current approach to regional governance can be characterized by the following features: hybrid (economic and security governance intertwined), ambitious (willingness to reorganize the region), large geographical scope (Eurasia scope and beyond, not just focusing on Northeast Asia), long-term planning (by 2049). China's approach to regional governance can be considered as revisionist in the sense that it sees the US alliances in Asia as illegitimate, and wishes to restructure the region towards a post-alliance direction.

The number and diversity of China's recent regional governance initiatives underline a strong ambition to reorganize the region. It is noteworthy that China's activism towards

regional governance is a rather new development, which started to accelerate five years ago (from Autumn 2013) and has been fueled in recent years by an intense domestic brainstorming.¹⁵⁾ This activism is most likely to unfold in the coming years under the mandate of Xi Jinping, as the current Chinese president shows a strong political will and determination to reorganize the region towards a network of partnerships in which China would be the core.

China's ambition to promote a post-alliance regional order appears unrealistic today given the central and structural role that the US-alliance system continues to play in the region, and the relative isolation of China in the region in relative terms. But China can count on the support of various countries, either because such countries are unhappy with the presence and influence of the US and "Western-allies" in the region (such as Russia, and, from a different perspective, North Korea), because such countries are already in China's sphere of influence (such as Cambodia or Laos). China can also count on some countries simply because they themselves do not have a clear-cut vision and strategy regarding regional governance - or because they do not have the economic means to support such vision or strategy (which is the case of several Southeast and Central Asian countries). In addition, the fact that China is promoting an apparently flexible, not fully institutionalized and constantly evolving regional governance architecture (be it through the "Belt & Road" or the "New security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region") makes it hard for countries to shape a position towards such architecture.

In the coming years, China's international activism will focus primarily on its neighborhood - in a broad sense, i.e. Eurasia as a whole - as the Chinese government considers regional leadership as a prerequisite for global leadership. But the scope is likely to remain larger - as China's activism towards regional governance is part of China's activism towards global governance as a whole. In any case, from Beijing's perspective, regional governance restructuring is a very long term process which will develop step by step and fully emerge only by 2049, for the centenary of the People's

15) Conducting by institutions such as China's Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS).

Republic of China, with an intermediary deadline by 2035. The recent amendments to the constitution, officially allowing Xi Jinping to remain President of the PRC beyond 2023, confirm that China's domestic and foreign policy strategy is shaped according to a political timetable which is very different from its neighbors'.

Consequences on the Korean peninsula¹⁶⁾

Understanding China's approach towards the Korean peninsula requires taking fully into account China's long-term strategy towards the broader Asia-Pacific region, which has been analyzed above. Undoubtedly, China aims to reorganize the Asia-Pacific region in a post-alliance security framework/China considers the U.S. presence and influence in the region illegitimate, and is confident that Beijing now has the diplomatic ability and economic leverage to progressively reduce them both. This is a very long-term ambition—by 2050—that requires step-by-step implementation, and one that has started to materialize more clearly in recent years through actions such as China's strong pressure to limit the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea.

A nuclear North Korea is not incompatible with China's strategy in the region, and there is to date no evidence that China does feel directly threatened by it.¹⁷⁾ Denuclearization *per se* therefore does not appear to be a top priority for Beijing. At the same time, the negotiation process over denuclearization can be of use to China to promote, step-by-step, its long-term regional strategy. In 2017, Beijing's "double suspension" proposal was shaped with this aim in mind: it advocated for the DPRK's suspension of its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S.-R.O.K. military exercises, but was quickly rejected by the U.S. and its allies. In 2019, under the new circumstances, China is likely to come up with another

16) Some elements of analysis presented in this section have initially been presented in a ChinaFile Conversation entitled « Does China Want the Koreas to Reconcile? », April 25, 2018, www.chinafile.com

17) None of the exchanges on the topic conducted with Beijing-based Chinese foreign policy and security think tanks during the years 2016-2018 is pointing at this.


idea to channel the discussions towards a downgrading of the U.S. presence in the region. It has already managed to do so in June 2018, with the US suspension of the some of its major military drills with South Korea. In the coming years, China's initiatives and proposals may be formulated less publicly than the « double suspension » was, and more subtly than in 2017, using bilateral and personal channels of communications first and on a more frequent basis, as proposed during the Xi-Kim meeting in Beijing last March.

Given Beijing's strong determination to reorganize the Asia-Pacific region, it is most likely that it will weigh in all it can to channel the negotiations towards a process that leads, in the long-term, to a united Korea that is not U.S.-aligned. The process could lead more easily to a reconsideration of the deployment of THAAD, the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, or other signs of a U.S. presence that China already opposes today. Even if they do not always appear as preconditions for discussions over denuclearization at this point in time, they could shortly reappear in the discussions.

In any case, China's weight in the negotiations remains significant given its special relationship with Pyongyang—the centrality of China for the implementation of sanctions and its overall economic leverage on both North and South Korea. Such weight may also increase with the support of countries, such as Russia, who share with China a post-alliance/post-Western vision for the reorganization of the region. In any case, whether alone or with “like-minded” countries, opportunities for China to weigh in on the negotiation process will be numerous as it has started not long and is already a very sinuous one.

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The Impact of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons

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The Impact of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons

I. Introduction

In Northeast Asia, the deepening economic interdependence is not matched by a commensurate level of cooperation in the security domain. That is also known as the 'Asia's Paradox' phenomenon. Northeast Asia is marking the 1st trading bloc in the world,¹⁾ while the world's largest military powers are concentrating in this region.²⁾ With each country continuing its strategic cooperation and competition among them, instability and uncertainty are increasing as the nation's military strength is increased in order to enhance its influence.

Such instability and uncertainty in Northeast Asia are amplified by potential conflict factors. The first is the competition between the United States and China in various areas. The United States and China are pursuing its military modernization and active foreign policy in order to enhance their status and influence in the region. The second factor is a latent historical issue. Korea, along with China, has raised the issue of Japanese wrong perception, and Korea's resistance to China's "Northeast Project", which symbolizes China's historical revisionism and radical political expansionism, is also strong.³⁾ Third, the alliance system from the Cold War era is developing into a "New Cold War." As the revival of the Cold War in this region is taking shape, every country is taking advantage of cooperation and conflict among relevant countries to maximize its own national interest. The fourth is territorial disputes, for example, Dokdo, Senkaku Islands, and other maritime territorial issues. The variety of domestic politics and public sentiment are associated with this sovereignty issue above the water can be revealed at any time.

1) World Bank shows trade summary for East Asia & Pacific region. This region marks exports US\$4,730,659million and imports 4,094,202million in 2016. <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/EAS> (2018.8.11.).

2) Planned global defense expenditure of North America marks 39.3%, and Asia and Australia 24.0%. IISS, *The Military Balance 2018* (London: IISS, 2018), p.19.

3) Lee Hee-ok, "China's Northeast Project and South Korean-Chinese Relations," *Korea Journal* (Summer 2005).

And the North Korean nuclear issue has become a very challenging factor in the complex security landscape of Northeast Asia. Indeed, there are still some controversies on how to assess the North's nuclear threat, its nuclear goals, capabilities, and intentions, linkage of its nuclear and conventional military strategies, and changes in South Korea's strategy. And no agreement has been made exactly because of incomplete information about North Korea. In addition, it is not easy to grasp exactly what the North intends to do in the midst of talks with relevant countries over its denuclearization in 2018. Many experts claim that if North Korea, having nuclear weapons, appreciates the devastating destructive power of its nuclear weapons and the ripple effects of using them, it can have a reasonable and careful attitude in long-term perspective, like the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War. Although there is a concern that this perspective will perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula, the North's possession of nuclear weapons could play a role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula since it would rather inhibit smaller conflicts and developments into full-scale war. This is the main argument of the so-called North Korea's "nuclear peace" argument.⁴⁾

On the other hand, there is a prospect that North Korea, a weak nuclear state, will take the same path as Pakistan, not China. Since its 1998 nuclear test, Pakistan has been operating a "Badr" operation to control the mountainous region of the disputed India, Kargil.⁵⁾ Moreover, the attack on India's parliament in 2001, Mumbai in 2008, Pathankot Air Force Base in 2016, and Uri and Nagrota army base were attempting with the confidence of nuclear capabilities to change its situation of disadvantage. Furthermore, some say that North Korea is an irrational actor and "rogue state," making the world unstable. In order to deter their opponents with weak nuclear capabilities and to gain strategic benefits, North Korea has to emphasize its irrational, aggressive and unpredictable characteristics. The so-called "Madman" strategy has been a typical characteristic in the second nuclear age.⁶⁾

4) B. Z. Khasru, "How North Korea's nuclear weapons are helping to prevent war," *South China Morning Post* (2018.1.13.), <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2127985/how-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-are-helping-prevent-war> (2018.9.1.).

5) Gurmeet Kanwal, "Pakistan's Strategic Blunder at Kargil," *CLAWS Journal* (Summer 2009), pp.55-58.

6) S. Thomson, "Madman or Madman Strategy? What's really going on with North Korea?," *National Post* (2018.1.15.), <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/madman-or-madman-strategy-whats->

Therefore, it is very important to clarify in detail the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on each country in Northeast Asia's security landscape. Of course, it is true that concerns about North Korea's nuclear weapons are falling with the start of dialogue for denuclearization along with the Pyeongchang Olympic Games. However, there are several reasons why the North Korean nuclear issue is still so important. First, we cannot completely trust the North's intention to initiate talks with the South and the United States. That can be an attempt by North Korea to avoid international sanctions and military pressure, and President Trump and Moon Jae-in sounded out the atmosphere of negotiations to be. However, preparation for the worst is also necessary as there is the possibility of returning to the 2017 situation at any time. Second, it is clear that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and capability. Despite the summit agreement,⁷⁾ nuclear threats have not been completely eliminated yet. We have to consider various difficulties leading to complete denuclearization. Rather, Seoul realized how vulnerable it is politically and militarily to nuclear weapons.

Therefore, this paper is aimed at presenting the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development on the security landscape of Northeast Asia, and impacts on the military preparedness of each country. The remainder of this article is organized into three parts. First, we are looking at what kind of risks North Korea's nuclear weapons pose. The second part will analyze how these risks affect the military posture of each country. Finally, it arranges the discussions of future prospects and policy implications.

II. North Korean Nuclear Threats to East Asia

It remains controversial as to why North Korea started the talks, and what the purpose of the talks. According to the researchers, North Korea's goals are categorized as follows: First, it is regarded as a change in tactics to secure the initiative on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the purpose is to manage the situation in a passive manner to overcome

really-going-on-with-north-korea (2018.9.2.).

7) Full text of this agreement, [http://time.com/5309425/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-summit-document-full-text/\(2018.9.1.\)](http://time.com/5309425/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-summit-document-full-text/(2018.9.1.)).

difficulties as sanctions on the North become more severe. Third, there is a position that it has confidence in the negotiations with the U.S. after completing the nuclear development. Fourth, there are claims that the North has eventually accepted denuclearization and made a strategic decision to seek regime change, as other countries have claimed for a long time.⁸⁾

For the third and fourth scenarios, North Korea's nuclear weapons will eventually be dismantled. In this case, North Korea will be a new model of the "Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)."⁹⁾ That means various sanctions and pressures from the international community have been effective, although there were concerns that North Korea in light of its withdrawal from the NPT could hand out nuclear weapons illegally. Therefore, many countries are hoping that North Korea's denuclearization will finally pay off.

The situation, however, in which the nation must continue to concern is that North Korea begins negotiations without any real authenticity or is intentionally trying to delay the negotiation process. This will be the first and second scenario situations above. Without the North's cooperative intention and action of denuclearization, North Korea's nuclear threats will inevitably continue and Northeast Asia will face various risks. The following five possible situations can be summarized as follows:

U.S. preventive attack

The first threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons to Northeast Asia is the possibility of a U.S. preventive attack. Firstly, the following are reasons why preventive attacks are not likely despite uncertainties in the Trump administration. First, although the accuracy of the hitting has been greatly increased, the ability to inform and targeting is still insufficient. Even if we have information on North Korea's hidden fixed facilities, we still lack accurate identification of transporter erector launchers (TELEs)

8) Leandra Bernstein, "North Korea strategy shift raises questions about denuclearization," *Circa* (2018.8.27.), <https://www.circa.com/story/2018/08/27/world/north-korea-strategy-shift-raises-questions-about-denuclearization> (2018.9.4.).

9) Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Amy F. Woolf, "The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, R43143 (2014).

and submarines. Second, considering the irrational behavior of North Korea and the non-conflicting characteristic of authoritarian regimes, the North can easily launch a nuclear attack without any agreement on how to use its nuclear weapons. In other words, when South Korea and Japan are held hostage to the North's nuclear weapons program, they will not be able to completely deter the North's retaliation.¹⁰⁾ Third, we cannot be sure that China will not intervene in the case of the U.S. preventive attack despite its passive stance. When there is a war on the Korean Peninsula, China will support North Korea for its reputation as a protector.

However, preventive attacks are not a completely impossible option. Just last year, in 2017, we witnessed the development of North Korea's nuclear development and the U.S. strategy of "Bloody Nose." As North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons for more than two decades, there has been a need and a possibility of a preventive attack. Of course, it is hard to satisfy all possibilities of achievement, passive attitude of neighboring powers, concerns about further armed conflict, securing national support and ensuring national security, international norms, and support from the international community.¹¹⁾ When, however, the U.S. needs to do something before the threat grows bigger, it will have to do so. If the current denuclearization talks are delayed or reversed, the possibility of a preventive attack will not be lower than in 2017. For the United States, a military action is an important tool for achieving its goals.

North Korea's provocation under the nuclear shadow

There have been many predictions that North Korea will act more aggressively if it has nuclear weapons. These results have already been verified quantitatively through various studies.¹²⁾ In the early days when North Korea becomes capable, they overreact to their capabilities and act aggressively. Of course, although North Korea's possession

10) Lim Soo-ho, "North Korea's Coercion against U.S. and its Theoretical Basis," *Strategic Studies*, No.40 (2007).

11) "What the U.S. Would Use to Strike North Korea," *Stratfor* (2017.1.4.), <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-us-would-use-strike-north-korea> (2018.5.10.).

12) Mark S. Bell, "Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy." *International Security*, Vol.40, No. 1 (July 2015).

of nuclear weapons does not equal the Korea-U.S. alliance's superiority, it is certain to set a critical milestone in its actions. In other words, it is more difficult to deter North Korea. Therefore, while each other will avoid escalating into all-out war due to the formidable destructive power of nuclear weapons, a "stability-instability paradox" occurs frequently at the tactical level.¹³⁾

Of course, some conditions will have to be met for North Korea to act aggressively under "nuclear shadow." The first is the possibility of a successful provocation. Considering the state of the North Korean nuclear standoff, Seoul should be able to achieve its goal quickly through surprise attacks in that Seoul can take Pyongyang more seriously. Second, North Korea should be able to deter a retaliation of the Korea-U.S. alliance. For the reason that North Korea has nuclear weapons, the ROK-U.S. alliance will quickly retaliate against the North's provocation. That means North Korea can only launch provocations if it can suppress or deny retaliation. These two conditions actually depend more on conventional capabilities than on the North's nuclear capabilities. This is why the North should develop conventional forces even after completing its nuclear capability.

Crisis Instability

In 2017, North Korea has taken provocative actions by conducting several missile tests and threatening attacks on Guam.¹⁴⁾ The problem is that the United States and South Korea may not accept the same level of provocative behavior by North Korea. Due to the fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons, the adversaries can take the same level of provocation more seriously and take stronger action. Of course, rationally speaking, the North's military provocations are reckless and irrational. So, some argue that the North Korean nuclear issue will bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. But the crisis will never be controlled or ended in a good faith. Both sides should recognize

13) Robert Jervis, *The Illlogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell Uni. Press, 1985), p.31.

14) Tom O'Connor, "North Korea Says It Will Attack U.S. Territory of Guam if Trump Keeps Tweeting Threats," *Nesweek* (2017.10.13), <https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-attack-us-territory-guam-trump-keeps-tweeting-threats-684716> (2018.9.4.).

that it is better for the crisis to end than to be continued and that the other party will not pursue a nuclear war. These conditions should be met in order that the crisis can be controlled.

However, the nuclear crisis never begins with a rational process of decision. The possibility of a nuclear war is clearly high unless the crisis between countries with nuclear weapons is controlled. Bruce Klingner, an expert on the Korean Peninsula at the Heritage Institute, also criticized that simply turning the pre-emptive strike into an option would increase the possibility of armed conflict by mutual miscarriages.¹⁵⁾ There are claims, including the *Washington Post* (2017.3.3.), that “there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war in the first place.”¹⁶⁾ Even if one party wants to limit the power and quantity of nuclear weapons, not all people expect it to end. One cannot be sure that such an intention will be conveyed to the other, and someone who thinks he or she is vulnerable may take stronger action. Once the crisis has started, nobody can control it easily.

The conflicts between the United States and China

The most likely threat is to deepen competition among regional powers, causing instability. Even as the denuclearization talks are underway, the nuclear conflict between the U.S. and China is still continuing under the pretext of North Korea's nuclear weapons. In addition, Japan will strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance by taking an approach to the U.S. and the U.S. will strengthen its security strategy through strong missile defense cooperation with its allies. This causes China, which is concerned about Japan's rearm, to form a counter-U.S. front. China and Russia are attracting other countries by strengthening their cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).¹⁷⁾ The formation of a bloc centered in China makes Korea or Taiwan

15) Bruce Klingner, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” *Backgrounder* (The Heritage Foundation, March 2017), pp.8-9.

16) Dianne Feinstein, “There’s no such thing as ‘limited’ nuclear war,” *Washington Post* (2017.3.3.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/theres-no-such-thing-as-limited-nuclear-war/2017/03/03/faef0de2-fd1c-11e6-8f41-ea6ed597e4ca_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1340fb99fd78 (2018.5.3.).

nervous, making Northeast Asia into a New Cold war.

Of course, North Korea's nuclear weapons are not the only reason why the U.S. and China are competing against each other. Nor does the United States or China, which is seeking stable economic growth, want hostile relations. They are avoiding open conflicts. But competition could be intensified because of North Korea's nuclear weapons. The deployment of the THAAD system to counter the North Korea's missiles in South Korea prompted a strong backlash from China, while China deployed its S-400s from Russia on the west coast.¹⁸⁾ Japan has a plan to introduce Aegis Ashore.¹⁹⁾ A competition that begins with the missile defense systems can evolve into an offensive weapon or a nuclear race. On the diplomatic front, the competition for initiative and influence over North Korea's nuclear program is notable. In a short period of time, Kim Jong-Un has visited China three times,²⁰⁾ and the U.S. has declared a trade war against China, which exercises influence behind the denuclearization dialogue scenes.²¹⁾ North Korea's nuclear weapons program is clearly functioning as a catalyst for competition among great powers.

Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia

Although the possibility seems to be lowest at this moment, North Korea's nuclear weapons may trigger "nuclear dominos" in Northeast Asia.²²⁾ Contrary to many experts'

17) For more information on SCO, <http://eng.sectsc.org/> (2018.9.2.).

18) Franz-Stefan Gady, "China's Military Accepts First S-400 Missile Air Defense Regiment from Russia," *The Diplomat* (2018.7.26), <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/chinas-military-accepts-first-s-400-missile-air-defense-regiment-from-russia/> (2018.9.2.).

19) Daisuke Kikuchi, "Japan approves introduction of Aegis Ashore missile defense system amid North Korea threat," *The Japan Times* (2017.12.19.), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/19/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-approves-introduction-aegis-ashore-missile-defense-system-amid-north-korea-threat/#.W4_a-egzZPY (2018.8.24.).

20) "Kim Jong-un's third visit to China this year reflects importance of North Korea-China relations," *Hankyoreh* (2018.7.20.), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/849904.html (2018.9.1.).

21) Ian Bremmer, "The North Korea Summit Gave Trump a Genuine Victory. But China May Benefit Most," *Time* (2018.6.12.), <http://time.com/5310082/trump-kim-summit-singapore-china-victory/> (2018.9.1.).

concerns, it is fortunate that South Korea and Japan did not go nuclear during the last two decades when North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Behind North Korea's nuclear development, there are various analyses of two countries that are still non-nuclear states. The reasons that the researchers analyzed were as follows: First, it is protected by a strong extended deterrence of the United States. Second, it has increased deterrence by developing conventional denial capabilities. Third, there was a constant expectation of diplomatic efforts represented by the six-party talks. Fourth, for Japan as the only victims of nuclear weapons and South Korea who once tried to develop nuclear weapons, the nuclear taboo has been activated within the two. However, despite these deterrents, the most worrisome scenario is that Japan or South Korea will go nuclear. Considering the reconciliation efforts of the two Koreas as of 2018, Japan is more likely to go nuclear if the current negotiations are delayed or have no progress. In particular, Japan faces a serious nuclear threat without any protection. It is possible that once Japan's nuclear development will spread to not only South Korea but also to countries like Australia where it considered nuclear armament. Given that it is not a rogue state like North Korea, the nuclear issue to these countries could lead to global proliferation.

III. Impacts on Neighbouring Countries

The various threats discussed above do not work equally in all countries. Although all scenarios individually affect the relevant countries, perceived threats cannot be at the same level of priority. Depending on each country's geopolitics, national security goals and strategic interests, threat perceptions and external relations, the framework to perceive North Korea's nuclear weapons will also change. Therefore, in this study, we will look at the impact on South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia.

Considering the current situation, the current impact of North Korea's nuclear weapons on each country's military posture is limited. However, as stated earlier, it is important

22) Dong Sun Lee, "A nuclear North Korea and the stability of East Asia: a tsunami on the horizon?," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.61, No.4 (2007).

to analyze nuclear weapons' impact on each country considering the North's current nuclear capabilities and offensive military strategies. The study also briefly examines the strategic calculations and intentions of countries in the course of current denuclearization dialogue.

South Korea

First of all, let's take a look at how North Korea affects South Korea's security. First, North Korea's nuclear weapons are a direct and imminent survival threat to South Korea, as the North is likely to use them. North Korea has repeatedly threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire."²³⁾ The North's "siege mentality" which constructed with distrust and fear is intensifying the conflicts and rather only strengthening sanctions by the international community and the U.S.²⁴⁾ And as the North has that kind of recognition the nuclear crisis will be higher in times of war. Therefore, the allies need to think about how to deter the use of nuclear weapons during wartime as well as during peacetime.²⁵⁾

Second, there is a heightened risk of provocation and crisis escalation under the nuclear shadow. Given the inferiority of military and national power comparing ROK-US alliance, it is unlikely that North Korea will actually use nuclear weapons first. However, there is still the possibility of military provocations under the nuclear shadow, or a group of crises being an escalation, to reverse the strategic environment and secure control over the situation. That can be possible because of the political destructive power of nuclear weapons. Given North Korea's aggressive provocations after the Korean War, we can see that it will take more aggressive actions and try to gain control of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. As seen in 2010, Cheon-An warship sinking and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea's response to North Korea's provocative

23) Lee Yong-soo, "N.Korea Threatens to Turn S.Korea into 'Sea of Fire,'" *Chosunilbo* (2017.8.9.), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/09/2017080900949.html (2018.9.1).

24) Boo Seung Chan, "North Korea's Survival Strategy: Principles and Ways," *Journal of National Defense Studies*, Vol.60, No.2 (2017).

25) Ki Hyun Ryu, Hong Il Cho, and Myung Hwan Cha, "Intra-War Deterrence Theory and its Application for Korean Peninsular," *Defense Policy Studies*, Vol.33, No.3 (2017).

actions can turn more aggressive, meaning a crisis could easily escalate.²⁶⁾

Third, North Korea's nuclear program will solidify the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's nuclear weapons have a significant impact on the military balance in East Asia, as the United States continues to check the rise of China's military power. The competition between the United States and China centered on both countries, and the New Cold-War could be intensified with the two Koreas forming a front on the Korean Peninsula. Although the peace regime of the two Koreas could be a reasonable choice, when the ROK-U.S. alliance concerns over the North's nuclear weapons program and China's threats more seriously, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is likely to recur in the pre-1950s period

Now that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and is negotiating for denuclearization, South Korea stands on the knife edge. A more powerful military posture is required to deter the use of existing nuclear weapons and further nuclear development. On the other hand, it is also necessary to show tolerance to North Korea behind utilizing its military superiority in order to make the denuclearization talks with Pyongyang fruitful. It is worrisome how to maintain a balanced military posture. It makes the problem even more difficult to see that this action could give the United States or China a false impression.

The United States

North Korea's nuclear weapons seriously damage the U.S. national interest. First, one of the most important goals in the U.S. Pacific region is to protect its allies from outside threats and maintain regional stability. For this, the alliance in Asia must be strengthened. However, South Korea and Japan are being held hostage by North Korea's nuclear program because of their geographic proximity to the North. Although the two, non-nuclear states, are building a strong missile defense system, they are still vulnerable to North Korea's nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the impact of North Korea's nuclear

26) Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea's Provocations," *The RUSI Journal*, Vol.156, No.2 (2011).

weapons on U.S. policy goals is “de-coupling” in Asia, and the three stages of decoupling are as follows: First, it restricts the active response to the actions of South Korea and Japan through its nuclear threats. Second, by threatening attacks on the U.S. mainland, it reduces confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence. Third, South Korea and Japan may be considering their own nuclear deterrent. This may also put a wrong spin on European allies.

Second, not imminent but most fundamental concern is the threat of attack on the U.S. homeland. North Korea directly threatens the mainland U.S. militarily, although there are many questions about the North's ICBM capability.²⁷⁾ To attack the U.S. mainland, it is necessary not only to extend the distance of missiles but also to penetrate missile defense systems and to have re-entry capabilities. Accuracy will also be needed to control unnecessary prevarication of retaliation. For these reasons, there is skepticism about whether North Korea will be able to attack the U.S. However, it is only a matter of time before the North can achieve such capabilities.

Third, it could threaten the U.S.-led non-proliferation regime. Most directly, North Korea's nuclear weapons and technology are likely to reach the terrorists with anti-American sentiments. For North Korea needs foreign currency in the midst of sanctions, illicit trade of nuclear technology can be an important source of funding. Various evidence has been presented that North Korea is attempting such a deal. In particular, there is strong evidence that North Korea supported Syria's nuclear program.²⁸⁾ There was also a case in which the Kahn network in Pakistan greatly increased nuclear proliferation.²⁹⁾ On the other hand, there is also a possibility that North Korea serves as an indirect catalyst for global nuclear proliferation and damages the NPT system, which has been well blocked since 1970. The collapse of the

27) For more information on the North Korean overall nuclear capabilities, Hans M. Kristensen, “North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.74, No.1 (2018).

28) Michael Schwartz, “U.N. Links North Korea to Syria's Chemical Weapons Program,” *The New York Times* (2018.2.27.), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/world/asia/north-korea-syria-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html> (2018.9.3.).

29) Samuel Ramani, “The Long History of the Pakistan-North Korea Nexus,” *The Diplomat* (2016.8.30), <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-long-history-of-the-pakistan-north-korea-nexus/> (2018.8.23.).

international non-proliferation regime will result in significantly weakening U.S. hegemony and global influences.

Therefore, for the United States, the first step is to reduce the effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear program by consolidating the alliance architecture. In other words, by providing extended deterrence and assurance strategy, it will be able to prevent the decoupling by the North's nuclear weapons. It would reduce the North's incentives to develop nuclear weapons. The second is coercion strategy through various means. The “maximum pressure” strategy in the early days of Trump's government has been increasing the cost of nuclear development by using various means, including diplomacy, economy, and military. Some claim that the reason for the denuclearization talks was the result of those efforts, not the North's revision of strategic goals. After all, the U.S. has a policy goal to minimize the influence of North Korea's nuclear program.

Japan

First, North Korea's nuclear program is a direct threat to Japan. North Korea has often threatened to attack Japan. All of the Japanese territories is within range of North Korea's missiles, Nodong, Musudan and Daepodong missiles. Nevertheless, it has refrained from taking direct action due to the U.S.-Japan alliance and limitations of the Constitution Article 9.³⁰⁾ The year of 2012 example illustrates Japan's difficult position, regarding the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise in 2012, North Korea warned that “if Japan were to intercept North Korean missiles, a war would be the first to break out in Japan.”³¹⁾ Japan, which is facing North Korea's nuclear threat, has no capability to retaliate, nor to operate military forces around the Korean Peninsula due to historical issues

Second, however, it highlights the asymmetry in that no influence can be exerted on

30) Full text of the Constitution of Japan, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (2018.9.1).

31) Justin McCurry, “North Korea missile launches raise tensions,” *The Guardian* (2012.3.30), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/30/north-korea-missile-launches-tensions> (2018.9.1).

North Korea. Sometimes, the U.S. policy on North Korea does not address Japan's security concerns. And cooperation with South Korea is essential, but there is a limit that it does not develop further due to historical issues. In other words, Japan has no direct means to implement. In particular, sanctions are not effective because Japan and North Korea are not closely related in the economic sphere. Because the channel of communication has been suspended after the North's continued nuclear test, the means of dialogue will also be limited. Rather, the North is expected to move toward its promise of "compensating measures" such as the settlement of the Japanese abductees issue and normalization of bilateral relations.

Thus, for Japan, an important goal is to have direct deterrence capabilities to deter North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Considering the limitations of Article 9 of the Constitution, it may be the only way to achieve maximum missile defense for deterrence by denial. Another important goal is to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance to increase the extended deterrence and strengthen cooperation with Korea. Although it is a secondary issue, it is also important to play a certain diplomatic role in the negotiations for denuclearization of North Korea. In other words, they are making diplomatic efforts to ensure that Japan is not excluded from the Korean Peninsula issue. In order to take over the position of the permanent member along the reform of the U.N. Security Council, it needs to play a role in establishing a peace regime in this region.

China

China, a strong ally of North Korea, also agrees with its goal of denuclearization. First, however, North Korea's nuclear weapons will not threaten China militarily. While some say North Korea's nuclear program could threaten China, citing the cases of the China-Soviet conflict in the Cold War era,³²⁾ it is putting pressure on China by mainly providing causes for political unrest. But China puts more priority on maintaining stability around it. China is still necessary to continue economic growth in the context of the U.S.-led global order. China's biggest goal is to protect the North from

32) Weiqi Zhang, "Neither friend nor big brother: China's role in North Korean foreign policy strategy," *Palgrave Communications*, Vol.4 (2018).

international pressure, especially from the United States.

Second, North Korea's nuclear program could damage China's prestige. Despite North Korea's nuclear tests, China has rejected calls from the international community for sanctions. China's double stance has been criticized by the international community in that it has also advocated global non-proliferation and disarmament since its nuclear development. Of course, this attitude puts China in a very difficult position because it also provided a justification for developing South Korea and Japan's claim to nuclear armament.

Third, from a more aggressive standpoint, North Korea's nuclear weapons contribute to maximizing China's strategic interests. Compared to the United States, China puts more priority on stability before denuclearization. In other words, if China recognizes that the North's nuclear weapons contribute to stability in Northeast Asia, China needs to protect its nuclear program. China could also increase its military presence in Asia because of the United States' push for an Asian Rebalancing policy and military buildup in the region. North Korea's "irrational" behavior is sometimes an important asset that confirms China's influence and leadership over the North.

Therefore, for China, its first goal is to consolidate its strategic position based on the North Korean nuclear issue while maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is secondary. However, if the current mood of reconciliation between the two Koreas can be linked to the market opening that China has long demanded of North Korea, it will actively support. In the process, proper strategic interests need to be ensured without violating China's core interests.

Russia

Russia's policy goals are also stability on the Korean Peninsula, along with China. Of course, the perception of geopolitical values cannot be the same as that of China. However, stability in the region is crucial for Russia, which is seeking to advance into the Far East for economic development. The first concern for Russia is that North Korea's nuclear program can trigger nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. This would cause

global proliferation, weakening Russia's political and diplomatic position. In addition, Russia could be forced to compete with the U.S. in East Asia. It is likely to overspend Russia's resources.

Second, like China, North Korea's nuclear program can maximize its strategic interests. Through the Iran nuclear talks, Russia gained the right of Iran's highly enriched uranium processing.³³⁾ In other words, they can benefit from supporting the denuclearization process of North Korea. Russia already laid the groundwork for the six-party talks by presenting a package solution in 2003.³⁴⁾ And North Korea's nuclear weapons are not always a burden. If North Korea continues to possess nuclear weapons, each country will speed up its missile defense system and Russia's strong missile defense system, the S-400s, can be exported.

The most important task for Russia will be to maintain close relations with North Korea and other relevant countries in the process of denuclearization. For now, working with China and stopping the United States and South Korea from entering North Korea could be a short-term goal. Of course, China should be prevented from exercising its dominant influence over North Korea. This is because it can accelerate instability and cause military competition. Currently, it is expected that Russia will provide assistance to the two Koreas while sitting on the sidelines so that the two can continue their cooperation without outside intervention.

IV. Conclusion

As it entered 2018, efforts to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula began. Comparing last year, when the preventive attack was considered seriously, things changed drastically within just one year. North Korea has declared a halt to nuclear

33) David E. Sanger and Andrew E. Kramer, "Iran Hands Over Stockpile of Enriched Uranium to Russia," *The New York Times* (2015.12.28.), <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-hands-over-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-to-russia.html> (2018.9.1.).

34) Georgy Toloraya, "The Six Party Talks: A Russian Perspective," *Asian Perspective*, Vol.32, No.4 (2008).

tests and missile tests and has refrained from military provocations, which is not considered to happen immediately. After the summit agreement between the two Koreas, it is unlikely that North Korea's provocations will cause a sudden crisis. However, the U.S. and China are competing against each other over the initiatives of the North Korean nuclear issue. And, on the pretext of the North's nuclear weapons development and existing nuclear capability, the arms race could occur if the North's denuclearization negotiations are assessed as a failure. Moreover, the nuclear domino will not be an impossible scenario.

The opinions of relevant countries regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons have also changed a lot. As awareness of threats has changed, strategic calculations have also changed. As North Korea starts denuclearization negotiations, efforts to maximize its strategic interests are increasing. Only South Korea and Japan, directly threatened by North Korea's nuclear weapons program, desperately want denuclearization. The United States considers the time to be on its side if it removes the imminent threat of an ICBM. For China and Russia, North Korea's nuclear weapons have become more important strategic assets than ever before. The two countries have more to gain by denuclearization of North Korea.

Even if the calculation is different, there is a lot that countries can gain from North Korea's denuclearization. In the case of North Korea, its regime survival can only be guaranteed through denuclearization. After all, the North Korean nuclear issue is a task for South Korea and other concerned countries to solve somehow. It is also important that this problem cannot be resolved without solving it together. If China keeps providing aid for the survival of the North Korean regime, the U.S. is playing with its military option cards, Russia is pursuing its own economic interests, and Japan is moving toward a negotiation process, then Northeast Asia's security landscape will become more dangerous, especially to South Korea and North Korea.

In the end, the denuclearization of North Korea cannot be achieved if efforts by relevant countries are dispersed and only pursued their own interests. If the North Korean nuclear threat continues, it could again lead to U.S. preventive attacks, North Korea's military provocations and the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Since it is reasonable

to see North Korea's denuclearization profitable and recognized as such, we should work closely to ensure that efforts are not distributed. If Asia's Paradox is intensified because of North Korea's nuclear weapons, the denuclearization of the North could create a new system for economic and military cooperation.

IV-1

A Thought on North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

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A Thought on North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

1. NK's Assessment of the Prospects

- North Korea may assess the prospect for armed conflict with the United States relatively high. There are two types of conflict: direct conflict between the U.S. and North Korea or indirect conflict through South Korea. The probability of the second is higher than the first due to the ROK-US alliance.
- Due to the relocation of USFK, there is no US troops deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. So that North Korean leaders think the prospect for direct armed conflict between the U.S. and North Korea is relatively low compared to the period before the 1990s. If the relocation is completed, the probability will go down further.
- The U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK and the combined defense posture can lead to the situation under which North Korea must face the U.S. directly. In other words, any conflict between North and South Korea can escalate to or be transformed into the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.
- Unlike their hostile and aggressive narrative, they have shown a tendency to avoid, contain, and control direct military confrontation, or conflict, with the U.S. as we have seen in some cases in the past (Axe Murder Incident of 1976, the first nuclear crisis of 1994 when the U.S. seriously considered surgical strike at Youngbyeon).
- Their demand and argument for a peace treaty with the U.S., termination of the ROK-US alliance and military exercises, withdrawal of the USFK can be interpreted as a sign of North Korea's desire to survive. They claim that tension on the Korean Peninsula is caused by U.S. oppressive hostile policy toward North Korea.
- During the post-Cold war era, in almost every crisis, North Korea has shown a distinctive pattern of behavior: heightening tension, negotiation, and termination of the situation (bluffing or blackmailing). They have never gone all the way. Tactical risk-taking behavioral pattern but not risking the regime survival.

2. A Thought on Deterrence and/or Defeating

- North Korea, who barely survived the Korea War by the Chinese intervention, is very much seriously concerned with and is really afraid of the U.S. military might (North Korean fear of the U.S.).
- And North Korean leaders know they cannot win the war that will bring an end to the regime should it occur. They believe that the U.S. has capabilities, maybe intension too, to destroy the North Korean regime.
- So it is possible to conclude North Korea's primary objective is deterrence, not defeat: deter the U.S. from waging full-scale war (termination of limited conflict or armed conflict before its survival is seriously threatened).
- It is doubtful that North Korea will go all the way up to risk the survival of Kim regime. Nowadays North Korea may be leaning more toward low intensity conflict or limited war rather than full-scale war, which will inevitably result in the full-scale U.S. involvement.
- Pattern or sequence of the events can be as follow: Incurring substantial damage to South Korea and seeking the termination of the situation before it gets out of control (before the US fully commits itself): provocation or limited war→threat of further escalation→seeking ways (military or diplomatic) to de-escalate or terminate the situation.
- There are two factors which might lead North Korea to believe in their own version of deterrence: South Korea's vulnerability and Chinese intervention.
- South Korea's vulnerability: The Capital area, where 10 million (25 million) people live, is only 40 km away from the DMZ and it is within the range of North Korea's artillery attack. Over the years, North Korea has continuously upgraded and added more artillery pieces to exploit this vulnerability of South Korea for its own advantage in any crisis.
- After having a series of North Korean provocation in recent years, South Korea

has begun to argue for retaliation in the event of North Korea's provocation and it has introduced counter-provocation plan with the U.S. However, unless South Korea takes high risk of escalation and is ready to bear the possible damage and cost, it is very unlikely for South Korea to carry out the plan as being planned. In other words, unless South Korea is ready and willing to fight a war with North Korea at all cost, it is difficult and unlikely for South Korea to retaliate North Korea massively (self-deterred).

- North Korea knows this well. So that North Korea is very much likely to exploit South Korea's vulnerability in controlling the situation and consequently deterring the U.S. from engaging massively. North Korea will use South Korea as a hostage in deterring the U.S. from doing what North Korea does not want.
- Second factor North Korea can think as a deterrent factor is China. Whenever there is a crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula, China always says peace, stability, restraint, patience, and peaceful resolution.
- Over the years, North Korea has become liability rather than asset for China (China's 3 Nos: No War, No Collapse, and No Nuclear). But China cannot afford the end of North Korean regime which might result in unified Korea aligned with the U.S. Thus, even though it does not like North Korea, China will intervene to save North Korea. China will seek the termination of armed conflict as soon as possible either through diplomatic ways or showing possibility of Chinese physical intervention.
- North Korea knows Chinese position and possible reactions well. So North Korea will try to use China as an external deterrent means.
- How can North Korea bring in China factor in deterring the U.S.? North Korea may think of rationality of irrationality. By showing the possibility of uncontrolled escalation through risk-taking behavior and action, North Korea can gain what it from China. North Korea will also try to change the game: that is, from conflict between North Korea and the ROK-US to China vs. the U.S. alliance by taking further escalation-oriented actions. Of course, to control or de-escalate the crisis,

China will try to prevent North Korea from taking risk-taking provocative action on one hand. On the other, China will ask or threaten the other parties to restrain their responses. It is unclear what kind of action China can take to prevent further escalation. But China will do whatever it thinks necessary to prevent further escalation and early termination of the crisis or conflict.

3. Thought on the Roles of Nuclear Weapons

- Three roles: Make up deficiency of conventional forces, diplomatic tool, and then deterrent means.
- Nowadays North Korea seems to seek "survival second strike capabilities" to ensure its deterrent posture vis-à-vis the U.S. and the ROK: development of mobile missiles and SLBMs can be the sign of that. North Korea has established Strategic Force as a separate service.
- The role of nuclear weapons from North Korean perspective seems to have evolved. Initially, North Korea might have thought nuclear weapons as a means to redress the erosion of conventional superiority over the ROK. It is very unlikely for North Korea to have any thought on detailed and well-developed nuclear strategy or plan in the beginning.
- Until the late 1980s or early 1990s, North Korea enjoyed conventional superiority over South Korea. From the late 1980s or early 1990s North Korea began to see the erosion of its conventional superiority over the ROK. Due to the worsening economy, North Korea knew that they could not maintain and upgrade such large conventional forces of 1.2 million troops. To redress the eroding conventional superiority, North Korea might have decided to go nuclear. In a word, nuclear weapons are to make up North Korea's deficiency of conventional forces. It is similar to the U.S. decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the Korean Peninsula to redress conventional inferiority.
- Second, North Korea can use nuclear weapons as a diplomatic tool to negotiate

with outside world in peace time by keeping the other parties concerned with North Korea. Recognition and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power are the objective of North Korea and then North Korea will be in a better position to deal with them. Nuclear weapons are believed to provide North Korea more options.

- Third, North Korea may regard nuclear weapons as the most reliable deterrent means vis-à-vis the U.S. North Korea may believe nuclear weapons will have an effect of restraining the U.S. in contingency or an effect of preventing and/or limiting U.S. involvement (reaction) and its options. Furthermore, nuclear weapons may be a way to terminate the situation before North Korea's survival is seriously challenged by the U.S. involvement. North Korea may think the threat to use nuclear weapons will make the U.S. to stay under a certain level in its response. In a word, North Korea can view nuclear weapons as the most reliable tool to control the situation (i.e. escalation control tool).
- The preferable course of actions North Korea might think could be as follow:
 - North Korea's surprise attack of limited scale → inflicting substantial damage on South Korea → U.S./ROK responses → North Korea's threat to use nuclear weapons either on South Korea or on the U.S. (seeking possibilities of limiting the conflict at conventional level and terminating the situation) → negotiation → termination of the situation with some "acceptable" damage upon itself.
- In addition, having nuclear weapons can make it easier for North Korea to manipulate China card. China has been arguing for 3 Nos: No War, No Collapse, and No nuclear weapons.
- China is very much likely to intervene actively in contingency to terminate the situation before it gets out of control or escalate into a full-scale war which might inevitably involve the use of nuclear weapons and result in the end of North Korean regime.
- Threat to use nuclear weapons can be believed to increase possibility of China's

intervention.

- Being faced with the possibility of escalation into full-scale war with the possible use of nuclear weapons and confrontation with the U.S., China will actively seek ways to terminate the situation and return to the status-quo again as soon as possible.

4. Responses

- Tailored Flexible Deterrence Strategy, not massive retaliation
- Tightening up the Alliances: integrated responses: Mix-up of strategic and non-strategic tools
- Development of usable and practical military options
- Mix of Offensive and defensive capabilities (+C4ISR)
- Assurance measures to China

IV-2

North Korean Nuclear Capability and Nuclear Strategy

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North Korean Nuclear Capability and Nuclear Strategy

1. Introduction

For past sixty years, North Korea has pursued a nuclear program that has gradually developed in size, complexity and capabilities from a political means for negotiation to operational nuclear weapons for military purposes. Now North Korea is estimated to possess an inventory of minimal 10 nuclear weapons that could rapidly expand by 2020.¹⁾ Especially in the last 2 years, north Korea accelerated a speed of improvement of nuclear program. North Korea conducted more than 40 missile launches in 2016 and 2017. In Summer 2017 north Korea conducted first intercontinental ballistic missile flight tests in July and intermediate-range missile tests over Japan in August and September. In addition to ICBMs, North Korea developed and tested longer-range solid-propellant missile systems, submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBM), and SRBM as countermeasures against U.S. and US-ROK missile defenses. North Korea conducted its sixth and largest nuclear test in September 2017 following two tests in 2016.

In the successive strategic provocations in 2017, north Korea became gradually bold. In early August 2017, North Korea threatened even to launch four IRBMs toward Guam, a U.S. territory, and in late August and September 2017, North Korea tested an Hwasong-12(IRBM) over Japan. North Korea conducted a sixth and significantly larger nuclear test on September 3 2017, claiming that the explosion had been a “successful hydrogen bomb test for an ICBM.” North Korea has recently improved its ability to threaten the United States with intercontinental ballistic missile tests and an alleged thermonuclear device. The US 2018 NPR finally presumed that North Korea has dramatically increased its missile flight testing, most recently including the testing of intercontinental-range missiles capable of reaching the U.S. homeland.²⁾ North Korea’s missiles now have a longer range and its warheads are significantly more destructive. It is believed that north Korea has gradually developed a nuclear strategy that appears

1) SIPRI, 2018 Yearbook (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2018).

2) Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (Washington D. C.: DoD, 2018).

to have progressed from political tools to deter an attack from the United States to operational strategic defensive weapons to inflict unacceptable losses upon attacking outside forces and assured retaliation, and possibly today, into viewing nuclear weapons as both strategic political weapons and for use in a range of strategic, operational situations during wartime.³⁾


In this background, the purpose of this paper is to tackle the following question: What is the north Korea's nuclear strategy? In order to analyze north Korea's nuclear strategy, it is necessary to closely look over all of its nuclear capability and its intention. This includes a stockpile of nuclear weapons and material inclusive delivery systems based on a nuclear triad(ICBM, SLBM, Bomber). Futhermore, this paper introduces the current debate on the country's nuclear strategy, a framework for analyzing any nuclear strategy, and the most relevant school of thought from Vipin Narang's 3 alternative models based on a posture optimization theory for regional nuclear powers. Additionally, this research introduces a Shane Smith' "north Korea's evolving nuclear strategy", and other important view. This paper finds that the north Korea's nuclear strategy exploits the threat of nuclear escalation to make up for inadequacies in the survivability and credibility of its small nuclear forces. This paper argues that north Korea will pursue an 'assured retaliation' in the near future, and might make an offensive and preemptive use of nuclear weapons if nothr Korea miscalculate ROK-US intentions or overestimate its capabilities as well. The latter is not realistic, but its possibility cannot be excluded.

3) Joseph S. Bermudez JR, North Korea's Development of a Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Washington D. C: USKI, 2012), p. 1.

2. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Capability

2.1. Nuclear Weapons: Yield and Type

[Figure 1] North Korea's Nuclear Tests and Yields



Source: Globalsecurity.org (yield estimates for first five tests), One kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT

Over the past thirty years, north Korea's nuclear program has grown from a proliferation problem to a military threat to its neighbors and the United States until north Korea came to a negotiation table in 2018. North Korea continued to invest in its nuclear infrastructure. It conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, two in 2016, and one in 2017.⁴⁾ North Korea is now estimated to possess enough fissile materials to build anywhere from 30 to about 50 nuclear weapons. An underground test on 3 September 2017 suggested that north Korea's desired end state may also be within reach. The regime said this was a hydrogen bomb and the size of the explosion on 3 September makes it plausible. It triggered a magnitude-6.3 earthquake and was significantly more powerful than previous North Korean tests, as well as the atomic bombs dropped by the US on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the second world war.⁵⁾ Especially after the

4) Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Washington D. C: DoD, 2017), p. 1.

5) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/how-has-north-koreas-nuclear-programme-advanced-in-2017>

successful launch of Hwasong-15 November 2017, North Korea declared the completion of its nuclear weapon capabilities and committed itself to pursue the mass production and deployment of nuclear weapons in Kim Jong Un's 2018 New Year's Address.⁶⁾

North Korea has followed two paths for its nuclear weapons programme, aiming at producing fissile material with both highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. Estimates of the north Korea's nuclear-weapons inventory vary from source to source; they are based on the level of the country's weapons technology and the quantity of fissile material available. Plutonium production is a little easier to estimate than HEU stockpiles, as reactor operating times and reprocessing campaigns can be observed more readily using imagery analysis, in contrast to the difficulty in making judgements about HEU due to uncertainty over overt nuclear facilities.

Most Experts estimate that North Korea already possesses large stockpile of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. According to a joint research of Joel Witt and Ahn Sun Young, north Korea's nuclear stockpile could expand at a rate of anywhere from 100 percent in the best case scenario to 525 percent in the worst case scenario by 2020. Their minimal growth scenario tells that stockpile increases from a low level of 10 weapons to 20 weapons by 2020.⁷⁾ Further miniaturization is also minimal and yields of the weapons remain essentially 10 kilotons. But rapid growth scenario is rapidly estimating that north Korea's nuclear stockpile grows to 100 weapons by 2020. Significant advances are made in weapons designs allowing the North to deploy battlefield and tactical weapons if it chooses to do so. The average stockpile yield increases to 20 or more kilotons with an increasing number having yields of 50 kilotons. A one-stage thermonuclear device with a yield of 100 kilotons is tested but is too large to be deployed. Work is done on developing a two-stage thermonuclear device.⁸⁾ Even if we take moderate growth scenario, Pyongyang's stockpile grows to 50 weapons by 2020.⁹⁾


6) "Kim Jong Un's 2018 New Year's Address," in: <https://www.ncnk.org/node/1427>

7) Joel S. Wit and Ahn Sun Young, *North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy* (Washington D. C.: USKI, 2015), pp. 7-8.

8) Wit, *North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy*, pp. 7-8.

9) Wit, *North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy*, pp. 7-8.

[Figure 2] North Korea's Delivery System and Nuclear Forces for 2020



Sources: Joel S. Wit and Ahn Sun Young, *North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy* (Washington D. C.: USKI, 2015), p. 25.

Many other sources provide similar assessment. A prominent nuclear expert, Siegfried S. Hecker, estimates that it possess 25-30 nuclear weapons by the end of 2017 and could produce 3 to 5 nuclear weapons per year. Hecker estimates that North Korea has 250-500 kg of HEU, based on what he saw, logical assumptions, and 'probabilistic analysis of the import and production of key materials and components'.¹⁰⁾ In September 2017 David Albright put the 'realistic' range as 23 to 39, growing by three to five a year.¹¹⁾ According to updated count by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the number of nuclear warheads with nine nuclear countries (United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) has reduced from 14,935 at start of 2017 to 14,465 at start of 2018.¹²⁾ SIPRI estimates that north Korea is believed to possess 10-20 and to have demonstrated unexpected rapid progress


10) Siegfried S. Hecker, "What We Really Know About North Korea's Nuclear Weapons", Foreign Affairs, 4 December 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-12-04/what-we-really-know-about-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons>.

11) "A Legislative Proposal to Impede North Korea's Access to Finance", 13 September 2017, <https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhr115-ba19-wstate-dalbright-20170913.pdf>.

12) <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/disarmament-arms-control-and-non-proliferation>

in testing of two new types of long-range ballistic missile delivery systems for delivery of its nuclear weapons.¹³⁾

[Figure 3] Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018



Sources:

<https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/disarmament-arms-control-and-non-proliferation>

Other different sources come to a similar estimate. South Korea estimates that North Korea has more than 50kg of plutonium and the US Defense Intelligence Agency sees that North Korea has an arsenal of up to 60 nuclear weapons as of 2017.¹⁴⁾ In a report to center for american progress, North Korea is estimated to have between 10 and 35 nuclear warheads.¹⁵⁾ Based on assessments of the nation's fissile material stockpiles and a modest production rate and many of credible sources, we can come to a conclusion that north Korea has currently as many as 50-60 weapons.¹⁶⁾ These nuclear weapons

13) SIPRI, Yearbook 2018 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2018).

14) ROK MND, Defense White Paper (Seoul: MND, 2017).

15) Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74 (1) (2018): 41-51, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1413062>; David Albright, "North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities: A Fresh Look - with Power Point Slides" (Washington: Institute for Science and International Security, 2017),

16) Center for American Progress, North Korea's Nuclear Program at a Glance (June 11, 2018) p. 1.

have a destructive power of 10 to 25 kilotons, which is roughly equivalent to the yield of the atomic bombs at the 'Hiroshima' and 'Nagasaki'-level. North Korea also claims to have created a hydrogen bomb and even demonstrated that it possesses a bomb with destructive power of 200 to 250 kilotons, equivalent to that of a hydrogen bomb.

After all, when it comes to north Korean nuclear capabilities, we can come to a shared conclusion. There is a dominant opinion that North Korea is able to produce a boosted or thermonuclear design bomb and north Korea has a stockpile of from 10 at a minimum to 60 nuclear weapons at a maximum level.

2.2. Delivery Systems: Missile Capabilities

As demonstrated in numerous missile tests in 2016 and 2017, north Korea has developed its ballistic missile capabilities including IRBM and ICBM. It successfully launched Hwasong-12/14/15 in 2017. It possesses SCUD-B/C and KN-02 as SRBM, SCUD-ER, Rodong and Bukkeukseung-2 as MRBM, Hwasong-12 as IRBM and Hwasong-14/15 as ICBM, and Bukkeuksung-1 as SLBM. North Korea has developed a solid fueled missile for its ballistic missile submarine, and a subsequent land-based variant of the same missile. Solid fuel marks a more sophisticated and operationally useful design because missiles remain fueled and available at all times while liquid fueled missiles are generally stored empty and fueled just prior to launch, adding time and increasing the probability that their preparation for use will be detected.¹⁷⁾ North Korea has displayed its liquid fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles on multiple occasions. North Korea 28 November 2017 declared that it will stop ICBM tests and declared 'completion of nuclear power' even though reentry technology for ICBM has not been completed yet. Analysts claim that north Korean ICBMs can reliably reach the United States mainland. Now, the north Korea has more credibility in its threats toward the U.S. mainland.

17) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula* (London: IISS, 2018), pp. 23-24.

Table 3: 2017 North Korea ballistic-missile test launches				
Date (local)	Type	Classification	Assessed outcome ⁽¹⁾	Distance flown
29 Nov	<i>Hwasong-15</i>	ICBM	Successful	~1,000 km ⁽²⁾
15 Sep	<i>Hwasong-12</i>	IRBM	Successful	~3,700 km
03 Sep	6th nuclear test			
29 Aug	<i>Hwasong-12</i>	IRBM	Successful	~2,700 km
	Unconfirmed	SRBM	Successful	~250 km
26 Aug	Unconfirmed	SRBM	Successful	~250 km
	Unconfirmed	SRBM	Failure	n.k.
28 Jul	<i>Hwasong-14</i>	ICBM	Successful	~1,000 km ⁽²⁾
04 Jul	<i>Hwasong-14</i>	ICBM	Successful	~930 km ⁽²⁾
29 May	<i>Scud (MaRV)</i>	SRBM	Successful	~400 km
21 May	<i>Pukgukson-2</i>	MRBM	Successful	~500 km ⁽²⁾
15 May	<i>Hwasong-12</i>	IRBM	Successful	~800 km ⁽²⁾
29 Apr	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	Failure	~50 km
16 Apr	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	Failure	n.k.
05 Apr	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	Failure	~60 km
22 Mar	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	Failure	n.k.
	<i>Scud-ER</i>	SRBM	Successful	
06 Mar	<i>Scud-ER</i>	SRBM	Successful	~1,000 km
	<i>Scud-ER</i>	SRBM	Successful	
	<i>Scud-ER</i>	SRBM	Successful	
12 Feb	<i>Pukgukson-2</i>	MRBM	Successful	~500 km ⁽²⁾

[Table 1] 2017 North Korea's Ballistic Missile Launches

Sources: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula* (London: IISS, 2018), p. 25.

But It is not clear whether North Korea does possess an operational ICBM. North Korea has to still prove definitively that it possesses an intercontinental capability. Despite all its missile tests and the obvious advancement of its nuclear weaponry, crucial tasks pertaining to systems integration and operational testing are far from complete. There is no definitive evidence that North Korea has ever mated a warhead to a ICBM, and simulations and ground tests offer insufficient proof. As matters stand, additional missile tests will be required to demonstrate that North Korea has a reliable delivery vehicle with a prototype warhead able to survive reentry. In brief, North Korea has a limited deterrent option. North Korea nuclear capability is not sufficient to strike directly the continental US, but is enough to destroy Republic of Korea and Japan as allies of US. All the missiles north Korea has developed until end of 2017 are depicted as follows.

Missile	Class	Range	News
Taepodong-2	SLV	4,000-10,000 km	Operational
Taepodong-1	IRBM	2,000-5,000 km	Obsolete
Scud-ER	SRBM	800-1,000 km	Operational
No-Dong	MRBM	1,200-1,500 km	Operational
M1985/M1991	MLRS	40-60 km	Operational
Kumsong-3	ASCM	130-250 km	Possibly Operational
Koksan M1978	Artillery	40-60 km	Operational
KN-18(MaRV Scud Variant)	SRBM	450+ km	In Development
KN-15(Pukkuksong-2)	MRBM	1,200-2,000	In Development
KN-14	ICBM	8,000-10,000 km	In Development
KN-11	SLBM	1,200 km	In Development
KN-09	MLRS	190 km	In Development
KN-08	ICBM	5,500-11,500 km	In Development
KN-06	SAM	150 km	Operational
KN-02	SRBM	120-170 km	Operational
KN-01	ASCM	110-160 km	Operational
Hwasong-6	RBM	500 km	Operational
Hwasong-5	SRBM	300 km	Operational
Hwasong-15	ICBM	8,500-13,000	In Development
Hwasong-14	ICBM	10,000+ km	In Development
Hwasong-12	IRBM	4,500 km	In Development
BM-25 Musudan	IRBM	2,500-4,000 km	In Development

[Table 2] North Korea's Missiles: Class and Range

Sources: <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/north-korea/>


But in terms of technological improvement of nuclear forces, north Korea has to overcome following obstacles. First, the biggest challenges north Korea has to overcome to credibly threaten delivery of a nuclear warhead are the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the reliability of its ballistic missiles. The most recent ICBM is designed to deliver a nuclear warhead to the U.S. mainland. Although it is believed that their nuclear warheads can be put on all the ballistic missiles, the possibility of mounting on ICBM and its operationalizing is still in question.

Second, one of the most critical problem referring north Korea's nuclear capabilities is the survivability. North Korea knows that it lacks sufficient survivability having a limited number of warheads and a submarine force that still does not significantly increase an ability to threaten a nuclear attack. North Korea accomplishes this most

easily by using TELs to have the capability to move missiles and warheads around the peninsula. Another part of the north Korea's survivability strategy is heightening the risk of inadvertent escalation with China. North Korea began constructing a missile launch facility 50 kilometers from the Chinese border which increases the risk of conflict with China. And north Korea rapidly developed a solid-fuel propellant ballistic missile in its submarines and conducted a successful test that flew up to 600 kilometers.¹⁸⁾

Third, north Korea has to still improve its capacity to develop a nuclear warhead for its missiles capable of surviving re-entry. However, in the absence of a proven re-entry vehicle and demonstrated penetration aids, such as manoeuvring warheads and decoys, they would remain vulnerable to correctly configured ballistic-missile-defence systems. In July 2017 North Korea twice tested the Hwasong-14, a missile with the potential for intercontinental range. On 29th November 2017, North Korea successfully tested the Hwasong-15. Though this missile travelled only 1,000 km on a highly lofted trajectory, experts assessed its potential range at 13,000 km, bringing within range the entire continental United States. However, while the two rapid launches indicated a growing ICBM capability, the north Korea's re-entry vehicle technology has yet to be proven.¹⁹⁾

[Figure 4] North Korea's Ballistic Missiles



Sources: <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/north-korea/>

18) Jordan Rott and James Keagle, "north Korea Nuclear Strategy: The Objectives and Limits of Risk Manipulation," *The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs*, Vol.2. Issue 2 (Fall 2017), pp. 74-75.

19) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula* (London: IISS, 2018), pp. 22-25.

North Korean nuclear arsenal has not reached at the level of minimum deterrence in the strict sense, but is de facto minimal deterrent power. ROK and US intelligence community cannot precisely predict developments now to individual days or weeks, but in aggregate, the community was on target in its assessment of North Korea's progress. The Central Intelligence Agency predicts that North Korea will have a reliable capability to strike at the continental United States in only a few months. The Former CIA Mike Pompeo told in January 2018, "there is a world of difference between being able to build a rudimentary capability to build an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead that can possibly hit the United States if everything goes right versus a reliable weapon that will hit the target every time." Pompeo said, "This is the core of deterrence theory. You have to be certain that what you aim to deliver will actually be successful. At the very least you have to make sure your adversary believes that... North Korea's goal is to make sure that the United States believe that it is capable of delivering a nuclear payload with absolute certainty. Once North Korea achieves that end, it will achieve deterrence against the United States."²⁰⁾

3. North Korea's Strategic Goal and Military Strategy

There is many evidence to support many different theories about the north Korea's intentions. A comprehensive review of the available evidence supports an argument that the north Korea's nuclear strategy is designed to deter a powerful foreign threat. In order to do so, the north Korea threatens a risk of escalation to make up for inadequacies in the survivability and credibility of its small nuclear forces.²¹⁾ However, it is not yet possible to offer definitive judgments on the directions of North Korean strategic thinking. North Korean Sources and statements are not credible, because they seem more propaganda for domestic consumption than credible strategic thinking. There is uncertainty on even a basic question about North Korea's actual capabilities

20) "North Koren only months away from ability to hit america with nuclear weapon(2018. 1. 23)," <https://nationalinterest.org>

21) Jordan Routt and James Keagle, "north Korea Nuclear Strategy: The Objectives and Limits of Risk Manipulation," *The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs*, Vol.2. Issue 2 (Fall 2017), p. 2.

and strategic intent. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that North Korea continues to convey mixed messages, leaving its adversaries guessing about its intent and its capabilities.²²⁾ Independently of various estimates and argumentation, we can come to a consensus that North Korea sees nuclear weapons as central to its security.

North Korea's leaders have consistently justified developing nuclear weapons for security purposes.²³⁾ In this context, there are two levels of strategic objectives: political and diplomatic objective on the one hand, military objective on the other hand. For the political and diplomatic purposes north Korea can exploit nuclear weapons as a defensive tool to get a concession for economic aid from outside the world, and as a legitimization for justifying its monolithic leadership inside the north Korea.

First, political negotiations over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs over two decades suggest that north Korea has long used its nuclear program to get food aid, energy assistance and other material concessions from the international community as well as to gain diplomatic bargaining leverage. This strategy requires the technical elements of a nuclear weapons program that can then be traded for concessions from countries that do not want to see a nuclear-armed adversary.²⁴⁾ But of more importance for Kim Jong Un's domestic politics is a Kim-family's ideological legitimation. Regime legitimation concerns Kim Jong-un's claims to absolute power, and reflects the deeply adversarial conception of Kim-family rule. Kim Jong-un has tied the fate of the North Korean system to the possession of the absolute weapons. The development of ICBM including many types of missiles provides Kim Jong Un a means to place it on a nominal par with the world's major nuclear powers.²⁵⁾ In Kim's view, the presumption of strategic equivalence with the United States will ultimately leave the United States and others with no choice than to accept North Korea as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. Additionally, North Korea believes that nuclear weapons will ultimately erode the

22) Jonathan Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs: Strategies, Directions, and Prospects," Brookings Institution(2018).

23) Shane Smith, North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy (Washington D. C: USKI, 2015), p. 3.

24) Smith, North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy, p. 10.

25) Choi Kang and Kim Gi Bum, "A Thought on North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine," Korea Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 29. Issue. 4 (2017).

credibility of the south Korea and United States' alliance.

Second, Deterrence is the second key objective, and north Korea's primary declared rationale for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.²⁶⁾ North Korea has repeatedly argued that without nuclear weapons it would be vulnerable to US decapitation and regime change akin to the fate of Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi. Kim seems to regard nuclear weapons as the regime's ultimate form of protection, guaranteeing its survival in a highly malign world. North Korea's leaders regard nuclear weapons as the "absolute weapon," without which the regime would be inherently vulnerable. Kim Jong-un with the nuclear weapons has the power to withstand every pressure, and to impose his will on the north Korean internal system.

The second strategic objective of north Korean regimes is offensive use of nuclear weapons. At the military level, it is important to note that north Korea can use nuclear weapons as a instrument for a 'coercion'. Assuming that North Korean nuclear and missile assets continue to mature, north Korea could begin to see their nuclear weapons as a means to compel other states to shift their policies toward North Korea. North Korea would be able to advance or achieve goals that would otherwise be beyond its reach, and tolerate levels of risk well beyond present levels, thereby diluting or undermining US deterrence pledges.²⁷⁾

The most dangerous, but not to be excluded, north Korean strategic objective is an extreme offensive and adventuristic military use of nuclear weapon in order to accomplish 'reunifying by military means'. Pentagon says north Korea ultimately seeks the capability to strike the continental U.S. with a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile, and that nuclear weapons are central to its strategic calculus. "Pyongyang portrays nuclear weapons as its most effective way to deter the threat from the United States," it says. "However, regime propaganda began emphasizing 'final victory' over the United States and Republic of Korea in 2017, suggesting Kim Jong

26) Jonathan Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs: Strategies, Directions, and Prospects," Brookings Institution(2018).

27) Jonathan Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs: Strategies, Directions, and Prospects," Brookings Institution(2018).

Un has larger ambitions, including use of nuclear weapons to deter interference if it attempts to reunify the Korean Peninsula.”²⁸⁾ An senior U.S. administration official offered an explanation for why North Korea pursued nuclear weapons: “North Korea’s goal is not to simply acquire these horrific weapons to maintain the status quo in the Peninsula. It is seeking these weapons in order to fundamentally change that status quo. Its primary goal, as stated … is to reunify [with] South Korea. These weapons are part of the plan to reunify with South Korea.”²⁹⁾ According to this analysis, nuclear weapons will provide a shield that emboldens Kim to seize territory of a conventionally superior adversary. Ultimately, North Korea will pursue an offensive agenda, using its nuclear weapons to deter retaliation as it seeks to end the U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula, reunify it under the supreme leadership of Kim Jong Un, and attain what state propaganda has long called the “final victory.” The National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster stated “classical deterrence theory”, the idea that states respond to threats of denial or punishment, might not apply to Kim. Some key administration officials clearly believe Kim has expansive, revisionist goals and, having acquired a nuclear shield, cannot be deterred from pursuing them.³⁰⁾

Last but not least, a adventuristic strategic culture of north Korea should be taken into consideration. It is not surprising that north Korea can make use of nuclear weapons for its offensive purposes. Especially when it comes to an ideological confrontation, there is no evidence that north Korea gave up its ‘reunification by forces’ illusion. Traditionally north Korea adopted an offensive military strategy. North Korea developed an offensive military doctrine that consists of ideological warfare, surprise attack and combined, two-front warfare which blends the employment of conventional and unconventional forces deployed in South Korean rear areas with rapid and concerted operations to achieve victory.³¹⁾ A key element of north Korean military strategy is the

28) <https://apnews.com/4e3ea3d291aa4d5cb3e2151e3a1c4f2c>

29) Vipin Narang, Ankit Panda, Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North Korea and the Lessons from Pakistan, in: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/20/nuclear-stability-conventional-instability-north-korea-and-lessons-from-pakistan-pub-74787>

30) <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/20/nuclear-stability-conventional-instability-north-korea-and-lessons-from-pakistan-pub-74787>

31) ROK MND, Defense White Paper (Seoul: MND, 2017).

offensive and coercive use of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan, and US in Pacific, and against the US mainland. To this end North Korea has focused on the development of weapons capable of reaching the continental US, as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles. North Korean military strategy appears to have moved beyond solely viewing them as political tools, to strategic deterrent capabilities designed to inflict unacceptable losses on attacking forces. Some missile exercises suggest possible views of the wartime use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve a range of strategic, operational and 'battlefield' effects.³²⁾ Finally, there is not reliable evidence that North Korea altered this classic strategy to reunify by military means.

4. North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

Unlike other nuclear-armed states, North Korea has not published a clear official statement setting out its nuclear doctrine, the circumstances under which it would launch a strike. North Korea proclaims that it will employ nuclear weapons only to defend its regime and to deter and retaliate against aggression similar to other nuclear states. 'Laws on Consolidating position of nuclear weapons state for self-defense', announced in April 2013, tells that the nuclear weapons are just means for defense and serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy and dealing deadly retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression.³³⁾ The North Korean sources are but not reliable. Many North Korean papers and statements seem more rhetoric than credible strategic intention. It is uncertain whether North Korea actually has the considerable nuclear capabilities and strategic choices as officially declared. This kind of attitude of North Korea leaves us numerous questions about its intent and its capabilities.

Based on strategic objectives analyzed on a previous chapter, we can come to a shared

32) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula* (London: IISS, 2018), pp. 12-13.

33) www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201304/news01/20130401-25ee.html

consensus that deterrence is the primary rationale for north Korean leadership. According to Vipin Narang, Professor MIT, small nuclear powers have essentially adopted one of four alternative strategies. Catalytic, assured strategic retaliation and asymmetric escalation.³⁴⁾ First, Catalytic is designed to exploit the specter of nuclear war to draw in one or more great powers during crises to restore stability. In the case of north Korea, this strategy would require North Korea to demonstrate that it could cross the nuclear threshold and raise the regional costs of a potential conflict. The main shortcoming of this strategy is that it is essentially a gamble on third-party intentions. Narang's argument that North Korean nuclear strategy would be primarily intended to catalyze Chinese intervention in a conflict on its behalf is but problematic. In the context of contemporary Sino-North Korean relations, a culture of political and military self-reliance would be unlikely to allow it to pursue a deliberate strategy of dependence.³⁵⁾ The nature of the patron-client relationship between China and North Korea is simply too different; North Korea does not seek reliance on an outside power for its security.³⁶⁾ Second, Assured strategic retaliation is aimed at deterring regime threatening attacks outside the world. It depends on developing survivable second strike nuclear forces that can credibly hold at risk an enemy's strategic targets and impose unacceptable costs.³⁷⁾ According to Narang, this strategy calls for a larger arsenal than what is minimally necessary in catalytic deterrence. The main problem is a credibility gap for deterring lower levels of war against conventionally superior, nuclear armed enemies. Third, the most robust nuclear strategy, according to Narang, is a asymmetric escalation strategy. This is intended to offset conventional inferiority by threatening to use nuclear weapons first on the battlefield rather than solely relying on blunt threats against strategic target.³⁸⁾ The distinguishing characteristic is the addition of so called

34) Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 14-23.

35) Jane Perlez, "Chinese Annoyance With North Korea Bubbles to the Surface," *New York Times*, December 20, 2014 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/chinese-annoyance-with-north-korea-bubbles-to-the-surface.html?_r=0

36) Van Jackson, *Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Korea's Nuclear Futures* (Washington D. C.: USKI, 2012), pp. 8-9.

37) Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, pp. 14-23.

38) Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, pp. 14-23.

tactical weapons that can be used against opposing forces rather than relying on blunt retaliatory threats against major strategic centers. Given North Korea's current existing level of capabilities, north Korea appears focused principally on assured retaliation, which is a far more realistic option in peninsular than seeking to target the US.

In the context of Narang's 3 nuclear alternatives, Shane Smith added one more alternative so called 'political and diplomatic strategy', and conceptualized north Korea's nuclear strategy as a "Evolving Nuclear Strategy".³⁹⁾ He argues that north Korea's behavior at times exhibits elements from all four alternatives, and the one it adopts in the future may in fact be a hybrid. One reading of the limited evidence, however, suggests that its nuclear strategy has evolved over three decades and is on an ambitious and dangerous path.⁴⁰⁾ In the past, North Korea may have valued political and diplomatic goals above others.

Nuclear Model	Past	Present	Emerging	Over the Horizon
Political/Diplomatic	Trade elements of unproven program for concessions - 1994 Agreed Framework - Six Party Talks - Fuel and Food Aid (Yongbyon)			
Catalytic		Demonstrated technical means but still ambiguous operations capability; over-the-top threats during crises to "catalyze" US and Chinese intermediation		
Assured Strategic Retaliation			Developing survivable strike capabilities targeting ROK, Japanese and US cities	
War-fighting Strategy				Parallel Develop Economy and N and the April 1 Consolidating P Nuclear Weapon

[Table 3] North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy

Sources: Shane Smith, *North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy* (Washington D. C: USKI, 2015), p. 18.

Smith argues that north Korea has over the past few years claimed that its nuclear program is not a bargaining chip. North Korea officially stated that "nuclear weapons

39) Shane Smith, *North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy* (Washington D. C: USKI, 2015), p. 18.

40) Smith, *North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy*, p. 18.

of Songun Korea are not goods for getting US dollars and they are neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings... the nation's life [and treasure] which can never be abandoned." As north Korea has more robust and improved its capability till 2017, north Korea appears to have higher ambitions for its nuclear program that would allow it to move beyond a catalytic strategy to an assured retaliation doctrine. North Korea is to Smith' opinion pursuing more capable, longer-range missiles that can strike key targets in South Korea, Japan and the United States. More serious is that those delivery systems are being designed with survivability. Many Missiles are believed to be mobile and can exploit North Korea's mountainous terrain, underground facilities to protect them from a first strike. There is many evidence that north Korea is constructing silos and submarine launch technologies, to increase survivability.⁴¹⁾ One potential hurdle facing the North is that a war-fighting strategy would require a sophisticated command and control system that would likely entail a high-alert status, some pre-delegated authority and integration of nuclear forces into its broader military doctrine.⁴²⁾ Building a robust nuclear arsenal into a broader military doctrine for a warfighting strategy would be expensive, technologically difficult and risky. Building and maintaining multiple weapons systems necessary to integrate them into a broader military doctrine would be costly. Adopting a war-fighting strategy would come with significant risks. North Korea may be willing to accept these costs and risks, but it is unclear whether it can ever overcome the inherent obstacles of this strategy, even if it aspires to develop such capabilities.⁴³⁾

Despite all of these argumentations, not everyone does not agree with this. Many warns that north Korea is not rational. North Korea might adopt an irrational option than we expect. Accordingly most experts think that in addition to the regime survival purposes, north Korea would employ nuclear weapons for various political and military purposes in many situations.⁴⁴⁾ A korean expert, Park Chang Kwon, who has observed

41) Terence Roehrig, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programm," in: Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age* (Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 92-95.

42) Smith, *North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy*, pp. 15-17.

43) Smith, *North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy*, pp. 15-17.

44) ROK MND, 2016 Defense White Paper (Yongsan: MND, 2016).

and analyzed the north Korean nuclear strategy and capabilities for a long time argued that north Korea will use its nuclear weapons for various purposes using following different strategies.⁴⁵⁾ The aggressive scenario seems not likely and feasible, but the possibility is not excluded, when it comes to north Korea.

- make use of nuclear first-use to win in the war as Russia nuclear doctrine describes
- utilizes nuclear blackmail or pursue escalation dominance in a local conflict with the strategy of escalation to de-escalate
- applies 'de facto and fait accompli' strategy with nuclear brinkmanship in an all out war or a local provocation
- seeks to decouple to interrupt US-ROK alliance and thus to prevent proper US support to south Korea
- undertakes EMP attacks to neutralize C3 system and war infrastructure
- develops and exploits tactical nuclear weapons for operational use in the battle field
- undertakes the first nuclear action in reciprocal fear of surprise attack or misperception and miscalculation
- pursues coercive diplomacy with nuclear shadow during peace time and crisis

5. conclusions

North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a serious challenge to South Korea and Japan. Kim has expanded ballistic missiles that can reach more US and allied targets in South Korea. Since 2016, North Korea has successfully conducted multiple submarine launched ballistic missile tests, and tested more than two dozen theater ballistic missiles. North Korea is finally developed a ICBM that can deliver a nuclear warhead to the US mainland. North Korea seems to have had a clear strategic objective, developing the ability to deliver a missile-based nuclear warhead to North America.

45) Park Chang Kwon, "North Korean Nuclear Capabilities and Strategies," Presentation Proceeding at International Seminar for RINSA and Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (May 2018).

This research leads to following conclusion based on the analysis of the north Korea's nuclear capabilities and strategic possible strategic paths. This research assumed that north Korea's current and future nuclear alternatives proposed in this paper are based on north Korea's advancement of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Each nuclear and missile program scenario makes different assumptions about how far North Korea might go, but even the minimal modernization scenario makes North Korean anti-access operations and a wartime strategy of asymmetric escalation. North Korea will seek an assured retaliation capability, a nuclear deterrent capable of surviving any alliance first strike. North Korea's nuclear strategy is to achieve assured second strike capability, in order to credibly threaten the risk of nuclear escalation. Its goal is to achieve more survivable forces through solid fuel propellant, submarines, mobile launchers, and bases near the Chinese border that enhance its ability to threaten the risk of drawing China into a nuclear conflict. North Korea's ability to actually adopt this strategy depends on the survivability of its nuclear arsenal, which in turn depends partly on how many nuclear weapons and delivery systems it develops. In spite of this, it is not excluded that north Korea will adopt a offensive use of nuclear weapons in order to reunify the korean peninsula, considering north Korea's irrational and adventuristic strategic culture and ideological indoctrination,

Facing the maximum pressure and engagement campaign in 2017 north Korea now entered a negotiation arena with US. It is not clear whether north Korea will give up its all missile capabilities and nuclear weapons in the end. Despite all the dialogues and negotiations, maintaining nuclear arsenals will remain as north Korean top national security. This is why we should constantly keep our eye on how north Korea's nuclear capability and strategy is evolving. Even in the process of 'complete denuclearization' based on a 'FFID', serious countermeasures have to be prepared in case it fails.