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## 연구윤리 부정행위 공지

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- 임윤갑, 러시아-터키, 새로운 지역 경쟁 구도의 형성과 전망(PKO 저널 제23호, 2021년 12월) - 표절
- 임윤갑, 유엔 평화유지 활동에서 역정보의 역할과 대응방향(PKO 저널 제26호, 2023년 6월) - 표절

ROK PKO Center announces a case of academic misconduct due to plagiarism. The violation was identified through the KNDU Research Ethics Committee's in-depth investigation process. As a result, the following paper has been confirmed as plagiarized and permanently deleted. and strict and fair follow-up measures were carried out.

- Yoonkap Lim, Russia-Turkey, A Prospects on the New Competing Dynamics(PKO Journal Vol.23, December 2021) - Plagiarism
- Yoonkap Lim, How to Respond to Disinformation and Misinformation in UN PKO(PKO Journal Vol.26, June 2023) - Plagiarism



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# Analysis of UNIFIL Peacekeeping- Intelligence Staff's Responses to the Challenges Arising from the Israel-Hamas War 2023-2024

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## ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the response of Peacekeeping–Intelligence (PKI) staff at the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to the challenges they faced since the onset of the Israel– Hamas war on October 7, 2023. Although the war did not occur within UNIFIL’s Area of Operations (AO), its impact was immediate and significant, resulting in continuous deterioration due to exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah. During this period, the staff continuously examined and attempted to apply guidance from key documents published by the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), including the “UN PKI Policy” and the *UN Military PKI Handbook*.

For a comprehensive understanding of how UNIFIL PKI staff have tackled the challenges, the analysis part of this study is structured around the four steps of the PKI cycle: direction, acquisition, analysis, and dissemination. Each section of the analysis defines the meaning of its respective step, presents the identified challenges in the PKI implementation process at UNIFIL, examines the responses by UNIFIL PKI staff, and provides lessons learned and suggestions for the future.

Key findings show that the guidance in the aforementioned documents was clear but often ignored in practice. In the context of UN peacekeeping operations, the significance of information acquisition by UN soldiers’ patrols and through Open–Source Intelligence (OSINT) was evident. Additionally, while the production of analysis is a key part of PKI implementation, the study highlighted the vital importance of the processes preceding analysis, including collation, and those following it, such as delivering easily understandable reporting, especially during high–tempo situation.

**Keyword:** UNIFIL, Peacekeeping–Intelligence, Intelligence cycle, Israel– Hamas war

# Analysis of UNIFIL Peacekeeping-Intelligence Staff's Responses to the Challenges Arising from the Israel-Hamas War 2023-2024

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## I. Introduction

### 1. Purpose of the Study

This study analyzes how Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) staff at the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have addressed the challenges they faced throughout the process of PKI implementation since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war on 7 October 2023.

Although the Israel-Hamas war did not occur within the UNIFIL Area of Operations (AO), its impact on UNIFIL was immediate, significant, and continuous. The situation across the UNIFIL AO deteriorated due to the ongoing exchange of fire between two adversaries, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah, stationed in Lebanon. Additionally, given Hezbollah's identity as an ally of Hamas and its support from Iran, the possibility of escalation into the UNIFIL AO has steadily increased. Consequently, right after the Israel-Hamas war began, UNIFIL activated its crisis management

mechanism as the situation exceeded the scope of normal preparedness<sup>1)</sup>. As of 1 August 2024, the crisis management system has persisted for over ten months.

This protracted crisis situation has been challenging for all UNIFIL members, regardless of their entity. Like other entities, the PKI staff faced various new challenges and were required to proactively address them. During this period, the staff continuously examined and attempted to apply guidance from key documents published by the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), including the “UN PKI Policy” and the *UN Military PKI Handbook*, to address the complexities of the situation effectively. Based on the author's firsthand experience taking part in this process, this study delves into the challenges and responses experienced by the UNIFIL PKI staff.

## 2. Framework for the Analysis: Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle


The PKI cycle is an essential tool for PKI practitioners and acts as the process for generating intelligence outcomes. The *UN Military PKI Handbook* published in 2019, as shown in the <Figure 1>, outlines how the PKI staff receives directives from their commander, gathers the necessary information, analyzes this information to produce intelligence, and subsequently distributes this intelligence to recipients, including the commander<sup>2)</sup>. Following these four steps in the cycle, the analysis part of this study consists of four sections. Each section is commonly structured to first define the meaning of each step and present the identified challenges in the process of PKI implementation at UNIFIL. It then examines the responses by UNIFIL PKI staff to address these challenges. Finally, each section provides lessons learned throughout

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1) UNIFIL Standard Operating Procedure (Unclassified), “Crisis Management” (Naqoura: UNIFIL Joint Operations Center, 2021), p. 7.

2) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence* (New York: UN Department of Peace Operations, 2019), p. 22.

the challenges and responses and suggests the way ahead. This structured approach provides a comprehensive understanding of how UNIFIL PKI staff have tackled the challenges encountered during the implementation of PKI since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war.



**<Picture 1> UN PKI Cycle based on the UN Military PKI Handbook published in 2019**

Source: UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 5.

## II. CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES IN EACH STEP OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING-INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

### 1. Direction

“Direction refers to the process of identifying questions that need to be answered<sup>3)</sup>.”

3) UN Policy, “Peacekeeping-Intelligence” (New York: UN Department of Peace Operations, 2019), p. 6.

## A. Definition of Direction and Identified Challenges

Direction in UN PKI involves the determination of Intelligence Requirements (IRs), issuance of orders and requests to acquisition assets, and maintaining a continuous check on the productivity of such assets. Clear direction from the commander is the starting point for the PKI Cycle. It outlines what the commander wants to know and ensures that the PKI staff have a clear focus for their acquisition efforts. However, commanders often are not trained in PKI techniques and procedures, so it falls to the PKI staff to draw IRs from the commanders' concerns and operational priorities<sup>4)</sup>.

Since the onset of the Israel-Hams war, the situation has been unprecedented for everyone in UNIFIL, including the PKI staff and the Force Commander/ Head of Mission. A primary challenge during the direction step was identifying the right questions necessary to effectively address these challenging situation.

## B. Responses to Address Challenges

### 1) Assessing Battle Damage and Enhancing Situational Awareness

The first identified IR was to assess battle damage and enhance situational awareness in the UNIFIL AO following the Israel-Hamas war. After the war, kinetic military engagements between Lebanon and Israel caused extensive damage within the UNIFIL AO. A considerable number of incidents impacted civilian villages and UN positions along the Blue Line. In line with this need, this battle damage assessment was crucial to:

- Provide early warnings of threats to the lives of UN personnel, both uniformed and civilian.
- Provide early warnings of threats to the lives of the local population,

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4) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, pp. 25-27.

in support of the protection of civilians<sup>5)</sup>. Therefore, it was a top priority for UNIFIL to ensure an accurate, data-driven compilation and assessment of all areas affected by battle damage, ensuring these areas were accurately evaluated and documented. This comprehensive situational awareness is crucial for informing current UNIFIL operational activities and enhancing the protection of both UN personnel and civilians.

## 2) Assessing the Possibility of Escalation

The second identified IR was to assess the potential escalation of the situation in Israel into an Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanese territory. Since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war, tensions between Israel and Hezbollah have escalated, marked by near-daily cross-border exchanges of fire. This increased hostility, along with Hezbollah's strategic alignment with Iran, suggests a readiness for a more significant escalation in the UNIFIL AO. Although neither side might seek full-scale war, the risk of escalation through miscalculations or provocations remains high. In this context, it was crucial for UNIFIL to:

- Enhance decision-makers' understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape.
- Facilitate the identification of risks and opportunities for the protection of UN personnel and civilians within the scope of the mandate<sup>6)</sup>.

While the first identified IR, focusing on assessing battle damage and enhancing situational awareness, was more relevant to current operations, this second IR is crucial for the planning process due to its

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5) *Ibid.*, p. 6.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 5.

nature of forward-looking PKI assessments. Decision-makers need to understand the potential for escalation in advance to make informed decisions effectively<sup>7)</sup>.

## C. Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

### 1) Prompt Establishment of Direction

Promptly establishing clear direction is crucial. Commanders with access to quality PKI can take appropriate actions, and it is essential for PKI staff to engage in discussions with their commanders, asking critical questions such as:

- What knowledge is necessary to effectively carry out the mandate, mission, or operational tasks, particularly concerning the safety of UN personnel and civilians?
- Which specific threats to the mandate or operational tasks affecting the safety of UN personnel and civilians need to be addressed by PKI?
- At what times, in which locations, and in what formats (such as a written report or briefing) do you require the intelligence to be delivered?
- Which regions need to be focused on for intelligence acquisition?<sup>8)</sup>

By systematically addressing these questions, PKI staff can enhance commanders' situational awareness and improve decision-making processes, ensuring more effective mission outcomes.

### 2) Application of Area of Peacekeeping-Intelligence Interest (APII)

Focusing on the aforementioned question, "Which regions need to

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7) *Ibid.*, p. 102.

8) *Ibid.*, p. 26.

be focused on for intelligence acquisition?”, recognizing the Area of Peacekeeping-Intelligence Interest (APII) is essential. The APII refers to regions where a commander needs PKI about various factors and developments that could impact the success of current or future operations.<sup>9)</sup> This ensures that the right questions are asked and that information acquisition efforts are effectively targeted. UNIFIL’s APII extends beyond its immediate AO to include not only Lebanon and Israel but also the occupied West Bank and Gaza, Syria, Iran, and the Mediterranean Sea between Cyprus and Lebanon. Monitoring efforts also encompass issues in the Gulf States and Yemen that could impact Lebanon. The focus is on monitoring activities of various actors that may influence mandate implementation and pose threats to UNIFIL.

Before the Israel-Hamas war, it was common to dismiss concerns about regions outside southern Lebanon with the excuse, “It’s outside UNIFIL’s AO, so it’s not PKI staff’s responsibility.” However, this rationale is no longer acceptable following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, which significantly impacts UNIFIL. By effectively applying the APII, commanders can stay informed of developments that may influence their operations, enhancing situational awareness and operational readiness.

## 2. Acquisition

“Every soldier is a sensor. It is key to the success of UN military information acquisition<sup>10)</sup>.”

### A. Definition of Acquisition and Identified Challenges

9) *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 38.

10) *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Acquisition refers to the process of obtaining data and information for analysis. Effective acquisition requires careful direction and planning to ensure resources are utilized efficiently to meet IRs<sup>11)</sup>. As such, acquisition is inherently linked to direction, with the two processes being closely interdependent<sup>12)</sup>. Thus, the challenges in acquisition directly relate to the questions identified in the direction step.

The first challenge emerges because, despite the need for assessing battle damage and enhancing situational awareness in the AO, the primary acquisition asset, UNIFIL reconnaissance helicopters, became unavailable due to air threats. The second challenge is that, despite the requirement to assess the influence of the Israel-Hamas war on Israeli territory, UNIFIL PKI staff were limited to using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) due to a lack of other suitable acquisition assets.

## B. Responses to Address Challenges

### 1) Patrol Reports by UN Soldiers After Reconnaissance Flight Suspensions

Before the Israel-Hamas war, it was evident that aerial imagery collected through reconnaissance flights by the Italian rotary wing unit assigned to UNIFIL was both an effective and efficient asset for situational awareness within the AO and near the Blue Line. Regular updates from these reconnaissance flights allowed for the analysis of changes in the AO. However, all reconnaissance flights were suspended due to the air threat, subsequently significantly impacting situational awareness.

To address this gap, patrol reports by UN soldiers became an alternative method for acquiring information for situational awareness

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11) *Ibid.*, p. 6.

12) *Ibid.*, p. 38.

in the UNIFIL AO. This approach was essentially a return to basics. The *UN Military PKI Handbook* states, “In addition to UN soldiers, there may be specialist acquisition capabilities deployed to the UN mission. While all of these assets enhance information acquisition capability, it is important to remember that the information soldiers acquire remains of vital importance<sup>13)</sup>.” It emphasizes that in the context of UN missions, the most readily available and best military acquisition capability is their personnel<sup>14)</sup>.

To implement this, operations staff at UNIFIL, in close coordination with PKI staff, issued tasking orders. Following the tasking orders, subordinate units were tasked to ensure that patrol units incorporate specific patrols focusing on battle damage assessment into their patrol schedules. It is important to note that acquisition is not just a PKI function; it requires coordination and liaison with operations staff, who often have tasking authority over patrol missions<sup>15)</sup>.

Meanwhile, the PKI staff at force headquarters provided subordinate units with a list of villages prioritized for data collection. To facilitate reporting, they also provided a checklist-style template for patrol reports. Concurrently, the PKI staff at subordinate units were to liaise with their counterpart at force headquarters for the timely compilation and submission of assessment reports.

## 2) Overcoming Challenges in Information Acquisition through OSINT

While patrols addressed the first challenge, the second challenge concerning the possibility of the Israel-Hamas war escalating into an

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13) *Ibid.*, p. 39.

14) *Ibid.*, p. 38.

15) *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanese territory posed difficulties due to its geographical complexity. Although UNIFIL's mandate is to monitor the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel<sup>16)</sup>, most of its forces are stationed on the Lebanese side. The only UNIFIL members on the Israeli side are staff officers in the Liaison Branch. These officers, limited in number and stationed just in northern Israel, focus on liaison duties rather than collecting information. These circumstances make effective information acquisition about the Israeli situation a longstanding challenge for UNIFIL, even before the Israel-Hamas war.

Given this context, OSINT became nearly the sole source of information to address the second challenge. OSINT, which includes publicly accessible sources such as radio, television, the internet, press, and other unclassified data, is advantageous due to its ease of accessibility, usability, and the ease with which it can be shared<sup>17)</sup>. However, the challenge of insufficient manpower to analyze OSINT persisted. To address this, a staff officer from the Assessment Team at UN headquarters was augmented as an OSINT analyst. This analyst was tasked with providing tailored OSINT in response to *ad hoc* requests from other analysts and producing a Daily OSINT Update focused on the military developments in Israel. This augmentation from UN headquarters highlights the importance of OSINT in light of the reality UNIFIL was facing.

The addition of the OSINT analyst significantly enhanced UNIFIL's capacity to acquire information about the potential escalation of the Israel-Hamas war into a broader conflict with Hezbollah, utilizing OSINT and addressing a critical gap caused by the shortage of

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16) UNSCR 1701, S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006, *para.* 8.

17) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 44.

intelligence staff.

## C. Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

### 1) Enhancing Patrol Effectiveness through Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support

The phrase “every soldier is an acquisition sensor” underscores the significance of soldiers gathering information during their various activities such as patrolling, manning observation posts, conducting base security patrols, and routine operations<sup>18)</sup>. These patrols are essential for maintaining situational awareness. However, to enhance the effectiveness of information acquisition, it is necessary to provide the units and soldiers conducting patrols on the ground with appropriate support from PKI. To this end, the UN Military PKI Handbook outlines specific and practical support measures as follows: Prior to any patrol leaving a UN base, PKI staff must provide its leaders with comprehensive and up-to-date information. This briefing should include recent and significant activities in the patrol area and any new PKI reports relevant to the mission. A detailed terrain briefing is crucial, outlining obstacles, ideal routes to the objective, areas offering cover and concealment, and potential uses of these features by both friendly and threat actors. The briefing should also discuss the limits of UN observation capabilities and their implications for patrol vulnerabilities, including areas where the patrol may be canalized or need to slow down.

Furthermore, understanding the human terrain is critical. This includes identifying locations of supportive and hostile actors, highlighting the capabilities, intentions, and tactics of threat actors,

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18) *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

and pinpointing key leaders and areas likely to support or oppose the UN. Patrol leaders must be informed of the implications of this information, including where, how, and when the patrol is most likely to be targeted.

Additionally, the information terrain must be addressed, identifying communication blackspots and understanding their impact on both the patrol and potential threat actors. Detailed profiles of specific threat actors should also be provided, including their likely reactions to the patrol and their most probable and dangerous actions against the UN patrol.

Throughout the briefing, patrol leaders should have the opportunity to ask questions to clarify any uncertainties. PKI staff should outline the patrol's intelligence requirements and the key leaders they should engage with during their mission. Upon the patrol's return, leaders are required to report back to PKI staff for a debrief to ensure all gathered information is accounted for and assessed.

By ensuring that patrol leaders receive comprehensive and actionable intelligence before their missions, the effectiveness of patrols in acquiring valuable information and maintaining situational awareness is significantly enhanced<sup>19)</sup>.

## 2) Enhancing OSINT Capabilities through Specialized Training

To bolster OSINT capabilities within UNIFIL, providing specialized training to personnel is paramount. Traditionally, OSINT was undervalued due to its non-secretive nature. However, modern technology and new media have shifted this perspective, emphasizing OSINT's strategic importance in the PKI domain. OSINT now plays a

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19) *Ibid.*, p. 101.

crucial role in the UN's information acquisition, with information from public sources such as social media and news outlets proving invaluable for understanding social dynamics and strategic communications<sup>20</sup>. Meanwhile, it is necessary to take measures to overcome inherent disadvantages of OSINT, such as the difficulty of source evaluation and verification, and the ease with which deception can be introduced into open sources.

In this context, adequate training is the prerequisite for effective OSINT use. Regularly, UNIFIL sends PKI staff to three key training courses organized by the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team (PICT) at UN headquarters and conducted at the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda: the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Course, the Human Peacekeeping-Intelligence Course, and the Open-Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence Course. Before the Israel-Hamas war, there were no significant differences in the importance of each course to the UNIFIL PKI staff. However, since the Israel-Hamas war, the Open-Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence Course has become especially crucial in addressing the specific challenges of OSINT. This course equips staff with the necessary skills to accurately evaluate and verify information from publicly accessible sources, which is essential due to the potential for deception. Furthermore, it is noted that the UN published guideline stipulate: Trained open-source PKI personnel, who have the necessary skills and experience to efficiently locate required information promptly, should carry out open-source PKI activities whenever feasible. Additionally, integrating open-source PKI specialists within the PKI entities of mission components is strongly recommended

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20) Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, "Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine" (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016), pp. 10-11.

whenever possible<sup>21)</sup>.

Consequently, it is advisable that personnel undergo this training before deployment, or alternatively, include OSINT-trained specialists in the team to enhance the effectiveness and reliability of intelligence activities in UNIFIL.

### 3. Analysis

“Collation is the foundation of the Analysis stage<sup>22)</sup>.”

#### A. Definition and Identified Challenge

According to the current “UN PKI Policy,” analysis within PKI is defined as a methodical deconstruction of information into its core elements. This process is systematically structured, focusing on a detailed examination of each element to identify how they relate to one another. It also involves applying logical reasoning to understand both the individual parts and their significance within the larger context<sup>23)</sup>. Therefore, the analysis process includes several sequences such as review, collation, evaluation, integration, and interpretation<sup>24)</sup>.

This definition reinforces that analysis is primarily a process-oriented approach, rather than being solely focused on the results or products it yields. It is noted that the *UN Military PKI Handbook* identifies collation as a crucial and foundational sequence. Collation involves processes for collecting, documenting,

21) UN Guidelines, “Open-Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence” (New York: UN Department of Peace Operations, 2022), p. 9.

22) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 47.

23) UN Policy, “Peacekeeping-Intelligence,” p. 6.

24) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, pp. 23-24.

and organizing all gathered information<sup>25)</sup>. This indicates that the effectiveness of intelligence analysis is greatly influenced by the ability to efficiently gather, organize, and synthesize data. Thus, it implies that problems in the sequence of collation can significantly impact the quality and usefulness of the intelligence analysis.

In line with these findings, it is noteworthy that the challenge in the analysis process arose during the collation stage. This challenge stemmed from the fact that although collation is a key preliminary step in analysis, there is typically more focus on the end results or products rather than on the process itself. As a result, this focus shift can lead to undervaluing the importance of collation. Conversely, this challenge underscores the crucial role that collation plays in shaping the analytical outcome.

## **B. Response to Address Challenge**

The importance of collation is highlighted for several reasons. All information should be cross-referenced to related materials in the database to support the identification of related intelligence and the development of trend analysis. And, time and effort can be saved by continuously updating databases, leading to more efficient management and quicker access to analyzed data.

Now, it is obvious that the use of databases is critical for collation. A database serves as a centralized system that enhances the maintenance and operation of data through information technology, improving accessibility and presentation. It enables effective recording, indexing, and retrieval of reports, ensuring that critical information is highlighted and easily accessible. This supports effective and efficient analysis based on cross-referencing, which is

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25) *Ibid.* p. 47.

essential for reliable and credible intelligence productions<sup>26)</sup>.

Meanwhile, at UNIFIL, the Intelligence Network Database (INDB), a web-based mapping application, supports the analytical processes and services for the PKI staff. It is designed to collate various types of information, facilitating the storage of information and aiding analysis. Collators play a crucial role in ensuring that every piece of relevant information is registered, sorted, and recorded, allowing analysts to retrieve information on demand.

However, at UNIFIL, in the absence of dedicated collators, analysts must also perform the roles of collators. As a result, analysts often find themselves too busy to update the INDB regularly. Given that keeping the INDB updated is vital for effective and efficient analysis, Senior PKI staff officers have emphasized the importance of continuous updates to the analysts as follows:

- Updating the INDB involves more than just logging raw data, such as recording fire trajectories in Excel sheets.
- Updates should be conducted through a careful collation process by experienced analysts.
- Regular updates are manageable; however, postponing updates can be overwhelming.

Additionally, during the weekly intelligence staff meetings held every Monday morning, analysts are required to report on the status of the INDB updates. This process ensures that the INDB is continually updated by monitoring the update status, which can also bring about resistance from busy analysts. However, it is a necessary and, albeit painful, process to make analysts aware of the importance of collation and to ensure that the INDB is continuously updated, overcoming these challenges.

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26) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

### C. Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

While collation is recognized as a key preliminary step in analysis, its importance is often undervalued, not just in UNIFIL but as a common issue across peacekeeping operations (PKOs). This problem was particularly highlighted under the significant conditions of the Israel-Hamas war, requiring rigorous PKI efforts. Furthermore, the research by the International Peace Institute, based on interviews with PKI staff during various UN PKO field mission visits, consistently indicates that:

- All analysts agree on the need for a more rigorous and standardized approach to managing databases.
- The ongoing challenge is to improve database management to ensure all peacekeeping components have timely and reliable access to information<sup>27)</sup>.

Moreover, the *UN Military PKI Handbook* starkly outlines the difficulties in proper collation:


“Collation tends to be the work of junior staff; often they are inexperienced and unfamiliar with the staff with whom they are working. Busy Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence officers can also easily overlook its supervision; thus, there is a danger that the collation system will fail. It is important that it is supervised closely and maintained conscientiously if it is to be effective<sup>28)</sup>.”

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27) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, “Finding the UN Way on Peacekeeping-Intelligence” (New York: International Peace Institute, 2020), pp. 16-17.

28) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 48.

Ironically, while recognizing these issues and suggesting remedies, the *UN Military PKI Handbook* made a significant oversight. It merged collation and analysis into a single step, contrary to the “UN PKI Policy”’s five-step cycle as shown in the <Figure 3>. It is noted that the United States’ Joint Intelligence designates a collation step separately under the title of ‘Process and Exploitation<sup>29)</sup>’. This reveals that, despite its importance, the Handbook initially undervalued collation<sup>30)</sup>.



Source: UN Policy, “Peacekeeping-Intelligence,” p. 5.; UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 22.

Fortunately, throughout 2023, revisions to the *UN Military PKI Handbook* published in 2019 were carried out, resulting in significant changes. The revised Handbook now acknowledges the importance of collation, separating it as an independent step from analysis in the PKI cycle. This adjustment highlights a shift towards recognizing the critical role of thorough and effective collation in the intelligence process.

29) US Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), p. 1-6.

30) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 22.

## 4. Dissemination

“Peacekeeping–intelligence disseminated that cannot be understood has no value<sup>31)</sup>.”

### A. Definition and Identified Challenge

The final step of the PKI Cycle is Dissemination. This phase involves the transmission of PKI to mission decision-makers and other pertinent personnel<sup>32)</sup>. Dissemination must ensure that the intelligence is provided to the right people, at the appropriate time, and in the necessary quantity and quality. Regarding dissemination, the *UN Military PKI Handbook* emphasizes two key points:

- PKI that is not distributed holds no value.
- PKI that is reported but not understood is also worthless<sup>33)</sup>.

The first point highlights the importance of ensuring that PKI is effectively distributed, while the second underscores the necessity of clarity and comprehensibility in the reporting stage.

Since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war, a significant challenge at UNIFIL related to dissemination that PKI staff faced was specifically concerning the clarity and comprehensibility of the disseminated PKI. This challenge has become particularly prominent due to the heightened frequency and importance of disseminating PKI outcomes to decision-makers at UNIFIL. Consequently, it underscores the critical need for ensuring that the essential content of PKI is conveyed effectively and efficiently to decision-makers.

31) *Ibid.*, p. 66.


32) UN Policy, “Peacekeeping–Intelligence,” p. 7.

33) UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping–Intelligence*, p. 66.

## B. Response to Address Challenge

In the context of the ongoing crisis situation, verbal briefings utilizing concise Picture Peacekeeping-Intelligence Summaries (PICINTSUM), as shown in the <Figure 3>, which include a map, intelligence related to the map, and an assessment, proved more effective due to their timeliness and focus on significant issues. This approach also enabled the briefer to get immediate feedback and further guidance. It also became clear that commanders often lack the time for lengthy documents or detailed briefings, especially during a crisis characterized by its high tempo. Under these circumstances, for effective dissemination, three key attributes were emphasized:

- Timeliness: PKI must be delivered promptly.
- Relevance: PKI should meet the specific needs of the recipients, namely decision-makers.



Source: UN Handbook, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, p. 71.

- Brevity: Reports must be concise yet comprehensive enough to include all necessary information.

Especially, it was essential to strive for brevity in both briefings and reports, utilizing all available means, including standard formats, visual aids, maps, drawings, and diagrams. In response, efforts were made to ensure that PKI outcomes, such as the PICINTSUM, were provided in a format that recipients readily understand<sup>34)</sup>. Therefore, PKI staff focused on enhancing the comprehensibility of verbal briefings and clarifying the intelligence being discussed. Effective dissemination depends on presenting the most information in the fewest possible words, particularly in a time-limited conflict context.

### **C. Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead**

Ultimately, dissemination should clearly answer the questions, “What does this mean?” and “So what?” without leaving any ambiguities for decision-makers. This was the most significant lesson learned by PKI staff during the challenging dissemination processes throughout the Israel-Hamas war. For such effective dissemination, continuous training is necessary. When preparing for the dissemination of intelligence outcomes to decision-makers, especially through verbal briefings, the following checklist should be considered:

- Ensure the briefing is delivered in the language the audience understands.
- Assess the audience's knowledge level on the subject to determine the amount of detail or background information needed.
- Allocate time for the briefing and ensure the message is concise and within the time limit to avoid overrunning and potentially not being

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34) *Ibid.*, p. 67.

asked to brief again. Share only what the audience needs to know.

- Anticipate likely questions and prepare responses based on the commander's requirements.
- Identify and prepare the necessary visual aids for the briefing.
- Ensure the briefing is compatible with the technology available in the briefing room<sup>35)</sup>.

In sum, for effective dissemination, briefings, whether spoken or written, must be clear, relevant, and concise. The shorter a message or briefing, the easier it is to remember.

### III. CONCLUSION

It is clear that the rapid circumstantial changes, while challenging, provide opportunities to advance beyond the status quo towards evolutionary next steps when successfully addressed. The outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war represented such a drastic change, posing significant challenges to the UNIFIL PKI staff. Aligning with these observations, this study examined the responses of the PKI staff at UNIFIL to these challenges across each step of the PKI cycle. Throughout this process, the staff consistently reviewed and effectively applied authoritative documents, such as the “UN PKI Policy” and the *UN Military PKI Handbook*, to manage the complexities of the situation.

This study underscored the critical importance of guidance that, although well-articulated in the aforementioned documents, was often overlooked in practice. In the context of UN PKOs, the significance of information acquisition by UN soldiers and through OSINT was evident. Additionally, while

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35) *Ibid.*

the production of analysis is the outcome of PKI implementation, the study highlighted the vital importance of the processes preceding analysis, including collation, and those following it, such as delivering easily understandable reporting, especially during crises characterized by high-tempo.

With regard to the limitations of this study, while analyzing the challenges and responses of UNIFIL PKI staff within the framework of the UN PKI cycle provided comprehensive insights into all processes involved in PKI implementation, it did not adequately explore overarching issues such as the need for improvements in the organizational structure of PKI staff at UNIFIL. Addressing these structural issues could significantly enhance the effectiveness of the PKI staff in managing challenging situations. In reality, the head of PKI staff at UNIFIL has repeatedly appealed for organizational adjustments, noting that the current structure, designed for peacetime, has struggled under the increased workload and requests during conflict. Future research could significantly contribute to the holistic development of PKI implementation by exploring these issues separately.

Finally, this study concludes by affirming that it cannot be overstated that the successful responses analyzed in this study were supported by the unwavering efforts of every UNIFIL PKI staff member who upheld UN core values: Integrity, Professionalism, and Respect for Diversity. These efforts reflect the UNIFIL PKI staff's commitment to perform their duties steadily, even under the perilous conditions of continuous artillery shelling and airstrikes, demonstrating their Integrity. Additionally, they apply expertise developed in their home countries and work towards consensus despite ongoing arguments, showcasing their Professionalism. Furthermore, this process involves acknowledging that each other's differences are not signs of wrongness and making concerted efforts to reach an agreement, embodying Respect for Diversity. Overall, such commitment fundamentally supports the overall effectiveness of UNIFIL's PKI implementation during these challenging times.

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**해외파병부대 민군작전의 이해와 적용  
- 남수단재건지원단 유엔민군협력을 중심으로 -**

Understanding and application of Civil military  
coordination of oversea dispatch unit.

- Focusing on ROK HMEC UN Civil Military Coordination -

육군 소령 박지원

MAJ Park, Ji Won



## 요약

남수단재건지원단(이하 '한빛부대')은 유엔남수단임무단(이하 'UNMISS')에 소속된 공병부대로 재건지원작전과 민군작전을 수행하며 현지로부터 '신이 내린 선물'이라는 찬사를 받고 있다. 한빛부대에서의 민군작전은 재건지원 과업 수행을 위한 여건조성의 목적으로 수행된다는 특징을 갖는다.

본 연구에서는 한빛부대의 유엔민군협력을 중심으로 해외파병부대 민군작전의 이해와 적용 방향을 제시한다. 교리상 정립된 민군작전과 유엔민군협력을 비교하고 관련 조직을 소개하여 이해를 돕도록 하였으며 유엔임무단 규정에 부합한 유엔민군협력 수행절차를 정립하였다. 또한, 한빛부대의 유엔민군협력 사례를 바탕으로 남수단 작전환경을 고려한 민군협력 수행개념을 제시하여 해외파병부대의 민군협력 적용 방향을 제공한다.

## ABSTRACT

The ROK HMEC South Sudan reconstruction support unit (referred to as "Hanbit Unit") is a horizontal military engineering unit belongs to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (referred to as "UNMISS") and has been praised by local residence as a "gift from God" for its reconstruction support and civil military coordination (referred to as CIMIC"). The CIMIC in Hanbit unit is characterized as creating conditions for the reconstruction support task.

This Study presents the understanding and direction of CIMIC in overseas dispatch unit, focusing on UN CIMIC of Hanbit unit. To help understand, this study compared the doctrines of Civil Military Operation(CMO) with UN CIMIC and introduce relevant organizations, and established procedures for carrying out UN CIMIC in accordance with UN mission regulations. Additionally, it provides a direction for applying CIMIC to oversea dispatch unit by presenting the concept of CIMIC considering the environment of South Sudan based on the UN CIMIC cases of the Hanbit unit.

# 해외파병부대 민군작전의 이해와 적용 - 남수단재건지원단 유엔민군협력을 중심으로 -

## Understanding and application of Civil military coordination of oversea dispatch unit

- Focusing on ROK HMEC UN Civil Military Coordination -

육군 소령 박지원

MAJ Park, Ji Won

### I. 서론

대한민국은 1964년 9월, 베트남 파병을 시작으로 국제평화에 이바지하기 위해 현재까지 다양한 평화유지 활동을 하고 있다. 2024년 6월 1일을 기준으로 대한민국에서 유엔평화유지활동<sup>1)</sup> 및 다국적군 평화 활동, 국방협력 등 16개 지역으로 989명의 개인과 부대가 파병<sup>2)</sup> 중이다. 이는 대한민국이 국제평화와 안전 유지라는 중대한 임무를 수행하는 책임 있는 국제사회의 일원으로 국제평화를 선도하는 중요한 역할을 담당하고 있다는 방증이다.

남수단재건지원단(이하 ‘한빛부대’)은 유엔남수단임무단<sup>3)</sup>(United Nations Mission In South Sudan, 이하 ‘UNMISS’)에 소속된 공병부대로 UNMISS 위임명령(‘23.3.15.’)<sup>4)</sup>에 의

1) 국제적 또는 국지적 분쟁의 해결과 평화정착을 위하여 유엔이 직접 주도하여 설치된 평화유지 활동 임무단이 안보리 결의 안에 명시된 제반 임무(mandate)를 수행하는 활동을 총칭한다.(국방부, 『국군의 해외파병업무 훈령』, 2009, p.1.)

2) 합동참모본부 홈페이지, ‘해외파병활동’(검색일 : 2024.6.29.)

3) UN 안보리 결의 1996호(2011.7.8.)에 의해 창설되었다.

4) 민간인 보호, 인도적 지원을 위한 여건조성, 신평화협정(R-ARCSS) 이행 및 평화협상과정 지원, 인도주의법과 인권법 위반 사항에 대한 감시, 조사, 보고(UNMISS 홈페이지, mandate, 검색일 : 2024.6.29.)

거 공병 분야 과업을 수행하고 있다. 한빛부대는 유엔의 평화유지군 파병 요청에 따라 지난 2012년 9월 27일 국회 본회의에서 '국군부대의 국제연합 남수단 임무단 파견 동의안'이 통과됨에 따라 국방부 지령 제12-10호 '남수단 재건지원단 파병계획' 및 육군본부 일반명령 제12-227호 '남수단 재건지원단 창설'에 의해 268명 규모의 공병부대로 창설되었다. 2013년 3월 한빛부대 1진 파병을 시작으로 현재까지<sup>5)</sup> 남수단의 평화와 재건을 위해 유엔평화유지활동을 수행하고 있다.

한빛부대는 UNMISS에서 부여되는 과업명령(Task Order) 수행을 위해 도로 건설 및 기반시설 복구, 인도적지원 등 재건지원작전과 민군작전을 성공적으로 수행하며 유엔과 남수단 주민들로부터 '신이 내린 선물'이라는 찬사를 받고 있다.

한빛부대의 민군작전은 '재건지원'이라는 공병 분야 과업을 원활히 수행하기 위한 여건 조성의 하나로 수행된다. 이러한 민군작전은 유엔민군협력정책(UN-CIMIC Policy)<sup>6)</sup>에 따라 해외파병부대 단독으로 수행하는 것이 아닌 유엔임무단 일부로 수행한다는 특징이 있다. 때문에 '유엔의 공동목표 달성'이라는 통일된 방향성을 위해 유엔임무단으로부터 조정 및 통제를 받는다.

따라서 해외파병부대의 민군작전은 유엔민군협력정책에 관한 이해를 바탕으로 시작하는 것이 중요하다. 그러나 아쉽게도 국내에서는 위와 관련된 자료를 구하기 쉽지 않은 데다 연구자료가 부족하다 보니 대부분 육군 교리로 정립된 민군작전(야전교범 운용 3-9, 2015.6.15.)을 참고하는 경우가 다반사다. 하지만 두 분야는 용어와 개념에서부터 큰 차이가 있는 데다 유엔민군협력 수행절차와 관련 조직, 역할과 범위를 제대로 인식하지 못하다 보니 결국 과거 진의 성과교훈집에 명시된 내용을 통해 업무수행 과정을 답습하는 등 규정에 부합한 유엔민군협력 수행에 어려움이 많았다.

특히 과거 민군작전은 군사력 또는 경찰 등 전통적 안보 위주로 수행되었으나, 지금은 전쟁 및 분쟁 등으로 인한 재건 소요와 민간인에 대한 의료지원, 식량난 해결, 교육, 생업 보장 등 인권 및 환경 분야의 비안보적 영역에서 광범위한 노력이 요구되어 남수단을 비롯한 해외파병부대의 작전환경은 크게 변화하였다. 이러한 민군작전 패러다임 속에 군과 경찰의

5) 2024년 4월 7일 부 한빛부대 18진이 전개하여 임무 수행 중이다.

6) DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS(DPKO) CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION POLICY(2002. 9.)

역할은 다차원적인 대응의 일부로 그 역할이 축소되고 있다.

본 논문은 이러한 민군작전 패러다임의 변화를 바탕으로 세 가지를 논한다. 먼저 유엔민군협력의 이해를 돕기 위해 교리로 정립된 ‘민군작전’과 유엔에서 규정하는 ‘유엔민군협력’의 차이를 비교하였으며 이와 관련된 유엔임무단의 주요 조직과 역할, 범위를 소개하였다. 또한 앞서 소개한 유엔민군협력의 개념과 관련 조직을 바탕으로 정립한 ‘유엔민군협력 수행 절차’와 남수단 작전환경을 고려한 한빛부대의 유엔민군협력 사례를 중심으로 ‘민군협력 수행개념’을 제시하였다. 이를 통해 해외파병부대의 원활한 임무 수행에 기여하고자 한다.

## II. 본 론

### 1. 교리상 민군작전과 유엔민군협력의 이해

이 장에서는 유엔민군협력에 대한 이해를 돕기 위해 교리상 정립된 민군작전과 유엔평화유지활동간 수행되는 민군협력의 정의와 목적을 소개하고 차이점을 분석하였다. 또한, 유엔민군협력 수행과 관련된 유엔임무단의 주요 조직 및 부서의 역할과 범위를 소개하여 유엔민군협력에 대한 올바른 인식을 제공하고자 한다.

#### 가. 교리상 민군작전과 유엔민군협력의 차이

##### 1) 교리상 민군작전

육군 교리에서는 민군작전을 “군사작전을 보장하기 위해 군이 정부 기관, 국제기구(IGO)·비정부기구(NGO), 주민과의 관계를 구축, 유지, 확대하는 제반 활동”으로 정의<sup>7)</sup>한다. 민군작전은 공격작전, 방어작전, 안정화작전, 정부기관 및 민간지원작전을 보장하거나 지원하는 작전으로 민(民)을 대상으로 작전을 수행하기 때문에 안정화작전과 정부 및 민간지원작전간 차지하는 비중이 다른 작전유형에 비해 상대적으로 매우 크다. 특히 대규모 전투작전간 안정화작전에 직접 기여한다.

7) 『안정화작전』, 육군본부, 2021, p. 1-4

안정화작전은 자유화지역<sup>8)</sup>에서 안정된 환경을 조성하고 통치질서 확립에 기여하기 위해 군이 정부 및 민간 분야와 협력하여 수행하는 제반 군사활동<sup>9)</sup>으로, 민군작전은 이러한 안정화작전 과업 수행의 일환으로 시행된다. 예를 들어 공격작전 및 방어작전 위주 상황 시 군사작전에 방해가 되지 않도록 주민을 소개하고, 주민 또는 실향민의 이동을 통제하며 주민의 의·식·주를 지원하는 활동 등이 민군작전 활동이다. 이러한 활동은 군이 직접 수행할 수도 있고 정부 및 비정부기구와 협조하여 수행할 수도 있다. 이때 주민을 상대로 더욱 전문적 능력을 발휘하도록 민사부대를 활용하는데, 이를 민사작전이라 한다.

민군작전은 적을 대상으로 하는 전투작전과는 성격이 다른 민(民)을 대상으로 하는 작전이므로 고도의 전문성이 요구되는 민사부대와 민사요원을 필요로 한다는 특징이 있다.



〈그림 1〉 전시 작전유형의 동시적 수행과 관계

출처: 『(야전교범 운용 3-2) 안정화작전』(육군본부), p. 1-21

8) 적대세력을 축출하고 국내법 적용 범위를 확대하게 된 군사분계선(MDL) 이북지역을 의미, 『합동안정화작전』, 합동참모본부, 2017

9) 『안정화작전』, 육군본부, 2021, p. 1-1

따라서 육군 교리상 민군작전은 군사작전의 보장을 위해 실시한다는 측면과 정부·비정부기구 등과 협조한다는 점에서 해외파병간 수행되는 유엔민군협력과 맥락적인 부분에서는 비슷하다고 할 수 있으나 작전지역을 자유화지역, 즉 한반도로 국한하고 있으며 전시 작전유형의 동시적 수행 시 성공을 보장하는 군사작전의 일환이라는 점에서 유엔민군협력과 차이가 있다.

## 2) 유엔민군협력(UN Civil-Military Cooperation<sup>10)</sup>, 이하 'UN CIMIC')

UN DPKO가 발간한 유엔민군협력정책서(UN CIMIC Policy, 2002. 9월)<sup>11)</sup>에는 “유엔민군협력이란, 유엔의 목표 달성을 위해 군사적 요소와 인도적지원 및 개발기관, 지역 주민들 간 전 영역에 걸친 정보 교환, 협상, 분쟁 완화, 상호지원 및 체계적 활동”으로 정의한다. 이러한 용어는 “유엔평화유지 활동, 인도주의적 단체 등에서 광범위하게 사용되었으나 공통적으로 군사적 요소와 민간요소, 특히 인도적지원 및 개발기관 간의 상호지원 및 체계를 의미”함을 명시<sup>12)</sup>하고 있다.

유엔민군협력은 유엔평화유지활동의 일환으로 과거 군·경찰에 의해 주도적으로 수행되었으나, 이제는 정치·선거·인도주의·인권 및 기타요소 등 다차원적인 대응의 일부로 전환되었다. 이는 안보와 직접적으로 관련이 없는 영역에서 다양한 민간요소 간 상호 협력 및 협조 관계로 변화되었기 때문이다. 따라서 유엔민군협력 정책서에서는 “평화 및 안보와 직접적으로 관련된 상황에서만 군사력 또는 치안 유지를 위한 경찰력을 사용하며, 일반적으로 긴급 인도적 구호 및 개발 등 업무를 수행한다” 규정한다. 즉 무력충돌 또는 소요사태 등 직접적인 안보적 위협 상황에서 군과 경찰의 능력을 활용하며 기타 민군협력분야는 인도적 지원 및 개발기관들

10) Cooperation은 사전적 의미로 협력, 협조 등으로 쓰인다. 그러나 “서로를 돕기 위한 개인의 자발적인 노력”이라는 의미에서 “힘을 모아 서로 돕는다”라는 협력(協力)과 같은 의미로 해석되어 협력이라 해석하였다.

11) 유엔민군협력정책은 유엔평화유지활동의 맥락에서 인도적지원 및 개발기관, 군, 경찰, 민간인 등 다양한 공동체와의 조정 수행을 위해 DPKO가 유엔산하 조정기관인 인도주의업무조정국(UN Office Coordination Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA) 등 기관과 협의하여 개발되었다.

12) DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS(DPKO), *CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION POLICY*(2002. 9.), Scope and Purpose "7."

과 협력 및 협조하는 것으로 활동 범위에 제약<sup>13)</sup>을 두고 있다.

이러한 유엔민군협력의 목적은 분쟁국의 안정과 안전한 환경을 조성하고 인도적 지원 및 지역 발전 등 임무를 수행하며, 인권운동가 및 구호 단체들이 활동할 수 있는 여건을 조성하는 것이다. 따라서 해외파병부대의 유엔민군협력은 평화유지 또는 평화구축을 위한 활동의 일부로서 유엔산하기구 및 민간기관, 단체와의 협업 성격이 강하다. 즉 교리상 정립된 군 주도의 민군작전(민간의 안전 확립, 정부 및 민간지원, 필수 공공서비스 복구 등)과는 성격과 목적 측면에서 활동의 영역이 다르다.

### 3) 소결론

앞서 소개한 교리상 민군작전과 유엔민군협력 비교를 통해 두 활동에 분명한 차이가 있다는 것을 알 수 있다. 교리상 민군작전은 한반도라는 특정된 작전환경에서 전시 작전유형<sup>14)</sup>별 확보한 지역의 잔적 위협제거와 안정적 환경 조성을 통해 적시적인 전투력지속작전을 유지하여 전쟁 종결에 유리한 환경을 조성하기 위한 군사작전의 일부로 수행된다. 반면 유엔민군협력은 국제분쟁지역에서 평화유지 및 평화구축을 위해 유엔과 유엔산하기구 및 민간단체가 인도적 지원을 위한 상호협력 및 조정 역할을 수행하는 것이다.

이러한 유엔민군협력은 군에서 수행하는 민군협력활동 자체가 목적이 아니라 유엔임무단의 평화유지활동이라는 임무 달성을 위한 여건조성과 유엔의 공동목표 달성을 지원하는 일종의 수단이라 볼 수 있다. 때문에 유엔민군협력은 전체적인 유엔평화유지활동에 비해 비교적 그 영역이 협소하다 할 수 있다.

13) “민군작전 영역이 확장됨에 따라 군의 역할이 비대해 지면 인도적 지원 영역 축소 및 원칙 훼손, 민간단체의 의존성 유발 및 공격 위험성 증가 등이 발생할 수 있다.” (UNMISS CIMIC Seminar, OCHA '18. 6. 13.)

14) 공격작전, 방어작전, 안정화작전, 정부기관 및 민간지원작전

〈표1〉 교리상 민군작전과 유엔민군협력의 차이

구분	민군작전	유엔민군협력
목적	전시 작전유형의 동시적 수행 보장, 지원	평화유지 및 평화구축, 인도적 지원
성격	군사작전의 일환으로 수행	평화유지를 위한 수단(협력, 조정)
주도	군, 민사부대	유엔임무단, 유엔산하기구 및 민간단체
대상	민	분쟁국 정부 및 주민, 실향민 등
지역	자유화지역(군사분계선 이북지역)	국제분쟁지역

## 나. 유엔민군협력 관련 주요 부서

### 1) UNMISS 편성 및 조직<sup>15)</sup>

UNMISS는 임무단을 지휘하는 유엔사무총장 특별대표(이하 ‘SRSG’)<sup>16)</sup> 아래 정부부특별대표(DSRSG P)<sup>17)</sup>와 인권부특별대표(DSRSG HC/RC)<sup>18)</sup>를 두고 있다. 또한 UNMISS 내 각 부서의 업무를 조정·통제하는 참모장(Chief of Staff, 이하 ‘COS’), 임무지원국장(이하 ‘DMS’)<sup>19)</sup>이 있으며 군 조직인 군사령관(Force Commander, 이하 ‘FC’), 경찰국장(Police Commissioner, 이하 ‘PC’)이 있다.

유엔민군협력과 밀접한 연관이 있는 주요 조직으로는 인권부특별대표 아래 PTR 부서, 참모장 아래 지역사무소 및 주조정관(Head of Field Office, 이하

15) 『유엔남수단임무단귀국보고서』, 국제평화활동센터, 2024.2.7, p. 55


16) SRSG(Special Representative of Security General) : UN사무총장에 의해 지명되며, UN사무총장을 대리한다. UNMISS 수장으로서 UNMISS Mandate의 이행과 성취를 지휘/감독한다. 외교적 협상력을 가진다.

17) DSRSG P(Deputy Special Representative Security General Political) : 임무단 내 정치 및 민간업무, 인권, 선거 지원, 법률자문, 유엔 경찰요원에 대한 지휘 등을 하고, 유엔 산하기구 및 민간기구와 협력한다.

18) DSRSG RC/HC(Deputy Special Representative Security General Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator) : DSRSG P의 임무 영역을 제외한 민간 분야 즉 DDR, 인권보호 및 연락 임무, 난민 지원 문제, 지뢰 제거와 관련된 업무 등을 담당하며, 관련된 유엔 산하기구 및 여타 국제기구와 협력한다. 또한, 남수단내 UN개발프로그램(UNDP)의 대표를 겸임한다.

19) DMS(Director of Mission Support) : 임무지원국(Mission Support Division)의 수장으로서, 효율적이고 효과적인 임무수행을 지원하기 위한 군수, 기술적 지원, 제반 행정문제에 대한 책임을 가지며, 예산을 집행하고 통제하는 권한을 가진다. 또한 군사령관(FC)으로부터 공병, 의무, 통신, 유류부대 및 임무지원국(MSD)에 보직된 장교에 대한 권한을 위임받아 통제한다.

‘HoFO’<sup>20)</sup>, 군사령부의 UN CIMIC 참모 부서(U9) 및 예하 지역사령부<sup>21)</sup>의 참모 부서(G9) 등이 있다.



출처: 『유엔남수단임무단 귀국보고서(국제평화활동센터, 2024.2.7.)』, p. 57

## 2) 인도주의업무조정국(UN Office Coordination Humanitarian Affairs, 이하 ‘UNOCHA’)

UNOCHA는 1998년 인도주의사무국(Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 이하 ‘DHA’)이 인도적지원, 정책 개발, 인도주의 활동 조정 등을 포함하여 자연재해 및 여러 가지 위급사태에 대비 지원하기 위해 확대된 기구<sup>22)</sup>로 인도주의 활동의 전반적인 지침, 지원 소요에 관한 정보를 제공하며 동시에 각 기관과 단체의 활동을 조정하는 역할을 수행한다. UNOCHA는 유엔사무총장 직속으로


20) UNMISS는 남수단의 10개 주(州)로 단위로 각각의 지역사무소(Field Office)을 두고 있다. 지역사무소는 임무지원국, 직할부서, 유엔 경찰 등으로 구성되며 책임자로 주조정관(Head of Field Office)을 둔다. ‘주조정관’은 지역사무소 대표로 관할 주(州)의 모든 업무를 조정한다. 한빛부대는 동부지역사령부에 소속되어 작전통제를 받으며, 종글레이주(州) 및 GPAA를 관할하는 지역사무소의 임무지원국으로부터 공병 분야 과업을 부여받는다.

21) UNMISS 군 조직은 1개 군사령부와 6개의 지역사령부(동부, 서부, 북부, 남부, 유니티, 주바)로 구성되어있다.

22) UNOCHA 홈페이지, unocha.org/ocha(2024.7.13. 검색)

편성된 기구로 인권 및 긴급구호, 조정 분야의 최상위 기구라 할 수 있다.

UNOCHA의 기능 중 가장 중요한 역할이 바로 조정(Coordination)인데, 이는 분쟁국 정부와 유엔, 유엔산하기관, 각종 기관 및 단체들이 혼재된 파병지에서 인도적 지원 등 전반적인 노력의 중복 및 충돌을 방지하며 소통의 창구를 단일화하는 데 목적이 있다. UNOCHA는 이러한 조정 기능 수행을 위해 인도주의 클러스터 시스템을 운영한다.



〈그림 3〉 UNOCHA 클러스터 시스템(좌)과 조정 기능(우)

출처: UNOCHA 홈페이지(unocha.org/ocha)

UNOCHA는 이러한 역할 수행을 위하여 유엔임무단에 인도주의조정관(Humanitarian Coordinators, 이하 'HCs') 또는 유엔상주조정관(United Nations Resident Coordinators, 이하 'RCs') 형태로 운용하며 분쟁국 지역별 현장사무소를 파견하여 유엔 산하기구, 인권 단체 등을 관리·조정·통제한다. 또한 분쟁국 행정구역 단위 통합으로 인도주의적 활동을 계획하고 조정한다.

UNMISS의 경우 이러한 인도주의적 활동에 대한 조정 기능을 DSRSG HC/RC에서 수행하며 예하에 PTR 부서를 별도로 두어 UNOCHA와 협조한다. 또한 분쟁국 지역 단위로 지역사무소(Field Office)를 운용하며 주조정관(HoFO)과 PTR 부서를 둔다.

### 3) PTR(Protection, Transition and Reintegration)

PTR은 기존 RRPS(Relief Reintegration and Protection Section) 부서

의 재구성 및 통합에 따라 2021년 7월에 설립<sup>23)</sup>되었다. PTR은 UNMISS DSRSG HC/RC 소속 예하 부서로 민간인 보호와 국내 실향민 및 난민 귀환 및 재통합을 조성하며, 분쟁 및 재난으로부터 인도적 지원이 가능토록 여건을 조성한다.

〈표 2〉 PTR의 역할

구분	내용
보호(Protect)	· 민간인 보호 강화를 위한 파병국가 및 당사자들의 참여 · 중점보호대상 : 국내 실향민, 귀향민, 난민, 여성, 청소년, 아동
전환(Transition)	· 안정화를 위한 통합된 전략구상, 계획수립 및 실행 · 인도주의 단체 및 기관, 분쟁국 정부와 평화 유지 촉진
재통합(Reintegration)	· 국내 실향민, 귀향민, 난민의 이주 및 재정착을 위한 안전한 환경 조성

PTR은 분쟁국 정부, 해외파병부대, 경찰, UN산하기구 및 인도주의 단체들과 긴밀한 협조 관계를 유지하고 평화 유지 및 국가기반시설 복구, 민간인 보호 등에 대한 일관된 노력이 구현되도록 현장에서 지원하기 위해 UNMISS 지역사무소별로 편성되어 있다. PTR의 주된 역할은 분쟁국 정부와 각 지역에서 활동하는 유엔산하기구, 인도주의 단체 및 기관, UNMISS를 연결하는 매개체 기능이다. 이를 통해 특정 지역 및 특정 대상에 여러 기관의 중복된 노력 발생을 방지하여 균등한 지원이 이루어지도록 한다.<sup>24)</sup>

따라서 유엔민군협력 활동 시 해외파병부대 단독으로 분쟁국 정부 또는 유엔산하기구와 직접 접촉하는 것이 아니라, 지역사령부의 G9을 통해 지역사무소의 PTR 협조하여 수행해야 한다. 또한 분쟁국 지역 내 유엔민군협력에 관한 조정은 지역을 책임지는 주조정관(HoFO)의 권한이므로 이와 협조해야 한다.

23) UNMISS 홈페이지, [https://unmiss.unmissions.org/protection-transition-and-reintegration\(2024.7.15. 검색\)](https://unmiss.unmissions.org/protection-transition-and-reintegration(2024.7.15. 검색))

24) PTR은 UNOCHA와 평화유지를 위한 인도적 지원 활동을 수행하는 다양한 기관들과 협조, 협력한다는 점에서 그 기능이 유사할 수 있으나 UNOCHA는 유엔 직속 기구이며 유엔산하기구 및 인도주의 단체 등을 관리, 조정, 통제하는 역할을 수행한다. 따라서 유엔임무단 소속으로 유엔산하기구, 인도주의단체와 해외파병부대를 연결해주는 PTR과는 소속과 역할 측면에서 차이가 있다.

#### 4) UN CIMIC 부서(U9, G9)<sup>25)</sup>

##### 가) 편성 및 역할

UN CIMIC 부서는 군사령부 예하 부참모장(작전 기능)에 U9을 두며 지역사령부<sup>26)</sup> 단위 G3(작전부서)에 G9을 별도로 두고 있다. 한빛부대의 경우 동부지역사령부(Sector EAST, 이하 'SEAST')에 소속되어 유엔민군협력 활동간 G9과 협조한다. 권역별 유엔민군협력 담당 제대와 부서는 아래와 같이 정리할 수 있다.

〈표 3〉 UN CIMIC 부서 / 조직

구분	제대	부서
국가급	군사령부(Force HeadQuaters)	U9
지역(Sector) 단위	지역사령부(Sector HeadQuaters)	G9
주(州) 이하	해외파병부대(TCC <sup>27)</sup> )	S9(민군 기능부서)

유엔민군협력 부서는 군 조직에 속한 일원들로 인도적 지원, 지역 발전을 지원하는 민군 관련 임무를 수행한다. 주로 분쟁국의 안정과 안전한 환경을 조성하고 유엔산하기구 및 인도주의단체, 기관이 활동할 수 있는 여건을 마련하며 분쟁국 주민 및 지역별 민간 역량 격차를 확인하여 지역사회지원 및 관련 부문의 민간 및 인도주의적 단체를 접촉·유지한다. 또한 해외파병부대와 유엔산하기구 등 관련 조직에 대한 민군협력 활동을 지원하며 관계자 CIMIC 교육 및 감독, 인도적 지원, 정보 공유 등 다양한 역할을 수행한다.

25) 이해를 돕기 위하여 유엔민군협력 부서를 한국군으로 따지면 부대 규모 고려시 UNMISS 군사령부(3성 장군)의 경우 군단급 민군작전참모처(U9), UNMISS 지역사령부(1성 장군)의 경우 여단급 민군작전과(G9)와 유사하다.

26) UNMISS 군사령관은 현재 남수단의 상황을 독립이후 사회 전 분야에 걸쳐 불안정 요인이 지속되고 있다고 인식하고 있으며 효율적이고 안전한 군사작전을통해 UNMISS의 최우선 과업인 '민간인 보호'를 실현하는 것을 매우 중요하게 판단하고 있다. 효율적인 군사작전을 통해 민간인을 보호하고 UNMISS를 비롯한 인도주의 기구 활동의 여건을 조성하기 위해 남수단 전역을 6개의 작전지역(Sector)로 구분하고 준장급 지휘관과 참모부로 지역사령부를 신설('14. 12.)하여 운용하고 있다. 『유엔남수단임무단귀국보고서』, 국제평화지원센터, 2024.2.7, p. 60

27) Troops Contributing country : 병력공여국

〈표 4〉 UN CIMIC 부서의 역할

구분	내용
CIMIC 연락 및 정보공유	· 경찰, 인도주의 단체 등과 협력체계유지 · 민·군·인도주의 대상과 상호 작용을 위한 관리
민간지원	· 인도주의 기관 및 단체 요청에 대한 조정, 지원사항 제공 · 지역사회지원(CS) : 지역사회지원사업(CSP <sup>28)</sup> ) 및 지역사회지원활동(CSA <sup>29)</sup> )
신속영향사업 (Quick Impact Project)	· 소규모의 신속히 실행가능한 프로젝트를 위한 임무단 예산 지원 사업

UN CIMIC 부서의 역할 중 민간지원의 일환으로 지역사회지원(Community Support, 이하 'CS')을 수행한다는 점이 특징인데, 이는 지역별 경미한 소요를 해결하기 위해 군 일부 또는 인력을 지원하는 것으로 평화유지 및 구축에 대한 신뢰를 형성하고 각 지역별 군과 주민이 긍정적으로 평화유지 활동에 참여할 수 있도록 하기 위함이다. 그러나 지역사회지원 활동은 엄연히 인도주의 기관의 영역<sup>30)</sup>이므로 긴급한 기아, 인명 손실 등 직접적인 위협 상황에 대응할 수 있는 인도적 지원이 없는 상황을 제외하고는 군이 식량, 물, 의약품, 의료지원 등의 직접적인 지원을 하지 못하도록 규정<sup>31)</sup>하고 있다. 또한 군의 지역사회지원으로 인도주의단체의 활동 공간이 손상되는 것을 방지하기 위해 반드시 UNOCHA 및 PTR 등 관련 조직과 소통해야 할 것을 강조한다.

따라서 UN CIMIC 부서는 지역 주민 간 격차를 인도주의 단체가 인식하도록 정보를 제공하고, 주민 생활 여건 개선을 위한 방법을 지역 사회에 가르치는 '간접지원 대안'을 찾는 역할에 주력한다. 이러한 활동은 군 본연의 임무인 DMS으로부터 부여받는 과업명령(Task Order)에 부정적인 영향을 미쳐서는 안된다.

28) 지역사회지원사업(Community Support Project, CSP) : 직업훈련, 학교 또는 기반시설의 건설, 복구, 예방접종, 학용품 배포 등 사업성 지원 개념

29) 지역사회지원활동(Community Support Activities, CSA) : 지역 내 쓰레기처리, 공공시설 위생에 대한 교육 등 평화적인 여건조성을 위한 일회성 지원 개념

30) PKO 임무단은 분쟁국 주민의 필요를 충족시켜주는 예산이 없다. 따라서 민간지원 분야에 대해 긴급히 필요한 사항은 QIP사업으로 시행한다. 민간지원 분야는 분쟁국에 대해 전문지식과 재정적 기반을 보유하고 다년간 임무 수행한 전문 집단인 유엔산하기관 등 인도주의 단체의 영역이다. UN, CPTM module1, *An overview of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Lesson 18. Mission Partners*(2020), p. 17-10

31) Standard Operating Procedure Or Guidelines(USG DPKO), *Part.9 - CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION*(2020), p. 302

## 나) 목적과 범위<sup>32)</sup>

UN CIMIC 부서는 인도주의 기관 및 단체가 활동을 할 수 있는 여건을 만들고 이들을 간접적인 방식으로 지원하는데 그 목적이 있다. 이는 군은 평화 유지(Peace Keeping)<sup>33)</sup>를 통해 인도주의 기관 및 단체의 평화구축(Peace Building)<sup>34)</sup>을 지원하는 활동 범위를 규정하여 유엔민군협력간 군의 관여를 최소화함으로써 분쟁국의 민간화·지역화를 강조한다.

이와 연계하여 특히 유엔민군협력은 주민의 지지를 얻는 것(Winning Hearts & minds, 이하 ‘WHAM’)이 아님을 강조한다. 이는 유엔의 목표이지 군이 추구해야 할 사항이 아니며 “군이 주민의 지지를 얻는 것이 아니라 유엔과 인도주의 기관 및 단체들이 얻어야 한다” 규정하는데, 군이 WHAM을 목적으로 할 경우 인도주의 기관 및 단체들의 위협을 초래할 수 있고 유엔임무단에 대한 분쟁국의 현지 의존도를 높이게 되어 분쟁국 정부가 자국민에게 식량, 의료지원, 기반시설 마련 등 본연의 역할과 지원 활동을 축소·억제하기 때문이다. 또한 이러한 결과로 군이 분쟁의 원인 및 당사자로 인식될 수 있는 위험이 있어 활동 범위를 규정하고 있다.

결론적으로 유엔민군협력간 군은 조력자의 역할이며, 민군협력에 관한 직접적 지원은 유엔산하기구 및 인도주의 단체들에 의해 수행된다. 또한 모든 해외파병부대의 유엔민군협력 활동은 조정 기능을 수행하는 지역사무소 및 PTR 부서를 통해 수행해야 함을 강조<sup>35)</sup>한다. 따라서 해외파병부대는 G9, PTR 등

32) Standard Operating Procedure Or Guidelines(USG DPKO), *Part.9 - CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION*(2020), p. 302

33) 전투행위가 종결된 곳에서 깨지기 쉬운 평화를 수호하고 평화 조성자들이 이룬 평화협정의 이행을 지원하는 기술이다. 수 년 동안, 평화유지는 항구적인 평화유지를 돕기 위해, 정전을 감시하고 국가간 전쟁 후 군사력을 분리시키는 주요한 군사적 모델로부터 항구적인 평화의 정착을 위해 군·경·민이 함께 일하는 복합적 모델로 발전되어 왔다.『UN 평화유지활동 원칙과 지침』, 국제평화활동센터, 2013.9.17, p. 20

34) 평화구축은 분쟁 관리를 위한 모든 차원의 국가 역량을 강화하여 분쟁의 발생이나 재발의 위험을 감소시키고, 항구적인 평화와 개발의 기초를 다지는 수단들을 포함한다. 평화구축은 항구적인 평화에 필요한 여건을 조성하는 복잡하고 장기적인 과정이다. 그것은 폭력적 분쟁의 뿌리 깊고 구조적인 원인을 종합적으로 다룬다. 평화구축 활동은 국가와 사회의 기능 발휘에 영향을 미치는 주요과제를 해결하며, 국가의 역량을 강화하여 효과적이며 합법적으로 핵심 기능을 수행할 수 있도록 한다.『UN 평화유지활동 원칙과 지침』, 국제평화활동센터, 2013.9.17, p. 20

35) UNMISS U9 주관 해외파병부대(TCC) 기본 민군 트레이닝 회의(2024.6.3.)

관련 부서의 조정 및 통제 아래 유엔산하기구, 인도주의 단체와 협조된 민군협력 활동을 수행해야 한다.

### 5) 소결론

유엔 및 임무단에는 유엔민군협력을 위한 다양한 조직과 기능이 있으며, 관련 규정과 SOP를 통해 군과 민간의 역할 및 범위를 명확히 구분한다. 유엔민군협력 활동간 군은 인도주의 단체의 활동 여건조성을 위한 다양한 과업을 수행한다. 예컨대 한빛부대는 유엔민군협력의 일환으로 도로 개설 및 보수 등 공병 분야 과업을 수행함으로 WFP, FAO 등 유엔산하기구 및 인도주의 단체가 지역 주민에게 식량, 의료 지원 등 직접적인 지원 활동을 할 수 있도록 간접적인 지원<sup>36)</sup>을 하는 것이라 할 수 있다.

UNOCHA는 유엔산하기구를 조정 및 관리, 통제하여 적절한 인도주의 활동이 이루어지게 하며 지역 단위로 현장사무소를 운용하여 지원한다. 지역사무소 내 PTR과 지역사령부의 G9은 유엔산하기구와 분쟁국 정부를 군과 연결하여 효율적인 민군협력 활동을 촉진하고 노력을 통합하며 지역별 이러한 조정 활동은 주조정관(HoFO)이 책임진다.

〈표 5〉 UN CIMIC 관련 조직의 기능 및 역할

구분	유엔임무단		유엔 및 산하기구
	군	민간	
상위기관	군사령부(FHQ)	DSRSG HC/RC	UNOCHA
주요조직	UN CIMIC(U9, G9, S9)	지역사무소(HoFO, PTR)	현장사무소, 유엔산하기구, 인도주의 기관 및 단체
범위	평화유지(Peace Keeping) 인도주의 활동 여건조성	평화구축(Peace Building) 인도주의 활동 조정·통제, 수행	

36) 한빛부대는 공병 분야 과업은 DMS를 통해서, 유엔민군협력은 PTR, G9과 협조하여 수행한다. 공병 과업 중 민군협력 차원의 공병 과업 수행 시 이는 DMS를 통해 통제를 받게 되며 이러한 공병 과업 수행을 위한 여건을 조성하기 위해 민군 협력을 수행한다.

구분	유엔임무단		유엔 및 산하기구
	군	민간	
역할	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 재건지원, 호송지원, 경호 등 간접적 지원</li> <li>· 인도주의 기관, 단체 요청에 대한 지원</li> <li>· 민간지원(CS), QIP</li> <li>· 정보공유 및 연락</li> <li>· 민간 격차 소요확인 및 정찰</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 지역 내 인도주의 활동 조정·통제</li> <li>· 인권 관련 업무 담당</li> <li>· 군, 유엔산하기구, 분쟁국 정부 연결</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 인권 관련 업무 담당</li> <li>· 식량지원, 의료지원 등 직접적 지원</li> <li>· 장기적인 프로젝트를 통한 분쟁국 개발, 인도주의적 지원 추진</li> </ul>

이와 같이 유엔에서 규정하는 군의 유엔민군협력은 활동 범위에 제약이 있다. 따라서 해외파병부대는 이러한 민군협력활동간 군의 역할과 목적, 활동 범위를 명확히 이해한 가운데 지역사령부(G9) 및 지역사무소(HoFO, PTR 등)의 조정 및 통제 아래 관련된 유엔산하기구 및 분쟁국 정부와 공동으로 수행해야 한다.

## 2. 유엔민군협력 수행절차 정립

한빛부대는 부여된 공병 과업을 원활히 수행하기 위한 여건조성의 일환으로 민군작전<sup>37)</sup>을 수행하며, 이를 위해 대한민국의 예산을 배정받아 자체적인 민군작전을 바탕으로 분쟁국 주민을 대상으로 직접적인 지원이 가능<sup>38)</sup>하다. 이는 유엔민군협력 규정 및 SOP상 제한된 군의 역할을 고려했을 때 상충되는 부분이 있다. 따라서 유엔민군협력 규정 준용과 해외파병간 부여된 임무 달성이라는 두 가지 요소를 동시에 충족하기 위한 민군협력 수행이 필요하다. 이를 위해 G9·PTR 등 관련 부서의 조정 및 협조를 바탕으로 민군협력 활동과 관련된 유엔산하기구 및 분쟁국 정부와 협력하여 파병부대 단독이 아닌 공동으로 수행해야 한다.

이 장에서는 이와 같이 규정에 부합한 유엔민군협력 활동을 위해 관련 규정 및 조직과


37) 한빛부대 편제상 민군 업무 부서는 '민군작전과'로 명시되어있다. 따라서 '민군작전'이라 표현하였다.

38) 한빛부대는 지난 11년간 성공적인 재건지원 및 민군작전으로 UNMISS에서 매우 높은 평가를 받고 있으며 이에 따라 예외적으로 자체적인 민군작전 사업을 선정하고 주조정관 및 관련 부서(PTR, G9 등) 조정 아래 직·간접적인 민군협력 활동을 수행하고 있다.

협조된 ‘유엔민군협력 수행절차’를 정립하여 제시하였다. 이러한 프레임워크를 통해 규정에 부합한 유엔민군협력 활동을 기대할 수 있다. 유엔민군협력은 광범위한 지역에서 군, 경찰, 민간단체 등 다양한 조직이 활동하기 때문에 특정 지역과 특정 대상에 지원이 집중될 경우 지역 또는 주민들의 갈등 및 분쟁을 초래할 수 있다. 따라서 노력의 중복을 방지하고 균등한 지원을 위해 규정된 정책과 예규에 의해 수행되어야 하며, 관련 부서의 조정 및 통제를 받는다. 이러한 유엔민군협력은 규범적인 성격을 보유하기 때문에 본 논문에서는 ‘절차<sup>39)</sup>’라는 용어를 사용하였다.

### 가. 유엔민군협력 업무계선 정립

한빛부대는 동부지역사령부(SEAST)의 작전통제를 받으며 지역사무소(FO)의 임무지 원국에서 과업명령(Task Order)을 부여받는다. 즉 군 조직(지역사령부)과 민간조직(지역사무소) 두 개 상위조직의 통제를 받는다. 유엔민군협력과 관련된 부서는 지역사령 부는 G9, 지역사무소는 PTR이 있다. 관련 업무 계선을 정리하면 아래 그림과 같다.



39) 절차(節次, Procedures)란 특정 과업을 수행하기 위한 규범화된 순서 또는 단계를 말한다. 절차는 규범적이기 때문에 일반적으로 표준화된 과정이나 순서 또는 단계를 준수해야 한다.『교리』, 육군본부, 2000, p. 2-3

### 나. 유엔민군협력 수행 기준 정립

한빛부대는 대한민국으로부터 배정된 예산으로 자체적인 민군작전이 가능하지만, 앞서 언급한 바와 같이 유엔임무단의 일부로서 수행하므로 규정에 따라 G9·PTR을 통해 지원 소요, 중복 여부 등을 고려하여 지원대상을 선정하고 관련된 유엔산하기구 및 분쟁국 정부와 협력하여 공동으로 수행해야 한다. 이렇듯 규정상 군의 활동 범위에 제약이 있기 때문에 한빛부대 단독적인 민군협력이 어려운 것은 사실이나, 지원 대상 및 지역을 G9·PTR에게 일방적 통보를 받는 것이 아니라 과거 한빛부대에서 수행한 민군협력 데이터를 활용하여 계획수립, 민군협력 대상 선정, 수행 방법 등을 의사결정과정에서부터 참가하여 의견 적극 제시 등 주도적으로 수행해야 한다.

한빛부대의 유엔민군협력 활동 유형은 분쟁국 정부 및 주민을 대상으로 의료 및 식량 지원, 물품 공여, 시설 보수 등 인도주의적 지원이 대부분이다. 따라서 이와 관련된 전문성을 보유한 유엔산하기구와 협력하여 효과를 극대화할 수 있다.

〈표 6〉 유엔민군협력 유형별 관련된 유엔산하기구의 예

구분	난민보호	식량지원	의료지원	교육지원	사회기반시설
관련 기구	유엔난민기구 (UNHCR)	유엔세계식량 계획(WFP)	국제연합아동기금 (UNICEF)	국제연합아동기금 (UNICEF)	유엔개발계획 (UNDP)
	국제적십자사 (ICRC)	국제연합식량농업 기구(FAO)	세계보건기구 (WHO)		국제연합아동기금 (UNICEF)

한편 유엔민군협력간 지역 단위 유엔산하기구 또는 분쟁국 정부가 한빛부대로 직접적인 지원을 요청하는 경우가 빈번히 발생하기도 한다. 이는 유엔민군협력정책 및 SOP는 법적 구속력이 없고, 유엔산하기구가 UNOCHA 및 G9 등 관련 기관과 무조건 협력하라는 것을 강제하지 않기 때문이다. TCC부대가 이러한 요청에 대해 직접 수용 및 지원 시 특정 단체 또는 개인에 의한 사적 이득 행위와 분쟁이 초래될 수 있다. 따라서 민군협력 활동 대상 선정과 이러한 활동이 특정 인원, 단체에 대한 이득을 방지하기 위해 유엔민군협력 활동 수행기준을 정립하여 기준점을 제시하였다.

〈표 7〉 유엔민군협력 활동 수행기준(案)

구분	기준
적법성	· PTR, G9 등 관련 부서 · 기관과 협조가 되었는가? * 대상자 조정 및 통제 검토
	· 사업의 형평성은 유지가 되는가? * 공여 중복 여부, 특정 인원의 요구 등
	· 관련된 사업은 민군작전 예산 항목에 맞게 적절히 사용되는가?
필요성	· 해당 지역(대상)에 사업이 필요한 이유는? * 의견 : UNMISS, 당사국(자)
노력의 통합	· 분쟁당사국 정부 및 카운티와 공동으로 수행하는가? * 경호, 순찰 등 제공
	· 요청한 해당 시설(지역)과 공동으로 수행하는가?
	· 수혜기관(인원)이 지속관리가 가능한가?
주민 우호도 / 기대효과	· 일회성이 아닌 지속성 유지가 가능한 사업인가?
	· 부대 홍보 및 친한화 달성이 가능한가?
	· 해당 민군사업을 통해 주민의 우호도 형성이 가능한가?
위험성평가	· 도로 및 기상, 현지 정세가 작전에 미치는 영향은 어떠한가?

#### 다. 소결론

이 장에서는 유엔민군협력과 관련된 규정과 조직, 그리고 자체적인 예산을 보유하고 있는 한빛부대의 여건 등을 고려하여 유엔민군협력 절차<sup>40)</sup>를 정립하였다. 이러한 민군협력 활동은 부대 단위로 파병되어 일정한 교대주기가 있는 해외파병부대 특성상 예산 및 불필요한 노력의 낭비를 방지하기 위해 지속성 유지가 매우 중요하다. 따라서 이전 진에서 수행한 민군협력 활동 및 관련 사업의 지속성을 보장하고 요구되는 추가적인 민군사업을 PTR, G9과 협조하여 도출하는 과정이 필요하다. 이렇게 민군협력 활동의 지속·유지 및 소요 도출이라는 두 가지 방향성을 교대할 다음 파병부대에게 인계하여 국내 파병 준비 기간부터 상호 일치된 계획을 수립해야 한다. 이러한 일련의 수행절차를 행렬처럼 매핑하면 아래와 같다.

40) 합참 해외파병업무규정 제37(민군사업 시행절차)에서는 요청 접수, 심의절차(사업소요 선정, 사업계획 수립 / 선정, 사업평가 / 심의 단계)로 규정한다. 이는 소요 요청 우선순위(한국대사관, 현지 임무단/사령부, 현지 정부 기관의 요청 사업) 및 현장 실사를 통해 결정하는 것으로 현지 소요에 대한 대한민국 배정 예산 집행 절차를 나타낸 것이다. 따라서 본 고에서 정립한 전반적인 유엔민군협력 수행절차와는 차이가 있다.

〈표 8〉 유엔민군협력 수행절차(案)

구분	내용	협조부서	비고
1단계 : 소요파악	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 민군협력 활동 유형별 소요·요청 확인 * 지역 및 대상, 기간, 소요물자 등</li> <li>· 민군협력활동 수행기준 충족여부 심의</li> </ul>	PTR·G9	합참 해파과 유엔산하기관 분쟁국 정부기관
2단계 : 계획수립	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 파악된 소요에 대한 구체적 계획수립 * 합참 해외파병 규정 적용(민군사업 시행절차)</li> <li>· 상급 및 관련기관 보고 / 승인 * 합참 해외파병과, 지역사령부, 지역사무소</li> </ul>	HoFO, PTR·G9	합참 해파과 유엔산하기관 분쟁국 정부기관
3단계 : 실행	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 민군협력 활동 수행 * 인도적물자 공여, 의료지원 등 관련 기관 협조 하 유엔산하기관, 분쟁국 정부, 주민 공동으로 시행</li> </ul>	PTR·G9	유엔산하기관 분쟁국 정부기관 지역주민대표
4단계 : 평가/환류	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 민군협력 수행결과 보고(합참, G9)</li> <li>· 민군협력 활동 지역 재방문 / 추가소요 도출 * 주민반응 및 우호도, 분쟁 여부, 공여품 관리상태 등</li> </ul>	PTR·G9	분쟁국 정부기관, 지역주민대표
5단계 : 지속성 유지	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 민군협력 활동 연속성 유지 및 소요 파악 * 기후, 환경 등 고려 민군협력 활동 유형 판단</li> <li>· 도출된 소요 현황 교대부대에 인계 * 예산 집행 방향성 구체화 및 제시</li> </ul>	PTR·G9	파병교대부대 인수·인계

### 3. 한빛부대의 유엔민군협력 수행개념 및 적용

해외파병부대는 유엔민군협력 활동을 위해 임무변수와 더불어 작전변수를 같이 고려해야 한다. 이는 분쟁국에서 소요되는 유엔민군협력 활동이 정치, 경제, 사회 등 국가 및 지역 단위로 상이하므로 상황과 조건에 따라 적용해야 하며, PTR 등 관계부서와 긴밀한 협조 아래 수행되어야 적절한 효과를 볼 수 있다. 이 장에서는 남수단의 정세 및 환경을 고려하여 적용 중인 한빛부대의 유엔민군협력 수행개념을 사례로 제시하였다. 이를 통해 해외파병부대가 파병지 작전환경에 부합한 유엔민군협력을 수행하는데 기여하고자 한다.

#### 가. 최근 남수단 정세 및 환경

##### 1) 남수단의 정세

한빛부대가 임무 수행 중인 남수단은 2011년 7월 11일, 수단으로부터 분리 독립

립한 이후 신생국가로 독립 직후 지속된 내전으로 혼란기를 겪으며 현재까지 극심한 경제적 어려움을 겪고 있다. 특히 공공기관 및 민간기관이 주민의 삶이 향상되는데 신뢰할 만한 전략을 약속해주지 못하여 사회불안, 대규모 이주, 폭력적 극단주의가 심화되는 등 국가 발전 저해가 지속되고 있다. 2015년 12월 15일 남수단 중앙은행의 변동 환율 적용 이후 극심한 인플레이션으로 외국기업 이탈 등 경제 상황이 악화되며 주민들의 부담이 가중되고 있다. 파병지 현장에서 체감할 정도로 2024년 8월 기준 1달러당 4,300SSP<sup>41)</sup>에 이르는 등 환율이 급변하고 있으며 공무원, 의사, 교사 등 월급이 지급되지 않아 지역별 시위가 빈번하게 발생하고 있다. 특히 일자리 부족과 경제 상황 악화 등으로 청년실업자가 대거 증가함에 따라 젊은 계층이 생계를 위해 총을 들고 약탈을 하는 등 악순환이 광범위하게 반복되면서 아동납치, 가축도난, 영토소유권 주장 등으로 표출되며 정세가 매우 불안정한 상태다.



〈그림 5〉 UNMISS 난민 복귀 예상도표

출처: UNMISS 기본 민군트레이닝 회의(2024.6.3.) 중 일반자료

41) 한빛부대 18진이 전개한 4월 7일 기준으로 1\$당 1,700SSP 환율을 보였다.

남수단은 현재 900만 명의 사람들이 인도적 지원을 필요<sup>42)</sup>로 하는데, 이는 전체 인구의 약 72%에 해당한다. 최근 우크라이나-러시아 전쟁, 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁 등 연이어 발생하는 국제 분쟁으로 UNMISS에 대한 예산 지원이 삭감될 가능성이 높아짐에 따라 국제사회는 남수단의 식량 분배량을 줄이고 있으나, 남수단 정부에서는 식량·의약품 등 인도적 물자를 전적으로 유엔에 기대고 있으며 국가적인 노력이 부족한 실정이다. 또한 줄어든 인도적 지원에 따른 주민의 반발은 정부가 아닌 UNMISS를 향하고 있다. 특히 현재까지 70만 명의 난민이 수단에서 남수단으로 돌아왔으며 향후 100만 명 이상 귀국할 것으로 분석하고 있다.


## 2) 남수단의 환경

UNMISS는 최근 기상의 급격한 변화로 인한 폭우 등으로 빅토리아 호수의 수위가 급격하게 상승하며 남수단으로 물을 방류해야 하는 상황에 직면하여 최악의 홍수가 발생할 것으로 전망<sup>43)</sup>하고 있다. 특히 목축을 생업으로 하는 남수단에서 가축은 생계를 위한 주요한 수단인데 우기철 홍수로 탄저병을 포함한 가축 질병이 확산되면서 감염률이 55%에 달하는 등 심각한 상황에 직면해있다. 주민들은 가축 질병 확산의 방지와 홍수를 피해 가축에게 먹일 새로운 목초지로 이동 등 안전한 지역으로 이주를 할 것이며 이는 지역 사회 간 충돌로 이어질 수 있다<sup>44)</sup>. UNMISS는 홍수로 인원 및 가축 질병의 창궐, 식량 공급 제한, 목축을 위한 토지 부족 등 주민 간 갈등이 점차 심화 될 것이며 인플레이션으로 인한 물가 상승 및 난민 귀국 등으로 식량 문제가 더욱 심각해질 것으로 전망하고 있다.

42) 국제구조위원회 홈페이지, “2024/01/1 5 보고서”, <https://www.rescue.org/kr/article/top-10-crises-world-cant-ignore-2024>(2024.7.15. 검색)

43) 합참·정부성과평가단 UNMISS SRSG 방문(2024.7.12.)

44) UNMISS U9 보고서 일반자료(2024.7.1.)



출처: UNMISS 기본 민군트레이닝 회의(2024.6.3.) 중 일반자료

### 나. 유엔민군협력 수행개념 및 적용 사례

앞서 살펴본 바와 같이 남수단은 현재 다양한 위기 상황에 직면하여 있으며 특히 식량 문제, 홍수로 인한 가축 질병, 경제적 위기 등이 크게 대두되고 있다. 따라서 한빛부대는 이러한 남수단의 작전환경과 유엔민군협력 수행절차를 고려하여 '재건지원작전 여건조성'과 '인도적지원' 두 가지 범주의 유엔민군협력 수행개념을 정립<sup>45)</sup>하였다. 이는 UNMISS 위임명령 이행을 위한 한빛부대 임무<sup>46)</sup>과 '24년 국회파병연장동의안 제3항 기본계획 '다'항 임무에 명시과업<sup>47)</sup>을 근거로 한다. 한빛부대는 두 가지 범주의 유엔민군협력 수행개념을 7개의 주요과업으로 구분하였으며 각 분야별 과업 달성을 위해 세부적인 과업을 창의적으로 정립하여 적용하고 있다.

45) 기존 한빛부대의 작전수행개념은 '사회개발지원, 인도적지원, 친한화활동'으로 단계별로 시행하도록 구분되었으나, UNMISS 위임명령 및 '24년 국회파병연장동의안 명시과업과 일치하지 않아 국가 정책 및 UNMISS의 전략적 목표 달성을 위한 작전수행개념으로는 연계성이 부족하였다. 또한 '사회개발지원, 친한화활동'은 민군협력을 위한 과업 수준이며, 현재 남수단의 정세 고려 시 각 과업의 단계별 시행이 아닌 동시성·통합성이 요구되었다. 이러한 내용을 종합적으로 검토하여 필자가 '재건지원작전 여건조성 및 인도적지원' 두 가지 범주로 재정립하였다.

46) 한빛부대 임무 : ① 동부사령부 유엔 공병부대로서 작전지속지원 및 공병지원 ② 유엔기지방호 / 생존성 보장 지원 ③ 승인된 범위 내 지방정부 재건지원

47) 남수단 공화국 평화 정착 및 재건(공병) 지원, 인도주의적활동 『국군부대의 국제연합 남수단 임무단(UNMISS) 파견연장동의안』, 대한민국 정부, 2023, p. 6

〈표 9〉 한빛부대의 유엔민군협력 수행개념

구분	주요과업	세부과업
재건지원작전 여건조성	· Task Order 이행	· CIMIC Task Order(DMS에서 부여)
	· 군사교류활동	· 문화교류 활동(태권도, 한국어교실), 유엔 행사 참석, 친한화활동, 기타 부대개방 행사
	· 인도적 물자 지원 및 공여	· MSR 및 주둔지 인근 마을 인도적 지원
인도주의적 활동	· 한빛농장 운영	· 벼 시험재배 및 과수원, 원예작물 재배
	· 한빛직업학교 운영	· 농업, 전기, 목공 등 기술 교육
	· 수의진료 및 의료지원	· 가축 진료 및 취약계층 의료지원
	· 기타 인도적지원 활동	· 관·군 협력체계 유지, 민군협력 효과평가 등

1) 재건지원작전 여건조성

한빛부대는 UNMISS 위임명령 수행을 위한 재건지원 등 공병 분야를 지원하는 공병부대다. 재건지원작전을 위한 여건조성으로 수행하는 유엔민군협력은 공병 임무 수행에 유리한 환경 조성을 위한 일환이다. 이와 관련된 주요과업은 과업명령(Task Order) 이행, 군사교류활동, 인도적 물자 지원 및 공여를 적용하고 있다.



과업명령 수행은 임무지원국에서 하달되는 공병 분야 및 민군 분야 과업을 수행하는 것이다. 이러한 과업명령의 수행이 파병부대 본연의 임무라 할 수 있다. 한빛부대는 18진 전개 후 상습 침수 거주지 주민 이전을 위한 도시확장 부지 조성, 도로 신설 등 민군 분야 과업명령(CIMIC Task Order)을 수행하고 있다.

군사교류활동<sup>48)</sup>은 한빛부대가 주둔 중인 보르 기지 내 유엔직원 및 TCC 대상으로 태권도 및 한국어 교실 운영, 각종 부대행사를 통해 업무 관계자와 우호증진, 친밀감을 형성하고 현지 주민 또는 어린이를 대상으로 흥미와 관심을 유도할 수 있는 각종 놀이·활동을 통해 한빛부대에 대한 우호 및 신뢰감 향상 등 친한화를 목적으로 수행한다.

인도적 물자 지원 및 공여는 PTR·G9 협조 및 유엔산하기구와 협력하여 주보급로(Main Supply Route, 이하 ‘MSR’) 인근 지역 및 주둔지 일대 조성된 마을에 생필품, 의약품 등 인도적물자 공여로 주민들의 우호 획득, 친한화를 조성하여 재건지원작전 여건을 조성한다. 이는 유엔민군협력 분야 중 평화적인 여건조성을 위한 일회성 지원 개념인 ‘지역사회지원활동(CSA)’과 그 성격이 유사하다.

## 2) 인도주의적 활동

한빛부대는 국회파병동의안에 명시된 임무에 따라 인도주의적 활동을 수행한다. 이러한 활동은 단기적인 전시성·선심성 사업이 아닌 지속 가능하고 남수단 경제 및 식량난 등을 지원하기 위한 장기적인 사업을 추진한다. 이는 유엔민군협력 분야 중 ‘지역사회지원사업(CSP)’과 성격이 유사하다. 주요과업으로 한빛농장, 한빛직업학교, 수의진료 및 의료지원, 기타 활동을 적용하고 있으며 UNMISS 및 유엔산하기관의 인도적지원 활동과 협력하고 있다. 이를 통해 유엔에서 대한민국의 국제사회 평화유지 활동에 대한 위상을 드높이고 궁극적으로 원활한 재건지원작전 여건조성에 기여한다.

48) 기존에는 ‘친한화활동’이라는 용어를 사용하여 마치 친한화만을 위한 민간작전 활동으로 오해의 소지가 있었다. 따라서 UNMISS에서 대한민국의 국가적 위상 및 육군의 군사작전 범주(군사협력 및 정부정책지원)를 종합적으로 고려하여 ‘문화교류활동, 부대행사, 부대초청행사, 친한화활동’을 포함하는 포괄적 개념인 ‘군사교류활동’으로 필자가 용어를 재정립하였다.



한빛농장(벼 시험 재배장)	한빛직업학교(농업기술지도)	수의진료 현장토의
〈그림 8〉 인도주의적 활동		

한빛농장은 남수단의 식량난과 경제난 극복을 위해 시작한 사업이다. 한빛부대 3진(14.9.9.)에서 추진하여 운영 중 흉수로 인한 침수(22.9.20.) 후 대체사업으로 벼 시험 재배를 선정하며 대한민국 농촌진흥청과 최초로 추진하여 현재까지 지속하고 있다. 이는 단위 면적당 생산량이 높은 쌀의 특성과 광활하고 비옥한 남수단의 토지 환경을 고려한 장기 사업으로, 쌀을 식량난과 빈곤 해결을 위한 경제 작물로 활용하는 것이다. 이러한 한빛농장은 지역사무소 및 남수단 중앙정부 협조 아래 추진 중인 역점 사업 중 하나로, 현지인에 의해 농장 형태로 운영하여 주식인 수수, 옥수수과 과수원 등 다양한 작물을 재배하여 경제활동 촉진에 기여한다. 특히 한빛부대 18진 전개 후 한빛농장 부지를 확장(3ha) 및 벼 시험 재배<sup>49)</sup>를 통해 현지 기후에 적합한 우수 품종을 선별하여 범씨 분양 및 확대를 추진하고 있다. 향후 K-라이스벨트<sup>50)</sup>, 해외농업기술개발사업(KOPIA)<sup>51)</sup> 등 대한민국의 우수한 농업기술사업 유치를 위한 기반<sup>52)</sup>을 마련하여 전문기관에 의한 사업 유지 및 관리를 통해 성과를 확대하고, 점차 남수단 전역으로 확대하는 것을 목표로 하고 있다.

49) 한빛부대는 지난 7월 1일 모내기 작업을 시작으로 대한민국 농촌진흥청과 협력 아래 Africa Rice 2개(V-16, ISRIZ-7), KAFACI 2개(KAFACI-1, 3) 총 4개 품종을 시험 재배 중이다.

50) 쌀 생산 부족으로 수입에 의존하는 아프리카 국가에 벼 종자 생산단지를 조성해 수확량이 높은 벼 종자를 생산하고 농가에 보급하는 공적개발원조(ODA)사업, 시사상식사전, [https://m.terms.naver.com\(2024.7.31. 검색\)](https://m.terms.naver.com(2024.7.31. 검색))

51) 해외농업기술개발사업(Korea partnership for innovation of agriculture) : 개발도상국 현지에서 KOPIA 센터를 설치하고 농업기술 전문가를 소장하여 국가별 맞춤형 농업기술을 개발·실증·보급하는 사업, 농촌진흥청, “KOPIA 소개”, [https://itcc.rda.go.kr/kopia.portal\(2024.7.31. 검색\)](https://itcc.rda.go.kr/kopia.portal(2024.7.31. 검색))

52) 현재 남수단은 안보, 치안 등 안전문제로 대한민국의 대사관 및 KOPIA 센터 등이 설치되어있지 않다. 따라서 우간다, 케냐 등 인접국에 설치된 센터를 거점으로 남수단까지 관할, 파견하는 개념으로 협조 중이다.



한빛직업학교는 한빛농장과 더불어 청년실업 및 경제난 극복을 위해 농업기술, 전기, 목공 등 직업기술 교육을 위한 사업이다. 한빛부대 5진(16.2.23.)에서 추진하여 운영 중 홍수로 인한 침수(22.9.20.) 후 중단되었다가 벼 시험 재배장 조성 과 연계하여 한빛부대 18진에서 재추진하는 사업이다. 현재 UNMISS에 고용되어 일하는 배관공, 목수 등 현지 고용인력 대부분이 한빛직업학교를 수료한 교육생들로, UNMISS 및 남수단 정부로부터 현지 취업난 해결에 매우 긍정적인 영향을 미친 것으로 평가<sup>53)</sup>받고 있다. 한빛부대는 한빛직업학교를 '24년 후반기에 개강하여 남수단 현지 주민을 교육생으로 연간 4개 기수, 200여명의 교육생 배출을 목표로 하고 있다.

수의 진료는 목축업을 생업으로 하는 남수단의 환경을 고려하여 적용한 사업이다. 남수단은 가축이 재산이기 때문에 양호한 사육 조건이 곧 생계와 직결된다. 특히 방목 형태의 목축 특성상 가축 질병 발생 시 감염률이 매우 높는데, 현재 진드

53) UNMISS 주조정관(HoFO) 미팅(2024.7.17.)

기를 매개체로 한 4대 가축 질병<sup>54)</sup>이 남수단에 창궐하고 있다. 이는 주민들이 질병을 피해 다른 안전한 목초지로 이주하게 되고, 결국 지역 사회 불균형 및 공존에 부정적인 영향을 초래하게 된다. 또한 질병이 더욱 확산되며 폐사하는 가축의 수가 점점 늘어나 생계를 위해 가축을 빼앗는 주민 간의 충돌이 발생하는 악순환이 조성된다. 따라서 한빛부대는 구상한 수의진료 계획을 G9·PTR과 논의하여 진료 대상 마을을 검토하고 FAO·분쟁국 정부(종글레이주정부 가축부)와 협조하여 한빛부대·UNMISS·유엔산하기구·분쟁국 정부 공동으로 수행하는 수의 진료 사업을 적용하고 있다.



기타 활동으로 관·군 협력체계 유지와 민군협력 효과평가를 시행하고 있다. 관·군 협력체계 유지는 한빛부대에서 추진하는 민군작전 사업과 관련된<sup>55)</sup> 대한민국 정부 및 기관, NGO, 인도주의단체 등과 긴밀한 협력관계를 유지하여 사업의 전문성 견비와 지속성을 유지하고 인도주의단체와 협조된 인도적지원 활동을 수행한다.

54) ECF(East coast fever, Theileriasis), PPR(Pestie des prtits, cattle plague, rinderpest), 파동편모충, NCD(Newcastle disease)가 창궐하고 있다.

55) 농업기술 및 KOPIA, K-라이스벨트 등 ODA 사업과 관련하여 정부기관인 외교부, 농림축산식품부, 한국국제협력단(KOICA), 농촌진흥청과 협력하고 있다. 이를 통해 전문기관과 연계하 체계적이고 지속적인 사업 유지가 가능하며, 특히 한빛부대는 이러한 사업을 남수단에 제공하여 남수단과 국내 기관을 연결할 수 있다.

		구분	유엔군에 대한 반응			공여품·시설물		분쟁여부	추가지침, 보수소요
			우호도	주민반응	신뢰도	활용도	관리상태		
범씨 분양 농가 현지 방문	보르 병원 현지 방문	학 교	C	C	C	C	A	C	Y (필요 공여)
		안이디	C	C	C	C	A	C	Y (필요 공여)
		관	C	C	C	C	C	C	Y (필요 공여)
		보르 병원	C	C	A	C	A	C	Y (공여·보수)
		프리덤 광장	C	C	A	C	A	C	Y (공여·보수)
		민군협력 효과평가 결과 분석							
〈그림 11〉 민군협력 효과평가									

민군협력 효과평가는 시설물 보수 및 공여, 의료지원 등 과거 민군협력 활동 지역을 재방문하여 민군협력활동이라는 과업만이 아닌 주민의 우호도, 시설·공여품 관리 및 사용실태, 추가 보수 소요 등 과업 수행으로 나타는 효과를 평가하기 위해 적용한 활동으로 UNMISS 및 PTR와 협조하여 아래와 같은 평가지표를 자체적으로 수립, 발전시켜 평가간 활용하였다.

〈표 10〉 민군협력 효과평가 평가지표

구분	평가지표	비고
1	· 유엔군에 대한 우호 및 신뢰도	
	① 주민들은 유엔군(한빛부대)에 대해 우호적인가? * 우호, 보통, 적대	
	② 유엔군(한빛부대)에 대한 반응은 어떠한가? ③ 시설·공여자가 누구인지 알고 있는가?	
2	· 공여품 및 시설물 사용, 관리, 유지상태	
	① 공여된 품목·시설은 목적에 맞게 사용되는가?	
	② 도난, 파손, 방치 등 관리상태는 양호한가? ③ 개인 또는 특정 집단이 사적으로 사용하는가?	
3	· 지역 및 주민 분쟁 발생 여부	
	① 민군활동 지역에 마을 또는 주민간 분쟁이 발생한 경력이 있는가? ② 민군활동에 대한 불만 야기 소지가 있는가?	
4	· 추가적인 지원 및 보수 소요 파악	
	① 공여·시설에 대한 보수 및 유지가 필요한가? ② 효과 확대를 위해 추가적인 지원이 필요한가?	

민군협력 효과평가는 현장 방문을 통해 분쟁국 정부 담당자, 시설관리자, 주민 대표 및 주민 등과 직접 의사소통을 하며 한빛부대에 대한 주민의 우호도와 공여된 물자가 용도와 목적에 맞게 적절히 사용되고 있는지 확인하고 추가적인 지원 소요 도출을 통해 향후 사업의 방향성을 설정할 수 있다. 이러한 활동은 지원 대상에게 민군협력이 일회성, 선심성이라는 부정적 인식을 타파시키고 지속적인 관심을 표명하여 현장 방문 자체만으로도 긍정적인 민군협력 효과를 미칠 수 있다.

### III. 결 론

본 연구에서는 유엔민군협력의 이해를 위하여 교리상 민군작전과 유엔민군협력의 정의와 목적을 바탕으로 두 개념의 차이를 분석하였고 이와 관련된 유엔임무단의 주요 조직 및 역할을 소개하였다. 또한, 해외파병부대에서의 유엔민군협력 적용을 위해 앞서 논술한 개념을 정립하여 유엔민군협력 수행절차를 제시하였다. 또한, 한빛부대에서 적용 중인 민군협력 사례를 중심으로 분쟁국에서 민군협력 수행개념을 제시하였다.

UNMISS는 유엔임무단 중 가장 큰 조직임에도 불구하고 느슨하게 연결된 조직 구조와 민간 주도의 군, 경찰, 인권부서 등이 다양하게 섞여 있어 상호 업무 관계가 불명확하다. 또한, 국가 기능이 제대로 수행되지 않는 남수단 특성상 지역 단위 정부와 협조하여 원활한 유엔민군협력 활동을 하기에는 어려운 부분과 제약이 있는 것이 사실이다.

이러한 환경에서 자체적으로 보유한 예산으로 유엔민군협력을 수행할 수 있는 한빛부대는 명확한 기준과 중심을 바탕으로 UNMISS의 조정 및 통제, 분쟁국 정부와의 협조, 현지 정세 등 제한적인 환경을 고려하여 평화유지 임무 수행과 유엔 및 분쟁국의 지지를 동시에 얻을 수 있는 균형감을 가져야 한다. 이러한 균형감 있는 민군협력은 선심성, 전시성 사업 및 눈에 띄는 일회성 공여 위주에서 탈피하여 남수단의 환경과 현지에서 실질적으로 요구되는 소요를 바탕으로 장기간 지속 가능한 사업을 추진해야 불필요한 노력의 낭비를 방지할 수 있다. 즉 단순히 분쟁국 주민 눈앞에 닥친 생계에 필요한 공여 행위가 아니라, '무엇을 해야 하는가?'라는 방법의 영역으로 접근하여 장기적인 발전을 도모해야 한다.

현재 UNMISS의 유엔민군협력 기조는 지역 분쟁 및 주민 갈등 발생을 방지하기 위해 자

원의 균등한 분배와 지역 단위 균형된 발전을 추구하고 있다. 그러나 이러한 균등함 위주의 민군협력은 제한된 기간에 특정 효과 창출이 어려울뿐더러, 치안이 불안정한 분쟁국 특성상 불특정 광범위한 장소에서 인도적 지원 수혜를 받은 지역 및 대상이 현지 주민에 의해 도난 및 약탈, 방화 등 표적으로 노출되어 '밑 빠진 독에 물 붓기'로 전락할 가능성이 크다. 따라서 특정 지역 또는 대상을 중심으로 다양한 민군협력 활동과 더불어 치안, 인권운동을 동시·통합하여 그 효과를 극대화하고 이후 인접한 지역까지 단계적으로 확대해 나가는 방향으로 UNMISS 차원에서의 검토가 필요하다.

한빛부대는 남수단이라는 척박한 환경에서 지난 11년간 기상 및 지형의 악조건을 극복하며 여느 공병단급 이상의 대규모 공사를 직접 계획·수행하는 대한민국의 유일한 부대다. 따라서 이러한 재건지원이라는 본연의 임무를 원활히 수행하기 위한 민군협력의 성격과 범위를 잘 알아야 '재건지원작전 여건조성'이라는 본질에 부합한 민군협력활동을 할 수 있다. 특히 이러한 한빛부대의 전략적 가치와 성과를 바탕으로 우크라이나-러시아 전쟁 등 현재 국제적으로 발생하는 연속된 분쟁이 종결된 이후 장차 재건지원을 위한 국제사회의 부름에 대한민국이 응답하여 임무를 수행할 때 해외파병부대가 분쟁국에서 유엔민군협력을 적용하는데 이 연구가 작은 도움이 되길 기대한다.

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지속가능한 이라크 군사력 재건을 위한 노력  
: CJTF-OIR 군사자문  
〈아프가니스탄 실패 사례 분석을 바탕으로〉  
Efforts for Sustainable Reconstruction of Iraqi Military  
Capabilities: CJTF-OIR Military Advisory  
〈Based on the Analysis of Afghanistan's Failure Cases〉

육군 소령 노기택  
MAJ Giteak Roh

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## 요약

미국은 아프가니스탄 보안군 재건을 위해 약 860억 달러를 투입했으나, 철군 3개월 만에 탈레반에게 수도 카불을 빼앗기는 실패를 경험하였다.

이를 교훈으로 삼아, 현재 CJTF-OIR(Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve)에서는 “지속가능한 이라크군 재건”을 목표로 자문활동을 실시하고 있다. 이를 위해, 장기적인 접근방식을 채택하고, 현장답사를 통해 이라크군 평가 시스템의 신뢰도를 높였으며, 부정부패 방지를 위한 시스템을 도입하였다. 또한, 이라크군 지원장비 조달 과정에 이라크군의 의견을 적극 반영하고, 지원장비의 유지 및 관리 능력 향상을 위한 노력을 병행하고 있다.

“지속가능한 이라크군 재건”을 통해 미군 철수 후에도 이라크군이 스스로 자국을 지킬 수 있는 역량을 갖출 것으로 기대되며, 이러한 자문활동의 성패는 앞으로의 전쟁을 잘 마무리 짓는 중요한 요소로 작용할 것이다.

## ABSTRACT

The United States invested approximately \$86 billion in rebuilding the Afghan security forces, but experienced failure when Kabul fell to the Taliban just three months after the U.S. military withdrawal. Learning from this, CJTF-OIR(Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve) is currently conducting advisory mission with the goal of "sustainable reconstruction of the Iraqi military." To achieve this, they have adopted a long-term approach, increased the reliability of the Iraqi military evaluation system through field inspections, and introduced systems to prevent corruption. Additionally, they actively incorporate the Iraqi military's input in the procurement process of support equipment and strive to improve the maintenance and management capabilities of the provided equipment.

Through the "sustainable reconstruction of the Iraqi military," it is expected that the Iraqi military will be able to defend their country independently after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The success or failure of these advisory mission will be a crucial factor in effectively concluding future war.

# 지속가능한 이라크 군사력 재건을 위한 노력 : CJTF-OIR 군사자문 〈아프가니스탄 실패 사례 분석을 바탕으로〉

Efforts for Sustainable Reconstruction of Iraqi Military Capabilities:  
CJTF-OIR Military Advisory  
〈Based on the Analysis of Afghanistan's Failure Cases〉

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## I. 서론

“지속가능성”은 특정한 과정이나 상태를 유지할 수 있는 능력을 의미하며, 주로 환경·사회·경제 분야에서 언급되고 있다.<sup>1)</sup> 본 기고문에서는 그 의미를 확장하여, 군사력 재건 분야에서 지속가능성의 중요성을 다루고자 한다.

미국은 최근 두 번의 전쟁을 마무리하면서, 미군 철수 이후 해당 국가에 의한 지속 가능한 군사력이 얼마나 중요한지 강조하였다. 2011년 이라크 철군을 앞두고 오바마 대통령은 “이제 이라크 국민이 자기 나라의 안보에 대한 책임을 주도해야 한다.”며 “이라크의 미래를 이라크 국민의 손에 넘겨주기까지 우리는 막대한 비용을 지불했으며 이제는 역사의 페이지

1) “지속가능성”, 위키백과, [https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A7%80%EC%86%8D\\_%EA%B0%80%EB%8A%A5%EC%84%B1](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A7%80%EC%86%8D_%EA%B0%80%EB%8A%A5%EC%84%B1) (2024.09.22 검색)

지를 넘겨야 할 때”라고 말하였다.<sup>2)</sup> 또한, 조 바이든 대통령은 아프가니스탄 철군을 앞두고 “우리는 지난 20년 간 아프간에 1조 달러가 넘는 돈을 썼습니다. 이제는 아프가니스탄 스스로 자신들을 위해, 그리고 조국을 위해 싸워야 합니다”라고 언급하였다.<sup>3)</sup>

하지만 그 결과는 처참히 실패하였다. 2011년 미군 철수 후, 이라크군은 ISIS(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) 세력의 확장을 막지 못하고 영토의 1/3을 내주었으며, 결국 2013년 미국과 국제사회에 군사지원을 다시 요청하게 되었다. 또한, 2021년 아프가니스탄 보안군은 미군 철수 후 3개월 만에 탈레반에게 수도 카불을 내주었다.

현재 미국 주도의 연합군은 “지속가능한 군사력 재건”을 목표로 이라크에서 또 한 번의 도전을 진행하고 있다. ISIS 격멸을 위해 2014년 창설된 CJTF-OIR(Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve)은 2020년 ISIS 세력을 사실상 무력화시킨 이후, 직접적인 전투 임무보다는 이라크 주도의 단독작전이 가능하도록 군사력 재건을 위한 자문 활동에 집중하고 있다. 특히, 2020년 아프가니스탄 철군 과정에서의 충격이 채 가시지도 않은 시점에서 진행되는 새로운 도전은 더욱 조심스럽고 섬세한 접근이 요구된다.

필자는 2013년 8월부터 CJTF-OIR에서 지속지원자문관으로 임무를 수행하며, 이라크군 군수분야 재건을 위한 자문활동을 실시하고 있다. 본 기고문에서는 아프가니스탄에서의 미군 실패요인을 사례연구(Case study)를 통해 확인하고, 이라크 현지에서 필자가 직접 경험한 내용을 바탕으로 지속가능한 군사력 재건을 위한 미군의 새로운 시도를 분석하였다. 주요 목차는 ① CJTF-OIR 배경 및 임무 전반에 대해 소개하고, ② 아프가니스탄 보안군 재건 실패사례를 분석, 교훈을 도출한 후, ③ 이를 바탕으로 “지속가능한 이라크 군사력 재건”을 위한 새로운 노력 방안 순으로 작성하였다.

2) 양주희, 「국가건설에서 안보부문개혁이 갖는 함의」, 국방대학교 석사논문, 2023년 1월, P.1

3) “[사실은] 아프간 '편의 전쟁' 팩트체크했습니다”, SBS뉴스, 2021.8.24., [https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news\\_id=N1006440165#close&plink=COPYPASTE&cooper=SBSNEWSEND](https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1006440165#close&plink=COPYPASTE&cooper=SBSNEWSEND) (2024.09.22 검색)

## II. CJTF-OIR 배경 및 임무


### 1. CJTF-OIR 창설배경

CJTF-OIR은 2014년 10월 10일 ISIS 격퇴 및 제거를 위해 이라크 정부의 요청에 의해 창설된 미군 주도의 다국적군 TF이다.

ISIS는 2003년 미국의 이라크 침공 이후 형성된 알카에다 이라크 지부(AQI)에서 기원하였으며, 2011년 시리아 내전 간 시리아로 영역을 확장, ISIS로 이름을 변경하였다.<sup>4)</sup> 이후 중파 간 내전과 지역의 혼란한 틈을 타 2013년 이라크 및 시리아 주요지역을 점령하고, 자신들만의 이슬람국가(칼리프)를 세우자, 이에 대응하기 위한 이라크 정부의 요청과 국제사회의 군사력 동원에 대한 공감대가 형성되었다. 이에 ISIS 격퇴 및 중동지역 안정성 회복을 위해 2014년 10월 미 중부사 예하 연합합동작전부대인 CJTF-OIR이 공식 창설되었다.<sup>5)</sup>

### 2. CJTF-OIR 임무

ISIS 세력은 아래 <그림 1>과 같이 시기에 따라 추세가 변화하였으며, CJTF-OIR은 변화하는 ISIS에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 4단계에 걸쳐 임무를 전환하였다.



<그림 1> ISIS 활동지역 추세 변화

출처: BBC 뉴스(2019)

4) "The rise and fall of the Islamic State group: The long and short story", BBC뉴스, 2019.3.23., <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47210891> (2024.09.22 검색)

5) 「CJTF-OIR 임무단 귀국보고서」, 국방대학교 PKO센터, 2024.9.20., P.14

임무수행 초기에는 1단계 목표인 Degrade(여건조성)를 달성하기 위해 ISIS에 대한 공습 위주의 작전을 수행하였으며, 2015~2016년 2단계 Counterattack(반격), 2017~2020년 Defeat(격퇴) 임무를 통해 ISIS의 지휘체계를 와해하고 대부분의 영토를 회복하였다.

현재 ISIS는 대부분의 역량을 상실하여 조직적인 활동이 불가하며, 소규모/저강도의 비정규전에 그치고 있다. 이에 따라 CJTF-OIR은 4단계 임무인 안정화 지원(Support Stabilization)을 목표로, 이라크 및 시리아 주도의 단독작전이 가능토록 자문활동에 집중하고 있다.<sup>6)</sup>

### 3. CJTF-OIR 자문활동

CJTF-OIR 자문활동은 크게 Advise(조언), Assist(지원), Enable(활성화)로 구분되며, 통상 “A2E”로 불리고 있다. Advise 활동은 전략적·전술적 조언을 통해 계획수립 및 작전실시 간 간접적으로 작전을 지원하며, Assist 활동은 정찰감시자산 운영을 통한 정보공유, 공중공습 지원 등 직접적으로 작전활동에 기여한다. 또한 Enable 활동은 교육훈련, 장비·물자 군수품 제공 등 이라크 및 시리아군의 장기적인 재건을 목표로 한다.

필자는 MAG(Military Advisor Group) 예하 JOCAT(Joint Operation Command-Iraq Advisory Team)<sup>7)</sup>에서 근무하며, 교육훈련 및 군수품 지원 등 “Enable 활동”을 주로 담당하고 있다.

교육훈련은 분기별 지속지원 워크숍을 개최하여 군수분야 작전계획 수립절차, NATO군 군수 교리 등을 교육한다. 최근에는 이라크군 C4I 시스템의 군수분야 활용능력 향상에 집중하고 있다. 이는 이라크군의 업무체계가 대부분 수기로 진행되어 실시간 군수지원이 제한되는 문제를 해결하기 위함이다. 하지만 컴퓨터 사용에 익숙하지 않은 이라크군을 대상으로 하다보니 여러 어려움이 따른다.

군수품 지원은 미군의 CTEF(Counter-Terrorism Train and Equip Fund)<sup>8)</sup> 예산을 활용하여 조달한다. 필자는 CTEF 예산집행 및 조달과정에서 소요식별 및 타당성 확인, 군

6) “CJTF-OIR Mission”, CJTF-OIR, <https://www.inherentresolve.mil/campaign/> (2024.09.22 검색)

7) JOCAT은 이라크군 합동참모본부(JOC-I, Joint Operation Command-Iraq)를 대상으로 교육훈련 및 군수품 제공 등을 자문활동을 실시하는 다국적군(11개국 19명) 조직이다.

8) CTEF은 ISIS 격멸을 위해 필요한 장비 및 물자를 조달하여 이라크 및 시리아군에 지원하는 예산으로, 미 의회의 승인을 받아 매년 약 7,000억원이 집행되고 있다.

수품 수배송 현황 조회 등을 담당하고 있다. 현재 이라크군의 장비 가동률은 평균 50% 이하 수준으로 파악되며, 주요 지휘관 회의 간 수송자산 부족, 수리부속 조달 지연 등은 항상 주요 의제로 채택된다. 따라서 CTEF 예산을 활용한 군수품 지원은 이라크군 재건을 목표로 하는 CJTF-OIR 자문활동에서 중추적인 역할을 하고 있다.

아래 <그림 2, 3>은 필자가 이라크에서 실시한 Enable 활동 중 일부를 촬영한 사진이다.



<그림 2> 23년 4분기 군수분야 워크샵



<그림 3> 이라크군 지원 군수품 인계현장

출처: 직접 촬영

### III. 아프가니스탄 실패사례 분석


#### 1. 아프가니스탄 군사력 재건 노력 및 결과

미국은 2002년 시작되어 약 20년간 지속된 아프가니스탄전에서 천문학적인 전쟁비용을 지출하였다. 2021년 3월 미국 국방부가 발표한 “전쟁비용 분기 보고서(Cost of War quarterly report)”에 따르면 9/11 사태 이후 시작한 “항구적 평화작전(Operation Enduring Freedom)”부터 나토군과 함께 2015년부터 2021년 3월까지 지속하였던 “자유파수꾼 작전(Operation Freedom Sentinel)”까지 총 8,373억 달러를 지출하였다.<sup>9)</sup>

총 전쟁비용의 16퍼센트에 해당하는 약 1,374억 달러를 아프가니스탄 재건에 사용하였으며, 이 중 절반 이상인 860억 달러가 육군과 경찰을 포함한 아프가니스탄 보안군 설립에

9) 백승훈, 「탈레반 재집권과 아프가니스탄 체제 변혁에 관한 소고」, 한국이슬람학회, 33-2집, 2023, P.77

사용되었다.<sup>10)</sup> 막대한 자금이 투입된 아프가니스탄 보안군은 초기에 탈레반과의 전투에서 일정한 성과를 거두며 주요 도시와 지역을 방어하는데 성공하였다. 하지만 부패, 예산사용의 비효율성, 장비 유지 관리의 어려움 등으로 아프가니스탄 군사력 재건 노력은 한계에 부딪혔으며, 더 이상의 지출이 불가능했던 미국은 <그림 4>와 같이 2012년 이후 예산을 대폭 감액하고, 2021년 5월 1일 아프가니스탄에서 철군을 감행하였다.



<그림 4> 아프가니스탄에서 미국 세출 및 미군 주둔 규모 변화 양상(2002-2021)

출처: 미국 아프간재건특별감사관실, 「WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION」(2021)

미군 철수를 기점으로 탈레반은 총공세를 시작하였으며, 약 3개월만인 8월 15일 아프가니스탄 수도 카불에 재입성, 8월 30일 재집권하게 된다. 결국 860억 달러가 투입된 아프가니스탄 보안군은 3개월이라는 짧은 기간 내 무너지며, 지속가능한 군사력 재건은 처참하게 실패하였다.

아프가니스탄 철군 후 남겨진 미군 제공 무기 및 장비는 <그림 5>와 같이 대부분 탈레반에 넘어갔다. 2022년 3월 미 국방부의 보고서에 따르면, 약 72억 달러 상당의 무기 및 장비가 아프가니스탄에 남겨졌으며, 최소 78대 항공기, 40,000대 이상의 차량, 9,000여발 이상의 공대지 탄약 등 핵심 무기체계가 포함되었다. 세부내용은 아래 <표 1>을 참고하기 바란다.

10) “아프간 전쟁: 미국의 분쟁 비용은 얼마인가?”, BBC코리아뉴스, 2020.3.2., <https://www.bbc.com/korean/international-51688498> (2024.09.22 검색)

〈표 1〉 2005-2021년 아프가니스탄 보안군에게 제공된 장비 및 미군 철수 후 잔류 현황

Item	Amount	Value	Item	Amount	Value
<b>Aircraft Munition</b>			<b>Weapons</b>		
Precision and Gravity Bombs	18,160	\$41 M	M4, M16, and AK-variant Rifles	258,300	\$150.7 M
Precision and Non-Precision Aviation Rockets	163,480	\$201.8 M	Pistols	64,300	\$31.6 M
Practice and Training Munitions	50,150	\$4.8 M	7.62mm Sniper Rifles	6,300	\$33 M
Computer Control and Air Foil Group Assemblies	3,060	\$23.3 M	Light, Medium, and Heavy Machine Guns	56,155	\$233.7 M
2.75-inch Rocket Motors and Fuses	5,874	\$8.7 M	Machine Gun Mounts	5,500	\$5.7 M
Gun and Rocket Launcher Pods	260	\$15.2 M	Rocket-Propelled and 40mm Mobile and Hand-Held Grenade Launchers	31,000	\$51.4 M
<b>Aircraft Munition, Remaining</b>			<b>Weapons, Remaining</b>		
Air-to-Ground Munitions	9,524	\$6.54 M	Shotguns	9,115	\$4 M
<b>Ground Vehicles</b>			<b>Specialized Equipment</b>		
General Purpose or Light-Tactical Vehicles	53,180	\$1.66 B	60-82mm Mortar Systems	1,845	\$41.6 M
Medium Tactical and Specialty Vehicles	7,900	\$1.17 B	D-30 122mm Howitzer Artillery Guns	224	\$18.2 M
Firefighting, Towing, and Construction Vehicles	2,400	\$467.6 M	M150 Weapon Optics and PEQ-2/15/18 Laser Aiming Devices	41,350	\$41.8 M
Light and Medium Load Trailers	7,860	\$141.7 M	<b>Weapons, Remaining</b>		
HMMWVs (Humvees)	23,825	\$3.48 B	Weapons (types not specified)	316,260	\$511.8 M
Armored Combat Vehicles	900	\$759 M	<b>Specialized Equipment, Remaining</b>		
<b>Remaining Ground Vehicles</b>			According to DOD, nearly all of this equipment remains in Afghanistan		
Ground Vehicles	43,139	\$4.13 B	<b>Communications Equipment</b>		
<b>Explosive Disposal and Demining</b>			High Frequency Radio Sets and Equipment		
Electronic Countermeasure Devices	13,660	\$229.4 M	Very-High Frequency Radio Sets and Equipment	20,060	\$326.2 M
Mine Detection, Marking, and Removal Devices	860	\$1.4 M	Ultra/Super-High Frequency Radio Sets and Equipment	134,400	\$419.1 M
Bomb Detection and Disposal Equipment	2,280	\$154.9 M	Multi-band Radio Sets and Equipment	4,600	\$28.9 M
Vehicle Mine Rollers	695	\$35.2 M	Satellite, Data-Linked, Broadband, Beyond Line-of-Sight Radio and Data Systems	2,330	\$56.67 M
<b>Explosive Disposal and Demining, Remaining</b>			Non-tactical radios, Interference Detection, and Ciphering Devices		
Ground Vehicles	43,139	\$4.13 B	1,150	\$7.2 M	
<b>Ground Munitions</b>			<b>Communications Equipment, Remaining</b>		
120 and 122mm Mortar Rounds	188,000	\$121.7 M	According to DOD, nearly all of this equipment remained in Afghanistan as of August, 2021		
81 and 82mm Mortar Rounds	769,000	\$84.8 M			
60mm Mortar Rounds	249,000	\$89.6 M			
40 and 73mm Rocket-Propelled or Cartridge Grenade Rounds	3,768,000	\$269.5 M			
23x115mm and .50 caliber ammunition	6,895,000	\$38.3 M			
Small Arms Ammunition (e.g., 9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm)	Millions of Rounds	\$3.19 B			
<b>Ground Munitions, Remaining</b>					
Specialty Munitions	1,537,000	\$48 M			

출처: DOD, 「Property, Equipment, and Supplies and OOD-Funded Afghan National Defense and Security forces Materiel in Connection with the Withdrawal from Afghanistan」(2022)



〈그림 5〉 남겨진 미군 장비 및 물자를 사용하는 탈레반의 모습

출처1: NBC 뉴스(2023)<sup>11)</sup>, 출처2 : The conversation(2021)<sup>12)</sup>

## 2. 실패요인 분석

아프가니스탄에서 미국의 실패사례는 ‘제2의 베트남’, ‘제국의 무덤’, ‘미국 패권주의 몰락’ 등 다양한 시각으로 평가되었다. 그 중, 필자는 미국 아프가니스탄 재건 특별감찰관 (SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction)<sup>13)</sup> 리포트 내용을 바탕으로 실패요인을 분석하였다. 23년 2월에 발간된 SIGAR 리포트 23-16, 「Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed」는 〈표 2〉에서 설명하고 있는 8가지 요소를 실패원인으로 제시하였다.

〈표 2〉 아프가니스탄 보안군 붕괴 원인

① 아프가니스탄 군사력 수준을 고려하지 않고, 단기적 목표에 치중	② 연합군 어드바이저 능력 및 자질 부족, 지속적인 교체
③ 아프가니스탄 보안군 신규 확충 과정에서 종교적·지역적 갈등 발생	④ 아프가니스탄 보안군에 대한 모니터링 및 평가 프로그램의 낮은 신뢰성

11) “U.S. arms left in Afghanistan are turning up in a different conflict”, NBC뉴스, 2023.01.30., <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-weapons-afghanistan-taliban-kashmir-rcna67134> (2024.09.29. 검색)

12) “Taliban, Islamic State arm themselves with weapons US left behind”, The conversation, 2021.09.22., <https://theconversation.com/taliban-islamic-state-arm-themselves-with-weapons-us-left-behind-167960> (2024.09.29. 검색)

13) SIGAR는 아프가니스탄 재건 프로젝트의 효과성과 투명성을 평가하고 부패 방지를 위해 2008년 설립된 미국 정부의 독립적인 감찰 기관으로, 분기별 분석 보고서를 발행하고 있다.

⑤ 보안군 재건에 대한 주도 국가의 부재와 국가별 조율되지 않은 접근방식 활용	⑥ 아프가니스탄 정부 및 군대의 부패
⑦ 효과적인 경찰병력 설립 실패	⑧ 미군의 교육훈련 및 군수지원에 대한 과도한 의존

출처 : SIGAR 리포트 23-16, 「Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed」(2023)

이 중, 필자는 CJTF-OIR에서 이라크군을 대상으로 진행 중인 자문활동과 관련된 4가지 요인(〈표 2〉에서 ①,④,⑥,⑧번)을 집중적으로 분석하였다.

#### 가. 아프가니스탄 군사력 수준을 고려하지 않고, 단기적인 목표에 치중

미국은 전통적으로 안보지원에 있어 장기적인 접근방식을 채택해왔으며, 한국, 일본, 독일 등이 대표적인 사례로 꼽힌다. 이 과정에서 미 대사관은 해당 국가와의 관계를 지속적으로 관리하는 중요한 역할을 담당하였다.

그러나 9/11 테러공격은 미국의 전통적인 접근방식을 변화시켰고, 아프가니스탄 보안군 지원은 신속한 대응에 초점을 맞추게 되었다. 대사관을 활용한 장기적인 전략 대신 주둔 미군을 중심으로 탈레반과의 전투와 아프가니스탄 보안군의 재건을 동시에 추진하였다. 이로 인해 군 특성상 자문임무보다 전투임무에 더 집중하게 되었고, 이는 결국 장기적인 아프가니스탄 보안군 재건의 효과성을 저하시켰다.

#### 나. 아프가니스탄 보안군에 대한 모니터링 및 평가 프로그램의 낮은 신뢰성

군사력에 대한 정확한 평가는 병력 수, 무기체계와 같은 유형적 요인뿐만 아니라, 리더십, 사기, 부정부패 등 무형적 요인도 포함되어야 한다. 하지만 무형적 요인을 평가하는 것은 매우 어려운 일이다. 특히 아프가니스탄 보안군을 지원하는 어드바이저들이 현장에 가지 않고 그린존에만 머물렀기 때문에, 그들의 관점은 주로 객관적인 유형적 요인에만 한정되었다. 이로 인해 연합군이 지원한 무기는 단순히 숫자의 변화로만 평가되었고, 실제 활용능력이나 전투력 향상에 기여한 정도에 대한 평가가 부족했다.

또한, 평가지표의 잦은 변화는 평가의 일관성을 저해하였다. 평가지표는 통상 3~5년마다 수정되었으며, 이는 데이터의 신뢰성을 저하시켜 아프가니스탄 보안군에 대한 장

기적인 모니터링을 방해하였다. 더불어 평가지표 자체에도 문제가 있었다. <표 3>에서 2010~2013년 평가지표를 살펴보면 가장 높은 수준으로 설정된 “Independent with advisors”는 아프가니스탄 보안군의 자립성과 단독작전 능력이라는 목표와 괴리가 있는 평가지표로 볼 수 있다.

<표 3> 아프가니스탄 보안군 평가 지표 (2005년~2017년)

	Capability Milestone (CM) Jul 2005-Apr 2010	Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) Apr 2010-Jul 2013	Regional Afghan National Security Forces Status Report (RASR) Sep 2013-Jan 2015	Monthly ANDSF Assessment Reports (MAAR) Jan 2015-Present
Highest Rating(s)	<b>CM1:</b> Mission capable, may require specified assistance	(1) Independent with advisors	(1) Fully capable	(1) Sustainable
	<b>CM2:</b> Mission capable only with routine assistance	(2) Effective with advisors (3) Effective with partners	(2) Capable (3) Partially capable	(2) Fully capable (3) Capable
	<b>CM3:</b> Capable of partially conducting missions, reliant on assistance	(4) Developing with partners	(4) Developing	(4) Partially capable
Lowest Rating(s)	<b>CM4:</b> May be capable of conducting portions of missions, reliant on support	(5) Established (6) Not assessed	(5) Established (6) Not assessed (7) Awaiting fielding	(5) In development

출처: 미국 아프간재건특별감사관실, 「Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan」(2017)

#### 다. 아프가니스탄 정부 및 군대의 부패

아프가니스탄 정부 및 군대의 부패는 전투준비태세와 결속력을 저해하는 주요 요인으로 작용했다. 부패의 유형은 다양했으며, 국방부 예산이 개인 용도로 전용되거나 급여 명부에 ‘유령 병사’가 포함되는 등 국방비 누수가 발생했다. 이를 해결하기 위해 2009년 아프가니스탄 내무부에 TF가 설립되었으며, TF 요원들은 미 FBI와 마약단속국(DEA)에서 훈련받은 인원들로 구성되었다. 그러나 카르자이 대통령과 그의 측근들이 조사 대상이 되면서, 카르자이 대통령은 이를 “내정 간섭”으로 간주하고 TF를 해체했다.

이후 미군 지원 조달 및 계약에 대한 감독이 더욱 부실해졌고, 이는 대규모 부패로 이어졌다. 특히 2010년~14년 가장 많은 미국의 예산이 투입되었던 시기에 관리 감독 기능이 가장 약화되면서 그 피해는 더욱 심각해졌다.

## 라. 미군의 교육훈련 및 군수지원에 대한 과도한 의존

아프가니스탄 보안군은 미군의 교육훈련 및 군수지원에 크게 의존하였다. 그러나 이러한 지원은 현지 상황에 적합하지 않는 경우가 많았고, 지나친 의존성은 보안군의 자립성을 저해하였다.

첫 번째 문제는 미군 주도의 항공운송 물류시스템에 대한 과도한 의존이다. 초기에는 지상운송 시스템을 활용했으나, 아프가니스탄의 험난한 지형과 부족한 인프라로 인해 물자 수송에 많은 시간이 소요되었다. 이에 따라 항공운송 시스템으로 전환하여 물자를 보다 빠르고 안전하게 이동시킴으로써 단기적인 효율성을 높였다. 하지만 아프가니스탄 보안군이 지속적으로 사용할 수 있는 물류 인프라가 구축되지 않았고, 미군 철수 이후 독립적인 물류 시스템 운영이 불가능하게 되었다.

두 번째 문제점은 장비 운영 및 유지 간 미군에 대한 과도한 의존이다. 2002년 당시 아프가니스탄 보안군은 舊 소련으로부터 기증받은 낡은 무기체계만을 보유하고 있었다. 이에 따라 미군은 최신 기술이 적용된 장비와 항공기를 지원했으나, 이는 아프가니스탄 보안군의 정비능력과 장비운영능력을 고려하지 않은 조치였다. 대표적인 예로 2013년부터 2018년까지 아프가니스탄 공군은 C-130 항공기를 운영하였으나, 유지보수는 전적으로 미 계약업체에 의존함으로써 그들의 능력은 전혀 향상되지 못하였다. 결과적으로 미군 철수 이후 수십억 달러의 무기 및 장비를 보유했음에도 독립적으로 운영 및 관리를 할 수 있는 능력이 제한되었다.

## IV. 지속가능한 이라크 군사력 재건을 위한 노력

아프가니스탄 재건 과정에서의 미국의 실패는 구조적 문제와 접근방식의 한계를 보여주었다. 즉각적인 군사적 성공에 치우친 단기적인 접근방식과 평가지표의 낮은 신뢰성은 아프가니스탄 보안군의 장기적인 재건을 방해하였으며, 부패문제는 투입된 예산의 효과성을 저하시켰다. 또한, 미군에 대한 과도한 의존은 아프가니스탄 보안군의 단독작전 능력을 전혀 향상시키지 못하였다.

현재 CJTF-OIR이 실시 중인 이라크군 재건은 아프가니스탄에서의 경험을 통해 얻은 교훈

을 바탕으로 더욱 현명하고 지속 가능한 접근방식을 채택하고 있다. CJTF-OIR 철수 이후에도 지속 될 수 있는 장기적인 지원방안을 준비하고 있으며, “현장”으로 어드바이저들을 전개시켜 직접 눈으로 확인한 내용을 바탕으로 정성적인 평가를 실시하고 있다. 또한, 부패문제 및 미군에 대한 의존을 줄이기 위해 무기 및 장비 조달 간 다양한 방안을 강구하고 있다.

## 1. 장기적인 접근방식에 기반한 이라크군 재건 노력

### 가. “Post-OIR”을 위한 준비

2024년 9월 27일 미국과 이라크는 CJTF-OIR의 군사임무를 종료하는 공동 성명을 발표하였다. 주요 내용은 이라크 내 미군 주도 연합군의 군사 임무를 2025년 9월 내 종료하고, 이후 양자 간 안보 파트너십(Bilateral security partnership)으로 전환하는 것이다.<sup>14)</sup>

이라크에서의 CJTF-OIR 군사임무 종료는 ISIS 세력의 재등장 가능성뿐만 아니라 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁 이후 불안정한 중동 정세에 미칠 영향에 대한 우려를 낳고 있다. 그러나 공동 성명의 핵심은 “군사임무 종료”가 아닌 “양자 간 안보 파트너십으로의 전환”에 있다. 이는 아프가니스탄에서의 급작스러운 미군 철군과는 대조적이다. 이라크군의 자립능력 강화와 안보 공백을 최소화하는 방안이 포함되고, 철수 후에도 미국과 이라크 간의 안보 협력이 계속될 것임을 명시하고 있다.<sup>15)</sup>

실제로 25년 9월 군사임무 종료 이후에도 파트너십에 기반한 자문활동은 지속될 예정이다. 한국군이 속해 있는 MAG은 명칭을 변경하여 현 위치에서 이라크군에 대한 자문활동을 계속할 것으로 예상된다. 또한, 시리아 내 군사임무를 지원하기 위해 이라크 북부 아르빌 지역에 일부 미군이 26년 9월까지 주둔할 예정이다. 이를 통해 미군 철수 후에도 자국의 안보를 책임질 수 있는 지속가능한 이라크군 재건이 가능할 것으로 기대된다.

14) “Joint Statement Announcing the Timeline for the End of the Military Mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq”, 미 국무부, 2024.9.27., <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq/> (2024.09.29 검색)

15) Kathleen&Andrew, 「The Afghanistan Withdrawal: Military and Defense Implications」, Congressional Research Service, Version2, 2021, P.1-3

## 나. 주 이라크 미국 대사관과의 협조된 노력

미국은 전통적으로 “대사관”을 활용하여 장기적인 안보지원을 실시해 왔다. CJTF-OIR 역시 주 이라크 미국 대사관에 위치한 OSC-I(Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq) 조직과 협업하고 있다.

OSC-I의 임무는 CJTF-OIR과 유사하다. 이라크의 자립적인 안보 체계 구축을 지원하고, 훈련 및 장비 지원을 통해 그들의 역량을 강화한다. 2018년도 기준으로 약 3,680만 달러의 자금을 사용했으며, 이는 모두 이라크군에 대한 훈련 및 장비지원에 사용되었다.<sup>16)</sup>

OSC-I의 대표적인 활동으로는 “최종 사용자 모니터링(End-Use Monitoring)”이 있다. 이는 미 예산으로 지원된 장비 및 물자가 어떻게 사용되고 있는지를 추적 및 관리한다. 23년 3분기 OIR 평가보고서에 따르면, OSC-I는 이라크 대테러부대에 지급된 약 300개의 야간투시장비를 재고 조사하였으며, 수명도래된 M1A1 전차 20대의 비무장화를 실시하였다.<sup>17)</sup> 이는 아프가니스탄에서 철군 후 수십억 달러의 장비 및 무기가 탈레반의 손에 넘어간 사태를 방지하기 위한 노력으로 볼 수 있다. 이처럼 CJTF-OIR은 대사관과의 협업을 통해 단기적인 군사적 성공을 넘어 장기적인 관점에서 이라크군 재건을 지원할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

## 2. 현장답사를 통한 이라크군 모니터링 및 평가 신뢰도 향상 노력

이라크군에 대한 평가(Assessment)는 자문활동에서 중요한 영역이다. 장기적인 관점에서 평가의 평가를 통해 이라크군 수준 향상 여부를 추적하고, 향후 자문활동의 방향성을 재설정한다. CJTF-OIR은 월 1회 전장기능별 평가를 실시하며, 평가지표는 <표 4>와 같다.

16) 「Characteristics of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and How It Compares to Other DOD Security Cooperation Organizations」, US GAO, 20-196R, 2019, P.1~3

17) 「OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO IRAQ & SYRIA」, Lead Inspector General, JULY1-SEP30, 2023, P.11

〈표 4〉 CJTF-OIR 이라크군 평가지표

빨간 지표 0점	주황 지표 1점	노랑 지표 2점	연녹 지표 3점	녹색 지표 4점	파랑 지표 5점
진전없음	중지	일부진전	크게 진전	목표달성	지속달성가능
효과달성저조	효과달성 저조	독립작전 수행 직전단계	대부분 독립작전 수행가능 (능력과 자원 사이에 일부 차 이 발생)	일반적 수준 <b>독립작전 수행가능</b>	높은 수준의 독립작전 가능
파트너군 필수과업 수행준비안됨	파트너군 필수과업 능력부족	파트너군에 대한 군사자문 필수	파트너군에 대한 최소한의 군사자문 필요	<b>파트너군에 대한 군사자문 불필요</b>	파트너군은 높은 역량보유, 단독임무가능

출처: PKO 저널 28호, 「해외파병의 새로운 도전 “군사자문”」(2024)

그러나 정성적인 평가가 제외된, 지표에만 의존한 평가는 숫자놀이에 불과하다. 이에 CJTF-OIR은 이라크군이 임무수행하는 “현장”으로 어드바이저들을 전개시켜 직접 눈으로 보고 경험한 내용을 바탕으로 평가를 실시한다. 아래는 올해 군수 어드바이저 팀에서 실시한 현장방문 결과이다. 군수지원부대를 직할대로 보유한 사단급 제대와 종합정비창, 탄약창 등 군수지원부대를 주로 방문하였다. 아래 〈그림 6, 7〉은 어드바이저들의 현장방문 모습이다.



〈그림 6〉 이라크군 종합정비창 현장방문


출처: 직접 촬영



〈그림 7〉 이라크군 6사단 사령부 및 사단직할 군수부대 현장방문

출처: 직접 촬영

경호문제로 바그다드에서 멀리 떨어진 지역까지 전개가 어려운 경우에는 해당 부대에 자체평가 레포트를 요청한다. 〈그림 8〉은 6국경수비여단(6th Border Guard Brigade)의 보고서 주요 내용이다. 시리아에서 들어오는 ISIS 세력, 불법 이민자, 마약상 등을 막기 위해 미군으로부터 4종물자(철조망, HESCO장벽 등)를 지원받았으며, 지원물자 관련 내용이 보고서에 포함되어 있다.



〈그림 8〉 이라크군 6국경수비여단 미군 지원물자 사용결과 보고서

출처: 직접 촬영

이러한 현장 답사를 통해 어드바이저들은 이라크군의 실제 임무 수행 능력을 보다 정확하게 평가하고, 이를 바탕으로 자문 활동의 방향성을 재설정할 수 있다. 이는 단순한 숫자 지표에 의존하는 평가보다 신뢰도가 높으며, 이라크군의 자립적인 안보 체계 구축에 실질적인 도움을 줄 수 있다.

### 3. 부정부패 예방을 위한 노력

Vetted Officer(VO)는 CTEF 예산으로 조달된 장비 및 물자의 수령인으로, 해당 장비 및 물자를 직접 운영하는 이라크 부대의 대대급 이상 지휘관이 지정된다. 즉, VO는 CTEF 조달 군수품의 수령, 운영, 관리, 처리 등 전 수명주기에 대한 책임을 진다.

미군은 CTEF 예산 조달 군수품과 관련된 부정부패를 방지하기 위해, VO 지정 과정에 신중을 기한다. VO는 연합군 기지에 직접 방문하여 바이오정보(동공,지문 등)를 등록하고, 'Leahy'와 '1236'이라는 신원조회 절차를 거친다. 'Leahy' 신원조회는 미국의 리히 법(Leahy Laws)<sup>18)</sup>에 기반하여, 미 국무부(DoS)가 중대한 인권침해(GVHR, Gross Violation of Human Rights) 여부를 확인한다. 또한 '1236' 신원조회는 CJTF-OIR CJ2X 부서에서 실시하며, 테러단체와의 연계성을 집중적으로 확인한다. 이 과정에서 위법 사항이 발견되면 'CI Screening'이라는 대면질의를 추가 실시하며, 모든 절차를 통과한 경우에만 VO로 지정된다.

이처럼 철저한 검증 과정을 거치는 Vetted Officer 시스템은 CTEF 예산으로 조달된 군수품의 부정부패를 예방하고, 이라크군의 장비 운영 및 관리의 투명성을 높이는데 중요한 역할을 한다. 이러한 시스템은 이라크군의 전투력 향상 뿐만 아니라, CTEF 예산의 효과성을 극대화하여 아프가니스탄에서의 실수를 반복하지 않도록 하는 데 기여할 것이다.

### 4. 군수품 조달 및 운영유지 간 이라크군 참여 확대

아프가니스탄에서 미군은 수십억달러의 규모의 무기 및 장비를 지원하였다. 그러나 아프가니스탄 보안군은 이를 적절히 운영 및 관리하지 못하였으며, 미군 철수 후 탈레반의 손에 넘어갔다. 이는 단순히 많은 양의 군수품을 지원하기 보다는, 이에 대한 효과성에 고려되어야 한다는 교훈을 잘 보여준다.

CJTF-OIR은 이라크군의 무기 및 장비 조달을 위해 CTEF이라는 예산을 활용하고 있다. CTEF은 ISIS를 격퇴하기 위해 설립된 예산으로, 이라크 및 시리아군에 대한 훈련, 장비지원, 물류지원 등 다양한 활동을 지원한다. 2014년부터 현재까지 약 79억 달러 이상이 할당

18) 리히 법(Leahy Laws)은 외국군이 중대한 인권 침해(고문, 비인간적인 대우, 재판없는 장기구금 등)를 저질렀다는 신뢰할 만한 정보가 있을 경우, 해당 부대에 대한 미국 정부의 지원을 금지하는 법률임

되었으며<sup>19)</sup>, 최근 3개년 예산사용(요청) 현황은 <표 5>와 같다.


<표 5> 이라크군 지원 CTEF 예산 3개년 사용(요청) 현황

Category	FY 2023 Enacted	FY 2024 Request	FY 2025 Request
Training and Equipment	\$68,000,000	\$41,668,865	\$257,058,349
Logistical Support, Supplies, and Services	\$17,000,000	\$12,250,000	\$9,700,000
Stipends	\$182,000,000	\$135,000,000	\$60,000,000
Infrastructure Repair and Renovation	\$15,900,000	\$10,500,000	\$4,795,000
Sustainment	\$32,100,000	\$42,531,135	\$49,205,000
<b>Total CTEF Iraq</b>	<b>\$315,000,000</b>	<b>\$241,950,000</b>	<b>\$380,758,349</b>

출처: 미 국방부, 「FY 2025 COUNTER-ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF) REQUEST」(2024)

### 가. 이라크군 실 소요 기반 조달

CTEF 조달 프로세스는 소요제기에서 시작된다. 이후 MAG 심의, 법률검토, 미 중부사 심의를 거쳐 구매 및 수배송이 진행된다. 세부 절차는 <그림 9>와 같다.



<그림 9> CTEF 조달 프로세스

출처: CJTF-OIR, DMA, 「CTEF Introduction」PPT 파일(2023)

19) "Iraq", Congressional Research Service, 2024.09.05., [https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10404\(2024.10.01.검색\)](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10404(2024.10.01.검색)) \* CTEF 예산은 이라크 및 시리아군 모두를 위해 지원되며, 지원대상에 따라 CTEF-I(이라크), CTEF-S(시리아)로 구분된다. 본 수치(79억달러)는 CTEF-I와 CTEF-S를 합한 현황이다.

아프가니스탄 사례에서 볼 수 있듯이, 자국군이 운영할 수 없는 장비보급은 전투력 향상에 도움이 되지 않는다. 이에 CTEF은 소요제기 시 이라크군의 의견을 적극 반영한다. 이라크 합동참모본부(JOC-I) 군수참모부장 정기회의(주 1회)를 통해 소요를 추적하며, 필요시 <그림 10>과 같이 해부대 지휘관과의 면담을 실시한다.



<그림 10> 사막대대 및 합동여단 지휘관 회의

출처: 직접 촬영

대표적인 사례로는 사막대대(Desert Battalion)와 합동여단(Joint Brigade)이 있다. 이 부대들은 최근 사막지역 및 이라크-페슈메르가군 접경 산악지역에서 게릴라전 위주로 활동하는 ISIS 잔적 소탕을 위해, 연합군의 제안으로 23년에 신규창설 된 조직이다. 이들 부대를 위한 CTEF 조달 시, 일반부대와는 다른 작전환경(사막, 산악)을 고려할 필요성이 대두되었다. 이에 각 지휘관들을 소집하여 수차례 회의를 진행했으며, 이를 통해 넓은 사막지형을 커버할 수 있는 UAV 및 감시장비 소요를 추가 반영하였다. 또한, 지형 특성상 군수부대로부터의 신속한 군수지원이 어려운 점을 고려하여, 차량 체계를 민간차량 기반으로 조정하였다. 이를 통해 각 부대는 수리부속이 용이해지고, 직접 정비할 수 있는 능력을 강화하였다.

또한 이라크군의 소요제기 능력 향상을 위해 소요제기서를 이라크군이 직접 작성하도록 절차를 조정하였다. 기존에는 이라크군의 의견을 청취 후 연합군이 소요제기서를 작성하였으나, 이 과정에서 이라크군의 의견이 누락되는 사태가 빈번히 발생하였다. 이에 연합군 장비 제원, 조달절차, 소요제기서 작성요령 등을 교육하였으며, 이라크군에 의해 작성된 소요제기서가 CTEF 조달절차의 시작점이 되었다.

**나. 장비유지/관리 능력 함양**

지속가능한 이라크군 재건을 위해서는 지원받은 장비의 유지 및 관리 능력이 필수적이다. 미국은 이라크군의 장비 유지를 돕기 위해 수리부속을 지원해왔다. 특히, 2014년부터 CTEF 예산을 통해 지원된 장비들은 대부분 5년 이상 사용되어, 현재 유지보수 비용은 계속 증가하고 있다. 이에 따라 2025년 이라크군 지속지원에 필요한 CTEF 예산을 4,900만 달러로 산정하였으며, 이 중 3,400만 달러는 정비와 수리부속 등 장비 유지관리에 배정되었다. 항목별 세부내용은 <표 6>을 참고하기 바란다.

<표 6> 이라크군 지속지원분야 CTEF 예산 소요(FY2025)

Sustainment	
JOC-I Sustainment	Cost Estimate
RAID Systems Maintenance	\$12,701,000
<b>JOC-I Sustainment Total</b>	<b>\$12,701,000</b>
MoD Sustainment	Cost Estimate
Class IV (Barrier Material, Sandbags, Barbed Wire)	\$31,280
Class VIII (Medical Materials)	\$492,930
Class IX (Weapons Repair Parts and Vehicle Repair Parts)	\$4,147,169
<b>MoD Sustainment Total</b>	<b>\$4,671,379</b>
MoPA Sustainment	Cost Estimate
Class I (Subsistence)	\$3,690,000
Class III (Petroleum and Fuels)	\$8,612,720
Class VIII (Medical Material)	\$1,354,870
Class IX (Vehicle Parts)	\$6,619,128
<b>MoPA Sustainment Total</b>	<b>\$20,276,719</b>
MoI (BGF) Sustainment	Cost Estimate
Class VIII (Medical Material)	\$297,999
Class IX (Weapon Repair Parts and Vehicle Repair Parts)	\$6,877,158
<b>MoI (BGF) Sustainment Total</b>	<b>\$7,175,157</b>
CTS Sustainment	Cost Estimate
Class VIII (Medical Material)	\$750,000
Class IX (Weapons Repair Parts and Vehicle Repair Parts)	\$3,630,746
<b>CTS Sustainment Total</b>	<b>\$4,380,746</b>
<b>Total Sustainment</b>	<b>\$49,205,000</b>

출처: 미 국방부, 「FY 2025 COUNTER-ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF) REQUEST」(2024)

CJTF-OIR의 노력은 단순한 수리부속 지원에 그치지 않는다. 24년 7월 군수 어드바이저팀은 이라크 종합정비장을 방문하여, 특정업체에서 제작된 미군 장비에 대한 이라크군의 정비능력이 부족하다는 사실을 확인하였다<sup>20)</sup>. 이에 따라, CTEF 예산을 활용하여 해당 업체와 이라크군 정비 인력 교육훈련 패키지 계약(CLS, Contractor Logistics Support)을 진행 중이다. 교육목표는 이라크 정비인력 5명을 선발, 해당계열 장비에 대한 4단계 정비가 가능한 수준으로 하며, 총 18개월이 소요된다. 또한 직무교육(On the Job Training) 방식을 기반으로 하여, 교육기간 동안 이라크군이 보유한 모든 해당 장비의 정비(예방정비)를 병행한다. 교육을 수료한 5명의 정비인력은 이라크 군수학교의 교관이 되어 후배들을 양성할 예정이다. 이를 통해 지속 가능한 선순환 구조가 형성될 것으로 기대된다.

## V. 결 론

미군은 아프가니스탄에서의 철수 과정에서 장기적인 지원방안 구축, 평가 프로그램의 신뢰도 향상, 부정부패 방지 노력, 해당 군의 자립능력 향상 등 다양한 교훈을 얻었다. CJTF-OIR의 자문활동은 이러한 교훈을 바탕으로, “지속 가능한 이라크군 재건”을 목표로 하고 있다. 이를 위해, “Post-OIR 시대”에 대비하여 양자 간 안보 파트너십을 맺고, 대사관과 협력하는 등 장기적인 접근방식을 채택하고 있다. 또한, 어드바이저들의 현장답사를 통해 이라크군 평가 시스템의 신뢰도를 높였으며, 부정부패 방지를 위해 Vetted Officer 시스템을 도입하였다. CTEF 예산을 활용한 장비 조달 과정에서 이라크군의 적극적인 참여를 유도하고, 지원장비의 유지 및 관리 능력 향상을 위한 노력을 병행하고 있다.

CJTF-OIR 자문활동의 궁극적인 목표는 “지속 가능한 이라크군 재건”이다. 이는 미군을 포함한 연합군이 철수한 후에도 이라크군이 스스로 자국을 지킬 수 있는 역량을 갖추는 것을 의미한다. 새로운 관점에서 보면, 2003년 시작된 이라크 전쟁을 완전히 종결하기 위한 출구 전략으로도 고려될 수 있다. 21세기의 대표적인 전쟁이었던 이라크전과 아프가니스탄전에서 미국은 “전투” 보다 “안정화작전”과 “정상화”에 더 많은 시간과 예산, 인력을 투입하

20) 현장확인 결과, 험비 등 소형차량에 대한 정비는 가능하나, 유조차량, HET 등 대형차량에 대한 정비능력이 부족하였음.

였다. 이처럼 전투에서의 단기적인 승리뿐만 아니라, 전쟁을 잘 마무리하는 능력이 요구되는 시대이다.

본 기고문에서 언급한 경험과 교훈은 한반도에서의 안정화작전 및 자문활동 임무를 수행하는 다른 파병활동에 귀중한 자산이 될 것으로 기대된다. 파트너군에 대한 이해와 협력을 바탕으로, 긴 호흡을 가지고 접근할 때, 성공적인 자문활동이 가능할 것이며, 이는 전쟁을 “잘 마무리” 짓는데 중요한 역할을 할 것이다.

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# Atrocity Crimes: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Framework Post-2005

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## ABSTRACT

The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), adopted by the UN in 2005, was a response to the international community's failure to prevent the horrors of the Rwandan Genocide and the Yugoslav wars. It sought to enhance mechanisms for the prevention of mass atrocities. Although R2P was a compelling international norm in theory, it has faltered in practice, as evidenced by recurring atrocities in places like Myanmar, Syria, and Gaza. Its inconsistent implementation in cases of mass atrocities has sparked controversy. This thesis examined instances in which R2P was utilized and where it was not, exploring factors that address the question: 'How effective and successful is this framework in preventing and responding to mass atrocities?'

Using a qualitative methodology based on thematic analysis, this research explored the effectiveness of the doctrine in averting mass atrocities and highlighted instances where R2P interventions were successful. The study identified the instances where the R2P doctrine can or could have been invoked—like in Myanmar and Gaza—and analyzed the reasons behind its underutilization. As a result, the findings emphasized the structural issues inside the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that hinder the doctrine's effectiveness. Furthermore, the study highlighted the need for clear criteria to measure the success of atrocity prevention. Addressing the structural issues within the UNSC, establishing clear criteria for measuring atrocity prevention success, and fostering a greater inclusive and equitable approach to humanitarian intervention are crucial steps in realizing the full potential of the doctrine.

**Keywords:** Responsibility to Protect (R2P), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Mass Atrocities, Criteria for Success, Humanitarian Crises, Myanmar, Gaza

# Atrocity Crimes: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Framework Post-2005

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the world has borne witness to distressing human rights violations, epitomized by the tragic events of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the atrocities that unfolded during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The efforts of the international community to prevent and halt such mass atrocities have been somehow controversial throughout history. With the changing nature of the conflict, the level of violence perpetuated in those conflicts also became intense, targeting the civilian population.

The period following the Cold War has witnessed a surge in the discourse surrounding human rights and its advancement on the global stage, aligning with an increasing inclination to perceive a connection between breaches of human rights and international security. Also, at the end of the 20th century, the international community's failure to prevent events such as the Rwandan Genocide and the Yugoslav War also made the debate concerning the traditional definition of security focus more on the human aspect of security, that is, to protect human security. These alarming incidents were stark

reminders of the international community's inability to prevent or halt such crimes.

In this regard, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) coined the term 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) twenty years ago. In 2005, the UN Member States adopted the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) with consensus, which established the responsibility of states and the international community to protect under Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the documents.

This represented a paradigm shift in international relations as it emphasized the collective duty of the international community in cases where the states are, in reality, violating the principles that R2P seeks to uphold. The principle of R2P is primarily based upon three pillars that collectively guide the prevention and reaction to mass atrocities. One of the most essential components of the doctrine is the prevention of atrocity crimes, inclusive genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. For all the consensus about its framework as a mechanism to deal with such atrocities, there is a gap between its theoretical foundations and what is happening in reality, with reoccurring atrocities in places like Myanmar, Syria, Gaza, or Yemen.

The gap raises questions about the fundamental validity and implementation of the doctrine in preventing mass atrocities. To address this, it is crucial to analyze instances where the doctrine met the necessary threshold for atrocity crimes but was not invoked. Additionally, it is important to assess whether the doctrine, when applied, has effectively prevented atrocities or exacerbated the situation. This paper aims to investigate how the framework is sufficient enough in preventing and responding to mass atrocities. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to evaluate the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in conflict zones to identify the challenges and obstacles hindering

its effectiveness in preventing mass atrocities.

The paper is structured into four sections: the first introduces the brief literature review of the present data on the doctrine of R2P, the second outlines the research methodology, and the third presents findings, analysis, and conclusions.

## II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

- **Historical Context and the Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Framework**

Until the end of the 1990s, scholars and international relations analysts gave little attention to the diverse dimensions of violence, conflict, the level of crimes committed, and the international community's failure to prevent those crimes. However, with time and the growing failure of the international community to halt the atrocities, scholars such as Alex Bellamy and Gareth Evans have debated the international community's role in preventing and ceasing mass atrocities.

Their analysis of the failures of the international community to prevent atrocity crimes catalyzed the R2P principle. For example, Alex Bellamy critically examines the historical failures of the international community, particularly in the context of the Rwanda Genocide and the Yugoslav Wars.<sup>1)</sup> The situation being of prime concern to the overall global populace, the Government of Canada led by its Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy initiated the formation of ICISS in September 2000. The ICISS introduced the concept of R2P based on three principles, namely: Responsibility to Prevent, Responsibility

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1) Alex J. Bellamy. (2008). The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention. *International Affairs* 84(4), 615-639. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00729.x>

to Protect, and Responsibility to Rebuild as articulated by Stahn.<sup>2)</sup> The report shifted focus from the 'Right to Intervene' to the 'Responsibility to Protect'. The report also aimed to redefine the concept of sovereignty, stating that a state's sovereignty depends on its responsibility to protect its citizens.<sup>3)</sup> This shows that the principle of non-intervention should be respected by all states as long as the state is fulfilling this responsibility.

With this shift in the perspective of security, the term “responsibility to protect” was coined by the ICISS document and laid the foundation for what countries would adopt as the United Nations R2P principles at the 2005 World Summit. The responsibility to protect, known as R2P, has been embraced by world leaders in paragraph 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document. The same was later reiterated in Resolution 1674 of 2006.<sup>4)</sup>

Both Paragraphs 138 and 139 as referenced in the World Summit Document 2005 are stated below:

Paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document stresses upon prevention of the four crimes through “appropriate and necessary measures” and states have expressly agreed to “support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability”<sup>5)</sup>

Paragraph 139 refers to the international community's role, through the UN to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter” to protect populations

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2) Stahn, Carsten. (2007). Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm. *The American Journal of International Law* 101(1), 99–120. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0002930000029559>.

3) MacFarlane, S. & Khong, F. (2006). *Human Security and the UN*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

4) Davies, Sara E., and Luke Glanville. (2010). *Protecting the Displaced*. Nijhoff EBooks. <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004184039.i-210>.

5) United Nations. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005: World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1.

from causalities that results out from the possible escalation of these crimes. Only when states fail does that responsibility of the international come into play. With this in mind, we are ready to pursue collective action, where needed, through the Security Council, depending on the circumstances of the specific situation, in compliance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, and in cooperation with appropriate regional organizations as if peaceful means are incapable of ending genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity national authorities are a failure in offering protection to their people.<sup>6)</sup>

Hence the framework's underlying principle is based upon three main postulates given in Table below:

Table 1: Description of Pillars of Responsibility to Protect(R2P)

Pillar	Description
Pillar 1	Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
Pillar 2	The wider international community is responsible for encouraging and assisting individual states in meeting that responsibility.
Pillar 3	If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and by the UN Charter.

Source: United Nations (2016)<sup>7)</sup>

The Secretary General refers to Pillar 1 as the “bedrock” of R2P and calls for states to “ensure effective mechanisms to handle domestic disputes, foster respect among disparate groups and protecting the rights of women, youth

6) Ibid.

7) Šimonović, I. (2016, December). *The Responsibility to Protect*. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/responsibility-protect>

and minorities”.

Pillar 2 centres on the global community working cooperatively with "member States, regional and sub-regional bodies, civil societies and private sectors" to (1) engage states to fulfil Pillar 1 obligations, (2) help states to discharge their obligations, (3) develop the abilities of states to protect their populations from mass atrocities and (4) backing states which are under "stress" prior to "crisis" and conflict".

Pillar 3 then deals with the responsibility of the international community to take action through a great many varieties of mechanisms. This may be given in the form of economic, diplomatic, political or juridical responses and where necessary, in exceptional cases could be coercive. Force, however, must only be used when backed by the UNSC.<sup>8)</sup> It is one of the misconceptions that this framework is all about taking military actions when it comes to preventing atrocities. There is a need to view this from a much broader idea, that before taking any military action under the Pillar 3, several non-coercive measures should be adopted, while military action must be the last resort.

Since its formulation, the framework has emerged in numerous statements by the President of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on issues as diverse as protecting civilians in armed conflict, international peace and security, and the protection of children. R2P represents a significant shift in international society. It reflects a normative change in which human beings are recognized as subjects of universal law and international relations, to some extent, in response to the evolving nature of threats to individuals and the changing relationship between states and individuals.<sup>9)</sup> This evolution prompts

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8) United Nations. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005: World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1.2005

9) Tsai, Yu-Tai. (2010). The Study of Diffusion and Practice of International Norms through the Human Security: The Case of 'Responsibility to Protect. *Asian Social Science*, 6(2). <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fc4c/8ed32ddab3d41ae9f8e4db408690531891eb.pdf>

a re-evaluation of the global community's role in safeguarding human rights and ensuring collective security in an increasingly interconnected world.

### • Atrocity Crime: The Foundation of the R2P Framework

The term refers to severe violations of human rights and international humanitarian law on a large scale, often targeting civilian populations. Atrocities are viewed as extreme mass violence that shocks the public's conscience.<sup>10</sup> The world community condemns these atrocities and believes it is morally necessary to stop them, protect the victims, and punish those responsible. For these crimes, the framework of Responsibility to Protect was formulated because, in any situation, civilians must be protected at any cost.

The atrocities include *genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing*. The legal definitions of these crimes are defined in international documents, which will be stated below, other than ethnic cleansing, as it is not a legal crime under international law but has the threshold to be considered a war crime or crime against humankind. The table below shows different types of atrocity crimes under international law.

Table 2: Description of Atrocity Crimes under the framework of Responsibility to Protect(R2P) Framework

Crime Type	Definition	Examples
Genocide	A crime committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in whole or in part	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Killing members of the group</li> <li>b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group</li> <li>c. Intentionally inflicting conditions of life for physical destruction</li> <li>d. Imposing measures to prevent births</li> <li>e. Relocating children from one group to another</li> </ul>

10) R2P: The Dream and the Reality – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2020, December 3). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/r2p-the-dream-and-the-reality/>

Crime Type	Definition	Examples
Ethnic Cleansing	Attempt to create ethnically homogeneous areas through the deportation or forcible displacement of persons belonging to particular ethnic groups.	a. N/A (as ethnic cleansing is not recognized as a standalone crime, but acts may constitute other crimes)
War Crimes	Breach of the rules of war, as defined by the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.	a. Willful killing b. Torture or inhumane treatment c. Conscripting POWs d. Unlawful confinement e. Extensive destruction and appropriation of property
Crimes against humanity	Acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.	a. Murder b. Enslavement c. Extermination d. Forcible transfer of population e. Torture

Source: Global Center for Responsibility to Protect (2018)

### • R2P as a Framework for Preventing Atrocity Crimes

The framework has retained its significance even after its formal adoption. It has become more critical in the current context of protection crises that the emergence of violent extremists has worsened. R2P has played a significant role in shaping how the international community views situations involving protection failures and has created higher expectations regarding the response to atrocity crimes that have already taken place or are about to happen. There is a difference of opinion among scholars related to the tendency of R2P to prevent atrocity crimes.

For Alex Bellamy, the framework of R2P serves as one of the most significant developments in the conflict resolution to humanitarian crises. Another scholar Acharya, also views this principle as one of the greatest works of the ICISS in response to the previous crisis.<sup>11)</sup> However, in another work, Bellamy

11) Acharya, A. (2015). The Responsibility to Protect and a theory of norm circulation. In R. Thakur, & W. Maley (Eds) *Theorising the Responsibility to Protect* (pp. 59–63). Cambridge University Press.

discusses how R2P emerged as a response to the international community's failure to prevent mass atrocities, emphasizing its primary focus on prevention. He explores the three pillars of R2P and highlights the controversial issue of employing armed force as a final option within the third foundational aspect.<sup>12)</sup> Bellamy argues that while R2P promotes non-coercive measures and dialogue, military intervention might be necessary in certain cases to prevent or halt atrocities. He acknowledges the inherent tension between R2P's non-coercive intentions and the possibility of military intervention, and he underscores the significance of upholding proportionality standards, legality, and legitimacy when considering forces. Bellamy also addresses criticisms that R2P is a cover for powerful states' political agendas, emphasizing the need for transparency and adherence to international law to maintain R2P's credibility.

Similarly, other scholars also view R2P as 'sound and fury signifying nothing'; a mere 'slogan employed for differing purposes shorn of any real meaning or utility'.<sup>13)</sup> This argument is also validated by Murray in his work where he points out that state responses to mass atrocities continue to be dictated by 'rational calculations premised on self-interest'.<sup>14)</sup> The discourse around R2P continues to evolve, highlighting the complexities and challenges inherent in translating this doctrine into meaningful action to prevent and respond to crises.

According to Stretton, the concept of R2P represents both positive and negative sides. Its positive aspect lies in its encouragement of states to protect human rights and prevent mass atrocities. The concept serves as an

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12) Bellamy, A. (2011). Mass atrocities and armed conflict: Links, distinctions, and implications for the Responsibility to Prevent. *Stanley Foundation*, 1-20.

13) Hehir A. (2010). The Responsibility to Protect: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?. *International Relations* 24(2), 218-239. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117809366205>

14) Murray RW. (2013). Humanitarianism, responsibility or rationality? Evaluating intervention as state strategy. In Hehir A and Murray RW (Eds) *Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention* (pp.15-33). Palgrave.

instrument to pressure states to fulfil their responsibility to protect citizens, even if intervention doesn't occur. However, Stretton also points out the risk that self-interest can influence decisions regarding intervention.<sup>15)</sup> Also, M. Ayoob highlights how the Responsibility to Protect has given humanitarian intervention a new dimension by allowing governments to pursue their objectives under the protection of the international community.<sup>16)</sup> To be more precise, it makes the case that states have the authority to choose whether to act in areas in which they have a direct stake and whether to refrain from doing so in other areas in which they do not.

Authors in the past years have started to reposition the nature of R2P. Some conceive it is about individual responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes where others see an international and national capacity to prevent these crimes. Popovski, in his examination, underscores the global Responsibility to Protect (R2P) mechanism of response or intervention amidst mass atrocities. He also emphasizes this task of the Security Council as the "the most powerful and precise instrument of the international radial for the maintenance of international peace" for the implementation of R2P to protect people at risk.<sup>17)</sup> But his research has not considered the challenges or obstacles that might confront us in carrying through with this model.

However, Aji Poerana and Handayani emphasize the role of different actors in implementing this framework. For example, their study shows the importance of the role of government in conflict prevention and the prevention

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15) Stretton, Taylah.(2019). What Are the Risks and Benefits of Embracing the Responsibility to Protect concept? Should We Do So?. *Linkedin.com*. <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-risks-benefits-embracing-responsibility-protect-should-stretton-1f>.

16) Ayoob, M. (2002). Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6(1), 81-102. DOI: 10.1080/714003751.

17) Popovski, Vesselin. (2019). The United Nations Security Council and R2P as Global Approach to prevent mass atrocities. In, Kulnazarova, A., Popovski, V(Eds), *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace*: Palgrave Macmillan.

of atrocity crimes. Still, their study needs to include the main challenges that any actor on the national level may face when implementing this model.

Secondly, the primary focus on the role of national actors in implementing this model does not delve into the specific roles and responsibilities of international or regional organizations, such as the United Nations, in implementing R2P. On the other hand, research by Luck and Luck argues for strengthening the potential of individuals and including individual actors besides the national and international actors.<sup>18)</sup> This states that the focus should be broad to allow the comprehensiveness of the analysis of the effectiveness of R2P.

R2P was developed primarily to prevent the four atrocity crimes, and any use of force in conflict zones is reserved for actions within Chapters VII of the United Nations Charter. However, there are situations in the real world where the Security Council fails to act, such as the Syrian case in 2011. Under the third pillar of R2P, limited use of force should be permitted to safeguard populations in such scenarios. Although R2P has contributed significantly to protecting populations over the past decade, the Security Council's veto system can still lead to circumstances where states can commit mass atrocity crimes against their citizens. This inherent limitation in the Security Council's decision-making process underscores the need for continued dialogue and reform efforts to address the complexities surrounding the use of veto power.

- **From Doctrine to Practice: Implementation and Non-Implementation of R2P**

Since its adoption, many events have occurred under the roof of the United Nations regarding implementing this doctrine. The principle has been invoked

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18) Luck, Edward C., and Dana Zaret Luck. (2015). The Individual Responsibility to Protect. In Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (Eds), *Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention* (pp.207-48). Cambridge University Press. Doi: 10.1017/CBO9781316154632.012.

in over 80 Security Council resolutions and almost 50 Human Rights Council resolutions.<sup>19)</sup> The principle has been invoked in various resolutions but has seen limited implementation in countries to avert the atrocities. This section will provide a brief overview of the cases relating to the implementation and non-implementation of the framework since its adoption.

## Implementation of R2P

There have been some success stories as claimed by the international community just like in Kenya in 2008, Cote D Ivoire, and some initial success of Libya. This section will provide a brief analysis of the success cases of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) under the three pillars of R2P. This is further categorized into two sub sections, the implementation of the framework under coercive (military force), and non-coercive (preventive strategies) measures.

### R2P under Coercive Measures

- Libya

The conflict in Libya is considered a prominent example of the R2P case. The conflict has its roots in the February 2011 protests that turned into demands for President Muammar Gaddafi's resignation.<sup>20)</sup> As the demands grew, the government's response turned violent against the civilians. Followed by this, more than thousand people lost their lives even before the military intervention took place. As the violence escalated to an extreme level, many international and regional organizations, including the UN member states showed their concern on the matter.

For this reason, the UN Security Council (UNSC) had credited Resolution

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19) What is R2P? – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2024, September 9). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*.

20) Libya – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2023, June 1). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/libya/>

1970 on February 26 and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities by the Libyan authorities. It also agreed to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC), impose arms embargo on Libya, and freeze assets of some high-level Libyan official.<sup>21)</sup>

In a parallel development, as the desired result was not achieved and fatalities mounted, on March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing 'all necessary measures' to suppress the use of forces against civilians and the civilian community.<sup>22)</sup> This subsequent resolution authorized member states, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to undertake any requisite measures to safeguard civilians and areas inhabited by civilians that faced the imminent threat of attack within Libya, including the city of Benghazi. This resolution called for an immediate establishment of a cease-fire, an unambiguous halt to violence against civilians, and the enforcement of a no-fly zone and embargo on arms. So, a month later on March 31, NATO took over full command and spearheaded Operation Unified Protector in Libya to halt genocidal activities. This marked a critical turning point in the international community's response to the crisis.

- **Cote D Ivoire**

The country has been subject to long standing disputes related identity politics and resulted in years of political instability. However, in the context of Responsibility to Protect, Cote D Ivoire, also known as Ivory Coast serves as the prominent case where the UNSC authorized action under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in a manner consistent with Pillar 3 of R2P.

Ivory Coast fighting is rooted in complex ethnic, national and religious divisions. Politicians weaponized those divisions to entrench their own grip on

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21) United Nations. (2011). S/RES/1970.

22) United Nations. (2011). S/RES/1973.

power and pushed the country towards civil war. The post-election violence in 2010 had pushed the country into severe mass atrocities. The dispute revolved around results announced by the electoral commission, as Gbagbo had huge support in the south, so he rejected results declaring Ouattara a winner of the second round of presidential elections.<sup>23)</sup> Ouattara was of course not ready to hand over political leadership to him, as he stands accused of rigging votes in favor of the opposition's northern stronghold.

In the aftermath of the November 2010 presidential election, some 3,000 people were killed when incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power and clashes broke out between his supporters and those loyal to President Alassane Ouattara. However, under the UN Security Council in Resolution 1975, the atrocities ended, followed by an international military intervention.<sup>24)</sup> This intervention, along with diplomatic efforts halted the violence and led to the eventual arrest of Gbagbo, restoring relative stability to the country.

## R2P under Preventive Measures

The debate around the doctrine has mainly focused on the military resort or taking action under Pillar 3 of R2P. This debate has often overlooked the possibility of using preventive measures to resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, so far as the normative evolution of R2P within the United Nations (UN) is concerned, prevention has been presented as the primary objective of the concept. Separated from its now-deceased predecessor Kofi Annan (2004), who contended that the nobility of R2P lay in prevention, and following in the

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23) Ogwang, Tom. (2011). The Root Causes of the Conflict in Ivory Coast. *African Portal*. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/TomOgwang/publication/334391635\\_The\\_Root\\_Causes\\_of\\_the\\_Conflict\\_in\\_Ivory\\_Coast/links/5d2724a3299bf1547cac5bc9/The-Root-Causes-of-the-Conflict-in-Ivory-Coast.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/TomOgwang/publication/334391635_The_Root_Causes_of_the_Conflict_in_Ivory_Coast/links/5d2724a3299bf1547cac5bc9/The-Root-Causes-of-the-Conflict-in-Ivory-Coast.pdf)

24) Côte d'Ivoire – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2023, March 1). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.global2p.org/countries/cote-divoire/>

footsteps of Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has sought to emphasize prevention measures as a priority.<sup>25)</sup> In this regard, the cases of Kenya and Guinea represents the importance of using preventive measures under the Pillar 1 and 2 of the doctrine.

- **Kenya and Guinea**

Kenya and Guinea were the countries in which preventive diplomacy was used to halt the atrocities. Although they have witnessed more minor-scale atrocities as compared to other conflict zones but were eventually stopped due to the preventive efforts of the international community.<sup>26)</sup> In both the cases, the major cause of the conflict lies in the political and ethnic saturation in the society, like for example in Kenya, violence erupted against the community after presidential elections in 2007, Guinean junta forces quashed a peaceful protest led by this group killing over one hundred civil rights activist civilians during 2009.<sup>27)</sup> The situation in Kenya and Guinea underscores the importance of early prevention and how such measures also prevent the crisis from turning into atrocities. Williams also supports that such preventive deployments could reduce the risk of atrocity crimes through diplomatic, economic, and political efforts. Furthermore, the international community in Paragraph 139 of WSOD also authorized to use peaceful measures in accordance with the Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter.

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25) United Nation Secretary General. (2009). *Report of the Secretary General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/63/677, United Nations*. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/647126?v=pdf>

26) Serrano, M., & Weiss, T. G. (2014). Introduction: Is R2P “cascading”? In M. Serrano & T. G. Weiss (Eds), *The international politics of human rights, rallying to the R2P cause?*. Routledge.

27) Weiss, T. G. (2010). Halting atrocities in Kenya. *Great Decisions*,17-30. <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/halting-atrocities-in-kenya/>

## Non-implementation of R2P

The international community has witnessed numerous times where the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine has not been implemented, a long way outweighing the instances wherein it's been actually implemented. Atrocities continue to spread in locations like Yemen, Syria, Myanmar, and the long-status Israel-Palestine conflict, highlighting the frequent gaps in the doctrine's application.

### • Myanmar

Myanmar has a population of 54 million people and officially recognizes 135 major ethnic groups and seven ethnic minority states. Among this, the most significant percentage of Muslims is in Myanmar, in which the Rohingya community is the most discriminated against in the world. The community is described as the world's largest stateless community, depriving them of fundamental rights such as access to health services, education, and employment.

In 2012, a wave of violent incidents, including riots, occurred in the country against the Rohingyas.<sup>28)</sup> This situation further escalated the long-standing dispute, and as a result, over one hundred thousand Muslim Rohingyas were forced to leave their homes within the country, and hundreds lost their lives.

This situation worsened following the 2021 military coup, complicating potential solutions. Today, approximately 1.35 million individuals are classified as refugees or asylum-seekers, with an additional 2.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The atrocities include arbitrary killings, sexual violence, arson, and severe restrictions on movement and essential services, leading to allegations of ethnic cleansing and genocide. The UN Human

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28) Civil War in Myanmar | Global Conflict Tracker. (n.d.). *Global Conflict Tracker*. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar>

Rights chief in 2017 referred to the situation as a 'textbook example of ethnic cleansing' due to the presence of at least one of the four atrocity crimes categorized in the R2P framework.<sup>29)</sup> Also, there have been numerous reports of crimes against humanity, including torture of detainees, sexual abuse, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

- **Palestine**

The situation in Palestine is an ongoing crisis that serves as a current comparison in which the conflict is the violation of the norms and values that R2P declares to protect. It is not war only; it is impartial acts of aggression, social infrastructure demolitions and mass death by means of imminent starvation now a routine for many years without any termination at all in sight.

A critical and particularly acute manifestation of this conflict is the situation in Gaza. The Gaza Strip, a small and densely populated territory, has been a flashpoint of violence and humanitarian crises for decades. The Israel-Palestine conflict specifically focusing on the current Gaza crisis has crossed all the threshold of the atrocity crimes happening there.

The massacres and genocides happening are not one-day stories. Instead, it has been prolonged even before 1948, and now the October 7, 2023 conflict has been the deadliest among all. The escalation started when Hamas launched a startling offensive involving rocket attacks on Israel and raids on border towns. This offensive resulted in over 1,300 Israeli deaths, 3,300 injuries, and hundreds of captives. In response to this, Israel responded with a powerful counter-offensive. Following the October 7 attack, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant referred to Palestinians as “human animals”

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29) Syed, I. (2019). To Intervene or Not to Intervene: Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Myanmar. *IPRI journals* 19(1), 111-127. <https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.190105>.

and threatened to cut off essential water, food, and electricity supplies.<sup>30)</sup> This statement has been widely condemned as it represents a public threat to deny basic supplies to the population.

The conflict reached its critical point in March 2024, when the United Nations unanimously adopted the resolution 2728 to stop all the hostilities in the area, yet we have seen no substantial success.<sup>31)</sup> The atrocities are happening in their own pace, and the international community is witnessing them. The failure of the resolution was followed by a historic ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 2024, which declared Israel's presence and activities in the occupied Palestinian territory as illegal and demanded their immediate cessation. However, it was also strongly criticized and rejected by some countries, especially those that supported Israel.

Till date, according to the observation by one of the organizations Save the Children, almost 21,000 children are estimated to be missing in the chaos of the war in Gaza, many trapped beneath rubble, detained, buried in unmarked graves, or lost from their families.<sup>32)</sup> In another report, the statistics suggests that Israel has killed more than 14,000 children in Gaza since October 7, while others are suffering from severe malnutrition and do not “even have the energy to cry”, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), said in a report earlier this year.<sup>33)</sup> The recent escalation of the Gaza-Israel conflict highlights the severe humanitarian impact on civilians and is a clear-cut case for genocide and war crimes. The historical and ongoing nature of the Israeli-Palestinian

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30) Karanth, Sanjana. (2023, October 9). Israeli Defence Minister Announces Siege on Gaza to Fight 'Human Animals'. *HuffPost UK*. [https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/israel-defence-minister-human-animals-gaza-palestine\\_uk\\_65245ebae4b0a32c15bfe6b6](https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/israel-defence-minister-human-animals-gaza-palestine_uk_65245ebae4b0a32c15bfe6b6).

31) United Nations. S/RES/2728.

32) Jazeera, Al. (2024, June 24). Over 20,000 Children Buried, Trapped, Detained, Lost Amid Gaza War: Report. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/24/over-20000-children-buried-trapped-detained-lost-amid-gaza-war-report>.

33) Ibid.

conflict, coupled with the recent intensification, underscores the urgent need for renewed international efforts to address and resolve the core issues of self-governance and human rights for Palestinians.

- **Yemen**

The country has suffered from recurrent crimes against humanity and war crimes since 2015 with no substantial effort by the international community to prevent them. The conflict has its roots in the attacks by the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led international forces - airstrikes that have killed thousands of civilians, with deaths stemming from fighting between Houthi Forces and armed forces loyal to the internationally recognized government in Yemen since March of 2015. The crisis in Yemen has been lasting more than 20 years but it went through a sharp turning point in September 2014 when Houthi forces and military units loyal to the dethroned president Ali Abdullah Saleh managed to control dozens of governorates.

According to the Panel of Experts on Yemen, which is mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), all sides to the conflict have been engaging in arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, forced disappearances, mistreatment, and torture of prisoners since 2015.<sup>34)</sup> The coalition alone has subjected over 19,200 civilians to death or injury, including more than half of the children killed by airstrikes.<sup>35)</sup> At least 4 million have been displaced; it has generated the world's largest humanitarian crisis, with over 18 million people requiring some form of humanitarian aid and protection and over 17 million facing food insecurity.<sup>36)</sup>

34) UNSC Report. S/2021/79. <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2140/panel-of-experts/work-and-mandate/reports>

35) Yemen – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2024, September 3). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/yemen/>

36) UNHCR. (2017). *Yemen Refugee Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News | USA for UNHCR*. Unrefugees.org. <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/yemen/>

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has said to be the worst followed by hunger and disease as a result of the conflict. All sides to the war are still engaging in abuses and violations of human rights, such as arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and torture, in addition to possible breaches of international humanitarian law, such as the targeting of people and the denial of access for humanitarian aid.

- **Syria**

Since March 2011, Syria has been embroiled in an armed conflict between government forces and opposition groups. The protracted crisis originated from President Bashar al-Assad's brutal suppression of protests in 2011, quickly escalating into an internationalized conflict marked by widespread atrocity crimes, including the illegal use of chemical weapons. Since the conflict began, at least 580,000 people have been killed, including an estimated 306,887 civilians from 1 March 2011 to 31 March 2021, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.<sup>37)</sup> This conflict has caused around 400,000 deaths and mass displacement, profoundly impacted Syria's economy and resulted in dire humanitarian conditions with limited access to essentials. Despite the UNSC passing dozens of resolutions on Syria since 2013, none have been fully implemented, and the Syrian government has directly violated many of them.

Since the end of September 2023, all-hostilities have been waged in north-west Syria with bombing and shelling that has never stopped to hit civilian infrastructure especially the largest power plant for Idlib city schools' hospitals camps displacement markets mosques.<sup>38)</sup> According to Human Rights

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37) OHCHR. (2023, May 11). *Behind the data: Recording civilian casualties in Syria*. OHCHR. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2023/05/behind-data-recording-civilian-casualties-syria>

38) Syria - Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2024, September 3). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.global2p.org/countries/syria/>

Watch, Syrian forces attacked civilians in at least three towns that were under government control with incendiary weapons and banned cluster munitions has reported that at least 70 civilians have died, along with more than 303 injured and some 120,000 people displaced from their homes.<sup>39)</sup> Despite efforts for peace talks by the international community, diplomatic solutions faltered due to divisions and a lack of progress. Amidst these complexities, the Syrian crisis remains a deeply entrenched and pressing global concern.

• **Unexplored Terrain: Assessing R2P Application in Conflict Zones to Prevent Mass Atrocities**

It is not the case that these conflict zones do not make up the case for atrocities; they do, but still, we have witnessed the unwillingness of the international community to take action against these atrocities. Who is to blame for the failure to prevent or halt this ugly war, the world's worst continuing conflict? Was there any kind of intervention—and if so, by whom and when—that could have made a difference?

Is the ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Rohingya Community in Myanmar not considered atrocity crimes? Are the decades of conflict in Yemen and Syria are not enough to convince the international community to take some on ground action? Moreover, what is happening in Gaza today since the October 7, 2023 incident, where children are just beheaded, and the military forces are just destroying schools, hospitals, and refugee centres, does not come under international attention to take any serious action against these crimes? Also, why the international community was able to take the action in Libya or Ivory Coast, but not in other similar cases? Is the doctrine of R2P working on the principle of selective implementation? The question

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39) Syria. (2021, January 13). *Human Rights Watch*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/syria>

comes, why is R2P silent here, and why, having an internationally recognized framework to prevent such atrocities, are we still witnessing them daily in millions of numbers?

Even in dire circumstances demanding the invocation of this doctrine, there is a growing failure to utilize it due to the International Community's limitations. This raises the pressing question: why? Why does this doctrine, explicitly created to prevent such crimes, struggle to be implemented effectively? Is there a flaw in the R2P concept, or is it challenging to accurately gauge its effectiveness? This predicament challenges the fundamental efficacy of the R2P doctrine, warranting a closer examination of its practical application and actual impact on preventing atrocities.

As discussed above, there is a gap between the theory and practical implementation of the principle. Even though prevention is at the core of the principle and the principle of R2P also helped build the international community consensus to prevent atrocity crimes, the reoccurring atrocities in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, among others, show that the Protection of Civilians (POC) is still generally lacking in many regions of the world and serves as a reminder that there is still more work to be done to strengthen nations' obligations to prevent atrocities within their boundaries. In turn, the UN Security Council's inability to resolve R2P crises speaks eloquently about the controversy surrounding the idea's use.

In his research, Glanville posits that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine consists of two norms. The first norm states that every state must prevent atrocity crimes.<sup>40)</sup> The second norm holds the international community responsible for taking all necessary measures to protect populations from such crimes. According to Glanville, this second norm is the most contentious,

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40) Glanville, Luke. (2016). Does R2P Matter? Interpreting the Impact of a Norm. *Cooperation and Conflict* 51(2), 184-99. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48512896>

and the validity of the entire doctrine hinges on it. The second norm gets questioned the most by international scholars and commentators when invoking this doctrine in conflict zones.

Furthermore, the United Nations has developed a "Framework for the Analysis of Atrocity Crimes", an essential tool of atrocity prevention as it clearly defines what atrocity crimes are and the associated key risk factors. However, the ability of R2P to prevent mass atrocities remains unclear. For example, in the case of Myanmar, over the last ten decades, several instances have led to atrocities and genocidal violence. However, why is the international community still unable to prevent these atrocities? Why is the promise of "Never Again" turned into again and again?<sup>41</sup> These are some of the concerns that make us question the fundamental objective of the R2P framework, for which it was solely formulated.

### III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research employs a qualitative approach to explore the effectiveness of the doctrine, with a specific focus on the cases since 2005. Data for this paper has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. For this research, a total of eleven (11) interviews were conducted with different R2P experts worldwide. The research employed semi-structured interviews, which allowed for a mix of fixed and open-ended questions and encouraged engaging and relaxed question/answer sessions. For this research, the secondary sources used include research papers, journal articles, and books.

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41) Mennecke, Martin, and Ellen E. Stensrud. (2021). The Failure of the International Community to Apply R2p and Atrocity Prevention in Myanmar. *Global Responsibility to Protect*. Brill Nijhoff. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1875-984X-13020013>

Editorial pieces from newspapers and magazines were also part of the secondary source.

The primary and secondary data were analyzed through thematic analysis by examining and recording patterns (or themes) within the data. The data from the transcribed interviews have been used as evidence to support arguments in the findings section of the paper. Since all interviews have been kept anonymous, coded names have been used when using direct quotations from the transcripts; they are denoted as follows:

- Interview Participants: IP-1, IP-2, IP-3, IP-4, IP-5, IP-6, IP-7, IP-8, IP-9, IP-10, IP-11

Before engaging in the research, the participants were provided with an information sheet outlining the study's objective, accompanied by an informed consent form, which they duly signed. Additionally, the authors will ensure participants' identities and responses remain anonymous and confidential throughout the research process. All data has been securely stored and is accessible only to the authors.

## IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### **Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A doctrine in Crisis?**

The main research question that this research aims to explore is the effectiveness of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine in preventing and responding to mass atrocities. The answer to this question will determine whether the framework has sufficiently countered the atrocities or exacerbated the ratio of mass atrocities in the conflict zone. A detailed thematic analysis of the gathered data(interviews) has yielded the following results:

- **Challenges in Measuring Effectiveness**

While the term is widely discussed in the literature, there are few analyses from the angle of its effectiveness in preventing atrocities. There is a debate among the international community regarding the success or effectiveness of the doctrine in responding to the objectives for which it was formulated.

In order to understand the effectiveness of any principle or doctrine, it is essential to understand what it was established for. In the case of R2P, it was established in response to the international community's failure to prevent past atrocities, and the aim was to avoid those past events. However, the persistent occurrence of such crimes since its adoption highlights significant flaws. This argument is supported by one of the respondents who mentioned that R2P is a "spectacular failure" and believes that it has not saved a single human life but has made the bad situations worse. So, judging by any objective measurement, "it has been a complete and utter failure" (IP-7).

Another R2P expert, who served as the principal actor in formulating the doctrine in ICISS, mentions that R2P gets very "awful or failing grades" regarding its effectiveness. While sharing his thoughts, he remarked in the following words, "It is hard to say about the effectiveness of the doctrine when you cannot prove that what you are doing will have an impact" (IP-10). This means that without a specific-criteria, it is impossible to prove that what you have done prevented atrocities, and if they are prevented, you don't actually know if they would have been the same, better, or worse with no action.

For another respondent, the goal of R2P is not just to stop atrocities; in fact, its goal is also on the prevention side, even before the atrocities begin. Still, many atrocities are happening, and prevention has also failed. He believed that, we as an international community have yet tied too many expectations with the doctrine. It was not a magic formula that would stop all atrocities from 2005 onwards, so there is probably also a wrong measuring stick. This

again validates the argument of not having specific criteria to measure its effectiveness.

However, one of the most prominent experts in the field of R2P emphasized the significant gap in the implementation of R2P, arguing that the demands placed on the UN are unrealistic. This critique points to a critical flaw in evaluating R2P: With this in mind, we forget that while evaluating any operation, our main focus is whether all the atrocities stopped. He says, "What we do is we are comparing a real-life situation with some fictional alternative reality where everything suddenly turns out okay" (IP-1). This unrealistic benchmark sets R2P up for perceived failure, as the complex nature of international relations and geopolitical interests often hinder the doctrine's implementation.

As per the analysis of the interviewees, they used the phrase "R2P had no teeth" to analyze the ineffectiveness of the doctrine. The logic behind this use of words is that it was just bogus from the beginning and not going to work out within the presence of some big players in the system. It was meant to sort out the issues with the collective assistance of the international community.

One of the respondents criticized the like of R2P on many activities in the following words:

R2P's lack of silence on many activities protected by Western states has ultimately led to claims that it is biased. It is only upheld when the West seeks to uphold it, and many countries are now quite disillusioned with it.

(IP-11)

For her, R2P's capability to have a practical effect requires physical action, which some of the world's major players hinder.

Secondly, another view emerged from the interviews regarding the success or effectiveness of the doctrine. There was a point of contention among the participants to "What exactly success means in Responsibility to Protect(R2P)?" It is simply a matter of interpretation. Few of the respondents believed that the issue of implementation is not something "special in the case of R2P" (IP-4); rather, this is the problem with all other frameworks, whether it be of human rights promotion or conflict prevention. So why associate this implementation issue with R2P only?

Secondly, the respondents acknowledged that it is hard to measure the "success" of R2P because of the lack of criteria available, but that does not mean the doctrine is a dead slogan with no significance. They believed that different human rights institutions with the UN network all use the atrocity prevention framework. Then, a series of national committees act on the principles of Responsibility to Protect. The argument was that although the many resolutions invoked under R2P have not been implemented, they are still working as raising instruments.

However, IP 3, which is working closely with the United Nations on R2P, criticized one element: language use. Whenever we use the word "intervention," it is considered an attack by the states on their sovereignty. The respondent believed that instead of the word "intervention," the word "action" should be used (IP-3). Overall, she believed that if someone says R2P is dead, "she would like to see the dead body of the R2P" (ibid). She argued that despite many problems, be it from the use of language or the security, one that one cannot say, for example, if human rights are violated, they are no longer relevant. Similarly, one cannot say that if atrocities are not protected, then R2P is not relevant.

IP-2, former advisor to the Secretary-General on R2P, pointed out that to effectively address the issues, the Security Council needs to be reformed, and

the member states must be on the same page while doing a case-by-case analysis. However, as part of the success of R2P, start with the prevention efforts, which is the key indicator of the success of R2P. The same prevention efforts were seen in Kenya and Guinea, further curbing the atrocities from escalating to the extreme level where the decision was much more difficult. Another respondent validated that prevention efforts have successfully reduced the risks (IP-2; IP-9).

- **Politicization of R2P**

The R2P doctrine is frequently criticized as being politically driven, serving the interests of powerful states rather than its humanitarian goals. Scholars point out that the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) often use their influence to protect states committing atrocities due to their national interests. This selective application of R2P, driven by great power politics, double standards, and inconsistency, is a recurring theme in the interviews.

One of the respondents reflected the same observation: "It has been applied in a very selective way reflecting great power politics, double standards, and inconsistency" (IP-11). It means that R2P is very biased in terms of taking action against those that are either Western Countries or protected by Western countries.

So, it is the hard reality of the international system that no matter how much you are motivated to protect the peace and security in the system, eventually, everything boils down to the political will. In this case, it is the political will of the P5 members of the Security Council. This political will is also directly related to geopolitics, which stops the international community from taking action in Myanmar, Syria, or Palestine. It is the geopolitics. This is validated by the findings of Dr Alex Bellamy (2012) in his book "Massacres and Morality,"

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mentioned that the relationship between perpetrators and great powers is very important. If the perpetrators have a strong relationship with a great power, be it the US, Russia, or China, they can use their institutional power and material power at the United Nations to protect the perpetrators. It is just the hard reality of geopolitics.<sup>42)</sup>

While we can identify structural reasons for the failure, such as geopolitics, political will, and the dynamics of relationships, the complexity of the situations often leaves us unsure about the best way forward. So, to take action effectively, "it takes the convergence of values and interests have got to converge at a specific time and place to get the consensus you need to get action. And that can be a difficult thing" (IP-1). However, one of the most compelling factors for improvement is the urgent need for political agreement among the key players.

Much of the contemporary debate on atrocity prevention and response in the United Nations is based on the current and historical references to the selective implementation of the doctrine. In such cases, we have arguments coming from different scholars that if R2P was a litmus test for Libya in 2011, then why the international community has failed to take action in similar cases like Syria, Yemen, or Myanmar? The answer of course is that neither of these reside within the intersection of the national interest and political will of the Global North. This argument is also validated by one of the respondents, all the P5 have engaged in protecting their allies (IP-6). It's pretty clear that these great powers or P5 are pretty much engaged in protecting its allies, and allowing violations to go through unpunished. To sum up, it's all the reflection of great power politics unfortunately, which makes it really difficult to gauge the effectiveness of this principle.

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42) Bellamy, A. (2013). *Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity*. Oxford Academic Press

The dynamics of the Security Council protecting the interests of the permanent members, which are the great powers in the world, act as a hindrance in almost all cases where the R2P failed to be invoked. One respondent described the situation by giving the reference to Myanmar, that it is very clear that the government is engaged in mass atrocity crimes. However, on the other hand, the government is also friendly with a permanent security council member.

According to the respondent:

You are not going to get any leverage against that particular state. Look what the US is doing in Gaza today; it can soak up so much shame and criticism before it will change its position. So, in the end, it is the great power politics within the Security Council.

(IP-8)

However, in this context, one of the respondents mentioned that due to the geopolitical nature of the international system, the Security Council has veto power, and the aim was not to stop small states fighting small states; in fact, the aim was to stop big states fighting big states. Moreover, they have been largely successful since 1945, with several near misses. He described the situation in the following words: "You have not had any major conflict between the big powers" (IP-7).

In the same manner, IP-10 criticized the actions of the Security Council and opined that the Security Council is powerless to take any action where these great powers are involved. For the same reason, it has not yet been able to take any solid on-ground action in Gaza or even Myanmar. It is not the case that the Council ignores all the facts and figures, but it certainly does not move ahead and act very quickly.

The issue of veto power in security council was also discussed in the interviews. The respondents argued that the UN Charter introduced the veto for two good reasons. One that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have approved the UN Charter had the veto not been there. The second reason is that international action should not make matters worse.

In this regard, for one of the respondents if somehow the UNSC would take action against the Chinese in Myanmar or the US-Israeli coalition in Gaza, "you would have a major war on your hands instead of just an awful local suffering and war" (IP-10). However, only one of the respondents, IP- 5, expressed a slightly different view than others. For him, not every blame has to go on the security council and the P5 involved in it. He was of the view that in 2005, every member state committed to working with this idea of the responsibility to protect, so the contribution and efforts lie on both sides.

Lastly from the experience of IP-8, she discussed one interesting aspect regarding the situation in Myanmar.

In the case of Myanmar:

We saw absolute paralyses, total paralysis. And this is what happened with Syria but at least Syria was on the agenda. But getting even the council to even discuss Myanmar, forget even it in open setting or behind the closed doors, it's been extremely challenging.

(IP-8)

So, the same shackles on the system that exists no matter what the situation is. It really just boils down to the political will of the members of the security council. Many have suggested for the reformation of the security council, but it's like a dream to do and we would be living in very idealistic world, if this really happens. The argument is why would someone want to give their power

in someone's own hands, when they know that through this power they can control the entire politics of the world. For the same dynamics within security council, it has been very challenging to implement R2P in the cases which are in the dire need of implementation.

- **Effectiveness Beyond Implementation**

The lens for seeing its success must be broadened; one should not see its success in terms of its implementation only, but one should be seen what it is doing at the internal level of this doctrine, was another theme emerged out of the data gathered.

One of the respondents, in the following words, described her opinion on the success/ effectiveness of R2P:

How many states are using R2P language during statements in multilateral forums? How many states have included it in official policy documents, domestically and in foreign policy objectives? How many states have appointed R2P focal point- and how many are members of the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva? How many states have institutionalized R2P and built systematic and institutional frameworks with ministries of justice, interior, or foreign affairs?

(IP-4)

Another respondent validated this opinion by referring to the Group of Friends of R2P based in New York and Geneva. This group has over 50 members, and it is a political grouping of the member states within the UN system that are aligned on this topic. She believes that "R2P as a norm is quite alive because of the activities of the Group of Friends themselves" (IP-8).

As previously mentioned, the recurring themes from the interviews of

underscore the challenges posed by the P5 members of the security council. However, a thought-provoking perspective from these interviews is that international frameworks and doctrines, such as human rights or R2P, cannot work independently; rather, they depend on member states for their decisions. This reframes the issue, highlighting that the limitations are not inherent in R2P as a norm or principle but result from the actions or inactions of the member states. For example, in one of the interviews, a practitioner at the Global Center for Responsibility to Protect expressed optimism about the doctrine's potential, contrasting with the view of some; who consider R2P to be 'dead'. Most participants argue that one should use a broader lens to measure the success of R2P. Success is not just related to a mere implementation of this doctrine and taking on-ground actions; rather, success is also how many institutions use this framework to improve their policies or how many states use the language of R2P in their domestic and foreign policy. So, success should also be seen in raising awareness about the instrument. They also argued that this implementation problem is wider than the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In fact, other protection agendas, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or any other agenda, also face the same implementation issue, so one must not question the validity of the doctrine based on this issue.

- **Kenya and Guinea- Mixed examples of R2P**

Regarding the success cases of the doctrine, the major response was on Kenya, but again, it was categorized as a case with “mixed success.” One respondent mentions the case in terms of prevention. This idea is also validated in the book *Responsibility to Protect Twenty Years on* edited by Pinar Gözen Ercan. In the Chapter *Kenya and Guinea: Preventive Strategies in R2P*, the author argues that the atrocities were eventually stopped due

to the preventive efforts of the international community.<sup>43)</sup> However, again, another respondent, while accepting the case of Kenya as successful in terms of prevention, side by side criticized that in political terms, it is very hard to sell the notion of acting early because how would you prove that had we done nothing, it would have been the same result.

Kenya as a successful case of R2P is acknowledged by many official policy documents such as the reports of the United Nations or even the Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, and they mention that this is the success of R2P.<sup>44)</sup> This notion is criticized by IP 7, with the idea that people sometimes mention Kenya and Guinea as successful cases of R2P. However, the problem is that these tend to be the cases where the international community has come together and put pressure on the government or armed groups to stop the atrocities. Subsequently, the international community claims credit for these successes under the doctrine.

However, he told something from his own experience: He was talking to one of the diplomats involved in the Kenyan situation, the diplomat in the conversation mentioned that, “he had never even heard of R2P. It just was something that they used. It had nothing to do with”. So, because R2P exists, it cannot be credited for anything good that ever happens” (IP-7). While in the literature or academic papers, it is clearly evident that the period of 2005 was great with the cases of Kenya, Guinea, in terms of the success of R2P, and the pendulum started to swing backwards after the Libya intervention in 2011. So, the contradiction exists to the extent how the experts perceive these cases to be successful.

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43) Gözen Ercan, Pinar. (2022). *The Responsibility to Protect Twenty Years On*. Palgrave Macmillan.

44) R2P: The Dream and the Reality – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2020, December 3). *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.global2p.org/publications/r2p-the-dream-and-the-reality/>

- **Selective Enforcement of R2P (Myanmar and Gaza)**

The respondents highlight specific instances where R2P has been deemed unsuccessful, particularly in Myanmar and Palestine, particularly Gaza. These cases exemplify the doctrine's inability to prevent or respond effectively to mass atrocities in certain contexts. Myanmar and Palestine were the most common responses about the failure to implement R2P, especially the recent October 7, 2023 Gaza Crisis. As one respondent noted, the situation remains static. There has been no progress in terms of new laws, procedures, or processes, and what was applicable in the 1970s, 1980s, or 90s is still the status quo today.

However, IP-1 responded to the cases of Myanmar and Palestine through different lenses. In both cases, he even compared the situation with Syria, saying that in all these cases, you don't have legitimized effective political actors representing the group. So, one of the problems in Gaza is Hamas? Who wants to deal with Hamas? One of the problems in Myanmar is that you do not have just one sort of legitimate opposition group; you have a lot of different ethnic armed groups.

However, the analysis shows great criticism of the lack of the Security Council to act in the interests of the suffering states rather than putting their interests first. In the case of Myanmar and Gaza, the absence of the doctrine makes a huge question of the fundamental validity of the doctrine. However, according to some participants, it is not the question of the doctrine's validity but the question of the people guiding it. As defined previously, such protection agendas do not have their agencies, so they must rely on these member states to decide for them.

However, from my perspective, if we consider the current situation in Gaza, where Israel is conducting attacks on children and hospitals, it raises the question of why no one is stopping them. Despite the existence of the R2P

doctrine and the clear threshold of war crimes and genocide being met, the international community remains silent and inactive, unable to take any effective on-ground action.

Recent developments, such as UNSC Resolution 2728<sup>45)</sup>, illustrate the challenges of implementing R2P. This resolution faced criticism from powerful states backing Israel, highlighting a significant obstacle: the geopolitical interests of influential nations. This situation raises critical questions about whether R2P was designed to genuinely protect vulnerable populations or if it serves the interests of major powers. The discrepancy between the doctrine's principles and its application suggests that political considerations often override humanitarian concerns, undermining the effectiveness and credibility of R2P.

The situation in Gaza, similar to those in Myanmar, Syria, and other conflict zones, reflects decades of impunity. These long-standing disputes have persisted for decades without any substantial on-ground action. This lack of action highlights a significant flaw in the international system: the inability to enforce resolutions effectively.

One analysis to consider is the inherent delay and inefficacy of resolutions. Even if resolutions had been passed two years earlier, they likely would have faced vetoes, perpetuating a cycle of inaction. This cycle underscores the entrenched nature of the international system and the dynamics of the Security Council, where the interests of powerful states often dictate outcomes.

The international system is not a monolith; it cannot mobilize itself overnight. Its structure and the competing interests within it often hinder prompt and effective responses to crises. The case of Gaza and Myanmar exemplifies how political considerations and power dynamics can paralyze

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45) Resolution 2728 (2024) / adopted by the Security Council at its 9586th meeting, on 25 March 2024.

the international community, preventing it from upholding principles like the R2P doctrine. This ongoing impunity calls for a critical examination of the international system's capacity to address and resolve atrocity crimes, highlighting the need for reforms to ensure timely and decisive action.

## V. CONCLUSION

While exploring and analysing some depth about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework, this research reveals considerable challenges and criticism in its applicability and implementation as a spotlight. A significant concern is the measurability of this framework in a unified fashion. With no specified criteria, levels, or developed scales to mark the level of success of the R2P in atrocity prevention, its credibility and effectiveness come into question. This leaves effectiveness levels of R2P solely subject to one's interpretation by governments, involved parties or any organization. Not only that, but this also progresses into developing conflicting views of parties and stakeholders about a case of R2P blinded by their closed vision and self-interests.

Undoubtedly, we have a framework for analyzing atrocity crimes developed by the United Nations, but on what grounds should we make sure that the implementation of the doctrine was successful? Is success just focusing on short-term impacts like the immediate cessation of the atrocities, or should success be considered with long-term impacts? This is the same reason that there has been a diversity of opinions regarding the success and effectiveness of the doctrine since its adoption.

For example, while the Libyan intervention initially seemed successful, the ensuing instability and human rights abuses highlight the shortcomings of short-term evaluations. Similarly, preventive measures were taken in Kenya

in 2008, but still, the country is at risk of the atrocities. Was the designation of Kenya as a "successful case" in the literature based solely on the initial prevention of atrocities?

This lack of clear criteria means that this doctrine is just acting on an abstract basis, in which we need more criteria for success, resulting in inconsistent evaluation and implementation. The absence of holistic and context-specific criteria makes it difficult to justify interventions, ensure accountability, and refine strategies for future actions, becomes a daunting task. Most assessments are ad hoc, focusing on immediate outcomes like preventing violence without considering long-term impacts.

In retrospect, having felt a need to protect vulnerable populations and provide them with legal status by developing a dedicated framework of action is a testament to the foresight and vision of the international community. Decoding this vision into an actual reality to benefit from remains a daunting task that needs to be performed well. However, not doing so makes it seem like a foggy dream with small beacons of hope for good to come ahead.

A tremendous weak spot for R2P is the inconsistency with which it is applied. In Libya, R2P was imposed, which later misled into attracting a controversial situation. Likewise, R2P was imposed in Ivory Coast but not in similar or even worse humanitarian conditions in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar and others. Such an inconsistent approach towards R2P's application poses many questions, whether it is with the application of the framework or about those in charge of applying it in any of the demanded situations.

Overall, R2P would be far more effective and have resulted in better results if its shortcomings were addressed. At first, the doctrine's applicability must not be seen only in the military context but instead focused on Pillar 1 and 2 of the doctrine through non-coercive measures involving parties and stakeholders. While doing so, R2P's base pillars should be focused on a

proactive approach, such as developing early warning systems by depicting any chances of a severe conflict. It must also focus on capacity building within states and invest in getting the international community's better assistance in this effort at times when needed. Secondly, the focus should be on a unified lens in viewing R2P's success criteria and evaluation, which, if developed at times, would have yielded better results than the present. R2P, in assessing its effectiveness, requires a clear set of standardized criteria that would lead towards consistent assessment. The contrasting views and controversial situations in cases like Libya and Kenya depict how difficult it could be to balance short-term outcomes against long-term stability.

To sum up, this research highlights the dire need for political will and moral courage for states, governments, and actors in the international community to abide by principles and uphold the mission of transforming R2P into a practical framework of action. Additionally, some other areas, such as transforming the structural hierarchy within the UNSC, establishing a clear criterion for evaluating success in atrocity crime prevention, and having a more inclusive and equitable approach towards humanitarian intervention, are essential for witnessing the true potential of R2P.

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# Rethinking Peacekeeping in NIACs: A Comparative Analysis of Libya and Mali and the Case for a Hybrid Approach

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## ABSTRACT

Non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), characterized by the involvement of non-state actors and international interventions, have become a defining feature of contemporary global conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping models, such as those led by the UN or military coalitions, struggle to manage the complexities of these conflicts effectively. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the peace operations conducted in Libya and Mali, examining the interventions by the NATO-led Coalition of the Willing in Libya and the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Both interventions were launched to stabilize the countries, but despite initial efforts, both failed to deliver sustainable peace and stability. The Libyan intervention succeeded in ousting the Gaddafi regime. Yet, it left the country fragmented and in turmoil due to the rise of various non-state actors and international actors with competing interests. In Mali, MINUSMA's efforts to stabilize the country have been undermined by the presence of jihadist insurgents and the growing influence of external powers. These failures highlight the limitations of current peacekeeping approaches in addressing the unique challenges NIACs poses. This paper argues that a hybrid peacekeeping approach—combining the rapid military response and operational flexibility of coalitions with the legitimacy, and multilateral framework of UN missions—can offer a more effective solution. A hybrid approach is necessary to engage with non-state actors, balance international interests, and create sustainable conditions for peace in conflict zones like Libya and Mali. The study concludes with recommendations on how this hybrid model can be applied to future NIACs, suggesting a path forward for more effective international peacekeeping in an increasingly complex global landscape.

**Keyword:** Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs), Hybrid Peacekeeping, Non-State Actors, Libya, Mali, Coalition of the Willing, NATO, UN Peacekeeping

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Hiba Malik

## Introduction

The landscape of armed conflict has undergone a profound transformation over the past few decades. Traditional wars between nation-states, which dominated the 20th century, have given way to increasingly complex internal conflicts, or non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). These NIACs involve a wide range of non-state actors, from insurgent groups and militias to extremist organizations, and are often exacerbated by the involvement of external powers with vested interests. This evolution like conflict presents significant challenges for the international community, particularly for peacekeeping operations that were originally designed for more conventional, interstate conflicts.

In this context, two conflicts stand out as representative of the broader challenges faced by international peace operations: Libya and Mali. Both countries have experienced protracted internal conflicts that have drawn in non-state actors and international actors alike, transforming localized disputes into complex regional crises. In Libya, a NATO-led Coalition of the Willing intervened in 2011 under the banner of protecting civilians during the civil war against Muammar Gaddafi's regime. While the intervention

succeeded in toppling Gaddafi, it also left a power vacuum that was quickly filled by competing militias, extremist groups, and external actors with divergent goals. The resulting chaos has left Libya deeply fragmented, with no clear path to stability.

Similarly, in Mali, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) in 2013 to stabilize the country following a coup and the rise of Islamist insurgents in the northern regions. Despite the efforts of MINUSMA, the Malian conflict continued to deteriorate, with jihadist groups expanding their influence, and regional instability spilling over into neighboring countries. The involvement of external powers, particularly France, further complicated the situation, as foreign interests often conflict with local priorities.

The central research problem this paper addresses is the inadequacy of current peacekeeping models in managing the complexities of NIACs. Both the Coalition of the Willing in Libya and the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali represent distinct approaches to international intervention. However, both have fallen short of their objectives, failing to deliver long-term peace and stability. In both cases, the involvement of non-state actors and the intersection of various international interests have created a conflict dynamic that is not easily addressed by traditional peacekeeping or military intervention models.

This study highlights the limitations of these existing approaches and proposes an alternative model that is better suited to the realities of modern conflict. The NATO-led coalition in Libya was able to deliver rapid military intervention, but it lacked the long-term framework needed for governance and peacebuilding. Conversely, the UN mission in Mali, while more focused on multilateralism and legitimacy, was slow to respond to evolving security challenges and struggled to engage effectively with non-state actors. These failures point to a critical need for a hybrid peacekeeping model that combines

the strengths of both approaches.

The primary argument of this paper is that a hybrid peacekeeping approach—one that blends the operational flexibility and military capabilities of coalitions with the legitimacy, and long-term stabilization efforts of UN peacekeeping—is necessary to address the challenges posed by NIACs. A hybrid model would allow for more agile responses to immediate security threats while maintaining the multilateral framework required for long-term peacebuilding. Furthermore, it would offer a more effective means of engaging with non-state actors, whose involvement is often a central feature of modern conflicts.

The paper is structured as follows: First, it explores the nature of NIACs and the role of non-state actors in shaping conflict dynamics. This section provides the necessary theoretical background for understanding why current peacekeeping models struggle to address these conflicts. Next, the paper presents case studies of Libya and Mali, examining the implications of the Coalition of the Willing Intervention in Libya and the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. The comparative analysis of these two cases highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The final section introduces the concept of a hybrid peacekeeping model and outlines how such an approach could more effectively address the complexities of NIACs. This model incorporates lessons learned from the Libyan and Malian interventions and offers a roadmap for more effective peace operations in the future. In conclusion, this paper seeks to contribute to the growing discourse on peacekeeping reform, particularly in the context of NIACs. By proposing a hybrid approach that balances military effectiveness with legitimacy and governance, it offers a pathway toward more sustainable and comprehensive conflict resolution in today's increasingly complex global environment.

## Understanding NIACs and Non-State Actors

NIACs are defined as protracted conflicts that occur within the borders of a single state, involving government forces and organized armed groups, or between such groups themselves (“Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC)” 2023). NIACs often involve asymmetrical power dynamics, where one or more parties do not possess the traditional military capacities of a state actor. For a conflict to be labeled as NIAC, it should meet certain criteria such as reaching a minimum level of intensity, armed groups showcasing some organization, and the conflict being more than sporadic events (ICRC 2008) Non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) represent a significant shift like global conflicts, moving away from the traditional interstate wars that characterized much of the 20th century. This evolution is particularly evident in conflicts like Libya and Mali, where a wide array of non-state actors has played prominent roles alongside state forces and foreign interveners.

In terms of international law, NIACs are primarily governed by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, which distinguish them from international armed conflicts (IACs). The legal framework for NIACs focuses on ensuring the protection of civilians and restricting the methods of warfare. However, applying these legal principles in practice is fraught with challenges, particularly when dealing with non-state actors who may not recognize or adhere to international norms. NIACs frequently blur the lines between combatants and civilians, often resulting in severe humanitarian crises and complicating efforts to establish peace.

As per the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), NIAC involves:

- Armed conflicts between a State Party and one or more organized non-state Parties (ICRC, 2016).
- Armed conflicts that do not include a State Party but are between

two or more organized non-state Parties (UNGA, 1998).

- Confrontations must occur between organized Parties possessing organized armed forces (ICRC, 2016). While NIAC occurs predominantly within a State, NIAC may feature extraterritorial aspects (ICRC, 2016) and become internationalized with the involvement of foreign States in support (ICRC, 2016).

There is also a differentiation of the NIACs with situations that may appear non-international but fall below it, such as:

- “Internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” (UN, no date; Article 1 of Additional Protocol II).
- “Banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities” (ICRC, 2016).

### **The Role of Non-State Actors in Contemporary Conflicts**

One of the defining characteristics of modern NIACs is the prominent role of non-state actors. In literature, actors engaged in hostilities are categorized into various groups, including state actors, non-state actors, terrorists, transnational actors, non-state armed groups, and hybrid adversaries, each with distinct goals. As of recent, non-state actors have been found to have decentralized structures and unique informal methods of warfare which render conventional military strategies ineffective.

The Geneva Convention of 1949 specifies that only combatants are permitted to participate in hostilities, emphasizing the significant distinction between combatants and non-combatants, thereby distinguishing between regular and irregular troops. Combatants, as per the Convention, must meet specific criteria: they must operate under the orders of a responsible commander, wear distinctive insignia visible from a distance, openly carry weapons, and conduct

their activities by the laws and customs of war. These criteria generally do not apply to non-state armed groups. Thus, these groups are not typically party to international treaties or agreements, which makes engaging them in peace negotiations more complex. As non-state actors operate outside the traditional frameworks of international law and diplomacy, this is a significant challenge for peacekeeping missions.

Non-state actors rising to power in power vacuums or rising due to unfulfilled basic needs and demands such as succession are particularly important in 21st-century conflicts. This is particularly true in cases like Libya, where a multitude of competing militias and extremist groups emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 NATO intervention. Similarly, in Mali, insurgent groups such as Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have gained influence, complicating efforts by both national governments and international peacekeepers to stabilize the region.

The presence of non-state actors has grave implications for the human rights of civilians and non-combatants. Non-state actors frequently use civilians as leverage in their conflicts, either through direct targeting or as human shields. Indirectly, their involvement impacts the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians (POC) since these groups often control key territories. Overall, the presence of non-state actors in conflict zones has changed the security paradigm and created an atmosphere of ‘continuous threat’ (Petrosyan 2023).

### **International Interests and Their Impact on NIACs**

NIACs do not exist in a vacuum. They often draw in external actors with varying geopolitical, economic, and security interests. These international dimensions can escalate the conflict and complicate peacebuilding efforts, as seen in both Libya and Mali. In Libya, NATO's involvement under the Coalition

of the Willing was driven by a mix of humanitarian and strategic interests, including securing regional stability and controlling migration flows. However, once NATO's military objectives were achieved, the lack of a coordinated peacebuilding strategy allowed competing foreign interests and local militias to fill the void, plunging the country into chaos.

Mali, on the other hand, has seen significant French involvement through Operation Barkhane, aimed at countering jihadist insurgents in the Sahel region. While France's role has been framed as a counterterrorism effort, its broader geopolitical interests, including regional security and economic ties, also play a part. These international interventions often conflict with the local dynamics of the conflict, complicating peacekeeping missions and creating additional barriers to stability. In both cases, external actors' priorities often clash with the immediate needs of local populations, resulting in fragmented and inconsistent peace efforts.

### **Challenges in Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs): International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and more**

UN peacekeeping missions, designed for interstate conflicts, often struggle to adapt to the realities of modern internal conflicts. Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs) present unique challenges to the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Unlike international armed conflicts, NIACs involve non-state actors who may not adhere to established rules of warfare, making principles like distinction, proportionality, and precaution harder to enforce. The blurred lines between combatants and civilians heighten the risk of civilian harm. Furthermore, enforcement is limited as non-state actors are not bound by formal agreements such as the Geneva Conventions, though customary IHL norms remain binding. These challenges underscore the need for hybrid peacekeeping approaches that address the complexities of NIACs

(Kelley, 2013).

Another key limitation is the difficulty in engaging non-state actors, and critical stakeholders in many NIACs because their tactics—ranging from guerrilla warfare to sporadic acts of terrorism fall outside the conventional military frameworks that peacekeepers are trained to handle. In addition, these conflicts' political and humanitarian dimensions require peacekeepers to adopt a multifaceted approach beyond military intervention. This requires not only maintaining security but also fostering governance, supporting state-building efforts, and ensuring the protection of civilians. In summary, peacekeeping in NIACs involves a complex interplay of non-state actors, international interests, and asymmetrical conflict dynamics. The existing peacekeeping models have struggled to adapt to these realities, necessitating a rethinking of how international interventions are designed and implemented in these contexts.

With regards to Human Rights Law in NIACs, it is again problematic because non-state armed groups (NSAGs), key actors in these conflicts, are not bound by human rights treaties, which apply primarily to states. This creates a legal gap, as states are indirectly held accountable for violations committed by NSAGs through the duty of due diligence. The complex dynamics of NIACs make it difficult for states to consistently enforce human rights protections in practice (Lane, 2016).

## **Case Study 1: Overview of the Libya Conflict: Non-State Actors, International Interests, and Its Classification as a NIAC**

The conflict in Libya has been a hallmark example of the complexities that define modern conflicts. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, the country has been embroiled in a prolonged struggle between competing factions, and international actors. The involvement of regional and global powers, combined with the influence of armed non-state groups, has created a conflict that transcends traditional state boundaries while remaining classified as a NIAC.

### **The Origins of the Conflict**

Libya's conflict began in the context of the Arab Spring in 2011, when widespread protests erupted against Gaddafi's rule. What started as a domestic uprising quickly escalated into a full-scale armed conflict as Gaddafi's forces violently suppressed protesters. In response, opposition forces, comprised of defected soldiers, civilians, and tribal militias, formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) to challenge Gaddafi's regime. International actors, most notably NATO under the Coalition of the Willing, intervened in 2011 through a UN-sanctioned mission (Resolution 1973), ostensibly to protect civilians from Gaddafi's forces. This military intervention, however, accelerated the collapse of the central government and left a power vacuum. The initial goal of the NATO-led coalition was to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly zone, but after Gaddafi's fall, the mission did not transition into a long-term peacebuilding or state-building initiative. As a result, Libya splintered into various factions vying for control.

## Main Parties and Non-State Actors

The fragmentation of Libya post-2011 saw the rise of several competing factions and non-state actors, each claiming legitimacy. These groups can be categorized into political factions, militias, and extremist groups, all playing significant roles in shaping the ongoing conflict.

### 1. The Government of National Accord (GNA)

Established in 2016 under a UN-brokered agreement, the GNA is based in Tripoli and recognized as Libya's official government by the UN Security Council. Despite its status, the GNA has struggled to extend its authority beyond the capital and surrounding areas. It has relied heavily on a network of militias to maintain control ("Government of National Accord | Libyan Government," n.d.).

### 2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)

Led by General Khalifa Haftar, once a key military figure in Gaddafi's regime, emerged as a powerful actor following the regime's collapse. The LNA controls large portions of eastern and southern Libya and receives backing from foreign actors like Egypt, the UAE, and Russia. Tensions between Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army faction, and Fayez al-Sarraj, who heads the government recognized by the United Nations, have left Libya fractured despite several formal attempts to broker an agreement between them (New America, n.d.).

### 3. Militias and Tribal Groups

Beyond the GNA and LNA, numerous militias and tribal factions wield significant power in Libya. Many of these groups, such as the Misrata Brigades, emerged from the anti-Gaddafi uprising and have since aligned with different

political factions for territorial control. These militias operate with a high degree of autonomy, often switching allegiances based on political and financial incentives. Their presence exacerbates the instability in Libya, as they frequently engage in turf wars and criminal activities.

#### 4. Extremist Groups

The post-Gaddafi chaos provided a fertile ground for extremist groups to flourish. ISIS and Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups gained footholds in parts of Libya, particularly around Sirte and Benghazi. Though Libyan forces, with international assistance, successfully ousted ISIS from Sirte in 2016, the threat of extremist resurgence remains.

### **International Interests**

Libya's strategic location and oil wealth have attracted significant international involvement. The conflict has become a proxy war where regional and global powers support rival factions to advance their geopolitical interests. About NATO and Western Powers, the 2011, NATO's intervention was driven by humanitarian concerns and the need to prevent Gaddafi's forces from committing atrocities against civilians. However, after Gaddafi's fall, Western powers, particularly the United States, France, and the UK adopted a more hands-off approach, leaving the country in disarray. As instability persisted, these nations have offered limited support to the UN-backed GNA. Moreover, the regional powers Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have provided substantial military and financial support to Haftar's LNA, viewing him as a bulwark against Islamist militias, whom they see as a threat to their regional influence. Conversely, Qatar and Turkey have backed the GNA and Islamist factions within Libya, seeing them as key allies in the broader struggle for influence in the region. Lastly, Russia's involvement in Libya has grown

in recent years, particularly in its support for Haftar. Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have been reported to operate in Libya, further complicating the conflict. Russia's interests in Libya are twofold: to expand its influence in the Mediterranean and to gain access to Libya's energy resources.

### **Establishing Libya as a NIAC**

Although Libya's conflict has drawn significant international attention and involvement, it remains classified as an NIAC under international law. The primary combatants are domestic factions, and the fighting occurs within Libya's borders. Even with external factors supporting various factions, the conflict is between the GNA, LNA, militias, and extremist groups, with no formal declaration of war between Libya and any foreign state. The presence of external forces, such as foreign mercenaries and proxy support, complicates the conflict but does not transform its NIAC classification.

### **Libya Today**

Libya continues to face political instability and security challenges more than a decade after the U.S.-backed intervention in 2011. Since the 2020 cease-fire, the political factions have failed to agree on rules for national elections, leading to indefinite delays since 2021. Recent developments include attempts by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High State Council to prepare for elections, while GNU leader Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah refused to relinquish power. External players like Turkey, Egypt, and Italy remain involved, exacerbating tensions over oil exploration in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Libya is grappling with the humanitarian fallout from severe flooding in 2023 and continued migration crises, including human rights abuses against migrants (CFR 2024). Human rights violations in Libya have persisted since the fall of Qaddafi, including arbitrary detentions, torture, and

the exploitation of migrants and refugees. Nonstate armed groups and militias have engaged in inhumane treatment in prisons, while porous borders in the south have exacerbated trafficking in weapons and people. These challenges are compounded by the absence of a cohesive state, leading to systemic abuses of civilians, often caught in the crossfire of local and national conflicts (United States Institute of Peace 2020). In the wake of natural disasters like Storm Daniel, which devastated eastern Libya and particularly Derna, there are growing calls for investigations into the mismanagement of infrastructure that contributed to the massive death toll. The collapse of two dams, responsible for the flooding and extensive loss of life, has been met with demands for accountability. Moreover, Libya's justice system is severely impaired, with reports of torture, overcrowded prisons, and prolonged detentions without trial. Despite ongoing investigations by international bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC), significant gaps in accountability remain, with war crimes and human rights abuses continuing unchecked (Hussain 2024).

### **Coalition of the Willing Intervention: NATO in Libya**

A coalition of states is a union of states for any common purpose related to international affairs. It is an informal union and is always based on a common problem. The coalition forces military adventures in Iraq and Kosovo have granted them quite a negative image. However, contrary to popular opinion, Erskine (2019) asserts that in cases of humanitarian catastrophes against civilians by their own governments, a coalition of forces do have a duty to intervene and play their part. Ryan (2002,23) also shares similar views as he explored the role of the International Force in East Timor or INTERFET in stabilizing East Timor after the humanitarian crisis and suggests that it has opened opportunities for future ad-hoc multinational deployments. INTERFET was not directly under R2P yet its objectives were nearly the same-

protecting the civilians-and it was unique as after its success it was replaced by a UNPKO. The timing of the conflict called for a quick and decisive course of action which was very successfully provided by INTERFET. Coalition of the Willing approach by NATO in Libya or any other regional organization as per Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is a significant step towards conflict management since it ensures timely and decisive action, is backed by a better local understanding of the dynamics, and leads of more ownership and dedication of the intervening entity due to either proximity of conflict zone in case of regional organizations. By empowering other entities for conflict management and resolution not only can the slow organizational processes of the UN be surpassed but also the burden and resources of the UN can be managed effectively.

No doubt the NATO intervention in Libya is considered controversial by many. Many scholars regard it as an utter failure while some consider it a mixed success. The processes opted li Libya in 2011 do offer significant lessons for conflict management but also highlight the necessity of empowering entities other than the UN in times of need. Better accountability, resources, and training can help shift the burden of the UN and promote peace by avoiding humanitarian catastrophes in conflict zones.

## **Case Study 2: Overview of the Mali Conflict: Non-State Actors, International Interests, and Its Classification as a NIAC**

Since 2012, Mali has faced escalating violence, fueled by a combination of ethnic tensions, jihadist insurgencies, and separatist movements. The conflict has involved a range of non-state actors and external interventions, making it a case study of how regional and international interests intersect with internal instability. The lack of effective central governance and the rise of jihadist groups have further entrenched Mali in a prolonged and complex NIAC.

### **Origins of the Mali Conflict**

The conflict in Mali can be traced back to the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, which saw the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a separatist Tuareg group, declare the independence of northern Mali under the name Azawad. The Tuareg insurgency was fueled by long-standing grievances related to political marginalization, economic neglect, and ethnic identity, factors that had caused earlier uprisings in Mali's history. However, the 2012 rebellion took on a new dimension when Islamist groups, including Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), exploited the chaos and gained control of large parts of northern Mali.

In response to the deteriorating security situation, the Malian government was unable to mount an effective defense, particularly after a coup d'état in March 2012 destabilized the central government. This political vacuum allowed extremist groups to consolidate their hold over the north, imposing strict interpretations of Sharia law in areas under their control. The situation escalated to a full-blown civil war, with both ethnic separatists and jihadist groups challenging state authority.

## Main Parties and Non-State Actors

Mali's conflict is marked by the involvement of various non-state actors, including separatist movements, jihadist groups, and ethnic militias. These actors, each with their distinct agendas, have shaped the course of the conflict.

### 1. The Malian Government

Despite international backing, the Malian government has struggled to exert control over vast regions of the country, particularly in the north. Political instability, corruption, and weak military capacity have undermined its ability to address the root causes of the conflict. Even with external support, such as the French military intervention and UN peacekeeping forces, the government's influence remains limited to certain urban centers.

### 2. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)

The MNLA, a Tuareg separatist group, was one of the key players in the initial uprising. Their goal was to create an independent state of Azawad in northern Mali. While the MNLA initially allied with jihadist groups to overthrow Malian government forces, tensions later arose as the Islamists sought to impose religious rule, leading to a split in their alliance.

### 3. Jihadist Groups

Several jihadist groups have been central to the conflict, including AQIM, Ansar Dine, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). These groups have capitalized on the region's porous borders and weak governance to establish a foothold in northern Mali. They have also extended their operations into neighboring countries, contributing to the destabilization of the entire Sahel region. The jihadists' goals range from creating an Islamic

caliphate to leveraging their control of territory for smuggling and trafficking operations.

#### 4. Ethnic Militias

Ethnic militias, such as the Fulani and Dogon self-defense groups, have emerged as key actors in the ongoing violence. These militias often engage in cycles of retaliatory attacks, driven by local conflicts over land, resources, and political representation. Their activities further complicate the conflict, as they frequently clash with both jihadist forces and the Malian military.

#### **International Interests**

The conflict in Mali has drawn several foreign actors, each driven by security concerns, counterterrorism objectives, and geopolitical interests. France has played a central role in the Mali conflict, launching Operation Serval in 2013 to prevent Islamist groups from advancing southward and capturing the capital, Bamako. This intervention was later succeeded by Operation Barkhane, which expanded the French military presence across the broader Sahel region. France's involvement is motivated by counterterrorism concerns, given the potential for jihadist groups to destabilize West Africa and threaten Europe. France has also sought to protect its economic interests in the region, including its access to uranium in neighboring Niger. Secondly, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in 2013, was one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world, with the mandate to support the Malian government in stabilizing the country, protecting civilians, and facilitating political dialogue. MINUSMA faced significant challenges, including attacks by jihadist groups, lack of resources, and the complex nature of the conflict. Its effectiveness has been questioned, and the mission withdrew in 2023 even when violence continues to

plague the region despite the mission's efforts.

Moving onto the G5 Sahel, formed by five Sahel countries—Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—the G5 Sahel aims to address security and development challenges in the region, with a focus on countering terrorism. However, its operations have been hampered by logistical difficulties, limited funding, and the inability to coordinate effectively across borders. While less involved than France, the United States has provided military training and support to the Malian army and other regional forces through its Africa Command (AFRICOM). The U.S. views the conflict in Mali as part of the broader global struggle against terrorism, particularly the expansion of jihadist networks in Africa.

### **Establishing Mali as a NIAC**

The conflict in Mali is a clear example of a NIAC, given that the fighting is primarily internal, involving the Malian government and various non-state actors. These actors include separatist groups, jihadist organizations, and ethnic militias, each of which operates within the borders of Mali. The conflict fits the definition of a NIAC under international law, as the combatants are non-state actors challenging the authority of the state. While international actors such as France and the United Nations have intervened in Mali, these interventions have not altered the conflict's NIAC classification. Foreign forces are operating in support of the Malian government, rather than engaging in direct conflict with other states.

### **Mali Today**

The human rights situation in Mali drastically worsened in 2023 as Islamist armed groups, linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), escalated attacks on civilians. These groups were met with abusive

counterterrorism operations by the Malian military, often supported by foreign fighters, reportedly from the Wagner Group. This violence, compounded by clashes between government forces and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), jeopardized a 2015 peace deal. The withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA), requested by the Malian government, raised concerns about increased civilian vulnerability, especially in northern regions. Additionally, government crackdowns on media and opposition figures, alongside widespread impunity for state and non-state abuses, have further isolated Mali and deepened the ongoing political crisis (“Mali”, 2024). In 2024, Mali faces a worsening humanitarian crisis driven by escalating conflict, deepening poverty, and climate vulnerability. The central government is struggling to regain control from nonstate armed groups, who have laid siege to urban areas and restricted civilian access to essential goods and services. Violence against civilians surged by 38% in 2023, and this trend is expected to continue as clashes between the government and armed factions intensify. The withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission has further destabilized the situation, limited humanitarian access and left over 7.1 million people in need of aid, with nearly 400,000 internally displaced. Food insecurity is at alarming levels, with a million children under five at risk of acute malnutrition due to conflict and blockades that prevent the delivery of vital supplies. Additionally, Mali’s vulnerability to climate change, marked by prolonged droughts, is exacerbating poverty and fueling communal violence over scarce resources, particularly in rural areas reliant on agriculture. The convergence of these factors paints a grim picture for 2024, with humanitarian efforts increasingly challenged by violence, logistical barriers, and insufficient funding (International Rescue Committee, 2024).

## UN Peacekeeping Mission (MINUSMA)

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in 2013 to stabilize Mali and support the implementation of the peace agreement following a period of political instability and armed conflict. It represents one of the UN's most complex peacekeeping operations, integrating military, police, and civilian components aimed at fostering peace and security, protecting civilians, and promoting human rights. MINUSMA operated in a challenging environment and has been termed one of the most dangerous UN Missions (*MINUSMA and Protection of Civilians: Implications for Future Peacekeeping Missions - Mali, 2023*). Due to various debates over its effectiveness, sustainability, and the capacity of Malian forces to assume security responsibilities independently, Mali rolled back its consent for MINUSMA operations eventually leading to the withdrawal of MINUSMA from Mali in December 2023 (Al Jazeera, 2023). The withdrawal of MINUSMA and the complex conflict dynamics it faced in Mali have raised questions on the future of UN Peacekeeping. Conflicts such as in Mali are a characteristic of twenty-first-century conflict zones and the failure of MINUSMA is a reminder of the aging UN techniques and processes.

## Comparative Analysis of Peacekeeping Approaches

The peacekeeping approaches in Libya and Mali reflect distinct strategies used by the Coalition of the Willing and the United Nations (UN) to address non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). In Libya, the Coalition of the Willing, primarily led by NATO, undertook a militarized intervention under the banner of humanitarian protection, largely bypassing traditional UN peacekeeping frameworks. In contrast, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) exemplified a more conventional, albeit increasingly complex and multidimensional, peacekeeping operation.

The key difference between the handling of these conflicts stems from the difference in the mandates and operational scope. In Libya, the Coalition of the Willing had a narrow focus on regime change and protecting civilians under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The intervention was characterized by aerial bombardments and support to local rebel factions, with limited attention to long-term stability. Conversely, the UN mission in Mali followed a multidimensional peacekeeping approach aimed at political stabilization, protection of civilians, and humanitarian assistance, alongside counterterrorism efforts. MINUSMA was designed to manage a complex set of internal conflicts while supporting the Malian government.

### Evaluating Effectiveness

The success of both interventions must be measured by their ability to address the root causes of the NIACs and achieve sustainable peace. The Coalition of the Willing in Libya succeeded in achieving its immediate military objectives, including the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi, but it left a power vacuum that led to ongoing instability, armed conflict, and a proliferation of

non-state actors. The lack of a clear post-intervention plan and the absence of a peacebuilding framework severely undermined long-term peace efforts, and Libya descended into deeper conflict. The intervention's effectiveness is often questioned due to the humanitarian crises and regional instability that followed Gaddafi's removal.

In Mali, the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping through MINUSMA is more mixed. The mission has had some success in stabilizing key urban areas and facilitating peace negotiations, particularly with the Tuareg separatist groups. However, its ability to curb jihadist violence and resolve ethnic conflicts was limited. The mission suffered from logistical difficulties, attacks on peacekeepers, and coordination problems among international and regional actors. Although MINUSMA maintained a long-term presence, it struggled to fully implement peace agreements or bring lasting security to large parts of northern and central Mali.

Comparing the two cases highlights that while the Coalition of the Willing achieved short-term goals in Libya, it ultimately failed to create a stable post-conflict environment. On the other hand, the UN mission in Mali was more resilient but faced setbacks due to the complex dynamics of the conflict, raising questions about the adequacy of traditional peacekeeping in such contexts.

### **Engagement with Non-State Actors**

A critical challenge in both Libya and Mali has been the engagement with non-state actors, who played a central role in the violence. In Libya, the Coalition of the Willing chose to support rebel factions that were opposed to Gaddafi but failed to unify these groups or manage the subsequent infighting. The power vacuum left by the regime's fall allowed various militias and jihadist groups to thrive, resulting in a fractured political and security landscape.

The lack of sustained engagement with all non-state actors, particularly those outside the immediate rebel coalition, exacerbated the conflict. Post-intervention, no effective framework was put in place to integrate or demobilize these groups, leading to protracted violence.

In Mali, MINUSMA has had to engage with a variety of non-state actors, including separatist groups, jihadist factions, and local ethnic militias. The mission's success in brokering peace with the Tuareg separatists stands out as one of its achievements. However, engagement with jihadist groups has been far more problematic. These groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates, have been less open to negotiation and pose a constant threat to the peacekeeping mission. Additionally, ethnic militias, such as the Fulani and Dogon groups, present further complications, as they are driven by localized conflicts over resources and identity. MINUSMA has struggled to find effective strategies to manage these diverse non-state actors, which has hampered efforts at securing lasting peace.

Both Libya and Mali demonstrate that peacekeeping and intervention efforts cannot succeed without effective engagement with non-state actors. The failure to address the grievances and integrate non-state actors into political processes leads to a prolongation of conflict and complicates peacebuilding efforts. This non-state actor component makes NIACs more complicated and challenging for conflict management for both UN Peace operations and other regional coalitions.

### **Managing International Interests**

The involvement of international actors in both Libya and Mali has had a profound impact on peacekeeping efforts. In Libya, international interests, particularly those of NATO members, were primarily focused on removing Gaddafi. However, competing geopolitical interests, including concerns

over oil resources and regional influence, complicated the aftermath of the intervention. The international community's inability to coordinate post-intervention efforts contributed to the fragmentation of the Libyan state and the entrenchment of non-state actors.

In Mali, international interests have also played a significant role in shaping the conflict and the peacekeeping mission. France, as the former colonial power, was heavily involved through Operation Serval and later Operation Barkhane, driven by concerns over the spread of jihadism in the Sahel and the security of its economic interests in the region. While French military intervention helped stabilize parts of Mali, it faced criticism for its perceived overreach and for failing to address the root causes of the conflict. The UN mission had to balance these international interests while trying to maintain its neutral peacekeeping mandate.

In both cases, managing international interests proved to be a significant challenge. In Libya, the lack of a coordinated international response after Gaddafi's fall resulted in ongoing instability, while in Mali, the competing agendas of international actors complicated the peace process. These cases underscore the need for better alignment between international interests and local peacebuilding efforts to achieve sustainable conflict resolution.

### **Integrating International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law into a Hybrid Peacekeeping Model**

Non-state actors usually serve as pawns of regional and great powers in many conflict zones, adding the 'international' in the non-international conflicts in return for aid and weaponry. These actors affect the duration, intensity, and resolution of conflict with an increased chance of recurrence. By keeping such actors out of international law and diplomacy, states limit the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) and avoid external

intervention, while potentially reducing accountability for human rights violations. It also provides a legal framework for labeling opponents as insurgents or terrorists, further justifying internal measures like counter-terrorism operations.

Integrating International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights law into a hybrid peacekeeping model is essential for addressing the complexities of Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs). IHL, with its principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, offers guidelines for minimizing civilian harm in warfare, while human rights law provides a framework for ensuring the protection of individuals from abuses by both state and non-state actors. However, both bodies of law need to be updated to address the changing nature of conflict zones, the evolving methods of warfare, and the increasing influence of groups traditionally labeled as non-state actors. The term "non-state actors" has become outdated, as it oversimplifies and ignores the significant role these groups play. Rather than limiting or halting their rise, this vague classification has allowed such groups to grow in power. Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge their presence, develop criteria to classify and integrate them into IHL and human rights frameworks and bring them to the dialogue table. A policy of ignorance is no longer viable. By embracing these realities and incorporating the horizontal effect of human rights law, holding both states and non-states accountable for violations, a hybrid peacekeeping model can better address civilian protection, ensure accountability, and offer a more adaptive and inclusive response to modern conflicts.

## Building The Case for a Hybrid Peacekeeping Approach

Both the Coalition of the Willing and traditional UN peacekeeping approaches have shown clear limitations when applied to contemporary non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), as demonstrated by the cases of Libya and Mali. The Coalition model, as seen in Libya, was primarily focused on short-term military objectives and lacked a coherent plan for post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding. While the Coalition of the Willing was effective in rapidly removing Gaddafi's regime, a move still considered controversial by many, it failed to establish a sustainable political or security framework in its aftermath. This failure led to protracted conflict and humanitarian crises.

On the other hand, UN peacekeeping, while more focused on long-term peacebuilding and multilateral legitimacy, struggled with operational inefficiencies and a lack of robust military capabilities. In Mali, MINUSMA was constrained by bureaucratic limitations, slow deployment times, and an inability to fully engage with the diverse array of non-state actors involved in the conflict. Additionally, the UN's reliance on traditional peacekeeping mandates, which emphasized neutrality and post-conflict peacebuilding, made it difficult to address the urgency of the situation. This resulted in the mission being unable to fully stabilize the country or prevent the resurgence of violence, particularly in the face of jihadist groups and ethnic militias.

Both models fall short in engaging effectively with non-state actors and in managing the complex international interests that are often at play in NIACs. This suggests a need for a more flexible, responsive, and integrated approach to peacekeeping that combines the strengths of both models while addressing their respective weaknesses.

## **Features of a Hybrid Model**

A hybrid peacekeeping approach is needed to meet the demands of contemporary conflicts like those in Libya and Mali. Such a model should integrate the rapid-response capabilities of military coalitions with the long-term governance and multilateral legitimacy of traditional UN peacekeeping. Several key features could define this hybrid approach:

### **Integration of Rapid Response and Military Capabilities**

One of the key strengths of coalitions, such as NATO's intervention in Libya, was their ability to respond quickly and decisively. A hybrid model should incorporate these rapid-response military capabilities into the broader peacekeeping framework. This could involve a standing rapid-response force under UN command or regional organizations like the African Union (AU), capable of immediate intervention in escalating conflicts to prevent humanitarian disasters or state collapse.

### **Multilateral Legitimacy and Long-Term Governance Focus**

A hybrid model could maintain the multilateral legitimacy of traditional UN peacekeeping, ensuring that interventions are supported by the international community and adhere to international law. Unlike coalitions, which are often perceived as serving the interests of specific states, a hybrid approach should be built on a mandate that prioritizes long-term governance, institution-building, and peace consolidation. This could involve establishing transitional administrations, promoting political reconciliation, and fostering local ownership of the peace process.

## **Flexibility in Engaging Non-State Actors and Managing International Interests**

A key feature of the hybrid peacekeeping model is the intentional and strategic engagement with non-state actors, who have become central players in the majority of NIACs. Excluding these groups from dialogue and peace processes, based on the fear of legitimizing their claims, only risks further destabilization. In many cases, non-state actors control territory, command significant local support, or play a role in the conflict that cannot be ignored. Refusing to engage with them amounts to keeping hands over our eyes in the face of adversity, which only hinders peacebuilding efforts.

The hybrid model advocates for developing criteria that guide when and how to engage non-state actors in a manner that balances international law with practical conflict resolution needs. Such criteria would consider the nature of the group, its influence on the conflict, and its willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. Additionally, hybrid peacekeeping operations should deploy specialized teams that include mediators, conflict resolution experts, psychologists, and cultural advisors. These teams would work directly with non-state actors, understanding their grievances and motivations, while also facilitating dialogue with state actors and international stakeholders. By creating such mechanisms for engagement, the hybrid model ensures that all relevant parties are included in the peace process, enhancing the likelihood of a sustainable resolution.

## **Application and Benefits of a Hybrid Peacekeeping Model**

Applying a hybrid peacekeeping model to conflicts like those in Libya and Mali could address the specific challenges posed by NIACs. In Libya, a hybrid approach might have prevented the power vacuum that followed Gaddafi's fall by establishing a transitional governance structure that could have managed post-conflict stabilization and prevented the rise of armed militias. The rapid

military intervention would still have been necessary, but it would have been followed by a coordinated, multilateral peacebuilding effort designed to engage non-state actors and foster political reconciliation.

Similarly, in Mali, a hybrid approach could supplement the current peacekeeping mission's weaknesses by incorporating more robust military capabilities to address the jihadist insurgency while also engaging local ethnic militias through political and economic incentives. Additionally, the hybrid model could better manage the competing international interests, particularly those of France and regional powers, ensuring that foreign military interventions align with the broader peacekeeping goals rather than pursuing isolated counter-terrorism objectives.

The benefits of a hybrid model extend beyond Libya and Mali to other NIACs where non-state actors play a central role and where international involvement is inevitable. A hybrid approach allows for a more adaptable peacekeeping strategy that can respond to the rapidly changing dynamics of modern conflicts while still maintaining the legitimacy and long-term focus necessary for sustainable peace. By combining the strengths of military coalitions and traditional UN peacekeeping, this model could offer a more comprehensive and effective solution to the complexities of contemporary conflict zones.

## Conclusion

The conflicts in Libya and Mali provide critical insights into the limitations of traditional peacekeeping and military intervention models when applied to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Both cases underscore the unique complexities of contemporary conflicts, where non-state actors and international interests intersect in ways that complicate conventional

peacekeeping mandates. The Coalition of the Willing's intervention in Libya, while initially successful in achieving its military objectives, left a power vacuum that fueled ongoing instability and violence, revealing the dangers of short-term, militarized interventions without a coherent post-conflict strategy. Meanwhile, the United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Mali, though better suited for long-term stabilization, faced significant challenges in addressing the multiplicity of actors involved in the conflict, particularly jihadist insurgencies and local militias. The slow response times and operational constraints of the UN mission highlight the need for more robust and flexible mechanisms to manage active conflict zones.

These cases collectively demonstrate that neither traditional UN peacekeeping nor coalition-led interventions, in their current forms, are sufficient to meet the demands of contemporary NIACs. The Coalition of the Willing's emphasis on rapid military action is not sustainable without a complementary peacebuilding effort, while UN peacekeeping's emphasis on long-term stability must be supported by stronger, more agile military capacities and a more nuanced approach to engaging non-state actors.

In light of these challenges, this paper argues for the development of a hybrid peacekeeping model that incorporates the strengths of both approaches. Such a model would combine the rapid-response capabilities of military coalitions with the multilateral legitimacy, governance focus, and peacebuilding orientation of the UN and a branch of experts to engage the non-state actors in peace processes. By doing so, it would be better equipped to manage the multifaceted nature of NIACs, where the need for immediate intervention coexists with the requirement for long-term stabilization and political reconciliation.

A hybrid peacekeeping approach would also offer greater flexibility in dealing with non-state actors, an essential component in conflicts where these

actors are central to the continuation of violence. Whether through negotiated settlements, disarmament and reintegration programs, or political inclusion strategies, engaging non-state actors is critical to achieving sustainable peace in NIACs. Additionally, a hybrid model would better manage the competing international interests that often exacerbate conflicts, ensuring that foreign involvement aligns with peacekeeping and conflict resolution goals.

Looking ahead, the adoption of a hybrid peacekeeping model could significantly enhance the international community's ability to respond to complex conflicts like those in Libya and Mali. By integrating military responsiveness with long-term peacebuilding and local engagement, such a model could address both the immediate and underlying causes of conflict, offering a more holistic approach to peacekeeping. This shift is not only necessary but urgent, as the nature of contemporary conflicts continues to evolve, and the limitations of current peacekeeping frameworks become increasingly apparent.

In conclusion, the hybrid peacekeeping approach represents a more comprehensive, adaptable, and effective solution for addressing the challenges posed by NIACs. It balances the need for swift intervention with the requirement for sustainable peacebuilding, making it a viable strategy for managing the complexities of modern conflict zones. If implemented, this approach could lead to more durable and inclusive peace processes, ultimately reducing the recurrence of violence and enhancing global peace and security.

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