

# 『대한민국과 아프리카 연합의 파트너십 증진을 위한 PKO 활동』

「Peacekeeping Activities as a Means to Enhance  
ROK-AU Partnership」

일시 : 2016. 11. 10(목), 09:30~16:30 / Date : 2016. 11. 10(Thu), 09:30~16:30

장소 : 장충동 서울클럽 (한라산 룸) / Venue : Seoul Club (Hallasan Room)

| 주최 |



국방대학교 국제평화활동센터  
Korea International Peace Operations Center, Korea National Defense University



한국유엔체제학회  
Korea Academic Council on the United Nations System

| 후원 |



대한민국 국방부  
Ministry of National Defense



# 프로그램

09:00 ~ 09:30 (30')	등 록	
	사 회 자	대령 박성호 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터장)
09:30 ~ 10:20 (50')	개 회 사	중장 위승호 (국방대학교 총장)
	환 영 사	홍규덕 교수 (한국유엔체제학회 회장)
	기조연설	최영진 대사 (연대 석좌교수, 前 주미 대사, 주 유엔 코디부아르 특별대사) <b>아프리카 내전의 경험과 유엔의 역할</b>

## 제 1 부 아프리카 지역에서의 PKO 경험 [사회 : 현인택 교수, 전 통일부 장관]

10:30 ~ 11:50 (80')	① <b>대한민국의 아프리카 지역 PKO 경험 : 교훈과 도전과제</b>	
	발 표 자	대령 박원대 (한빛부대 4진 부대장)
	② <b>말레이시아의 아프리카 지역 PKO 경험</b>	
	발 표 자	마틴세바스찬 (前 유엔 PKO 국장, 말레이 CSCAP PKO 의장)
	토 론 자	예)소장 최영범 (前 인도-파키스탄 유엔 정전감시단장) 예상한 박사 (아프리카 미래전략센터) 중령 서해림 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터)
11:50 ~ 13:00 (70')	오 찬	

## 제 2 부 아프리카 연합과의 파트너십 구축: 왜 중요한가? [사회 : 박흥순 교수]

13:00 ~ 14:30 (90')	① <b>유럽연합의 입장</b>	
	발 표 자	최윤미 교수 (숙명여자대학교)
	② <b>대한민국의 입장</b>	
	발 표 자	김성수 교수 (한양대학교, 유럽아프리카 연구소장)
	③ <b>아프리카의 입장</b>	
	발 표 자	엠마 프란스워드 이숨빙가보 대사 (주한 르완다 대사관)
	토 론 자	최현진 교수 (경희대학교) 송재익 박사 (한양대학교, 유럽아프리카 연구소) 정재욱 교수 (숙명여자대학교)

## 제 3 부 AU와의 PKO활동 증진을 위한 새로운 대안 모색 [사회 : 홍규덕 교수]

14:50 ~ 16:20 (90')	① <b>민간인 보호를 위한 효과적인 대안</b>	
	발 표 자	임윤갑 교수 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터)
	② <b>성범죄 차단을 위한 교육의 중요성</b>	
	발 표 자	보리스 콘독 교수 (극동대학교, Journal of Peacekeeping 편집장)
	③ <b>대한민국 PKO 확대를 위한 정책 제언</b>	
	발 표 자	대령 박동순 (국방부 군사편찬연구소)
	토 론 자	박순향 교수 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터) 정은숙 박사 (세종연구소) 임)소령 백장미 (한빛부대 4진 법무장교)
16:20 ~ 16:30 (10')	폐 회 사	대령 박성호 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터장)

# Program

09:00 ~ 09:30 (30')	Registration	
09:30 ~ 10:20 (50')	Moderator	COL. Park, Sung-ho (Director, KIPOCENT)
	Opening Remarks	LTG. Wee, Seung-ho (President, KNDU)
	Welcoming Remarks	Prof. Hong, Kyu-dok (Chairman, KACUNS)
	Keynote Speech	Amb. Choi, Youngjin (Former Korean Ambassador to the US, Special Representative to the Secretary General, UNOCI) <b>Civil War experience in Africa and the role of the UN</b>

## Session 1. PKO Experience in Africa (Moderator : Prof. Hyun, In-taek, Former Minister of Unification)

10:30 ~ 11:50 (80')	① Korea's PKO Experience in Africa : Lessons learnt and Challenges	
	Speaker	COL. Park, Wondae (Former Commander of Hanbit Unit)
	② Malaysia's PKO Experience in Africa	
	Speaker	Martin A. Sebastian (Malaysia Maritime Institute)
11:50 ~ 13:00 (70')	Discussants	MG(R). Choi, Young-Bum (Former Commander, UNMOGIP) Dr. Yea, Sanghan (Korea-Africa Future Strategy Center) LCT Seo, Hae-lim Ph.D(KIPOCENT)
	Luncheon	

## Session 2. Establishing Partnership with the African Union : Why is it Important? (Moderator : Prof. Park, Heungsoon)

13:00 ~ 14:30 (90')	① European Union's Perspective	
	Speaker	Prof. Choi, Yunmi (Sookmyung Women's University)
	② Korea's Perspective	
	Speaker	Prof. Kim, Sung-soo (Director of Institute for Euro-African Studies, Hanyang University)
	③ Africa's Perspective	
	Speaker	Ambassador Emma-Françoise ISUMBINGABO (RWANDA)
14:30 ~ 16:20 (90')	Discussants	Prof. Choi, Hyunjin (Kyunghee University) Dr. Song, Jae-ik (Institute for Euro-African Studies, Hanyang University) Prof. Jung, Jaewook (Sookmyung Women's University)

## Session 3. Exploring New Ways : Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations with the AU (Moderator : Prof. Hong, Kyu-dok)

14:50 ~ 16:20 (90')	① An Effective Alternative to the Protection of Civilians	
	Speaker	Prof. Lim, Yoonkap (KIPOCENT)
	② Education : Important Factors to Curb Sexual Violence	
	Speaker	Prof. Boris Kondoch (Far Eastern University, Chief Editor of the Journal of Peacekeeping)
	③ A Policy Proposal to Expand Korea's PKO Activities	
	Speaker	COL. Park, Dongsoo (Institute for Military History, MND)
16:20 ~ 16:30 (10')	Discussants	Prof. Park, Soonhyang (KIPOCENT) Dr. Chung, Eun-Sook (The Sejong Institute) MAJ. Paek, Jangmi (Chief, Inspection Cell, MND)
	Closing Remarks	COL. Park, Sung-ho (KIPOCENT)

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## 사회자 · 발표자 · 토론자 프로필



## 제1부 Session 1

# 아프리카 지역에서의 PKO 경험

## PKO Experience in Africa



### ◎ 사회자 Moderator

: **현인택 교수** (고려대학교, 前 통일부 장관)

**Prof. Hyun, In-taek** (Former Minister of Unification)

### ◎ 발표자 Speaker

■ **대령 박원대** (한빛부대 4진 부대장)

**COL. Park, Wondaek** (Former Commander of Hanbit Unit)

■ **마틴세바스찬** (前 유엔 PKO 국장, 말레이 CSCAP PKO 회장)

**Martin A. Sebastian** (Malaysia Maritime Institute)

### ◎ 토론자 Discussants

■ **예)소장 최영범** (前 인도 파키스탄 유엔 정전감시단장)

**MG(R). Choi, Young-Bum** (Former Commander, UNMOGIP)

■ **예상한 박사** (아프리카 미래전략센터)

**Dr. Yea, Sanghan** (Korea-Africa Future Strategy Center)

■ **중령 서해림** (국방대 국제평화활동센터)

**LTC. Seo, Hae-lim** (Ph.D, KIPOCENT)



# 대한민국의 아프리카지역 PKO 경험 : 교훈과 도전과제

## Korea's PKO Experience in Africa : Lessons learnt and Challenges

대령 박원대 (한빛부대 4진 부대장)  
Colonel Park, Wondaе (Commander of Hanbit Unit)

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대한민국의 남수단 파병은 소말리아와 앙골라에 이어 세 번째 아프리카 부대파병이며, 유엔의 적극적인 요청에 의해 파병이 결정되었다. 남수단은 아프리카 중북부에 위치한 신생독립국가로서 전반적인 국가체제가 완성되지 못했고 내부적으로도 각종 종족간의 분쟁이 해결되지 않은 불안한 상태이다. 그런 지역에 한빛부대가 2013년 3월 파병되었고 남수단의 안정을 위해 유엔의 일원으로서 최선의 노력을 다하고 있다. 기간 중 내전을 겪었으며, 유엔의 안전이 위협받는 상황에서도 기지를 확보하고 난민들의 인권을 지키기 위해 적극 활동하였다. 특히 한빛부대는 공병부대로서 유엔기지의 방호와 임무수행여건 보장을 위해 가장 중요한 역할을 수행하였을 뿐만 아니라 유엔 기지로 유입된 수많은 난민들에게 헌신적인 도움을 제공했다.

내전이 종식된 이후에도 난민들을 위한 대형 신난민보호소 건설, 보르주민의 안전을 위한 나일강 제방건설, 수도 주바와 주도 보르를 연결하는 192km 도로 보수공사 등 수많은 재건지원을 통해 유엔과 정부, 유엔과 남수단 주민들간의 신뢰를 구축하기 위해 노력했다. 그 외에도 학교신축, 고아원 지원, 의료지원, 문화교류 등 실로 다양하고 적극적인 활동을 통해 유엔의 이름으로 남수단의 평화를 구축하는데 기여하였다. 한빛부대는 단순히 물자를 공여하는 소극적인 지원에 그치지 않고 남수단 주민들이 함께 참여하고 보람을 느끼며 스스로 가치를 창조할 수 있는 민사작전에 주력하고 있다.

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### **|Abstraction|**

The decision was made by Korean Parliament after UN's strong request for troop deployment to South Sudan, which was the third deployment to Africa after Somalia and Angola. South Sudan is a newly born nation located in middle north of Africa Continent, and national system is not established firmly suffering from unstability caused from continuous disputes among diverse tribes. Hanbit Unit has been committing their best as UNMISS for stability of South Sudan since its deployment in 2013. They experienced a civil war during the deployment, strived to protect displaced people surged into UN base under threat from Government forces. Especially Hanbit played key roll to enhance protection capability of UN base at same time served displaced people surged into UN base by sacrificing themselves. Also, they tried to raise thrust between UN and Government, between UN and local people by

committing many different CIMIC activities such as POC Site construction, construction of embankment of Nile for the local people, connecting road between Juba, capital city and Bor, capital Jonglei state and so on. Others are school building, orphanage support, medical service to the local and cultural exchange activities. Hanbit has been focusing on not just providing rescue material but providing opportunity to join activities, and finally to have feeling confidence for creating values of their life.

## I . Introduction

### 1. South Sudan

I will be introducing through pictures which were taken while I was serving in South Sudan. With its land that is six times larger than South Korea, South Sudan is located in the middle of Africa with population about 12 million.

As we can see in this picture, the Nile, known as lifeline of South Sudan, has its origins in Lake Victoria that goes across South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt which then finally reaches Mediterranean sea. Because the Nile never dry regardless of the weather, it not only became one of the crucial means of transportation, but also has a key value in supporting agriculture and in even basic living.

Furthermore, except for some of southeast areas, South Sudan consists of endless plain. With these geographical characteristics, it is especially known for cattle farming. From April to November South Sudan becomes excessively restricted in moving of transportation during rainy season. Then from December to March next year, rain stops and land will become dry, while massive number of cattle move one place to another to find grass. Actually, this kind of climate characteristic with cattle farming is one of the main cause of endless disputes among diverse tribes.

South Sudan is composed of about 60 different tribes. These tribes are willing to provoke a war to protect their livestock and many people die each year from this conflict. Since their country does not have power to protect individual's assets and control to mediate disputes among tribes , almost every men is armed with gun and rifles.

Although South Sudan is a most fragile developing country in Africa, due to big gap between rich and poor, many people living rural area who do not

have power service possess cellphones(in some report, about 10%), and high ranking government officers and military general live a comfortable life in luxurious house.

Normally Men do not work in South Sudan. Most of them are shepherds that protect livestock. Other jobs for men include soldiers, and police officers otherwise jobless. It is all women who run small or big economy in their household. It is also women's job to raise children and do farming.

We can still see scars of civil war by observing destroyed streetcars and collapsed building, and devastated school, and people displaced internally and externally.

During the national holidays, people emphasize that they are "one people one nation" by opening up a military parade and mobilizing young students.

5 million people died during more than 50 years of war of independence and internal conflicts among tribes. The picture shown on screen is an area adjacent with UN compound which is massive burial site for the people who died from civil war in 2013.

One of the main cause of South Sudan's civil war is an excessive oil that is buried in the Northern area. To take this oil, South Sudan started a war of independence from Sudan. Even now, government and rebel forces confront each other around oil field.

Ironically, all of South Sudan's oil gets exported through oil pipeline of Sudan which is hostile for them. The difficulties arise here from rising of pipeline usage fee and decreasing of oil prices, which brings down economy of South Sudan. For your reference, 98 percent of government budget is covered by sum of exported oil while they do import refined oil from abroad.

## **2. Hanbit Unit (ROK HMEC)**

Hanbit Unit was initially approved by the passing of Parliament agreement of overseas deployment in 2012 and it was fully established the following year. In February of 2013 first echelon started the mission. After four years passed, the sixth echelon is carrying out mission in South Sudan right now.

Emblem of Hanbit Unit is composed of Mango Tree and Taegeuk design which represent hope of South Sudan. As shown in the picture, the unit lived under tent for two years, and experienced civil war in a poor condition in the

beginning of the deployment. Then the standard facilities erected after two years of construction.

As a reconstruction unit, Hanbit Unit is composed mainly of military horizontal engineers. The rests are composed of Operational Support unit, guards, and medical corps. While Hanbit Unit carried out its mission, the UN mandate has been changed after civil war, from Rebuilding Government Capacity to Protection of human rights.

This mandate change has caused many difficulties in Hanbit Unit which is a unit for reconstruction. For example, although the South Sudanese government desperately needed construction of infrastructure, the request was denied by United Nations many times by the reason that our unit might be helping the government.

However, Hanbit Unit continuously persuaded SRSG and DMS of UNMISS. Not only does reconstructing of infrastructure help South Sudanese government, we emphasized that it also guarantees economic activities of citizens, prevents them from contamination of disease, and protects them from disasters. In the end, we were able to get its mission approved by UNMISS HQs and carried forward the core business.

## II. The Activities of Hanbit

### 1. Construction of Rwardit Elementary School

Rwardit Elementary school is located about 5 km away from the base. However, facilities were lacking compared to the number of students. So it required building of extra classrooms. We received budget from one Korean church. But the civil war occurred while we were preparing for construction, so we could not start the construction for another year.

Furthermore, there were many difficulties to access the area during wet season. And materials we purchased from local company came with extremely poor quality that many times we could not use it properly. Although it was a small building with only two classrooms, it was the first school that Hanbit soldiers built with their sincere heart under tremendous heat.

ROK HMEC truly hopes that students who study here will grow up to become leaders of South Sudan that can stop wars.

## **2. Orphanage Support**

Long Conflict among different tribes and Civil War have resulted in so many homeless children. They lost their parents and home, so no place to lean. There was a orphanage house in Bor with hundreds of children under very poor condition. ROH HMEC found out their needs of proper housing, play ground, trenches, and some goods for study and living.

The picture shown on slide is an orphanage our unit supported. Hanbit unit repaired building, created playfield, and installed drainage, so children can play even after it had rained. Unfortunately, all of children scattered and buildings that took much effort to build destroyed during civil war.

When I visited the site, beds, mosquitoes nets, and notes were all abandoned and no one was living in that building. Without proper and sustainable support from Government or INGO, there was no hope to revitalize the orphanage house. We tried to support the Facilities again, but collaboration with government was not quite easy. At same time we also were faced with pressures from UNMISS HQs with many tasks which urgently prepared during rainy season.

Previously, we had worked together with one of INGO from Korea called "Green Umberallar" which were evacuated this area during the Civil was in 2013. As time being passed, the INGO was approaching their mission area from Nimule to Juba, and from Juba to Bor. Another cooperation will be possible soon for the orphanage.

## **3. The Nile Embankment**

The Nile is lifeline for South Sudanese. But when raining season visits every year, many people suffer from flooding. City of Bor, where Hanbit unit was stationed, is very close to the Nile, so many people had to move to different area every year after flooding. They have been living like this as if this is their fate. Therefore, I believed that The Nile embankment is very essential for people living in Bor.

The length of embankment to protect the city was about 17 kilometers, and we started visiting the sites with mayor of Bor guarded by local police. Many prite land and houses, swamp area became obstacles to proceed the project. Nevertheless we completed the project in 2 months long with our full capacity.

The dyke was built with 2 meter higher than maximum water level expected, and 4m depth on the top

One of the biggest challenges we faced in South Sudan was finding aggregates or cement. Even if we get to buy them, the amount we can get is highly restricted, and the price is 6 times costly than it is in Korea.

While progressing the embankment, our excavators got caught in mudhole, we faced opposition from town, and we even found dead bodies from the civil war. However, we could not express our happiness of accomplishing embankment after overcoming so many challenges.

#### **4. Road Construction named Hope**

Second project that Hanbit Unit started was improving roads which connected Capital Juba to Jonglei state's capital Bor. During raining season this road becomes so muddy that cars cannot pass by. Although it is only 172 km from Juba to Bor, it takes couple days in raining season. Even during dry season, it takes about a day or two.

Although it is South Sudanese government's biggest desire to opening up these roads, we faced strong opposition from UNMISS from the beginning. Nevertheless, we were able to persuade SRSG and got to start 4 weeks of long project. To observe roads, we had to drive 120 km all day. We encountered difficulties by our cars breaking down, and getting regulated by illegal checkpoint set up by soldiers. The freedom of movement given to UN forces does not apply in South Sudan.

So we gathered our large vehicles in road construction site and were supported of precaution at night by South Sudan military. During our operation, we were also supported by police who regulated and controlled road to be cleared up. In the beginning, we were little bit surprise to see too many police and soldiers.

Even during the raining season, we could not stop the construction. Because we had limited time, operation started in the early morning every day. We woke up 4am, ate breakfast, got ready for construction, and headed out to our destination by 6am. It was to prevent any further delay as our travel range expanded. It became our daily life to leave early in the morning and come back late at night. As we traveled much more often at night, this means that

we needed to bear the dangers of being more exposed by any unidentified threats

One of the most difficult parts was improving durability of roads. It has no meaning to simply flat out the roads, because the road goes back to its original stage of being muddy. In order to prevent this from happening, we must make road hard as rock by using White Murrem and Red Murrem, which can only be found in certain area.

However, we can only get these soils very remote area and many people in town oppose this kind of action, creating our difficulties to continue. South Sudanese government could not support us at that stage. It was also another “surprise” to experience heavy raining during the construction period. Although it was long struggling with less friend, My troops was able to continue this operation for 4 months only with our sense of duty.

Because of frequent skirmishes occurred nearby, we continued to operation wearing bulletproof jackets and hats under indescribable heat. Even at time, we had to do favors of townspeople in order to continue construction.

Military engineers from Bangladesh at same time was progressing road construction from Juba to our site. So we helped each other to do construction more effectively by exchanging information. Above all, the Minister of National Defense and State governor strongly supported this construction by visiting the sites and giving thanks.

Finally after 4 months into construction, 172 kilometers of roads were connected and travel time between Juba and Bor reduced significantly. We could see that Bor’s economy was getting back on the right track. Hanbit Unit specified in Memorandum Agreement that South Sudanese government has a responsibility of maintaining roads afterward as well as organizing its work forces and preparing their own heavy equipments.

## **5. Medical Aid for Local People and People in POC**

South Sudanese are exposed to all kinds of disease. It is not wrong to say that there is no fundamental health care system. Hanbit Unit’s medical team was originally organized to support members in the unit. However, we could not help but to support and help South Sudanese.

Refugee centers were built when many people evacuated into base of United

nations during civil war. Many UN's medical team, including ones in Hanbit Unit, tried their best to save people's lives. There were many people who died while receiving treatment. Amongst those patients, there were bullet wounded patients, patients who suffered from malaria, and even patients with AIDS. Particularly many children died due to lack of treatment. There were a place within and near UN base where people were buried and our help was much needed to resolve this problem.

As refugee centers started to settle, our medical team visited near town to provide medical aid. Many people gave eyes of alert when we first visited, but as the time went by, each side got closer to each other. There were even a mother walked more than one hour carrying her sick baby. People who learned local language the most are medical officers and nurse officers who got to spend most time with local people.

Our medical team also supported preventive measures against any epidemics and treated cows and sheep, which are considered as local people's most valuable belongings.

There were two girls suffering from facial tumor, threatening their lives. They were able to receive treatment in South Korea by connecting with INGO Organization. Her name was nyaring, many people tried to save her life.

However, one of the girls passed away while receiving intermediate care services in Uganda. It was hard for us to overcome this tragic event.

## **6. Cartography**

Another creative attempt Hanbit Unit took in Bor was cartography trial. The first step we took was installing measuring points. We started to measure Bor first. Although in principle we should've started at national first class reference points in Juba, we applied the local independent points.

The reference points, as shown in the picture, are installed at 10 different places in city of Bor. We were able to put all geo information in DB such as roads, drains, and water pipes, office building, school, market etc. For this, We we prepared 2 ARC GIS, which is a professional program for mapping, several survey equipments, with the help of GIS department in UNMISS.

Fortunately, mayor of Bor majored in Civil Engineering which helped tremendously in terms of carrying forward this business. The mayor appointed

staffs who would be in charge of cartography in Bor. And Hanbit Unit conducted control points and educated the staffs how to use the program.

We, of course, faced many difficulties while carrying out cartography. For example, we were suppose to insert names of roads in maps. However, there was no such concept in Bor. So we had to discuss this issue with authorities who had the rights, but it took long time since each of them wanted different names for the road.

Also it was not easy to depict the small roads in residential area because there were no clear trace or designated boundary of the roads. Cadastral ownership or some similar concept were no clear, so we had many difficulties to visualize the boundary of numerous geographical features

We defined the boundary of Bor City, State capital, in fact State law said that the city boundary reaches 5km from city hall, as you might know that is very unclear definition. as well as Address Code based on the Road Name, Classification of land use for future city plan were embedded in Digital Mapping

I would like to talk about one happening during the project. We had set 10 survey reference points that contain three informations of latitude, longitude, and elevation of geographical location within the city including city hall. One day we visited state government office. A group of people showed their hostility against our team complaining that the reference points could be used for targeting information when UN attempts to strike their building with missile. Wow, we were so thrown into confusion by them.

After many twists and turns, complications for 6 months, the map of Bor city was completed even it was not perfect, but the first digital map of the city or maybe even first in the country's history.

## **7. Expanding and Maintaining Airport**

The airplane in SS with very poor road condition is the only transportation means regardless weather considering extremely poor road condition. In some aspect, it is very odd. If they could maintain good road condition, massive

Logistics with low cost would be possible. But practically road construction cost tremendous amount of budget in SS. Construction material such as cement, wood, grave, and many basic element are very rare especially except Juba, the

capital city

As the result, many local Airports have been served for major cities, and all of them are unpaved except Juba International Airport. Heavy effort is required to maintain the functionality of unpaved airport. SS government can not afford to keep its condition

For UN who need to move large amount of relief goods in right time, air transportation is very crucial so that maintaining airport runway, Taxi way and Airport apron was came to ROK HMEC's periodical task. You can imagine how it will be dangerous if the runway have puddles or soft surface.

I had several experiences of taking small private airplane that can carry around 10 personnel, It was just like riding toy while it was landing. In fact there was a crash between choppers due to crowdy space of apron. Later on UNMISS issued an order to expand airport which required tremendous amount of soil movement. We initiated to remove surface soil, levelling, and trenching

However, runway expansion had to be stop. Worsening relationship between South Sudanese government and UNMISS. UN did not approve Plane's runway expansion construction which would benefit the central government. The government also started to regulate UN force's use of the runway.

## 8. Cultural Exchange

In order to get closer with South Sudanese, we built roads, runways, large scale landfill, and embankment. Also, we made small farm and let them work on it together with us. However, in order to do this, our relationship with townspeople had to build up first.

The most important thing was to breaking down barriers between us and them. In order to get rid of boundaries and wariness that developed in South Sudanese for long time, we wanted to create an opportunity work together. We chose Taekwondo and soccer. These two are very famous sports around the world. Students, especially, loved Taekwondo and soccer classes. Since there were too many students wished to be involved, many of them could not get to join.

For your reference, South Sudan has its own national team for soccer and it participates in international games. The team's director and coach are Koreans, too. In order for the national team to continue playing soccer, Hanbit Unit

supported the team with uniform, shoes, bags, and beverages.

We also brought Taekwondo instructor to Juba to play a role in South Sudanese Taekwondo competition. With demonstration of professional instructor, it helped people to increase their interests in Taekwondo.

## **9. Construction of POC(Protection of Civilian) Camp**

During 2013's civil war, about 15,000 refugees surged into UN base in Bor. Most of them were Nuer who are main tribe of Government in opposition. Due to brutal massacre that was taking place to kill Nuer people, most of refugees were fleeing from their home to save their lives.

Although UN was not prepared, it accepted refugees to the base to save their lives despite government's strong threats.

However more serious problem arrived next. We needed many goods, such as food, water, tent, and sanitary supplies, to support the refugees. However, UN did not possess any of these materials. In the beginning, we went to warehouse of World Food Organization. But most of them were plundered during the civil war. Despite the danger, we carried leftovers to the base, and shared UN's supply.

UN and Hanbit Unit provided treatment for patients that were suffering from bullet wounds. But there were only limited amount of supply we could support. South Sudanese government even sorted UN as an opposing force, since it has been helping refugees. It meant death when refugees breakaway from the UN camp.

In order to administer refugees in small space, it was important for us to prevent spreading of diseases by managing internal roads, drains, waterways. In order to solve these problems, we built large-scaled refugee shelter. We implemented this under the order of UNMISS. UN judged that without well-built refugee shelter, no progress can take place.

The building was 500m by 500m. In order to ensure their safety, we put three-layered fence, road for patrol, and installed water hazards. We also have wired safety through building internal patrol walk road, drains, and military guard post.

While the shelter was being built, 30 of armed Dinka people attacked the UN refugee camp, killing 16 people and many being hurt. After this incident,

many refugees fear their attack and have been carrying in weapons to protect themselves.

The refugee shelter was finally built after 2 months of day and night hard working. Many INGO organizations installed schools, deep-well and toilet to bring in refugees and prepared necessary supplies. However, many refugees refused to go out of the camp in base. They said that it is only safe in the camp. It took more than five months to persuade them. They'd been living a comfortable life in the camp, so they did not wish to move new camp which is adjacent with UN base.

The effect was minimal even UNMISS tried to persuade them. However, the downpours that started one day caused refugee camp to be flooded. So people had to move to newly built shelter.

People were able to live more hygienically with larger space. But as one can assume, it is not the best place to live. They have to go back home even though POC would be more convenient than any other place.

Later on, UNMISS tried to send them back to their home town. But the outcome was not satisfactory due to uncooperative attitude, negativity of people, and mainly hostilities of Dinka tribe against Nuer people.

## **10. Hanbit Experimental Farming**

South Sudan has wide land and very fertile with Nile river which is not dry along year. Regarding its land and climate, agriculture will be the most suitable means for national economic source. Traditionally South Sudan people depend their life on cattle farming. Number of cattle is the symbol of wealth and power in their communities. On the other hand, cattle farming has caused many troubles in their history as all might understand. Therefore without finding new alternative, it is very difficult to escape from troubles.

One of the most strong impression I got from the sight seeing in Airplane, it was endless plain land. As a person lived in highly populated, and mountainous area, the land was just amazing thing. As time passed, we decided to have experimental farm inside our base. Also we brought several types of seed which might fit to the this climate.

Later on, ROK HMEC expanded the farm up to 300m \* 300m as planting 1000 mango trees with Guwaba. To make watering easier, we utilized the

water pond near the farm, made water tank, pipe line for watering, preparing korean type tractors, educate people how to cultivate by inviting agriculture specialist from Korea.

One of the most important thing was, we believe, educating people, and have them to continue to serve at the farm. Government was very helpful. They keep the promise that they will provide regular work power and specialist for farming. Finally we experienced the first yield from the farm.

Now Government appointed a manager of farm, and they provide and sell UNMISS staffs and TCC the fresh vegetable.

Last year, a technical center was installed, in which our unit will have continuous program of experiment and education with youth from Jonglei state.

## **11. Visiting Korea Program**

Visiting Korea Program is intended to show South Sudanese leaders the future of SS through Korea. This program is planned periodically in accordance with Korean TCC rotation in every 8 months and it targets government officers, college students, journalists and young leaders of the community, by visiting education, industry compound and military base near DMZ.

Based on the review, two areas impressed them most.

First was the Canaan Farmers School. By observing quote “people who do not work should not eat,”they experienced what they need and work on in order to overcome poverty. They also will realize their infinite possibility and potential of growing and expanding their agriculture.

SS has higher potentiality of agriculture than any other African countries. But it seems that they have not quite realized this fact.

If they cultivate fertile land and industrialize in the farming instead of feeding cattle which cause disputes, I am sure, SS definitely would be competitive nation in Africa.

Second was the Roads and Railways.

It is not necessary to stress the importance of roads and railways. Many many problems among tribes will be solved naturally by just communicating each other. Roads and Railways mean exchange, communication, and harmonization.

### III. Closing remarks

I imagine the future of SS. Numerous highways which stretch up to corner to corner of the nation, Mega Agriculture industry complexes by Nile river, and busy and speedy traffics of trucks loading so many tropical fruits and vegetables, which are heading to neighbouring countries, making South Sudan a prosperous nation.

I now may be recalling that ROK HMEC planned and proceed all kinds of project such as constructing road, opening Hanbit Farm, making digital map, maintaining airport and so on...with imagining the future of SS.

I have confidence that SS has a great potentiality.

They have rich oil field, they enjoy abundant life from Nile river. SS people truly understand the cruelty of civil war. They achieved independence through fifty years of struggle.

They are very proud of their country. However, I am very sad to say that all efforts of UN and people of SS just turn into vain and went back to the past of conflict land because of political fighting.

I strongly expect all sort of trials from UN for the peace and rebuilding of SS could continue and develop. The political stability is the key, and that's the starting point. A Thousand Mango trees we planted 2 years ago are the symbol of Hope to SS. I wish SS people will see the hope when those Mango trees start to bear fruits.

UN PKO 현장의 도전과제 :  
2011년 코트디부아르 유엔감시단 사례  
UN PKO Challenges from the Field  
(Lessons from UNOCI in 2011)

마틴세바스찬 (말레이시아 CSCAP PKO 의장)  
Capt. Martin A. Sebastian (Malaysia Maritime Institute)



12<sup>th</sup> Seoul International PKO Conference

**UNPKO – Challenges from the Field:  
Lessons from UNOCI (Ivory Coast ) 2011**

Capt. Martin A. Sebastian RMN (R)  
Former Team Leader  
Africa Div II Military Planning Team  
MPS- OMA-DPKO



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## Ivory Coast





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## Post Election Violence

- Violence erupted in the West African nation after Laurent Gbagbo, who had been Ivory Coast's president since 2000, refused to accept rival Alassane Ouattara's victory in the November 2010 presidential run-off.
- Gbagbo's refusal to leave office led to an armed conflict during which serious human rights violations were committed by both sides.

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
- More than 3,000 were killed by the end of the conflict, over 150 women were raped or gang-raped people faced summary executions and villages were burned to the ground.
- Gbagbo-linked elite security force units abducted local political leaders associated with Ouattara's coalition, dragging them away from restaurants or out of their homes into vehicles. Family members later found the victims' bodies in morgues, riddled with bullets.



## UN Forces

- The U.N. established a peacekeeping mission (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, or UNOCI) in 2004 and charged it with monitoring the 2003 cease-fire agreement, keeping rival forces separate, and facilitating a national election.
- Among its responsibilities are monitoring the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups; disarmament and dismantling of militias; protection of United Nations personnel, institutions, and civilians; promoting law and order; and support for the organization of open, free, fair, and transparent elections



- 
- A background image showing a man in a suit and glasses speaking at a podium with microphones. A framed portrait of a man in a suit is visible on the wall behind him.
- Gbagbo lost the November presidential election. He rejected the result and undertook efforts to maintain power, including encouraging violent acts by his supporters.
  - The U.N. and most countries rejected Gbagbo's claim and recognized Ouattara as president.
  - U.N. peacekeepers and aid workers became targets of violence for supporters of Gbagbo since the U.N. declared Ouattara the winner.



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## Security Council

- The Security Council passed three resolutions in 2011 condemning the situation, expanding and enlarging the peacekeeping mission, adopting targeted sanctions, and authorizing the use of force by U.N. peacekeepers and French forces against Gbagbo's fighters.



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## UN Mandate

- **Protecting civilians and supporting the Government in DDR and security sector reform**
- Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) as from 4 April 2004 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003.



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## SRSG and Ivory Coast



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## Golf Hotel





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## Challenges

- Preserving the Mandate
  - Integrity of Bns
  - Ability of FHQ
- Safeguarding new Govt.
- Protection of Civilians
- Safety of UN Staff and Peacekeepers
- UN became target when Govt lost elections
  - Evacuation of UN Forces was planned with NATO
  - French Force Licorne 900 pax was mobilised. Standby Force in Gabon
- Force Nouvelle/The Invisible Commandos



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## Ibrahim Coulibaly-The Invisible Commandos





## United Effort to Capture Gbagbo



## Lessons

- SRSG and Staff under threat.
- Government forces had weapons. When losing elections, situation can be critical
- FHQ not ready with Contingency plans
- UN Battalions were not ready to risk lives to protect mandate
- UN Forces require Over The Horizon forces in case of attack
- Use of the sea in case of non combatant evacuation
- Standby UN Forces from neighboring mission

## 제2부 Session 2

# 아프리카 연합과의 파트너십 구축 : 왜 중요한가?

## Establishing Partnership with the AU : Why is it Important?

### ◎ 사회자 Moderator

: 박흥순 교수 / Prof. Park, Heungsoon

### ◎ 발표자 Speaker

- 최윤미 교수 (숙명여자대학교)  
Prof. Choi, Yunmi (Sookmyung Women's University)
- 김성수 교수 (한양대학교, 유럽아프리카 연구소장)  
Prof. Kim, Sung-soo (Hanyang University)
- 엠마 프란스워드 이숨빙가보 (주한 르완다 대사)  
Ambassador Emma-Françoise ISUMBINGABO (RWANDA)

### ◎ 토론자 Discussants

- 최현진 교수 (경희대학교)  
Prof. Choi, Hyunjin (Kyunghee University)
- 송재익 박사 (한양대학교, 유럽아프리카 연구소)  
Dr. Song, Jae-Ik (Hanyang University)
- 정재욱 교수 (숙명여자대학교)  
Prof. Jung, Jaewook (Sookmyung Women's University)



## 유럽연합의 입장

### Peace Operations Partnerships between the UN and Regional Organizations:

#### *EU's Cooperation with the UN and the AU in Peacekeeping*

최윤미 교수 (숙명여자대학교)

Prof. Choi, Yunmi (Sookmyung Women's University)

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반세기가 넘게 이어진 유엔의 평화활동은 유엔 창설 70주년을 맞이하여 2015년 '평화활동에 관한 고위급 독립패널 보고서(HIPPO)'를 통해 중대한 4가지 전환 과제를 제시하였다. 그 중 하나인 '지역기구와의 파트너십 강화'는 보다 효과적인 분쟁 해결 및 미래 유엔 평화활동의 역량을 확대해 나가기 위해서 지역기구, 특히 아프리카 연합(AU)과의 협력강화를 요구하고 있다. 유엔 평화활동에 있어서 지역기구의 중요한 역할과 임무는 1945년 유엔이 창설시 유엔 헌장에서 규정이 되었다. 그러나 당시에는 지역기구는 거의 존재하지 않았으며, 오늘날 세계 곳곳에서 일어나는 분쟁의 양상과 규모가 보다 복잡·다양하게 변화됨에 따라 유엔의 부족한 역량을 강화하기 위한 효과적인 대안으로 2000년대 들어서 주목을 받기 시작하였다.

유엔과 나란히 국제 평화와 안보 및 지역의 질서 유지에 기여하는 지역기구로는 유럽연합(EU)이 대표적이다. 유럽연합은 유럽 지역의 안보질서뿐만 아니라 유엔을 도와 아프리카 분쟁해결에도 큰 몫을 담당하고 있다. 유엔의 요구에 따라 대한민국이 아프리카연합 및 지역기구와의 파트너십을 구축하고 세계평화에 기여하기 위해서는, 무엇보다도 오랜 지역협력의 역사와 경험을 통해 유엔 및 타 지역기구와의 파트너십 구축을 발전시켜나가는 유럽으로부터의 교훈에 귀를 기울일 필요가 있다. 유럽연합과 유엔이 국제 평화활동을 위해 협력과 전략적 파트너십을 발전시켜 나가게 된 배경을 다양한 각도에서 조명해보고, 이를 통해 아프리카 평화활동에 적용할 수 있는 한계와 발전방안 등에 대해서 모색해보도록 하겠다.

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## I. Introduction

In June 2015, the United Nations (UN) called for a paradigm shift in peace operations. Upon the UN Secretary-General's request for an overall evaluation of the state of UN peace operations, the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) released a completion of the most comprehensive assessment of UN peace operations since the Brahimi Report issued in 2000.

The HIPPO Report put forward more than 100 recommendations in light of the emerging needs and evolving challenges in UN peace operations, which are classified into four essential shifts in the future design: i) primacy of politics, ii) spectrum of peace operations, iii) global and regional partnership for peace and security, and iv) more field-focused/people-centered operations.

While these four essential shifts referred to new findings of the assessment and different aspects for a sweeping reform, the issue of ‘a stronger global-regional partnership’ is particularly deemed ‘old wine in new bottles’. At the time of the signing of the United Nations Charter, the Charter gives the Security Council a universal and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the authority to allow the use of force. With the help of Chapter VIII, however, the Charter also left a minor opening for regional organizations, albeit almost inexistent at that time, for which UN’s partnership with regional organizations had been foreseen 70 years ago. The voice for a more inclusive and strategic partnership between the UN and regional organizations has been amplified over the past decades once it acknowledged that “the UN cannot be everywhere, every time, to solve every conflict in the world”.<sup>1)</sup> The HIPPO echoed the fact that the UN cannot single-handedly manage international peace and security, and endorsed the views on the necessity of burden-sharing and driving forward the momentum in a coordinated manner.

UN’s partnership with regional (and subregional) organizations are crucial, in particular the African Union(AU). As of August 2016, out of total 16 UN peacekeeping operations across four continents, 9 missions are deployed in Africa. With more than 82,000 of 100,000 Blue Helmets (82 percent of all UN uniformed personnel) currently deployed in Africa, the African continent indeed remains the largest recipient of UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>2)</sup> Today, UN’s peacekeepers are deployed in African soil amidst on-going conflict where there is no peace to keep. Moreover, as most of African conflicts become more multifaceted and complex, and are driven by various global/transnational problems such as the exploitation of natural resources, global war on terror, transnational organized crime, human trafficking, child soldiers and so on, concerns for African peace and security take up the largest portion of the time,

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1) A/70/95, S/2015/446.

2) For more detailed data, see UN peacekeeping Fact Sheet, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> (accessed on 18 October 2016)

resource and efforts of the UN Security Council. Despite the fact that Africa contributes approximately 50 percent of UN's uniformed personnel to African peace operations, the decentralized nature of institutional architecture and the weakness of institutional capacity of the AU remains the most serious impediment to the effective peacekeeping. Hence, the HIPPO revitalized the substantial meaning of Chapter VIII, and echoed the importance of regional approaches to peace operations in Africa.

Nevertheless, the initiative for a stronger partnership with regional organizations has been hampered by the fragmented approaches to global-regional and inter-regional organizational arrangement. In addition, the absence of common institutionalized framework and the deficiency of integrated response mechanism at both political and operational levels add unnecessary duplication of division of labour. How cooperation, coordination, and coherence between the UN and regional organizations are achieved, how mutual beneficial burden-sharing and comparative advantages in response to each distinct conflict situation can be leveraged, and how ad-hoc cooperation can move forward with more permanent, systematic and predictable mechanisms are questions of increasing importance. This paper seeks to examine the effective partnership between the UN and regional organizations in Africa peacekeeping, from the experience and perspective of the European Union (EU). It accesses the legal basis on the role of regional organizations in peace operations, and outlines the institutional framework for cooperation between the UN and the EU. Then the paper scrutinizes both coherent and inconsistent approaches in response to conflict situations among different organizations, i.e. UN-EU-AU trilateral cooperation. Finally, this paper offers a view on an effective partnership with the AU in support of UN peace operations.

## **II. The Global-Regional Partnership in Peacekeeping**

Lessons learned from experience through managing conflict and sustaining peace and security reflect that dynamic partnerships between the UN and regional organizations bolster capacities and efficiency of UN peace operations. Given the changing nature of conflicts where 'there is little or no peace to keep' and the growing demand for immediate deployment, the UN has appealed to regional organizations to provide robust assistance with

well-trained, equipped, mission-ready, and rapidly deployable forces. The increasing number of peace operations mounted by regional organizations has doubled in the past decades. Accordingly, more creative and constructive partnership with different regional organizations is becoming a regular feature in UN peace operation.

Whereas many regional organizations have reiterated their commitments to providing more decisive role as a reliable peacekeeping actor within the UN framework, the EU has been the most promising partner of the UN in peace operations. Since the 1990s, the EU has staked out a growing role in peace and security by developing structures and capabilities for a Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP). The EU has presented itself as a reliable regional security actor committed to strengthening UN peacekeeping capabilities. The EU and its member states have also emphasized the need for cooperation between the UN and the EU in carrying out effective global peace operations. By espousing these commitments and dedicating substantial efforts to their realisation, the EU has gradually come to be expected to play a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security. The UN welcomed the EU's willingness to share its heavy peacekeeping burden, and finally called upon the EU to play an important role in a wide range of international peacekeeping operations in close cooperation with the UN. Not surprisingly, the question of whether the smaller and regional EU can 'rescue' the larger and multilateral UN became one of the salient issues in the realm of international peace and security.<sup>3)</sup>

### Legal Basis

The Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, is the foundation document for all of the UN's work. According to the UN Charter, the UN was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. More specifically, the Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility and power to take collective action for the maintenance of international peace and security, which led to the Security Council's adoption of a range of measures for peace operations, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

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3) For example, see D. Hannay, "Making Multilateralism Work", CER Bulletin, No. 40, London: Centre for European Reform, 2005; and K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith, *The European Union at the United Nations*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.3.

The UN Charter already acknowledged in 1945 the positive role of regional organizations in supporting international peace and security. The Charter stipulates that the UN shall work with regional organizations acting within their geographical area. More specifically, Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements (Article 52-54) provides the basis for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. Several UNSC resolutions have since addressed cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, particularly UN-EU and UN-AU relations. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1631 in 2005, its first resolution on regional organizations. As the most recent resolution on the topic, UNSC Resolution 2176 (2014) recognizes that cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations can improve collective security, while reaffirming the UNSC's primary responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security. The resolution also expresses support for enhancing the peacekeeping role of regional organizations, and calls for more coherence and coordination of efforts. It also welcomed improved cooperation at strategic level between the UN and several organizations, inter alia the EU and the AU, and stressed the need to advance cooperation at operational level.

The New Horizons process of 2010, building on the Brahimi Report in 2000, highlights interoperability difficulties experienced in several parallel, hybrid or bridging operations conducted by the UN, AU, and EU. In his report in 2015, the UNSG Ban ki-moon mentioned several avenues for reinforcing global-regional partnerships in peacekeeping:

- Strengthening formal and informal mechanisms of engagement at strategic level, including through a clearer methodology for consultation between the UNSC and its regional and sub-regional counterparts, in view of a better division of roles in response to a crisis; more rapid decision-making and an optimal use of resources;
- Cooperating on planning at each phase of the response to a crisis;
- Gradually harmonizing policies and standards (e.g. pre-deployment standards and training; greater understanding of each other's policies and more systematic sharing of lessons learnt.

Importantly, a review of UN peacekeeping started in June 2014, and a comprehensive report was released on June 2015. Based on the HIPPO's recommendations, the UN reflected the need for reforming UN peace operations and strengthening the global-regional partnership, including but not limited to

institutionalizing the key relationships, better use of regional organizations' capabilities, and better burden-sharing with regard to support the AU in Africa.

### III. EU's role in UN Peacekeeping

Collaboration between the UN and the EU has developed steadily since the first UN-EU Troika meeting in 2000. Both the UN and the EU are gradually asserting their promising roles and partnership as global players in the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet, even though UN-EU cooperation is founded on shared common values such as human rights, rule of law and democracy, the range of UN-EU cooperation activities or modalities in international peace and security has not been clearly defined or specified. In fact, UN-EU cooperation takes a range of forms and denotations depending on the tasks to be carried out. Moreover, cooperation between the UN and the EU often adopts different terms that have a favourable resonance, so that states or institutions are inclined to use them in their statements and rhetoric in circumstances where it will look appropriate.

From its creation, the European Union has engaged in crisis management and conflict prevention, and now continues to strive for peace, security, and prosperity across the European continent and often beyond. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been developing a credible foreign and security policy designed to contribute to peacekeeping through international crisis management operations. During the past decade, as a part of the EU's CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) has developed rapidly to become the Union's first coherent strategy to identify and respond to EU-wide security concerns.<sup>4)</sup> CSDP enables the EU to develop the international crisis management capacities required to achieve five key objectives: safeguarding the EU's common values and fundamental interests; strengthening the security of the EU; preserving peace and international security in accordance with the UN Charter; promoting international cooperation; and advancing democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.<sup>5)</sup> CSDP affords the member states a broad range of options for managing crises as well as an enhanced ability to act rapidly and collectively

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4) With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been relabelled the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since December 2010.

5) Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) defines the five objectives of the CFSP.

in the face of security threats.

However, it is important to note that the EU itself is “neither a state nor a traditional international organisation”. Besides, EU foreign and security policy has remained largely intergovernmental in character, focusing on member states’ preferences in decision-making. In order to understand the role of the EU in line with the UN, a comprehensive approach needs to be adopted that elucidates the extent to which the EU is an important partner of the UN. The strength and impact of the EU before the UN is determined, first and foremost, by the mere presence of EU member states, especially in the Security Council. As things stand today, the EU is assured at least two most influential seats in the Security Council. These two permanent member seats are reserved for the UK and France, which are able to veto any Council decisions and resolutions. The maximum number of seats which the EU could theoretically occupy in the Security Council is six; i.e., out of the total 15 members of the UNSC, on average and in practice, the EU can count on four to six member states in the Council, which will amount from around 27% to 40%, respectively. In 2013 and 2014, for instance, no less than one-third of the seats were in EU Member States’ hands, while the 28 EU Member States stand for only one-eighth of the total 193 UN Member States. This numerical strength might be sufficient to guarantee the EU’s decisive influence in the UNSC, because EU Member States have an obligation to defend common EU positions at this venue (see Figure 1). Given this legal duty, EU states on the Security Council possess ‘EU-loyalties’ and are obliged to respect, pursue, and maintain common positions as well as interests of the Union on behalf of all EU Member States.<sup>6)</sup>

Figure 1. Article 19, Treaty on European Union

- (1) Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations.... [and] uphold the common position in such forums.
- (2) Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), [...] Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provision of the United Nations Charter.


Beyond voting power there is a financial dimension to the EU’s potential

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6) European Constitutional Law Review (2005), ‘Article 10 EC, Article 6 EU, Article I-5 Draft Convention’, 1:17-20.

power at the UN. This power derives from the EU's major contributions to UN activities. As in Figure 2, EU Member States provided around 38% of the UN's regular budget in 2012-2015. The EU member states are likewise the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, to the tune of 40%. In addition, the EU member states also provide around half of the budget of UN funds and programmes. Hence, there is no doubt that the EU Member States' current share of the overall budget for UN peacekeeping missions amounts around 40 percent, making the EU by far the single largest financial contributor.

Figure 2. Main Financial Contribution to the UN (2012-2015)




Source: United Nations DPKO

The EU's high level of commitment to the primary role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security and its core function of peacekeeping is also reflected in the number of troops, police and observers assigned to UN operations. As of 31 August 2016, a total of 5,549 men and women, or around 5.4% of UN peacekeeping personnel, came from the EU. Although the percentage of European troops in UN peacekeeping decreased compared to figures from previous years, due to the considerably increased troops contributed from Africa and Asia countries in recent years, the EU's contribution of peacekeeping personnel has been fairly constant and to some extent slowly and steady growing. In 2003, for instance, the EU's contribution to UN operations totalled 3,295 personnel, which accounted for 9.0% of the total. When the contribution of the ten new acceding countries was added in 2004, the figure rose to 4,801 which accounted for 13.2% of total UN

deployment. In 2007, a total of 11,140 men and women, or around 13.5% of UN peacekeeping personnel, came from the EU. In particular peacekeeping operations conducted in Africa, more than 29 percent of blue helmets are provided by the major EU countries (see figure 3). With the largest financial contribution as well as the provision of troops and police for UN peacekeeping operations, the EU and its member states are seen as substantial resources for capacity-building as well as decisive peacekeeping partner both for the UN and the AU.

Figure 3. Top Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa



Source: United Nations (2013-2015)

### UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping

The initial idea that UN-EU cooperation should perhaps be institutionalized was voiced in 2000, at a time when the UN was examining the reform of its operations through the 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', commonly known as the Brahimi Report (2000). In the Brahimi Report, the UN acknowledged the need for cooperation with regional organisations, and called upon the EU to take on a share of the responsibility for international peacekeeping and to provide assets that are needed for complex and robust peacekeeping operations.<sup>7)</sup> In response to the UN's request for cooperation, the EU underlined the special and unique value of cooperation

<sup>7)</sup> UN General Assembly / Security Council (A/55/305-S/2000/809), op. cit.

between the two bodies. The EU addressed that “efforts made will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN”.<sup>8)</sup>

The expectations for UN-EU partnership were stoked by the adoption, in 2001, of EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, which identified three areas of priority for cooperation: conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues.<sup>9)</sup> The document also established modalities for meetings at different levels between these two organisations. Both organisations have made further remarkable achievements when the UN Secretary-General and the Presidency of the Council of the EU signed the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management on 24 September 2003.<sup>10)</sup> In this landmark agreement, the UN and the EU declared that they are united by the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The EU’s commitments were echoed in Javier Solana’s report in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS), through which the EU reaffirmed its primary responsibility to support the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security and the core function of peacekeeping.<sup>11)</sup>

Despite the two organisations sometimes holding contradictory and competing visions, both the UN and the EU have acknowledged that they are the most ideal partners for cooperation in crisis management.<sup>12)</sup> Some arguments are also made that in both the scholarly literature and official documents the special and unique value of UN-EU cooperation has gradually become an object of attention.<sup>13)</sup> Moreover, according to a European national official, as UN-EU

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8) Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, 7-9 December 2000.

9) For details, see “EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management”, Annex to the Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

10) Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management”, New York, 24 September 2003.

11) J. Solana, *A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy*, Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2003.

12) For example, see “Civilian Police and Police Training in Post-Conflict OSCE Areas”, *Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, U.S Government Printing Office, September 2001, p.13; W. Hansen, “EU-UN Cooperation in Peace Operation: Change, Concepts and Constrains” in Hans-Georg Ehrhart et al (eds.), *Die Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert: Theorie und Praxis Europäischer Außen-, Sicherheits-, und Friedenspolitik*, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007, p.238.

13) For example, see B. Charbonneau (2009), “What is so special about the European Union? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.4, August 2009, pp.546-561 (p.548).

cooperation became a source of greater legitimacy for both organisations, the UN and the EU have mutually benefited from such cooperation.<sup>14)</sup> From the UN's side, the benefits derive from the credibility and operational resources provided by the EU in complex and multidimensional operations in difficult situations. The UN has tried to involve the EU as much as possible in peacekeeping activities. From the EU's side, the benefits derive from the political legitimacy conferred by UN mandates. In addition, UN-EU cooperation allows the EU to fulfil the initial aims of the CSDP. The EU seeks to equip itself with capacities for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces and appropriate decision-making bodies and to strengthen stability and security both in Europe and beyond by conducting military and civilian peace operations.<sup>15)</sup> In short, given the benefits derived by both sides of this equation, UN-EU cooperation in the realm of peacekeeping operations seems to be a phenomenon that will continue to develop and deepen in future years.

▪ **Table 1. Relations between the UN and Regional Organizations**

	<b>European Union</b>	<b>African Union</b>
Cooperation Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint Declaration 2003</li> <li>• Joint Statement 2007</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Declaration 2006</li> </ul>
Liaison Mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPKO Liaison Office in Brussels</li> <li>• DPKO officials attend EU PSC</li> <li>• Education Days</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Liaison Offices</li> <li>• UNOAU Head attends AU PSC</li> </ul>
Institutionalized Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN-EU Steering Committee meets twice a year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint Task Force on Peace and Security(JTF) meets twice a year</li> </ul>

For the question regarding negotiation outcome and decision-making whether to mandate the EU and its member states to cooperation with the UN or the AU in peacekeeping, it is essential to understand the EU's decision-making structure in the realm of CSDP and inter-organizational institutional dialogue. The EU's foreign and security policy is a purely intergovernmental matter involving all 28 Member States. However, Smith argues that EU foreign policy must be supplemented with, and fully explained by, insights from institutional functioning and coordination between the institution and the member states.<sup>16)</sup> The EU's intergovernmental decision-making structure became increasingly


14) Interview with official, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Paris, 04 March 2010.

15) For example, see European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Cologne European Council, Annex III, 3- 4 June 1999.

16) M. E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.63-89.

institutionalised and linked to 'Community' procedures. Hence, CFSP/CSDP is considered a policy-making competence which is shared by member states and supranational institutions.<sup>17)</sup> Björkdahl and Strömvik argue that the process of agenda-shaping, decision-making and implementation for an EU-led operation is carried out by the simultaneous interactions between the three main institutional structures of the EU: the intergovernmental Council structure, the support structure of the Council General Secretariat, and the supranational Commission structure (see Figure 4).<sup>18)</sup>

Figure 4. Organisation of main ESDP bodies




In the case of a UN mandate involving a broader array of multilateral actors and intervention, i.e. trilateral cooperation among the UN, the AU, and the EU, the rapid deployment in response to urgent request of peace operation on the

17) See D. C. Tomas, "Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approach", *International Politics*, vol. 46, no.4, 2009, pp.339-357 (p.340).

18) A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-making Procedures*, DIIS Report, 2008.

ground is hampered by the complex and inconsistent institutional decision-making mechanisms (see Figure 5). In particularly absence of common global-regional and/or inter-regional organizational framework for cooperation, the UN, the AU, and the EU would have come to deploy different types of operations in response to conflict situations in Africa which operate in the same area of operations under different mandates and with different objectives, as the table below highlights (see Table 2).

Figure 5. Road Map for EU autonomous operation in support of a UN Peace Operations



Source: DPKO/DFS, Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions

Table 2. UN, AU/African and EU Missions deployed to African Countries 2010 – 2015

	UN Missions	AU Missions	EU Missions
<b>Abyei</b>	UNISFA (since 2011)		
<b>Boko Haram Regions</b>		MNJTf (since 2015)	
<b>Burundi</b>	BINUB* (2007–2011) BNUB* (2011–2015) MENUB* (since 2015)	Military and HR Observers (2015)	
<b>Central Africa</b>	UNOCA* (since 2011)		
<b>Central African Republic (CAR)</b>	BINUCA* (2009–2014) MINUSCA (since 2014)	MICOPAX (2008–2013) MISCA (2013–2014) MISAC*** (since 2014)	EUFOR RCA** (2014) EUMAM RCA** (since 2015)
<b>Chad-CAR</b>	MINURCAT (2008–2010)		
<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	UNOCI (since 2004)		
<b>DRC</b>	MONUSCO (since 2010)		EUPOL RD Congo (2007–2014) EUSEC RD Congo (since 2005)
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	UNIOGBIS* (since 2010)	ECOMIB (since 2012)	(EU SSR Guinea Bis-sau; 2008–2010)
<b>Indian Ocean</b>			EUCAP Nestor (since 2012)
<b>Liberia</b>	UNMIL (since 2003)		
<b>Libya</b>	UNSMIL* (since 2011)		EUBAM Libya (since 2013)
<b>Lords-Resistance-Army (LRA)-affected Areas</b>		RTF (since 2011)	
<b>Mali</b>	MINUSMA (since 2013)	AFISMA (2013) MISAHEL*** (since 2013)	EUTM Mali** (since 2013) EUCAP Sahel Mali (since 2014)
<b>Niger</b>			EUCAP Sahel Niger since 2012)
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	UNIPSIL* (2008–2014)		
<b>Somalia</b>	UNPOS* (1995–2013) UNSOM* (since 2013)	AMISOM (since 2007)	EUTM Somalia** (since 2010)
<b>Somalia/Gulf of Aden</b>			EUNAVFOR Somalia- Operation Atalanta** (since 2008)
<b>Sudan/Darfur</b>	UNMIS (2005–2011) UNAMID (since 2008)	UNAMID (since 2008)	
<b>South Sudan</b>	UNMISS (since 2011)	MVM (since 2014) AU Political Mission (since 2015)	EUAVSEC South Sudan (2012–2014)
<b>West Africa</b>	UNOWA* (since 2002)		
<b>Western Sahara</b>	MINURSO (since 1991)		

\*UN Political Missions; \*\*EU Military Missions, \*\*\* AU Political Missions

#### IV. Global-Regional Peacekeeping Cooperation on the Ground

The EU has significantly increased its operational contribution to international crisis management. Through autonomous and UN Security Council-mandated CSDP operations, the EU helps lessen the burden on UN peacekeeping capacities that are stretched close to the limit. As of October 2016, the EU has carried out more than thirty-four CSDP operations, including military and civilian missions, rule of law missions, border management operations, and civil-military support actions, in Europe, Africa, and Asia.<sup>19)</sup> As in the figure 6 and 7, nine operations out of 16 on-going African operations are conducted by the EU missions. Currently, the EU and the UN are operating in parallel in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), RD Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, and the Middle East. Cooperation on the ground has evolved notably since the first EU mission and operation in 2003 - the EU Police Mission BiH taking over from the UN police mission, and the military operation Artemis in RD Congo, requested by the UN to support its mission there (MONUC).

**Table 3. EU Military Operations in Support of UN Peacekeeping in Africa**

Operation area	UN Mission (Resolution)	EU Missions (Council Joint Action)	Categories	Deployment
Congo (DRC)	MONUC <a href="#">S/RES/1484</a> <a href="#">30 May 2003</a>	Operation <i>ARTEMIS</i> Council Joint Action <a href="#">2003/423/CFSP</a> , <a href="#">of 5 June 2003</a>	<i>Bridging model</i> EU-led military operation before UN take over	12 June 2003 – 01 Sep. 2003
	MONUC <a href="#">S/RES/1671</a> <a href="#">25 April 2006</a>	EUFOR RD Congo Council Joint Action <a href="#">2006/319/CFSP</a> , <a href="#">of 27 April 2006</a>	<i>Stand-by/Over-the-horizon</i> EU-led military operation in support of an existing UN operation	30 July 2006 – 30 Nov. 2006
Chad and the CAR	MINURCAT <a href="#">S/RES/1778</a> <a href="#">25 Sep. 2007</a>	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Council Joint Action <a href="#">2007/677/CFSP</a> , <a href="#">of 15 October 2007</a>	<i>Bridging model</i> EU-led military operation before UN take over	28 Jan. 2008 – 15 Mar. 2009

19) For instance, military operations aimed at ensuring stability and security include EUFOR Concordia in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003), EUFOR *Artemis* in Democratic Republic of Congo (2003), EUFOR *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), EUFOR DR Congo (2006), and EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (2008). Mixed civilian/military operations for security sector reform was operational in Darfur/Sudan (2005-2007), in DR Congo (2005-2009), and in Guinea-Bissau (2008). Besides, a number of civilian missions for police, rule of law, border management and monitoring was also conducted in Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Asia.

Yet, at the end of operation Artemis, the European contributors refused to 're-hat' some of their forces as UN 'blue helmets' and no European state participated in the UN force that took over Artemis. The subsequent military operations, EUFOR RD Congo (July - November 2006), which, like Artemis, complemented MONUC, and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (January 2008-March 2009), which was a military bridging operation to the UN Mission to CAR and Chad (MINURCAT), were generally assessed as successful in terms of EU-UN cooperation on the ground and at the highest political level. However, a series of political and operational problems were also evident: due to divergent national interests, reluctance of EU Member States to get involved and to contribute troops to the operations (France was the main promotor of and contributor to the operations), shortage of EU operational capabilities and interoperability problems, and slow EU decision-making, but also problems resulting from persistent differences between the organisational cultures, practices and procedures of the EU and UN. On the other hand, these experiences provided valuable lessons for future collaboration.

Significant progress has ensued on the ground after the EU Action Plan and the mutually agreed modalities on planning. Mali, CAR and Somalia have been cited as 'excellent examples of the comprehensive and complementary nature of the UN-EU partnership '.

In **Mali**, the UN mission MINUSMA saw increased participation of uniformed personnel from 11 EU states, as well as the provision of helicopters, transport aircraft, intelligence experts and special forces. The EU also has a military training mission in the country (EUTM Mali) launched in February 2013, and a civilian SSR mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) launched in January 2015. Experts consider that EU-UN coordination with regard to EUCAP Sahel Mali was very good: coordinated planning, reciprocal liaison officers, consultations on the division of labour between the EU mission and UN police.

In the **CAR**, EUFOR RCA (April 2014-March 2015) has provided a successful example of a military bridging operation authorised by the UNSC. Its objective was to secure the environment in Bangui until the UN mission (MINUSCA) could assume full responsibility for the area. The EU replaced EUFOR RCA in March 2015 with a military advisory mission (EUMAM RCA) to assist CAR authorities with SSR, in particular reform of the armed forces. The EU had also provided support through the African Peace Facility to the AU mission in CAR

(MISCA), which handed over to MINUSCA in September 2014.

In **Somalia**, both the UN and EU have supported logistically and financially the AU mission in the country (AMISOM, established in 2006), and all three organisations cooperated in designing a security strategy for Somalia. Currently, the EU has three missions in Somalia and the Horn of Africa: EUTM Somalia (military training), EUCAP Nestor (capacity-building) and EUNAVFOR Atalanta (counter-piracy operation).

Figure 6. On-going EU's CSDP Missions (2016)





Figure 7. Map of UN Peacekeeping Operations and EU's Cooperation



## V. Conclusion

### Persistent Limitations to EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping

Over more than a decade, the EU and the UN have significantly strengthened their cooperation in maintaining international peace and security. Nevertheless, a series of limitations and challenges to the partnership persist. Some impediments to inter-organizational cooperation are said to be caused by divergent interests and preferences of member states, by collective action problems or lack of capabilities, as well as by conflicting procedures of both organizations, or even turnover of staff, affecting inconsistent institutional cultures. Furthermore, some consider the partnership as asymmetric and reflecting the gap between 'what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer'. In addition, inter-organizational awareness is still hampered by lack of resources and lack of mechanisms for monitoring and taking into account the agenda and developments in the partner organization.

On the issue of EU-AU partnership, the EU has also enhanced its relations with the AU. The EU has positively strengthened its presence in Africa. However, bilateral EU relations with African countries are complex and diverse, but not political enough at EU level, because former colonial powers retain diplomatic prerogatives. Moreover, the EU cannot rely too heavily on the AU too quickly. The EU must not ignore that internal AU politics may undermine the potential EU-AU partnership, because African interests and leadership are often directed elsewhere. Given such critical impediments, it is thus very important to understand and respect different culture, norms, identities, and interests in approaching, planning, implementing a cooperative peacekeeping operation. In terms of liaison officer, the lack of senior participants from the AU side due to the personnel recourse issues presents another key challenges. This is why a common, systematic, coherent institutional decision-making mechanism should be given in a timely manner for more effective peacekeeping cooperation.

At more practical issues, coordination on planning, training, capacity-building, financial management with the AU also need to be defined. In sum, in order for the UN to advance a stronger partnership with regional originations, in terms of global-regional and inter-regional cooperation, the following assignments need to be more clarified:

- Strong will of member states
- Common institutional approach
- Understanding different culture and language, and internal politics of Africa
- Simultaneous interaction and monitoring by Liaison officer
- Institutional decision-making framework
- Clear mandate and Types of cooperation



## 한국의 입장 ROK's Perspective

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Peacekeeping Operations Seminar 2016

### Political and Economic Outlook of Africa 2015-2016

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## Review of African Politics in 2015

- ◆ General elections were held in Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia in 2015
  - The ruling parties won elections by controlling electoral resources and electoral colleges in the most countries in 2015
  - The ruling parties won elections in 10 out of 12 national elections (Exceptions are Nigeria and Burkina Faso).

Elections of African Countries in 2015

Country	Election	Date
Zambia	Presidential election	2015.01.20
Nigeria	Presidential and general election	2015.02.14
Egypt	General election	2015.03
Tanzania	General election, Constitution Reform	2015.04.30, 2015.10
Ethiopia	General election	2015.05.24
South Sudan	General election	2015.06
Ivory Coast	Presidential election	2015.10.26

- ◆ Boko Haram, Islamist terrorist group, is the most significant social and political issue of Africa.
- ◆ Boko Haram has killed two hundred thousand people in Nigeria by 2015

## Review of African Politics in 2015

### Presidential election in Nigeria

- ◆ Muhammadu Buhari won presidency by beating incumbent Goodluck Jonathan by more than 2.5 million in April 1st in 2015.
- ◆ Buhari of All Progressive Congress(APC) won 52.4% of total votes while Janathan of People's Democratic Party(PDP) won 43.7%.
  - Many voters have said that they believe Gen Buhari is better positioned to defeat Boko Haram (The election was postponed because of Boko Haram insurgency).
  - Gen Buhari's victory is a hugely significant moment in Nigeria's turbulent history. Never before has a sitting president been defeated in an election.
  - It was the most expensive election ever to be held on the African continent.

Presidential election results by state



Goodluck Jonathan  
from the southern Niger Delta region  
Former President, Protestant



Muhammadu Buhari  
From the Northern region  
Incumbent President, Muslim

## Review of African Politics in 2015

### Ethiopian Parliamentary Election

- ◆ Parliamentary elections were held in Ethiopia on 24 May 2015. The result was a victory for the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which won 500 of the 547 seats. Allies of the EPRDF won the remaining seats.
- ◆ The opposition called the election an "undemocratic disgrace."
- ◆ Hailemariam Desalegn previously served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi from 2010 to 2012. When Meles died in August 2012, Hailemariam Desalegn succeeded him as Prime Minister.
- ◆ He was then elected as the Chair of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party, on 15 September 2012. Hailemariam Desalegn also served as the Chairperson of the African Union from 2013 to 2014.

#### Election Result

- ✓ Date : 2015.5.24
- ✓ Election Result
  - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) : 500 seats
  - Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP): 24 seats
- ✓ Turnout : 85% among 3.7 million registered voters

## Review of African Politics in 2015

### Boko Haram Insurgency

- ◆ In the local Hausa dialect, Boko Haram means "Western education is forbidden."
- ◆ Boko Haram is a militant Islamic group working out of Nigeria, whose purpose is to institute Sharia, or Islamic law.
- ◆ Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno. He established a religious complex and school that attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighboring countries. The center had the political goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for jihadis.
- ◆ It has been speculated that the reason Yusuf founded Boko Haram appears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corruption by linking it to Western influence in governance.
- ◆ Boko Haram militants mainly inhabit areas in the northern states of Nigeria, specifically Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Borno and Kaduna.
- ◆ Boko Haram had alleged links to al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab

#### Timeline

2014.01.26	At least 45 are killed in a market in Kawuri in Borno after Boko Haram militants open fire.
2014.02.11	At least 23 people are killed when suspected Boko Haram militants torch houses in the village of Konduga
2014.04.14	Boko Haram militants kidnap approximately 276 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno
2015.06.01	Boko Haram militants raid three villages in the northeastern Nigerian state of Borno, killing at least 145 people
2015.09.03	An estimated 30 people are dead and 145 injured after Boko Haram militants attack a crowded market in Kerawa
2016.05.17	Amina Ali Nkeki, the first of the more than 200 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram

## Review of African Politics in 2016

### Anti-Government Protests in Ethiopia

- ◆ Ethiopia has been governed by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front since the end of the Ethiopian Civil War in 1991
- ◆ The Oromo people is marginalized though they are the single largest ethnic group both in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.
- ◆ Oromos have been staging protest rallies across the country since April of 2014 against systematic marginalization and persecution of ethnic Oromos.
- ◆ The government used overwhelming force to crush the protest, killing hundreds of protestors and arresting thousands.
- ◆ The Ethiopian government is in denial and making the same promises of restoring 'law and order' through further repression and crackdown.

#### Timeline

2016 January	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government drops plans to expand Addis Ababa boundaries after months of protests by Oromo ethnic group fearing farmers could be displaced. Rights groups estimate at least 140 people killed by security forces during protests.</li> <li>• Millions of people face dire food shortages after Ethiopia suffers its worst drought in decades.</li> </ul>
2016 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tens of thousands of people from Ethiopia's ethnic Amhara group take part in an anti-government demonstration in the northern city of Gondar.</li> </ul>
2016 September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The African Union calls for restraint in Ethiopia after months of anti-government protests which began in the central Oromo region before spreading to Amhara in the north. Human rights groups say at least 500 people have been killed.</li> </ul>
2016 September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Britain, the EU and the World Bank announce a project to create 100,000 jobs in Ethiopia. A third of the jobs will be for Eritrean refugees to whom the Ethiopian government will grant full employment rights.</li> </ul>
2016 October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government declares a six-month state of emergency following months of violent anti-government protests.</li> </ul>

## 2016 Political Forecasting for Africa

- ◆ At least 14 national elections are scheduled in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2016, but major political changes such as regime changes or power alternation are not expected.

Major National Elections in Africa in 2016

Country	Election	Date
Uganda	General election	2016.02.18
Niger	Presidential election	2016.02.21
Congo	Presidential election	2016.03.20
Comoros	Presidential election	2016.04.10
Chad	General election	2016.04.10
Gabon	Presidential election	2016.08.01
Zambia	Presidential election	2016.08.11
Ghana	General election	2016.11.07
DR. Congo	General election	2016.11.27
Gambia	Presidential election	2016.12.01
Somalia	Presidential election	2016.12.01

## Sub-Saharan Africa's Economic Growth to 4.5% in 2015

2016 Expected GDP Growth of Sub-Saharan Africa is 5.0%

- ◆ The economic growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa for 2015 is lower than that for 2014.

- The economic growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa for 2014 is 5%, but it decreased after July of 2014 because of the drop in oil price.
- The stunning fall in oil prices results in economic downturn in Nigeria that has the largest economy and the petroleum industry on the African continent. The expected GDP growth of Nigeria for 2015-2016 is lower than 5% (It is 2.5% lower than what expected in 2014).

Economic Growth(%) for Sub-Saharan Africa



Note: IMF, 2015


- ↳ Nevertheless, the economy of developing countries will continue to improve.
- ↳ The dismal forecasting of economic growth of African countries is influenced by the negative economic expectation of the countries (e.g. Republic of South Africa, Nigeria) that rely heavily on natural resources.

## 2016 Economic Forecasting for Africa

The effects of falling raw material prices on the economy differ between resource rich and poor countries

### ◆ Falling raw material prices has a big impact on the economy of Nigeria and Republic of South Africa

- Nigeria and Republic of South Africa occupy 37.7% of the economy of the African continent.
- Nigeria and Republic of South Africa depend heavily on raw materials and oils.
- The trend in raw material prices will continue to decline in 2016.



Note: IMF, 2015

- ▶ The prices of energy and non-energy resources for 2016 will decline to 65.9% and 84% of the prices of 2010. Consequently, the resource dependent countries will suffer from falling of the resource prices.
- ▶ It is expected that raw material prices will rebound next year, but the recovery will be slow.
- ▶ The African countries that do not rely on raw materials such as Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, and Rwanda will enjoy relatively high GDP growth.

## FDI Flow decreased in 2015

Global economic crisis makes FDI flow for Africa reduced

### ◆ Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) has consistently increased since 2012 except for 2013 but decreased in 2015

- FDI inflow declines to 54 billion dollars in 2015 from 58.3 billion in 2014.
- FDI outflow also declines to 11.3 billion dollars in 2015 from 15.1 billion in 2014.
- In contrast, the global trend of FDI flow has recently increased.

- ▶ Because of economic hardship China, India, and Brazil have decreased their investment to Africa.

FDI Inflow for African ('15,million)

Inward/Outward	2005-2007	2012	2013	2014	2015
Africa	38169	55156	52154	58300	54079
	6931	12386	15543	15163	11325
North Africa	18768	15759	11961	11625	12647
	2275	3098	392	770	1831
West Africa	7920	16873	14493	12115	9894
	784	3504	2218	2246	2030
Middle Africa	2779	8948	7874	9091	5830
	60	399	121	214	360
East Africa	2749	5474	6790	7928	7808
	81	259	142	161	279
South Africa	5952	8101	11036	17540	17900
	3731	5126	12669	11772	6824
World	1418164	1510918	1427181	1276999	1762155
	1445276	1308820	1310618	1318470	1474242

Note: UNCTAD, 2015

## High Unemployment and Inflation Are Expected in 2016

◆ **Sub-Saharan African countries will have relatively high levels of unemployment and inflation**

- In 2016, 7.7% of unemployment rate is expected in Sub-Saharan African countries. It is the third highest rate in the world (The highest is 11.6% of Middle East and North Africa, and the second most is 7.8% of Central and Eastern Europe).
- Citizen dissatisfaction will increase in raw material dependent countries because of economic hardship.

African Nations Inflation (%)

Country	2014	2015*	2016*	2017*
Congo	1.0	1.0	1.7	2.5
Côte d'Ivoire	0.4	1.6	1.5	1.8
Ethiopia	7.4	10.0	9.0	8.3
Rwanda	1.8	2.1	4.3	5.0
Nigeria	8.1	9.1	9.7	8.8
South Africa	6.1	4.8	5.9	5.6

Note: IMF, 2015

- ☞ Most African countries export primary commodities and import manufactured products. Thus, a decline in the value of a country's currency causes an increase in inflation.
- ☞ Raw material dependent countries will face economic hardship and financial crisis.

## Economic Outlook for the Republic of South Africa in 2015

### Stagnation in economic growth

- ◆ Anticipated economic growth rate for Republic of South Africa is lower than 2%.
- Electricity deficit, high unemployment rate, the expected increase in US interest rate, falling in raw material prices, and economic downturn of China and EU will have negative impacts on economic growth.

South Africa Economic Indicator

Sector	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
GDP(100 million \$)	3,977	3,665	3,500	3,258	3,245
Per Capita income	12,474	12,798	13,047	13,148	13,530
GDP Growth	2.2	2.2	1.5	1.4	1.3
Average exchange rate (rand/\$)	8.48	10.49	11.54	14.22	15.45
Consumer Price Index	5.7	5.3	5.3	6.3	5.3

Note: EIU, 2015

- ◆ **Depreciation of South Africa Rand rates continues.**
  - Falling in raw material prices causes the decrease in the value of South Africa Rand.
  - The Rand depreciate to 13.95/US\$ on August 24<sup>th</sup> in 2015, which is the lowest since 2001.
- ◆ **Inflation rate exceeds 6% in spite of the increase in interest rates and the decrease in oil price.**
  - Interest rates of Republic of South Africa increase from 5.75% to 6%.
  - The decline in currency value and severe drought leads to an increase in the prices of food and electricity hinder to lower the inflation rate.

## Economic Outlook and Forecasting for Nigeria

The economy depends highly on oil and natural gas.

- ◆ Nigeria, the first quarter GDP growth is -0.36%.
  - National Bureau Statistics of Nigeria reported that GDP growth of Nigeria is -0.36%, which is the lowest after 2.11% of 25 years ago.
  - The unemployment rate has continuously increased. It reached 12.1% in the first quarter of 2016. - 9.9%(15.3.) → 10.4%(15.4.) → 12.1%(16.1.)
  - The decline in oil production, manufactured industry, and real estate market and fiscal deficit are the main factors of economic hardship of Nigeria.
  - The central bank of Nigeria announced that their subsidies and supports will be focused on the agriculture, manufactured, and oil industries to improve the economic structure although Nigeria suffers from the economic hardship in a short term.



Note: World Bank, 2015

## The Korea-Africa Relationship


Trade with Africa slowly increases.

- ◆ The amount of trade with Africa occupies only 1.6% (18 billion dollars) of the total trade (198.2 billion dollars) in 2014.

**Korea-Africa Trade (million \$)**


Note: Korea International Trade Association, 2015

Sector		'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14
Export	Amount	8,256	9,386	8,466	9,618	14,396	9,185	11,165	9,901
	Growth rate	6.8	13.7	-9.8	13.6	49.7	-36.2	21.6	-11.3
Import	Amount	4,316	4,051	3,185	4,683	5,606	5,382	5,791	8,054
	Growth rate	-1.3	-6.1	-21.4	47.0	19.7	-4.0	7.6	39.1
Trade Balance		3,940	5,335	5,281	4,935	8,763	3,803	5,374	1,847
Total		12,572	13,437	11,651	14,301	20,002	14,567	16,956	17,955



## The Korea-Africa Relationship

- ◆ The amount of foreign investment to Africa is 1.2% (5.1 billion dollars) of the total foreign investment in 2015.
- ◆ Korean Investment to Africa is very low.



### Oil and Natural gas development

- ◆ Participating 4 programs in 3 African countries in 2015 (1 for Production, 2 for exploration, 1 for supply)
  - Production: Libya
  - Supply: Mozambique
  - Exploration: Nigeria, Mozambique
- ※ The amount of imported oil from Africa occupies 2.4% in the total imported oil by 2015.

### Mineral development

- ◆ Participating 34 programs in 18 African countries (14 for production, 8 for development, 12 for exploration)
  - Madagacar Ambatovy Nickel Project : (Korean Ambatovy Consortium: Korea Resource Corporation holds 22.5% of the shares, Daewoo International 4%, and STX 1%)
  - Niger's Imouraren uranium mine project

## The Korea-Africa Relationship

- Utilizing natural resources and human resources.

### ◆ Promoting Capital Investment in manufacturing

### ◆ Guiding Human resource development

- Entrepreneurship and management skills
- Technical vocational skills

### ◆ Supporting Technology

- Applied science: private sector
- Basic science and technology: public sector

### ◆ Assisting Social development and security

- Education: primary, secondary, higher education, and vocational school
- Health care system
- Security empowerment and training personals for public order

### ◆ Sharing Economic management

- Policy making and implementation
- Institutionalizing monitoring and evaluation system for results

### ◆ Good governing to overcome corruption

- Public and private sectors

## The Korea-Africa Relationship

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- Partnership in industrial areas can be determined in terms of resources and reserves for stability and prosperity

### Industrial Areas

- ◆ **Resource rich countries** (such as South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Angola, Cameroon, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Sudan, etc.)
  - Capital intensive industries could be targeted
  - Resource related industries
    - Petrochemical, iron and steel, transport equipment
- ◆ **Resource poor countries** (such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, etc.)
  - Labour intensive industries
    - Textile and garment, light engineering, metal technology
  - Agricultural industries with arable land
    - Food processing, commercial farming, modern farming

## The Korea-Africa Relationship

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- The energy sector needs to be promoted as Africa is acute shortage of energy and inhibiting economic activities
- Africa has a potential for energy development

### The Energy Sector

- ◆ **Hydropower generation**
  - Africa has abundant rainfall and fresh water for hydropower. ( Nile River, Congo River, etc.)
- ◆ **Renewable energy (Green technology)**
  - Africa has a lot of potential for solar, wind, geothermal energies. Fossil fuel power generation
  - Oil, gas, coal could be used for power generation in Africa.
- ◆ **Power supply and distribution (the smart grid system)**

## The Korea-Africa Relationship

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- Partnership can include the service sector will allow to promote other sectors more effective way

### Service Sector

- ◆ **Financial institutions**
  - Commercial banking, insurance, other financial intermediaries
- ◆ **Logistics**
  - Wholesale and retail businesses
  - Transportation system and infrastructure
- ◆ **Market development**
  - Market for agricultural crops, fishes, and cattle in rural area
  - Promotion of tourist industries
- ◆ **Health services**
  - Health care system, hospitals and specialized clinics

## The Korea-Africa Relationship

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- Education and TVET should be given top priority SOC will be a good starting point for partnership and related to economic development for sustainable economic development

### Human Development and SOC

- ◆ **Human resource development**
  - Education and technical and vocational education and training(TVET)
  - To provide training opportunities for the increased school leavers and skilled manpower that is needed at all lever of economy
- ◆ **Social overhead capital (SOC)**
  - Building road and railway
  - Urban planning and development
    - Building an infrastructure
    - Needing an efficient public transport system
  - Provision of water and sanitation
    - Needing a safe water supply as it directly linked with disease



## 아프리카의 입장 Africa's Perspective

엠마 이슴빈가보 (주한 르완다 대사)  
Ambassador Emma-Françoise ISUMBINGABO (RWANDA)

### **|Abstraction|**

Since 1948, the UN helped end conflicts and promote reconciliation by conducting successful peacekeeping operations in some countries, it made real difference in some other places with recently completed or ongoing operations, in others however, UN peacekeeping and the response of the international community as a whole have been challenged and found wanting. Africa currently dominates the number of UN peacekeeping interventions with more than 75 percent of the peacekeeping budget dedicated to the peace and security operations on the continent. The AU initiative on “Silencing the Guns” and realizing a conflict free Africa by the year 2020 requires a strong roadmap that details the main priorities, an improved coordination as well as a stronger mobilization for new partnerships. As post experience shows that there are several factors that are essential for a successful peacekeeping operation. One main is the strategic partnership between the UN and the regional and sub-regional organizations, thus creating a common vision, capacity building and cost sharing. This paper discusses the UN and AU partnership in peacekeeping operations and presents some rising challenges and some solutions to address the priorities.

*Key words: UN, AU, roadmap, peacekeeping, peace operations, coordination, partnership, challenges, priorities.*

## Republic of Rwanda



### Peace Operations Partnership between UN and AU: Challenges and Priorities

By: Emma Françoise ISUMBINGABO  
Ambassador  
Republic of Rwanda  
November 2016



### Presentation Outline

- State of the PKO in Africa
- Need for the UN to partner with Regional Peace Organizations
- The UN And The AU POK Partnership
- Challenges and Priorities for UN-AU Peace Operations Partnership
- Securing Financing For Sustaining Peace in Africa
- Rwanda's Contribution to PKO





## 1.a. State of POK in Africa

- At the meeting of the African Union Assembly on 25 May 2013, African Heads of State and Government (AHSG) adopted a Solemn Declaration. The Assembly expressed its determination to achieve the goal of a conflict free Africa, to make peace a reality for all people and rid the continent of civil wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters.
- The African Heads of State and Government recognized the negative consequences of violent conflicts on civilians and the impact on socio-economic development and as a consequence enshrined in the Constitutive Act that the Union shall promote peace, security and stability on the continent; and promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.



## 1.b. State of POK in Africa

- Peacekeeping missions in Asia, Europe and Latin America used to take up a much larger share of the UN's attention.
- But nowadays approximately 75% of the UN's peacekeepers are deployed on African continent and the same proportion of the UN peacekeeping budget is dedicated to missions in Africa.
- The Middle East remains an important area for UN peace operations as well.



## 2. Need for the UN to partner with Regional Peace Organizations

Three considerations:

- Conflicts are rarely isolated within state borders,
- Those who are closer to the problem are often in a better position to understand and influence it
- Their proximity ensures that they have a long-term interest in its outcomes.



## 3. The UN and the AU POK Partnership

- On the Africa Continent the most important relationship for the UN is its relationship with the AU.
- Africa contributes approximately 50 % of all the UN's uniformed peacekeepers, 60% of its international civilian peacekeepers and 80 percent of its national peacekeeping staff.
- The UN is a critical enabler for AU operations,
- The UN is also an important exit strategy partner for the AU,
- The effectiveness of UN and AU peace operations are thus mutually interdependent on several levels.





## 4. Challenges and Priorities for Peace Operations Partnerships

The UN is good at implementing peace agreements and consolidating peace processes, but it is not well suited for enforcement actions. The AU has demonstrated that it is willing and able to undertake stabilization and counter-terrorism operations, but it lacks the broad sets of capacities necessary to implement comprehensive peace agreements. The UN and AU thus have mutually reinforcing capabilities and needs that should serve as a basis for a strategic partnership.

An informal partnership model has emerged where the AU, together with sub regional organizations and mechanisms in Africa, and with support from the UN and partners, has acted as a first responder to crises in Africa. This has been the case in Burundi (AMIB), the Central African Republic (CAR) (MISCA), Darfur (AMIS) and Mali (AFISMA). When basic stability had been achieved, these missions were handed.



## 5. Securing Financing For Sustaining Peace in Africa

The AU needs at least 160MUSD a year to carry out its projects and activities, almost 70% of this comes from:

- AU member states' contribution
- Multilateral and Bilateral contributions
- Private sector contributions

AU towards financial independence by sourcing money on the continent.

- 100% of the regular budget
- 75% of the programs
- 25% peace support operations





## 6.Rwanda's Contribution to PKO



Rwanda's commitment to peacekeeping is based on the firm belief that the international community has a responsibility to prevent conflict and to act when confronted with challenges to peace and security.

This perspective is influenced by the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, Rwandans were forsaken by everyone, more than a million lost their lives.

Rwanda deployed its first peacekeepers to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. The country's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping began with a modest contribution in May 2005 with the deployment of one military observer to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Since then, more than 40,000 Rwandan peacekeepers have completed their tour of duty with different missions.



## 6.Rwanda's Contribution to PKO



Today, Rwanda is the fifth largest Troop and Police Contributing Country in the UN, with over 6,000 troops currently serving in peacekeeping operations around the world, with about 978 of them being police officers deployed in eight countries: Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leon, Sudan, South Sudan, Ivory Coast and Central Africa Republic.

introduced aggressive peacekeeping and engaged in health, infrastructure development (schools, markets) water and sanitation projects in order to improve the living conditions of local residents. All these human activities are aimed at protecting civilians.





## 6. Rwanda's Contribution to PKO



MEDVAC (Medical Evacuation)



Foods and Cargo Transport



Rwanda Air Force airmen during a rescue mission.



Rwandan troops insure safety of Leaders



**THANK YOU  
MURAKOZE  
GAMSAHABNIDA**





## 제3부 Session 3

# AU와의 PKO활동 증진을 위한 새로운 대안 모색



## Exploring New Ways : Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations with the AU

### ◎ 사회자 Moderator

: 홍규덕 교수 (한국유엔체제학회 회장)

**Prof. Hong, Kyu-dok** (Chairman, KACUNS)

### ◎ 발표자 Speaker

■ 임윤갑 교수 (국방대 국제평화활동센터)

**Prof. Lim, Yoonkap** (KIPOCENT)

■ 보리스 콘독 교수 (극동대학교)

**Prof. Boris Kondoch** (Far Eastern University)

■ 대령 박동순 (국방부 군사편찬연구소)

**COL. Park, Dongsoon** (Institute for Military History, MND)

### ◎ 토론자 Discussants

■ 박순향 교수 (국방대 국제평화활동센터)

**Prof. Park, Soonhyang** (KIPOCENT)

■ 정은숙 박사 (세종연구소)

**Dr. Chung, Eun-Sook** (The Sejong Institute)

■ 소령 백장미 (전 한빛부대 4진 법무장교)

**MAJ. Paek, Jangmi** (Chief, Inspection Cell, MND)



## 민간인 보호를 위한 효과적인 대안 An Effective Alternative to the Protection of Civilians

임윤갑 교수 (국제평화활동센터)  
Prof. Lim, Yoonkap (KIPOCENT)

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1864년 8월 12일 제네바 회의에서 '육전에서의 부상자·병자·조난자에 관한 규정'에 대해 12개 국가의 정부에서 서명한 이래 1949년 '전시 민간인 보호에 관한 조약'이 채택되어 제네바 협약은 완결되기에 이르렀고 이를 계기로 국제사회에서 전시 부상자와 민간인 보호에 대한 관심을 가지기 시작했다. 냉전 이후, 국가의 와해와 더불어 민간인들은 무장세력으로부터 표적이 되었고 성폭력 등과 같은 인권 유린으로 인한 고통을 감내해야만 했다.

유엔평화유지활동은 전통적으로 정전 감시를 위해 분쟁국가 사이에 군사력을 배치하는 것으로 인식되어왔다. 하지만 냉전 종식 이후 분쟁 양상의 변화에 따라 평화유지활동은 질적, 양적으로 크게 확장되었다. 이전의 평화유지활동이 분쟁을 종식시키는데 주력해 왔다면 이후의 평화유지활동은 선거 지원, 인권 신장, 무장해제(Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration), 치안분야 개혁(Security Sector Reform) 그리고 법치와 관련된 활동 등 평화구축활동으로 확대, 변화되었다.

1999년 유엔 안전보장이사회는 유엔 시에라리온 임무단(UNAMSIL)에 물리적 폭력의 긴박한 위협에 놓인 민간인 보호를 위해 능력 범위 내에서 필요한 조치를 취하도록 하는 민간인 보호에 대한 최초의 위임명령(Mandate)을 포함했으며 이후 전개된 평화유지활동 임무단에도 이와 같은 위임명령이 포함되었다. 민간인보호 및 활동과 관련하여 국제 인권단체나 인도단체 그리고 유엔평화유지활동이 서로 상이한 개념 하에 접근하고 있기 때문에 실제 현장에서 각 단체 사이에서 상호 지원을 위해서는 공동의 목표, 책임의 명확한 구분 등을 포함한 새로운 접근 방식이 요구되고 있다. 이는 유엔안전보장이사회의 위임명령에 관한 언어 또는 용어의 사용에서 긴박한 물리적 폭력의 위험 아래 놓인 민간인을 보호하기 위해 유엔평화유지활동의 맥락 안에서 새로운 방향의 설정이 요구된다.

민간인 보호의 문제는 새로운 과업임과 동시에 향후 유엔평화유지활동에 있어 지속적으로 증가하게 될 것이다. 이와 동시에 새로운 전쟁의 역학적 환경에서 절망하고 있는 민간인에게 물리적 보호는 최우선적인 관심사항이 되어야 할 것이다. 분쟁에서 곤경 받고 있는 민간인 보호를 위해서는 실제적인 차원에서 유엔평화유지활동이 이루어져야 한다.

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### **|Abstraction|**

In 1864, the first international treaty was codified that covered the sick and wounded soldiers in the battlefield. Since then, the international community started to pay more attention to the issues of the protection of civilians.

After the end of the Cold War, connected with the disintegration of state structures, New Wars have acquired notoriety for the suffering endured by civilians who are regularly targeted by armed groups, subjected to cruel treatment such as sexual violence, or who are deliberately displaced.

UN peacekeeping operations were originally conceived as inter positional military forces deployed to carry out observation and ceasefire monitoring. The new generation of peacekeeping operations sought to address the root causes through peace building activities, including electoral assistance, promotion of human rights, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, security sector reform, and other rule of law-related activities.

In 1999, the Security Council mandated the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to take the necessary action within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilian under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone. The language used in the UNAMSIL mandate resolution set a precedent that has been employed in most subsequent UN peacekeeping missions.

Although protection concepts and activities may not always be easily reconcilable, there is a need for a more nuanced approach that recognizes shared objectives, clarifies responsibilities, and promotes complementary and mutually supportive activities in the field. In the UN peacekeeping context, this should lead to reorientation towards the Security Council mandate language, which is focused heavily on the protection of civilians from imminent physical violence. The broader interpretation of the peacekeeping mandate, which is currently prevalent, risks unclear expectations of the use of force by UN peacekeepers.

The protection of civilians, if necessary with the help of military force, is a relatively new task in the ever-increasing repertoire of functions which UN peacekeeping missions have come to assume, especially since the end of Cold War. At the same time, for civilians caught in the devastating dynamics of the 'new war', physical protection is doubtlessly the most important and immediate concern. The incredible plight which civilians continue to endure in armed conflicts makes the improvement of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations an immediately practical concern.

## I. Introduction

In June 1859, the Swiss businessman Henry Dunant travelled to Italy to meet French emperor Napoleon III with the intention of discussing difficulties in conducting business in Algeria, at that time occupied by France. When he arrived in the small town of Solferino on the evening of 24 June, he witnessed the battle of Solferino, an engagement in the Franco-Austrian war. In a single day, approximately 40,000 soldiers on both sides died or were left wounded on the battlefield. Henry Dunant was shock by the terrible aftermath of the battle, the suffering of the wounded soldiers, and the lack of medical attendance and basic care. He completely abandoned the original intent of his trip and for several days he devoted himself to help with the treatment and care for the

wounded. He succeeded in organizing an overwhelming level of relief assistance by motivating the local population to aid without discrimination. Back to in his home in Geneva, he decided to write a book titled 'A Memory of Solferino'<sup>1)</sup> which he published with his own money in 1862.

In 1859, he explicitly advocated the formation of national voluntary relief organization to help nurse wounded soldiers in the case of war. Additionally he called for the development of international treaties to guarantee the neutrality and protection of those wounded in the battlefield as well as medics and field hospitals. On 9 February 1863 in Geneva, Henry Dunant founded the 'Committee of the Five' as an investigatory commission of the Geneva Society for Public Welfare. In 1876, the committee adopted the name 'International Committee of the Red Cross'.

In 1864, the first international treaty was codified that covered the sick and wounded soldiers in the battlefield. The Geneva Convention defined the rights and protections afforded to non-combatants updated continuously and ratified by 196 countries in 1949. Since then, the international community started to pay more attention to the issues of the protection of civilians.

## II. War and Protection of civilians

Hopes that the end of the Cold War would facilitate the emergence of a 'New World Order' soon proved to be premature. Although no longer split along East-West lines, the United Nations found itself unprepared to respond to the kind of 'new wars' which took place in former Yugoslavia and Sub Saharan Africa and have been devastating entire regions ever since. Often connected with the disintegration of state structures, these wars have acquired notoriety for the suffering endured by civilians who are regularly targeted by armed groups, subjected to cruel treatment such as sexual violence, or who are deliberately displaced.

Traditionally the concept of 'Protection' has been relatively straightforward, rooted in International Humanitarian Law's protection of civilians from the consequence of war. As such, the International Committee of the Red Cross has traditionally played a great role in its application. Later conceptualizations of

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1) IRC, Memory of Solferino by Henry Dunant, ICRC Publication 1986.

'protection' have broadened to encompass elements of refugee law and international human rights law, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees adopting a role corresponding to that of the ICRC. As a consequence of prominent roles played by both the ICRC and UNHCR, the implementation of protection has tended to reflect their mandates and operational approaches, manifesting itself as a 'legally oriented, diplomatic and persuasive engagement with nation-state and non-state actors.'<sup>2)</sup>

The broad humanitarian community became increasingly concerned with the protection of civilians caught in the midst of armed conflict, particularly from the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War. This reflected changing perceptions of the relationship between humanitarian action and warfare, 'prompting humanitarian actors to think more deeply about the extent of their responsibility to provide more than relief alone.'<sup>3)</sup> Conflict in the Balkans, Somalia and Africa more generally resulted both in a greater understanding of the impact of war on the civilian populations as well as 'the limitations and sometimes negative consequences of relief assistance.' These situations also led to 'greater emphasis in international policy spheres on a 'responsibility to protect' and wider policy agenda.' This also encouraged a reconsideration of the boundaries of humanitarian action and the role and meaning of protection within this space. Increasingly 'protection' expanded from being the domain of the ICRC and UNHCR and took on a broader meaning which encompassed 'issue of civilian safety.' In practical terms this led to protection policies continuing to be pursued not only in term of national-level dialogues between the traditional protection actors and state/non-state armed actors but also to its operationalization by a much broader array of NGO actors working within communities and 'drawing links with other political and military actors in their efforts to increase civilian safety.

### III. UN Peacekeeping Operations and Protection of civilians

UN peacekeeping operations were originally conceived as inter positional military forces deployed to carry out observation and ceasefire monitoring.<sup>4)</sup>

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2) O'Callaghan, S and Pantuliano, S, Protective Action: Incorporating Civilian Protection into Humanitarian Response, *Humanitarian Policy Group Report 26*, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007).

3) Ibid.,

The end of Cold War heralded a quantitative and qualitative shift, with many more peacekeeping missions deployed and range of tasks significantly expanded. Where early peacekeeping missions sought to freeze a conflict, the new generation of peacekeeping operations sought to address the root causes through peace building activities, including electoral assistance, promotion of human rights, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, security sector reform, and other rule of law - related activities.<sup>5)</sup>

Due to the growing international concern with the humanitarian situation in several countries, spurred by 'CN effects', a number of UN missions were deployed into less permissive environments of ongoing international conflict with the mandate to use force to ensure a safe and secure environment and to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance.<sup>6)</sup> There were several high-profile failures to protect civilians during the early to mid-1990s, including in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.<sup>7)</sup> It was not until 1999 that the first UN peacekeeping mission was specifically mandated to use force 'to protect civilians', a mandate that has been provided to almost all UN peacekeeping missions established since.

Yet the origins of the protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping are deeper and richer, reaching back almost to the beginning of UN peacekeeping itself. UN peacekeeping operations have been involved in the protection of civilians since the deployment of the UN operation in the Congo(ONUC) in 1960. ONUC Operational Directives No. 8 stated;

Where feasible, every protection will be afforded to unarmed groups who may be subjected by any armed party to acts of violence likely to lead to loss of life. In such case, UN troops will interpose themselves, using armed forces if necessary, to prevent such loss of life.<sup>8)</sup>

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4) For example, UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), 1956-1967; UN Observation Group in Lebanon(UNOGIL), 1958; UN Forces in Cyprus(UNFICYP), 1964-present.

5) For example, UN Angola Verification Mission II(UNAVEM II), 1991-1995, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara(MINURSO), 1991-present.

6) Examples include UN Operations in Somalia(UNOSOM I, II), the former Yugoslavia(UNPROFOR) and Haiti(UNMIH).

7) See the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, para 49.

8) Operational Directive No.8(untitled), February 1961, Un Archives DAG/13/1.6.5.0.0; Operations Directives August 1960-January 1964, Box 3; and Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* , Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, Appendix 2.

However, the ONUC deployment was exceptional. As a result of the escalating conflict, the activities of the UN forces bordered on war-fighting. The resulting political and financial strains placed on the organization acted against the deployment of similarly expansive and robust operations for some time.<sup>9)</sup>

The UN Protection Force established in 1992 and deployed to the former Yugoslavia was the UN's first peacekeeping mission to make a concerted attempt to protect civilians, although it was not mandated or resourced to provide direct physical protection to the civilian population. UNPROFOR proceeded with an indirect civilian protection strategy based on two components: protection through the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protection through the demilitarization and defense of territory ('safe area'). At the height of its mandate, UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in three main situations: to 'deter the attacks against the safe area; to 'ensure the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR; and to 'protect humanitarian convoy'.<sup>10)</sup> There was however no specific 'protection of civilians' mandate, and UNPROFOR's authorization to use force was presented as acting self-defense.

Following the delivery of reports on the UN peacekeeping failures in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the Security Council embarked on a program of thematic activity, examining civilian protection issues and determining measures to increase UN involvement in their resolution. It also began using UN peacekeeping operations as a tool to address protection concerns. In 1999, the Security Council mandated the UN Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL) to take the necessary action within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilian under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone. The language used in the UNAMSIL mandate resolution set a precedent that has been employed in most subsequent UN peacekeeping missions. The meeting records from the Security Council debate preceding the adaptation of the protection of civilian mandate for UNAMSIL demonstrate recognition, on the part of the Security Council members, that the mandate represented the advent of a new dimension of UN peacekeeping operations. Security Council members

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9) William J. Durch and James A. Schear, 'Faultlines: UN operations in the former Yugoslavia', in W. J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping American policy, and the Uncivil War of the 1990s*, St. Martin's press, New York, 1996, pp. 197-202.

10) See Res. 743, 21 February 1992; SC Res. 758, 8 June 1992; SC Res. 776, 14 September 1992; SC Res. 836, 4 June 1993.

demonstrated express intent that UN peacekeepers be mandated to use force to provide direct physical protection to civilians.

Despite the protection of civilians' mandate being consistently provided to UN peacekeeping mission from 1999 onward, in the absence of operational guidance for implementation, the mandate became open to widely varying interpretation of senior mission leadership on the ground,<sup>11)</sup> and many peacekeeping missions that had been provided with the mandate were unable to implement it in any meaningful way. The focus of international debates on the political and security aspects of the protection of civilians were channeled into overarching normative dilemmas associated with the concept of the 'Responsibility to Protect'.<sup>12)</sup>

It was until 2007, following the significant failures of UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that focus returned to the protection of civilian mandate. In response to such failures, the Security Council began to explicitly prioritize protection efforts in several UN peacekeeping missions, such as those deployed to Darfur(UNAMID), the DRC(MONUC), Chad and the Central African Republic(MINURCAT), and more recently, South Sudan(UNMISS) and Liberia(UNMIL). Highlighting the importance of peacekeeping in furthering the overarching protection agenda, the thematic resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict adopted between 2007 and 2011 focused to a large extent on the implementation of protection mandates in UN peacekeeping operations, stressing that the protection activities should be given priority in resource allocation.

Momentum on the issue also grew in other forum. In the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (commonly known as the C-34) included language on the protection of civilians in the report of its 2009 regular session and every subsequent annual report.<sup>13)</sup> During this time the UN

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11) Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, *Protecting Civilians in the Contest of UN peacekeeping operations: Success, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, independent study jointly commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, 2009, pp.8 and 160-172.

12) The Responsibility to Protect is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based on the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crime and human rights violations.

13) Annual Reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/63/19 (2009), A/64/19 (2010), A/65/19 (2011) and A/66/19 (2012).

DPKO and DFS undertook several major projects to support the effective implementation of the protection of civilians' mandate. These included commissioning jointly with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, of a comprehensive study on mandate implementation, the development of an operational concept on the protection of civilians to guide missions' implementation efforts, and the development of training materials for military personnel.

Since the Libya intervention in 2011, the Security Council has introduced a new dimension to protection of civilians' issues. In March 2013, the Council authorized the deployment of an Intervention Brigade as part of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to operate alongside the regular UN forces, with the mandate to 'ensure effective protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.'<sup>14)</sup> The Intervention Brigade was provided the mandate to 'neutralize rebel armed groups by carrying out targeted offensive operations against them. This development could have a significant impact on how the original protection of civilians' mandate is understood and, in particular, whether it is unable to be conceived as incorporating an inherent authorization to carry out pre-emptive offensive operations.

#### IV. Legal Framework for the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping

International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law are most often understood as the normative bases for protection of civilians' concept and activities. While both of these laws are indeed relevant to the use of force by UN peacekeepers to protect civilians, a third, more central, normative basis for action arises from jus ad bellum (Right to War) and is grounded in the UN Charter. This provides greater scope for action by UN peacekeepers, although it sets out a legal authority or right rather than a positive obligation to which these forces may be held accountable.

While an express Security Council mandate provides the central basis for UN peacekeepers to use force for protection of civilians, it is not the sole source of

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14) SC Res. 2098, 28 March 2013, operative para.11(a)(i).

legal authority to use force for such a purpose. Even in the absence of an express mandate by Security Council, all UN peacekeepers arguably have the authority to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, a view endorsed by the UN itself.<sup>15</sup> This may fit under the expanded concept of 'self-defense' that is part of UN peacekeeping (including self-defense in defense of the mandate), but is best understood as an implied power normatively connected to the UN Charter's purposes and principles. The analysis of the legal framework for the protection of civilians' mandate also reveals that the mandate's development is the manifestation of progressive interpretation of the UN Charter provisions relating to the determination of threats to international peace and security, drawing heavily upon humanitarian and human rights ideals, and moving away from the traditional state-centric paradigm.

There are two security-related aspects of the protection of civilians. The first, encapsulated in the Responsibility to Protect concept, operates at the strategic level and is an interpretation of Jus ad bellum. It conceptualizes protection as preventing and halting genocide and widespread war crime against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and identifies the protection responsibilities of states, the UN and broader international community. Nicholas Tsagourias suggests that the concepts of 'responsibility to protect' and 'the protection of civilians' are 'subsets- indeed interrelated one- of the same concept and peacekeeping has become the main tool for providing such protection.<sup>16</sup>

The second aspect, manifest in Security Council protection of civilians' mandates, is generally focused on the operational level and solidly grounded in the collective security agreement articulated in the UN Charter.<sup>17</sup> The language formulation of the mandates, and the discussion surrounding the first adoption of the protection of civilians' mandate, indicate that the Security Council conceived the protection of civilians narrowly in terms of physical protection from the threat of imminent violence. Influenced by the protection of civilians'

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15) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report), 2000, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, para.62; United Nations Master LIST OF Numbered ROE, Guideline for the Development of ROE for UN PKO, Provisional Sample ROE, Attachment 1 to FGS/0220.001, United Nations, April 200, Rule 1.8.

16) Nicholas Tsagourias, 'Self-defense, protection and humanitarian values and the doctrine of impartiality and neutrality in enforcement mandate', in M. Weller(ed.)

17) Hans Kelsen, 'Collective security and collective self-defense under the Charter of United Nations', in *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 42, No. 14, October 1948, p.783.

concepts prevalent in the humanitarian and human rights communities, the mandate was interpreted more broadly in the UN DPKO and DFS operational concept on the protection of civilians, in which it was conceived as encompassing three 'tiers' of activities: (i) protection through political process; (ii) protection from physical violence; and (iii) establishment of a protective environment.

The protection of civilians' peacekeeping mandate therefore has somewhat of a dual conception. It is described narrowly as physical protection from imminent violence in Security Council Mandates, while implementation of the mandate is conceived to include a broad range of activities undertaken in a peacekeeping operation that contribute to a more general concept of protection. For example, UNAMID's Mission Directive on the protection of civilians in Darfur interprets the mandates as 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law. A similar trend was witnessed in respect of the UN Secretary-General's report on implementing the responsibility to protect from the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.<sup>18)</sup>

The language formulation used by the Security Council is explicit, clear, and narrow: the use of force to protect civilians from imminent threat of physical violence, which is an aspect of protection that military operations have the unique capacity to fulfill. A broadened interpretation of the mandate risks diluting its power and potential effectiveness. This was recently evidenced by the Security Council's need to mandate an Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO to use offensive force to protect civilians, despite the mission's already strong protection of civilians' mandate.<sup>19)</sup>

## V. Assessing the Effectiveness in Peacekeeping Operations

The significant development in Protection of civilians' mandate can only be fully appreciated in light of the more disturbing chapters of the UN's peacekeeping record. To recall only the most appalling example: The UN Mission stationed in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide failed miserably to stop

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18) The Secretary General's report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc, A/63/677, 2009

19) Bruce O. Oswald, "The Security Council and the Intervention Brigade: some legal issues", in ASIL Insights, vol. 15, 6 June 2013, pp. 1-5.

slaughter not only for a lack of troops, but also for its insufficient mandate, which allowed the use of force only in self-defense. After Rwanda and Srebrenica, the failure to protect civilians has come, in the eyes of many, to summarize incompetence and ineffectiveness on the part of the UN. But this is only one reason why the importance of the Security Council's increasingly serious commitment to civilian protection can hardly be overestimated.

The fact that the UN's capability to protection of civilians is regarded as a yardstick only reflects the more fundamental truism that "safeguarding their physical protection is the first concerns civilians have in times of conflict". The task to protect civilians is of a different quality than other elements of peacekeeping mandates. Whereas the effectiveness and importance of measures like assistance in the implementation of ceasefire agreement or reconstruction can only be meaningfully assessed with reference to the overall success of the mission, the protection of civilians constitutes a 'goal in itself', and the attainment of this goal is valuable regardless of other aspects of the mission. These relatively recent development in the history of peacekeeping practices have generated an entirely new set of questions. To answer the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in protection of civilians, and to identify those constellations of factors which can serve as a basis for the future UN peacekeeping operations, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) would be the proper case study.

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group, invaded the country from Liberia. With the Sierra Leonean government too weak to militarily defeat the rebels, they came to control large part of the country, and in 1995 it was only with the help of Executive Outcomes, a private military company, that the Government managed to halt the rebel's advance on Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital. Meanwhile, in the area under its control, the RUF engaged in the illegal exploitation of the country's resources, especially diamonds, and committed atrocities against the civilian population. In 1999, Nigeria announced its intention to withdraw its troops from the over 10,000 strong Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force, which had been trying to protect democratically elected President from coupes d'état and military defeat by the RUF since 1997.

Since its military situation would become hopeless without Nigerian support,

the Government was forced to negotiate a peace agreement with the RUF, the Lome Agreement, which granted the RUF a blanket amnesty and substantial political power, including important cabinet posts. The imminent Nigerian withdrawal also inspired, at least, a sense of urgency in the West and United Nations, which had so far only maintained a small observer force (UNOMSIL) in the country. In addition, the Lome Agreement specifically requested the UN to 'authorize the deployment of a peacekeeping for in Sierra Leone. This paved the way for the establishment of the UNAMSIL.

With the resolution 1270, October 22, 1999, the Security Council established UNASIL and authorized it to assist the parties to the Lome Agreement in the implementation of the agreement, in particular in the disarmament of the rebels and pro - government paramilitary forces, and in the planned elections. These tasks were typical for multidimensional peacekeeping operations and followed by disarmament and demobilization, and elections. What was new, however, was that for the first time in the history of UN peacekeeping, the Security Council endowed a UN peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate, i.e., mandate to use all necessary means, including military force, to protect civilians 'under imminent threat of physical violence'. In resolution 1289, of February 7, 2000, the Security Council expanded UNAMSIL's tasks to providing security to 'key locations' in Freetown, while it reaffirmed the mandate to protect civilian s.<sup>20)</sup> In addition, the Council authorized the expansion of UNAMSIL's military component to 11,000 troops, up from the 6,000 authorized in Resolution 1270.

UNAMSIL had a disastrous start. In the first months of 2000, it was not clear who was actually disarming whom: In January 2000, peacekeepers from Kenya and Guinea were the first to surrender their weapons and equipment, including armored personnel carriers, without resistance after being ambushed by the RUF. In May 2000, the RUF even began to take peacekeepers hostage, capturing more than 500 soldiers and their equipment within several days. Not only did the captured peacekeepers make no use of their right and mandate to defend themselves, many others also disobeyed orders by resisting to deploy into RUF - held areas and even giving up their position 'at the mere rumor that the RUF was advancing'. Not surprisingly, under this circumstance UNAMSIL did not protect any civilians. Although the gradual deployment of UNAMSIL into rebel-held territory reportedly had 'a positive impact on

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20) S/RES/1289, OC 10,11.

reducing the incidence of human rights abuse', civilians continued to be murdered, raped, and mutilated 'practically under the noses of government and international troops'.

The obvious failure of UNAMSIL prompted a decisive response. The first priority was to reinforce the UNAMSIL presence in order to protect the civilian population in Freetown and in other government-controlled area against the emboldened RUF. On May 19, 2000, the Security Council further expanded the authorized strength of what already was the largest UN peacekeeping operation at that time, to 13,000. Of the most immediate impact, however, was the arrival, on May 7, of several hundred British troops. Although officially operating independently of UNAMSIL and mandated only to provide safety to British nationals, the British were 'to all intents and purposed running the day-to-day operations of UN forces': the setting up roadblocks, securing the airport and patrolling Freetown as well as the most important highways.

After the May crisis, the UN had to acknowledge that there was no peace to keep in Sierra Leone. Member States began to advocate a peace enforcement mandate under the Chapter VII for UNAMSIL. Since the Secretary General cautioned not to give such a mandate until it could be matched by adequate capacity, it was only in August 2000 that the Security Council authorized to UNAMSIL to deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threats of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threats of imminent and direct use of force.

This mandate changed the character of the mission. UNASIL was no longer allowed to use force only in self-defense, to ensure the freedom of movement for its personnel and to protect civilians, but was de facto authorized to fight the RUF in case the rebels put up any resistance to UNAMSIL's deployment and extension of state authority through the country. However, it took time until UNAMSIL could translate this mandate into action. First, the mission had to undergo internal restructuring in order to enhance its effectiveness and remedy the shortcomings. Another factor which delayed actions beyond securing the status quo was the withdrawal by India and Jordan of their contingents which accounted for 4,800 troops, almost half of UNAMSIL's total strength at that time. Accordingly the replacement was progressed slowly.

In March 2001, UNAMSIL finally began to venture into RUF-held territory, where the civilian population continued to suffer from summary execution, rape

and other forms of sexual violence in the RUF's hold over the area. In accordance with a revised concept of operations, UNAMSIL first conducted robust patrols into RUF-controlled area. UNAMSIL also was able to force the rebels to dismantle their military positions and disarm in the process. Backed up by an increase in troop strength from 9,750 in March 2001 to 16,700 in March 2002, the deployment at times even proceeded more quickly than originally planned, and by January 11, 2002, all rebel groups had been disarmed. UNAMSIL had established its presence throughout the country and began to focus on ensuring security for upcoming democratic elections. UNAMSIL's mandate was terminated on December 31, 2005.

Based upon the lessons learned from UNASIL, the subsequent factors represent a comprehensive summary of the conditions which is relevant for the outcomes. First of all, 'Size' is the one of the most important factor in UN intervention, since the number of troops on the ground has so many times proved to be paramount element in the prevention of civilian casualties. Closely linked to the size, equipment is also important factor for the mission. UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire, the Secretary General mentioned in three consecutive reports that the lack of an aviation unit, but with no member states willing to contribute it, severely hampered the operational efficiency of UNOCI.

An intangible factor, 'commitment' refers to the psychological outlook of the deployment troops. The commitment of troops is most evident in situations of danger where they are confronted with resistance in the implementation of their mandate, or when they are attacked. Although in some cases it may simply be prudent not to take on the adversary, the extent to which peacekeepers are prepared to risk their lives in the fulfillment of their mandate is a good indicator for their commitment to the mission.

Whether the UN peacekeeping force is credible depends on a number of factors, especially the size, equipment and commitment of troops and the speed and resolve with which they are deployed. However, credibility is more than the sum of these factors in that it refers to the perception of the parties to the conflict rather than to the objective quality of factors. As Secretary General pointed out, "A mission that is perceived as strong from the beginning of its deployment is far less likely to be tested than one which is perceived as initially vulnerable or ineffective". Credibility thus contributes to the

effectiveness of the mission in that a credible mission is less likely to be challenged and can thus employ its resource more effectively.

Although 'expert knowledge' is not directly connected to the mission per se, this factor represents an important structural component of the UN Missions. Expert knowledge can be regarded as the specialized human rights units, or in a broader sense, of civilian personnel actively involved in the prevention of such abuses. The knowledge of how violations can be monitored, registered, and effectively countered represents a much needed addition to the use of force and is conducive to the reestablishment of the rule of law. Finally, the language of provisions which authorized the protection of civilians differs. In some case, the force may take the necessary action to protect civilians, in others it is authorized to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, and sometimes it is simply supposed to ensure the protection of civilians. It goes without saying that clarity of the protection of mandate to contribute to the effectiveness of a mission in protection of civilians.

## VI. Challenges of the Protection of Civilians

The lack of clarity on key aspects of the protection of civilians' peacekeeping mandate and the proliferation of related concepts within international law and across the humanitarian, human rights and peacekeeping communities raises a number of challenges for coherently advancing the protection of civilians' agenda and practically realizing civilian protection objectives. Some of the challenges stems from misunderstandings of the mandate and role of various actors, others from the inherent difficulty in reconciling some of the protection activities. As Bernard Ramcharan, former acting UNHCR, in the UN 'there is no common, system-wide understanding of the concept of protection. This has given rise to problematic inconsistencies in both usages and practice.<sup>21)</sup> A few of key challenges will be briefly touched on below.

Challenges are often encountered when different actors seek to fulfill their protection mandates through that are not always complementary. Balancing the protection activities of the humanitarian and human rights communities with the implementation of the protection of civilians' peacekeeping mandate has

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21) OHCHR staff, 'protection in the field: human rights perspectives', in Bernard Ramcharan(ed.), *Human Rights Protection in the field*, Routledge, London, 2006, p 121.

proved difficult at times. The robust use of force to protect civilians, through which UN peacekeepers may become a de facto party to the conflict, raises a number of issues. Prior to the mandating of the African Union forces in Mali, the argument was made by actors in humanitarian and human rights communities that UN-mandated or UN-authorized military deployments should not be presented as 'protection civilians' when they are expected to use force in a way that will effectively result in them becoming belligerent. As Brian Urquhart, former Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs in the UN and an influential figure in the initial development of peacekeeping, pointed out, 'the moment a peacekeeping force starts killing people it becomes a part of the conflict it is supposed to be controlling, and therefore a part of problem.'<sup>22)</sup>

UN peacekeeping force being viewed as a party to the conflict can undermine the perceived impartiality of other UN actors, and consequently their ability to deliver on their protection mandate. This challenge is compounded when UN peacekeepers use force selectively-against rebel militia groups but government force of government-sponsored armed groups, as is the case for the Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO. More broadly, the humanitarian community has raised concerns that the use of force for the protection of civilians can escalate a conflict and exacerbate the humanitarian situation through reprisal attacks, heightening human rights violations and sexual violence, increasing displacement and leaving in its wake a dangerous security vacuum. In this context, several humanitarian and human rights actors expressed concern at the mandating of MONUSCO Intervention Brigade.

Host state consent for the development of a peacekeeping operation is one of the traditional 'guiding principles' of UN peacekeeping. The withdrawal of consent, whether formal or effective, can have a significant negative impact on the ability of the mission to fulfill its mandate. In order to establish a presence and to move freely to provide physical protection to civilian populations, a UN peacekeeping operation needs to retain the political consent and cooperation of the host government and authorities. The maintenance of such consent can be jeopardized by human rights monitoring and reporting on issues that identify governmental elements as committing gross violations. Such challenges have been faced by the UN, including in South Sudan<sup>23)</sup>. A reverse dynamic exists

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22) Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, Harper and Row, New York, 1987, pp.178-179.

in respect of humanitarian activity, whereby the use of force by a peacekeeping mission to protect civilians against government forces, or even government-sponsored armed groups, may result in retaliatory restriction of humanitarian access. However, even though the protection of civilians' peacekeeping mandate authorizes the use of force including against host state actors, force has rarely been used in such a manner.

The dilution of the protection of civilians' peacekeeping mandate has deflected focus away from the use of force for physical protection, resulting in unclear expectations on UN peacekeepers and consequent difficulty in holding them accountable for their failure to act. If the implementation of the mandate more clearly focused on physical protection from imminent violence, the expectations to use force, obligations to carry out enabling military activity and accompanying resource requirements would be more transparent. The lack of clarity associated with the mandate has also resulted in concerns regarding overlap of mandates, including in respect of the militarization of humanitarian aid and resulting in implications for human access.<sup>24)</sup>

The lack of clarity regarding the legal framework governing the establishment and implementation of protection of civilians' mandate has significant practical implications. The misconception that the peacekeeping mandate derives from International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, rather than from an independent normative basis, has resulted in confusion regarding the appropriateness of using force to implement protection obligations articulated in those branches of law. The lack of appreciation of the inherent normative basis for UN peacekeepers to protection of civilians irrespective of an express mandate has resulted in the failure to recognize that UN peacekeepers will always have the authority to intervene in order to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence where the host state cannot act. Furthermore, a failure to intervene may also violate International Human Rights Law obligations owed by UN peacekeepers to the host state's population. Questions remain about the authority and obligation to use pre-emptive force and the scope of military activities that might cover. With these issues insufficiently addressed in the mission concept of operations or rule of engagement, and absent from the Memoranda of Understanding between the

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23) 'South Sudan expels a UN rights officers', in *New York Times*, 5 November 2012.

24) Pierre Krahenbuhl, *The Militarization of Aid and its Perils*, ICRC Resource Centre, 22 February 2011.

UN and troop contributing countries, the expectations of UN peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians remain unclear, undermining the potential role that the use of force can play in realizing protection ideals.

## VII. Conclusion

The protection of civilians' framework can be broadly conceived as comprising legal authority and obligations, and activities undertaken to realize those legal protections. As demonstrated by the previous analysis, the humanitarian, human rights and peacekeeping communities have each constructed discrete understandings of what 'protection of civilians' means, drawing on various bodies of law and building a concept of protection to frame their own narrative and practical activities.

While each of the concepts is legitimate and useful within the respective communities, the proliferation of concepts has created a high-level of confusion regarding the nature of the protection of civilians, in particular its normative basis, content and associated responsibilities. Each of the strands of protection essentially comes from the same place- recognition of civilians as individuals with inherent dignity to whom obligations of protection are owed, including from violence. They also aspire to reach a similar destination- the fulfillment of protection obligations deriving from international law. In order to improve the implementation of protection activities, there is a need to articulate an overarching framework in which the various concepts of 'protection of civilians' are coherently conceived, and can interact in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner.

Although protection concepts and activities may not always be easily reconcilable, there is a need for a more nuanced approach that recognizes shared objectives, clarifies responsibilities, and promotes complementary and mutually supportive activities in the field. In the UN peacekeeping context, this should lead to reorientation towards the Security Council mandate language, which is focused heavily on the protection of civilians from imminent physical violence. The broader interpretation of the peacekeeping mandate, which is currently prevalent, risks unclear expectations of the use of force by UN peacekeepers.

The protection of civilians, if necessary with the help of military force, is a

relatively new task in the ever - increasing repertoire of functions which UN peacekeeping missions have come to assume, especially since the end of Cold War. At the same time, for civilians caught in the devastating dynamics of the 'new war', physical protection is doubtlessly the most important and immediate concern. The incredible plight which civilians continue to endure in armed conflicts makes the improvement of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations an immediately practical concern.

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2016년 제12회 PKO 발전 세미나

## 성범죄 차단을 위한 교육의 중요성

### Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations

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Prof. Boris Kondoch (Far Eastern University)

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본 논문은 유엔 평화유지임무단에서 발생하는 성 착취와 성폭력에 관한 문제를 주로 다룬다. 지난 24년간 유엔 평화유지요원들은 성폭력과 성 착취 등의 문제로 인해 비난을 받아왔다. 이와 관련된 첫 번째 사례는 1992년 캄보디아 과도행정기구(United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 이하 'UNTAC')에서 발생하였고, 이후 거의 대부분의 평화유지임무단에서 강간, 소아에 호증, 매춘, 동성애, 그리고 다른 형태의 성범죄 등이 다수 발생하였다. 2015년에는 각 유엔 임무단에서 보고된 성폭력 건수만 69건에 달한다(대부분은 아프리카 지역에서 발생하였다). 본 논문은 현재 발생하고 있는 문제에 관해 개괄적으로 살펴보고, 유엔 평화유지요원들의 성범죄에 대한 유엔의 대응방식에 대한 논의를 진행할 것이다.

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#### **|Abstraction|**

The following paper addresses the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse within the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Over the last 24 years, UN peacekeepers have been accused of sexual abuse and exploitation. The first cases emerged from UNTAC, the UN mission in Cambodia, in 1992. Ever since then, rape, pedophilia, prostitutions, transactional sex and other forms of sexual misconduct and crimes have taken place on multiple occasions in almost every peacekeeping operation. In 2015, there had been 69 reported cases concerning different peacekeeping missions (most of them in Africa). The paper will first outline the ongoing problem and then discuss the measures taken by the UN in response to sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.

*A Peacekeeper who would exploit the vulnerabilities of a wounded population - already the victim of all that was tragic and cruel in war, was really no different from a physician who would violate the patient entrusted to their care or the lifeguard who drowned the very people in need of rescue. Actions of that sort punctured*

*violently the hope embodied by the very presence of the person who was there to help those in need. However rare they may be, abuses by peacekeepers were, therefore, not only repugnant, but struck at the very credibility of both the operation in question and the United Nations as a whole.*

H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein<sup>1)</sup>

*Sometimes when I'm alone with my baby, I think about killing him. He reminds me of the man who raped me.*

A 14-year-old teenage girl from the Central African Republic who was assaulted by a UN peacekeeper<sup>2)</sup>

From a normative perspective, there are arguably two major challenges in modern UN peace operations: the protection of civilians and how to effectively address sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers.

In my presentation, I will address the latter topic.

According to the SG's bulletin 'Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse', 'sexual abuse' may be defined as "the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions" while 'sexual exploitation'<sup>3)</sup> may be defined as "any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another."<sup>4)</sup>

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1) Security Council, 5191 meeting, S/PV5191 of 31 May 2005.

2) Quoted in *Washington Post*, 27 February 2016, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2016/02/27/peacekeepers/>.

3) For a comprehensive analysis of the term 'sexual exploitation', see O. Simic, 'Rethinking "Sexual Exploitation" in UN Peacekeeping Operations', 32 *Women's International Studies Forum* 2009 288-295.

Sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers have undermined the noble cause of peacekeeping and raise many different and complex issues:

- a) Why can the UN not solve this persistent and unrelenting problem?
- b) Why are peacekeepers engaged in sexual abuse and exploitation?
- c) Are we only talking about a few rotten apples or are these offences systemic to UN peacekeeping operations? Or to put it into different words: Are the reported cases only the tip of the ice-berg?
- d) What does accountability mean in this context? Should accountability be applied to the highest level of the UN?<sup>5)</sup>
- e) What is the role of training in preventing this?
- f) Should peacekeepers be better selected?
- g) How can assistance to victims be improved?
- h) What is the role of civil society in preventing sexual offences committed by blue helmets?<sup>6)</sup>

I would like to leave these questions to our debate after my presentation, because of time constraints and rather focus on whether the strategies and responses by the UN are sufficient and effective.

First, I will shortly summarize the allegations and then outline the different measures by the UN in response to sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers.

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4) See UN doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 of 9 October 2003.

5) For further reading, see the special issue on the accountability of peacekeepers in *Die Friedens-Warte*, issue 3-4, 2013 and B. Kondoch, M. Zwanenburg, "The Responsibility of Peacekeepers, Their Sending States, and International Organizations" in *The Handbook of International Law of Military Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

6) For a more detailed comment, see Jeni Whalan, Here's How to End UN Peacekeeping's History of Sexual Violence, 29 April 2016, available at <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/04/29/Heres-how-to-end-UN-peacekeepings-history-of-sexual-violence.aspx>. For different reports by human rights organizations, see for example, AI, CAR: UN Troops Implicated in Rape of Girl and Indiscriminate Killings Must Be Investigated, 11 August 2015, available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/car-un-troops-implicated-in-rape-of-girl-and-indiscriminate-killings-must-be-investigated/>; Human Rights Watch, Central African Republic: Rape by Peacekeepers, 4 February 2016, available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/04/central-african-republic-rape-peacekeepers>.

## I. A Short History

Over the last 24 years, UN peacekeepers have been accused of sexual abuse and exploitation. The first cases emerged from UNTAC, the UN mission in Cambodia, in 1992. Ever since then, rape, pedophilia, prostitutions, transactional sex and other forms of sexual misconduct and crimes have taken place on multiple occasions in almost every peacekeeping operation.<sup>7)</sup>

Victims are almost always women, girls and boys often living in the poorest countries of the world. Many women also get pregnant and have to raise the so-called “peacekeeper babies” without any financial support.<sup>8)</sup> In 2015, there had been 69 reported cases concerning different peacekeeping missions (most of them in Africa). 23 allegations concerned sexual offences against minors. More than half of the allegations were related to two of the sixteen current UN missions: 22 against peacekeepers in the Central African Republic and 16 in Congo.

## II. UN Responses to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers

UN Secretary General Ban, Ki-moon has called sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping “a cancer in our system.”<sup>9)</sup>

This raises the question of what the world organization has done to stop this sickness from spreading.<sup>10)</sup>

Since 2003, the United Nations has taken various steps in addressing sexual abuse and exploitation, among others through the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Office of the Special Coordinator

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7) For more information on UN statistics and investigations, see A/70/729 and the annual reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, available at <https://oios.un.org/page?slug=annual-reports>.

8) Cara Anna, ‘Peacekeeper Babies’ an Unintended Consequence of Sending in the United Nations, *National Post*, 13 June 2015, available at <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/peacekeeper-babies-an-unintended-consequence-of-sending-in-the-united-nations>. For further reading, see O. Simić, M. O’Brien, ‘Peacekeeper Babies: An Unintended Legacy of United Nations Peace Support Operations’, 21 *International Peacekeeping* 2014 345-363.

9) Ban Ki-moon Says Sexual Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Is ‘a Cancer in Our System’, *The Guardian*, 14 August 2015, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/ban-ki-moon-says-sexual-abuse-in-un-peacekeeping-is-a-cancer-in-our-system>.

10) For a detailed overview, see Fact Sheet on Sexual exploitation and Abuse, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2015factsheet.pdf>. See also the timeline at <https://cdu.unlb.org/Policy/EvolutionofInitiativesToAddressSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx>.

on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the UN Office of Internal Oversight.

There are already a great number of measures in place, which includes training personnel, and vetting personnel, standardized procedures for handling allegations and victim support.<sup>11)</sup> In general, the United Nations has adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards SEA.

However, it took the UN several years before it took comprehensive and systematic action.

In 2003, the UN SG issued a special bulletin titled 'Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,' which applies to all UN peace operations.

The bulletin prohibits almost all kinds of sexual activity including sex with minors, sex in exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favors or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behavior, and discourages "sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics."

In 2005, a landmark report after allegations of SEA in Democratic Republic of the Congo was published. In the report titled 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' Prince Zeid, the UN Adviser on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel recommended among others, to establish uniform and binding standards; professional investigative mechanisms; and organizational accountability.<sup>12)</sup> The Zeid report led to the establishment of the Conduct and Discipline Unit.

In the same year, the Security Council president issued a statement: "The Security Council is deeply concerned with the allegations of sexual misconduct by United Nations peacekeeping personnel ...The Security Council ... recognizes the shared responsibility of the Secretary-General and all Member States to take every measure within their purview to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse

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11) Key UN documents, resolutions as well as Secretary-General's reports and bulletins related to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers can be found at <http://www.codebluecampaign.com/un-docs>.

12) See Prince Zeid's Report, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, UN Doc. A/59/710 of 2005.

by all categories of personnel in United Nations peacekeeping missions to enforce United Nations standards of conduct in that regard. The Security Council reiterates the importance of ensuring that sexual exploitation and abuse are properly investigated and appropriately punished.”

On 17 December 2015, the report ‘Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers’ by an independent panel and commissioned by the UN, was released.<sup>13)</sup>

The panel described the ‘gross institutional failure’ of the UN adequately responding to allegations of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in a peacekeeping operation known as MINUSCA, in the Central African Republic. Initial complaints were mishandled and simply “passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility.”

The Independent Panel of Experts recommended, among others “(t)he UN must take immediate action when it receives reports of sexual violence by peacekeepers to stop the violations and hold the perpetrators accountable ... Above all, UN staff and agencies must end the bureaucratic cycle in which responsibility is fragmented and accountability is passed from one agency to another.”

In January 2016, for the first time, UN officials named countries whose peacekeepers have been allegedly accused of SEA.<sup>14)</sup>

In February 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban suggested the possibility of an absolute prohibition on sexual relationships between United Nations personnel and nationals of the host State.<sup>15)</sup>

On 11 March 2016, the UN Security Council has adopted its first ever resolution addressing the problem of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers. The resolution was US sponsored and the debate in the Council was controversial. Russia argued that the repatriation of national contingents would amount to collective punishment. Security Council Resolution 2272 was

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13) Available at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-Review-Report.pdf>

14) Available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53120#.WAXjYeiLSUk>.

15) UN General Assembly, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. A/70/729 of 16 February 2016, available at [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a\\_70\\_729.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_70_729.pdf), p. 21

adopted of 14 in favor, with Egypt abstaining.

SC Resolution 2272 endorsed the repatriation of entire military or police units “where there is credible evidence of widespread or systematic sexual exploitation and abuse.”

The Security Council requested “when a particular troop-contributing country whose personnel are the subject of an allegation or allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse has not taken appropriate steps to investigate the allegation and/or when the particular troop- or police-contributing country has not held the perpetrators accountable or informed the Secretary-General of the progress of its investigations and/or actions taken, to replace all military units and/or formed police units of the troop- or police-contributing country in the United Nations peacekeeping operation.”

In addition, the SC urged “all non-United Nations forces authorized under a Security Council mandate to take adequate measures to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse by their personnel” and encouraged “the appropriate United Nations mechanisms, including those related to Children and Armed Conflict, Women, Peace and Security and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to continue to include allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in their regular reporting to the Secretary-General.”

In Summer 2016, UN SG Ban, Ki-moon suggested a six component strategy in regard to SEA:

- (a) Member State engagement and emerging best practices in United Nations troop and police deployments;
- (b) enhanced unified system-wide approach;
- (c) strengthened prevention, including increased awareness raising, outreach to host communities, community-based reporting mechanisms and augmented training to United Nations personnel;
- (d) enhanced victim-centred response, encompassing victim services and protection;
- (e) robust enforcement through strengthened reporting, thorough and coordinated investigation and transparent judicial and public accountability; and
- (f) greater focus on monitoring and reporting on sexual exploitation and abuse by non-United Nations forces.<sup>16)</sup>

### III. Evaluation

Despite some laudable efforts taken by the United Nations, the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse has remained highly problematic.

In 2015, the Office of Internal Oversight Services concluded in a report that sexual misconduct has significantly been under-reported in UN missions.<sup>17)</sup>

In the evaluation of some commentators, little or no progress has actually occurred.

According to the CAR Report, this can be explained by:

“a culture of impunity in which some leaders turn a blind-eye to sexual crimes by troops; a bureaucratic culture in which many are not willing to take responsibility for addressing the violations or to show leadership in investigating and prosecuting the criminal conduct; a disproportionate concern with protecting the image of the UN and its agencies rather than helping the victims; and routine and systematic delay at every stage of decision-making, even as the failure to act means that crimes may be reoccurring and that the chances of bringing the perpetrators to justice decrease day by day.<sup>18)</sup>

Everyone will agree that when peacekeepers commit crimes, they ought to be subject to criminal proceedings.

However, members of national contingents are in general granted immunity from criminal proceedings from the host state jurisdiction by a Status of Forces agreement. The UN does not exercise criminal jurisdiction over them.

If the individual peacekeeper commits a crime, the individual remains under the jurisdiction of the Sending State and he or she may be held accountable for their action by the courts of the Sending State.

Since only a few decisions of courts martial and inquiries have addressed the violations of international law by members of UN peacekeeping forces, academic writers and non-governmental organizations will continue to criticize the United Nations and member states for not providing effective mechanisms of accountability.

It will remain one of the challenges of the future to create consistent

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16) A/71/97, para. 6.

17) Available at <https://oios.un.org/page/download2/id/13>.

18) CAR Report, pp. 4-5.

mechanisms to ensure the identification and punishment of law violations committed by UN forces.<sup>19)</sup>

It might be worth revisiting the proposals suggested in 2006 by a group of legal experts. They argued that states could adopt a convention which would address jurisdictional problems, definition of crimes and mutual legal assistance. In their report, they also recommended to enhance the host state's capacity or to establish hybrid courts.<sup>20)</sup> Another possibility could be onsite courts martial or even a role for the International Criminal Court.

Further measures to be considered could be to establish a special UN compensation fund for victims of SEA by UN peacekeepers; to set up a comprehensive and up-to-date database as suggested by the CAR panel; and to set up special police unit which would police peacekeepers.<sup>21)</sup>

At the end of my presentation, please allow me to quote the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power:

“To the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, we pledge that we will do better. We will do better to ensure that the blue helmets that we send as your protectors will not become perpetrators.”<sup>22)</sup>

How this can be achieved, should be the focus of our discussions.<sup>23)</sup>

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19) See F. Hampson, *Working Paper on the Accountability of International Personnel Taking Part in Peace Support Operations*, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/42 of 7 July 2005; the *Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. A/60/980 of August 2006 and *Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission*, UN Doc. A/62/2007. See also F. Rawski, 'To Waive or not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations', 18 *Connecticut Journal of International Law* 2002, 103-32.

20) The *Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. A/60/980 of August 2006.

21) UN News Centre, *Fresh Allegations of Sexual Abuse Made against UN Peacekeepers in Central African Republic*, available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52941#.WAIHtuiLSUK>.

22) Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, *Remarks at the UN Security Council Meeting on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, March 10, 2016, available at <http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7175>.

23) For further reading, see C. Ferstman, *Criminalizing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers*, USIP Special Report 335, 2013, available at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf>; J. Stern, *Reducing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping. Ten Years after the Zeid Report*, *Civilians in Conflict Policy Brief No. 1*, February 2015; R. Boom, *Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: Can the General Assembly Unite against Impunity of Military Peacekeepers?*, *ASIL Insight*, 27 July 2016, available at <https://www.asil.org/>

Thank you very much for your attention.

Kamsahamnida.

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insights/volume/20/issue/13/special-measures-protection-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-un; Bruce 'Ossie' Oswald, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peace Operations: Challenges and Developments (on file with the author); O. Simić, 'Policing the Peacekeepers: Disrupting UN Responses to "Crises over Sexual Offence Allegations', *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 2016, forthcoming; and the information provided by the UN peacekeeping department on conduct and discipline available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/cdu>.

## 대한민국 PKO 확대를 위한 정책 제언 A Policy Proposal to Expand Korea's PKO Activities

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아프리카는 국제사회에서의 영향력 증대와 주요자원 및 경제협력의 새로운 대상으로서 부상하고 있어 중국 등 주요국들이 경쟁적으로 교류·협력을 확대하고 있다. 한국은 6.25전쟁 때 아프리카의 에티오피아와 남아공 등 2개국으로부터 도움을 받았으며, 현재 아프리카의 54개 모든 국가들과 외교관계를 맺고 있다. 한국은 외교정책 면에서 이명박 정부에서의 '글로벌 코리아'와 현재의 박근혜 정부에서의 '신뢰외교' 기조 하에 외교·경제·안보의 포괄적인 측면에서 아프리카의 전략적 가치를 인식하고 국방외연을 확대하고자 노력하고 있다.

한국은 2016년 10월 현재, 아프리카에 남수단 한빛부대를 비롯하여 서부사하라 선거감시단 등 4개 지역에 개인파병을 통해 평화와 지역안정에 기여하고 있다. 그러나 지난 25년간의 한국의 파병활동은 많은 성과도 있었지만, 내외적인 요소들로 인해 제한적인 특징을 보였다. 유엔을 비롯한 국제사회는 PKO 활동에 대한 새로운 요구를 하고 있다. 그것은 작전능력의 강화와 복합적 평화유지 전략, 재정기여 및 병력공여의 준비, 그리고 아프리카에 대한 평화역량 강화로 집약할 수 있다. 따라서 한국의 PKO활동 확대의 기본 방향은 첫째, 국가차원의 통합된 전략을 수립·추진하고, 둘째, PKO 활동의 효율성을 위한 시스템의 구축, 셋째, 인적자원에 대한 종합적인 준비와 활용에 대해 정책적인 제언을 하고자 한다.

한국의 아프리카에서의 PKO 활동 확대를 위한 정책은 2단계로 나누어 제안한다. 단기적으로는 한빛부대의 전략거점화와, VIP가 공약한 사항의 조기 이행, 그리고 국내적으로 법적·제도적 정비와 국민 공감대를 형성해야 한다. 중장기적으로는 아프리카를 5개 권역으로 구분하여 권역별 거점국가를 선정하고, 전략수립-교류-제도화-협력-확대의 순서에 의해 단계별로 추진해 나갈 것을 제안한다.

### **|Abstraction|**

Due to Africa's enhanced influence in the international society and its new position as a partner for major resources and economic cooperation, superpowers such as China are seeking further exchange · cooperation with Africa. Republic of Korea(ROK) have received assistance from 2 nations in Africa during the Korean War, specifically Ethiopia and Republic of South Africa, and is currently establishing diplomatic relationships with all the 54 nation states in the African continent.

In terms of foreign policy, under the slogan of the Lee Myeong Bak Administration's 'Global Korea' and the current Park Geun Hae Administration's 'Diplomacy of Trust,' ROK has acknowledged the significance of Africa's strategic values in the comprehensive aspects of diplomacy · economy · security, and is making efforts to

extend national security cooperation.

Currently, in October 2016, ROK is contributing to peace and local stabilization through individual deployments to 4 regions in Africa including the Hanbit Unit in South Sudan and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara(MINURSO). However, although there have been great achievements in the deployment operations for the past 25 years, there were some limitations due to internal and external factors.

The international society including the United Nations are making new requests for PKO activities. They could be summed up as the reinforcement of operational capabilities, strategy for a compounded peace-keeping effort, financial contribution, preparation for troop contribution, and enhancement of peace capabilities in Africa.

Therefore the basic direction for ROK's extension of PKO activities are first, to establish and promote an integrated strategy at the national level, second, to construct a system for efficient PKO activities, and third, to propose policies for the preparation and application of human resources.

The suggestion for ROK's extended PKO activities in Africa is divided into two steps. In the short run, the Hanbit Unit must serve as the strategic focal point, public promises by the VIP should be executed quickly, legal and institutional measures should be implemented, and a social consensus must be formed. In the mid and long run, Africa should be categorized into 5 zones with base countries for each zone, and strategy establishment – exchange – institutionalization – cooperation – extension should be carried out step by step.

## I. 서론 : 한국의 아프리카에 대한 관심과 문제의 제기

한국의 박근혜 대통령은 2015년 9월 28일, 제70차 유엔총회에서 특별 연설을 하였다. 그는 “최근 유엔이 변화하는 안보환경에 맞춰 평화활동, 평화구축, 여성·평화·안보에 대한 재검토를 진행하는 것을 적극 지지한다.”고 밝히고, “대한민국은 유엔 평화활동 역량 강화에 적극적으로 기여할 것을 공약”하였다.<sup>1)</sup> 또한 박 대통령은 2016년 5월 28일, 아프리카연합(African Union, 이하 AU) 본부를 방문하여 ‘아프리카의 새로운 미래를 향한 상생의 동반자’라는 제하의 특별 연설을 하였다. 박 대통령은 이 자리에서 새로운 미래를 열어가는 아프리카에 한국이 함께 성장하고 상생 발전해가는 신뢰의 동반자가 될 것을 강조하였으며, ‘아프리카와의 포괄적 협력을 위한 청사진’<sup>2)</sup>을 제시하였다.

1) 제70차 유엔총회 기조연설(<http://blog.president.go.kr/220501141587>; 검색일 2016.10.8.) 그 주요 내용으로는 첫째, 재건 지원과 인도적 활동을 위해 공병 부대를 추가 파병할 계획이며, 둘째, 아프리카연합(AU)과의 파트너십을 강화하고 인도적 지원의 차원에서 Level-II급 의료시설을 지원하며, 셋째, 분쟁 예방과 평화구축 활동에 재정적 지원의 확대 등을 약속하였다.

2) 박근혜 대통령 아프리카연합(AU) 방문 및 특별연설(<http://blog.president.go.kr>, 검색일: 2016.10.6.); 아

그렇다면 최근 들어 한국은 2013년 3월, 남수단에 한빛부대의 파병을 포함하여 왜 이렇게 아프리카지역에 적극적인 관심과 외교적 접근을 시도하고 있는 것일까? 미국과 중국, 일본 등 세계의 주요 국가들은 왜 앞을 다투어 아프리카에 인적·물적 지원을 아끼지 않으면서 접근하여 교류하는 것일까? 사람들에게 아프리카는 황폐한 땅과 빈곤, 그리고 전쟁과 전염병 등 부정적인 인식들이 먼저 떠오를 수도 있다. 그러나 아프리카는 어려운 여건이지만 풍부한 자원을 보유하여 발전의 가능성이 큰 아름다운 땅이고, 사람들은 희망과 열정에 넘치는 우리 모두가 함께 살아가고 행복해야 할 인류공동체인 것이다.

한국은 1991년 유엔 가입을 계기로 국제사회의 책임 있는 국가로 평화와 안전에 이바지하기 위하여 2016년 현재, 약 25년간에 걸쳐 해외파병을 통한 국제평화활동에 참여하였다. 이에 국제사회의 지대한 관심 속에 새로운 평화활동의 시작단계에 있는 아프리카지역을 대상으로 대한민국의 PKO 활동을 확대할 수 있는 방안을 고민해 보고자 한다.

## II. 아프리카의 전략 환경 평가와 주요 국가들의 정책

### 1. 아프리카의 전략 환경 평가

아프리카는 1880년대 유럽 제국의 식민지로 분할되었다가, 1960년대에 대부분 독립하였다. 1970- 80년대까지는 자본주의와 공산주의의 체제경쟁 등 군사 쿠데타, 내전, 종족 간 갈등, 지도력 부재 등으로 인한 정치적 불안정과 저개발의 악순환에 시달렸다. 1990년대 탈냉전 직후에는 분쟁이 빈발하였으나, 2000년대 이후 아프리카 내의 정치적 불안정은 점차 감소 추세에 있으며 높은 경제성장률을 유지하고 있다.

1963년 5월, 아프리카국가들은 식민주의 청산과 단결, 연대 및 협력 증진을 목표로 출범한 ‘아프리카단결기구(Organization for African Unity, OAU)’을 출범시켜 약 40여 년 동안 국제무대에서 아프리카의 목소리를 대변해 왔다. 2001년 7월, 제37차 정상회의에서 53개 회원국<sup>3)</sup>은 1년간의 과도기를 거쳐 2002년 제38차 정상회의에서 아프리카연합(African Union, AU)을 발전적으로 해체·출범시키게 되었다.<sup>4)</sup> AU는 경제통합과 사회적 발전을 통해 정치적 연합을 지향하려는 느슨한 형태의 EU를 모델로 한 보다 포

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프리카와의 포괄적 협력을 위한 청사진은 ① 다양한 개발경험의 공유, ② 호혜적이고 미래지향적인 경제협력, ③ 아프리카의 지속가능한 평화와 안정의 구축을 위해 국제사회와 함께 적극 노력, ④ 한국과 아프리카를 연결하는 제도적 기반의 공고화 등 네 가지의 주요내용으로 축약할 수 있다.

3) 54개의 아프리카 국가 중 모로코만 1985년에 탈퇴하여 비회원국임. 주요 조직으로는 정상회의(Assembly), 집행이사회(Executive Council), 집행위원회(Commission), 상주대표위원회(Permanent Representatives' Committee), 평화안전이사회(Peace and Security Council), 범 아프리카의회(Pan-African Parliament), 기타 경제사회문화이사회, 재판소 등이 있다.

4) 설규상, “아프리카연합(AU)의 미래와 대 아프리카 외교”, (서울: 외교안보연구원, 2002.), p. 1-3.

괄적이고 수준 높은 통합기구라고 할 수 있다.<sup>5)</sup> AU는 아프리카의 통합을 촉진하며 아프리카의 공동이익과 입장을 추구하고 있다. 또한 역내의 평화와 안전의 유지를 위해 AU의 개입권한을 규정하고 있다. 이외에도 빈곤 철폐, 경제개발 촉진, 민주주의 및 법치·선정의 추구 등을 지향하고 있다.<sup>6)</sup>


아프리카는 전 세계의 1/7에 해당하는 10억 명의 인구를 가진 대륙이며, 대외적인 면에서 국제기구의 회원 수가 높은 비중을 차지하여 UN 안보리 결의 및 국제기구 진출 등에 그 영향력이 확대되는 추세에 있다. 즉 UN 회원국 193개 국 중 53개국(28%) 과 WTO 160개 회원국 중 40개국(25%)을 차지하고 있어, 범세계적인 안정을 위해 초국가적으로 관리하고 협력하는데 중요한 역할을 하고 있다. 뿐만 아니라 테러, 에볼라 및 에이즈 등의 질병, 재난, 해적 등 지역의 안보과제들이 UN안보리 이슈의 약 70%를 차지하여, 국제사회의 관심과 협력이 집약되는 지역이라고 할 수 있다.

대내적으로 범 아프리카 정부 간 기구인 AU를 비롯하여, <그림-1, 표-1>에서 보는 바와 같이 6개의 경제공동체 등 역내의 협의체가 1970-2001년도 사이에 결성되어 이를 통한 아프리카 각국 간 정치·경제·외교적 협력관계를 강화하고 있다. 또한 아프리카는 2004-2013년 평균 5.3%의 경제 성장률을 지속함에 따라 새로운 미래 경제협력 파트너로서의 중요성이 부각되고 있다. 자원 면에서는 아프리카 지역 내 유전·가스전 개발 등이 이루어짐에 따라 지금까지 전 세계적으로 중동에 편중된 자원공급 기능의 일부를 대체할 수 있을 것이며, 주요 국가들은 아프리카의 자원을 확보하기 위한 경쟁을 심화시키고 있다.<sup>7)</sup> 또한 아프리카는 자원부국들의 군 현대화를 위한 의지로 잠재적 방산시장이 될 것으로 전망하고 있다.<sup>8)</sup>

아프리카는 ‘역동적인 잠재력’을 바탕으로 국제사회에서의 영향력 증대, 주요 자원의 신규 공급처로, 신 경제협력의 대상국으로 부상하고 있어 미국, 중국 등 주요 국가들이 경쟁적으로 대 아프리카의 교류와 협력을 확대하고 있는 추세이다.<sup>9)</sup> 오늘날 세계 주요 국가들의 아프리카 진출은 단순히 경제자원의 영역에만 국한되지 않고, 경제·안보·자원·군사적인 요소가 융합된 ‘포괄안보(Inclusive National Security)’개념에 의해 주도되고 있으며, 각국은 이러한 측면에서 참여하게 영향력의 확대를 위한 경쟁을 벌이고 있다.

5) 심의섭, “아프리카 개발협력을 위한 새로운 접근전략”, (서울: 대외경제연구원, 2006.), p.  
 6) 변웅, “아프리카연합(African Union)형성과정을 중심으로 한 아프리카 역내협력 및 통합현황 분석 및 전망”, 『주요 국제문제분석, 2014-09』, (서울: 국립외교원 외교안보연구소, 2014.), p. 7-12.  
 7) 중국은 아프리카 20개국에서 자원개발에 참여하고 있으며, 미국은 거대 석유회사 진출 후 동아프리카 자원개발에, 일본은 자원보유 7개국에 대한 기술 및 인력을 제공하고 있다.  
 8) 2007-2012년 동안 아프리카 10개국이 세계 국방비 증가율 상위 20개국에 포함되고 있다.(리베리아 41.3%, 남수단 28%, 나이지리아 26%, DR콩고 24.8%)  
 9) 국방대학교 PKO센터, 『유엔 남수단임무단 귀국보고서(UNMISS)』, (서울: 국방대, 2014.) pp. 13-14.

<그림-1> 아프리카 역내의 주요 공동체 현황



<표-1> 아프리카 역내의 주요 공동체 현황

구 분	면적 (천km <sup>2</sup> )	인구 (천명)	1인당GDP (\$)	가입국수
<b>AU(Africa Union)</b> (아프리카 연합)	3천만	10억	평균 1,200	53 (모로코제외)
<b>UMA(Union du Maghreb Arabe)</b> (아랍-마그레브 동맹)	5,782	84,185	3,032	5
<b>ECOWAS(Economic Community of West African States)</b> (서아프리카제국경제공동체)	5,112	251,646	731	15
<b>SACU(Southern African Customs Union)</b> (남아프리카관세동맹)	2,693	51,055	5,402	5
<b>COMESA(Common Market for Eastern &amp; Southern Africa)</b> (동남아프리카공동시장)	12,873	406,102	697	19
<b>EAC(East Africa Community)</b> (동아프리카공동체)	1,817	124,858	488	5
<b>SADC(Southern African Development Community)</b> (남아프리카개발공동체)	9,880	233,944	1,618	15

출처: 심경옥외, 『왜 아프리카인가』, (서울: KIDA, 2013.), p.181을 참고로 일부보완

## 2. 미국의 대 아프리카 정책

미국의 입장에서 아프리카에 대한 전략적 이익은 테러의 방지와 중국의 영향력 확장을 견제하며 원유자원을 확보하는 것이라고 할 수 있다. 또한 해양안보를 통해 군사적

갈등을 방지하며, 에이즈 및 에볼라 등 질병의 확산을 방지하는데 중점을 두고 있다. 이를 위해 미국은 직접적인 군사력의 투입보다는 역내 국가들과의 협력을 통한 지역의 안정과 대테러 능력 향상을 도모하고, 국제사회의 협력을 주도적으로 이끌고 있다.

미국은 9.11 테러 이후 아프리카 주요 협력국의 대테러전 능력향상을 위한 군사적 지원을 확대하여 정찰 및 정보수집과 해당국의 안보지원 등 간접개입을 추진하고 있다. 미국은 2003년 7월 부시 대통령이 아프리카를 순방하였고, 2007년에는 아프리카사령부(Africom)를 창설하였으며, '북동아프리카지역 연합합동임무단(CJTF-HOA)이 활동 중에 있다.<sup>10)</sup> 또한 2015년에 다국적 평화유지군으로 활동할 '아프리카상비군(ASF)'을 창설하여 국제군사교육훈련 등을 지원하고 있으며, 오바마대통령은 에볼라 사태이후 서아프리카 국가들에 3천여 명 규모의 미군 병력을 파견하여 의료 및 수송을 지원하는 등 국제협력을 주도하고 있다.

### 3. 중국의 대 아프리카 정책

중국은 소국도 UN에서 1표를 행사한다는 점을 중시하여 1960년대 이후 아프리카에 대해 무상원조 등을 통해 지지 확보에 주력하였다. 중국은 특히 아프리카에서 분쟁의 감소와 경제개발에 따른 기업진출의 기회가 증대되는 2000년대 이후에 자국의 지속가능한 경제발전을 보장하기 위해 아프리카를 자원보고 및 수출시장으로 인식하여 경제 지원을 통한 영향력을 확대하여 왔다. 2005년 이후에는 방산수출 및 군사협력도 본격적으로 추진하고 있다.<sup>11)</sup> 중국의 대 아프리카 정책은 풍부한 자금력을 바탕으로 경제 원조 등을 통해 영향력을 확대하고, 지속적인 경제성장을 뒷받침할 수 있는 에너지 자원의 확보, 그리고 중국 상품의 판매와 건설 및 노동력의 진출, 군사협력을 통한 방산 수출 등 전략적인 노력을 가속화하고 있다.

중국은 2013년 3월 시진핑 주석의 첫 해외순방 시 향후 3년간 아프리카에 100억불의 차관을 약속하는 등 막대한 재정적·인도적 지원공세를 펴고 있다. 중국은 특히 안보리 상임이사국이라는 지위를 이용하여 민주화, 인권 등 민감한 문제들에 대한 UN 개입을 방지하고 '내정불간섭 원칙'을 준수하고 비즈니스에 주력하고 있다. 중국은 이를 통해 다양한 분야에서 전폭적인 지원을 전개하여 국제사회에서 아프리카에 대한 최대 지원국으로 부상하였으며, 국제평화활동의 적극 동참을 토대로 군사교류의 활성화와 경제적인 협력과 교역투자를 통해 실리위주 경협 전략으로 아프리카에서 우월적 지위를 확보하고 있다. 중국의 대 아프리카 전략은 아프리카국가들의 눈높이에 맞춘 '소프트 접근 전략'과 포괄안보의 시각에서 접근하는 '패키지 딜 모델'이라고 압축하여 말할 수 있다.

10) 심경욱의, 앞의 책, p. 71.

11) 중국은 군사협력의 일환으로 연간 500여명의 수탁교육을 실시하고 있으며, 남수단평화유지군(850명), 시에라리온 에볼라대응 군 의료팀(30명), 라이베리아에 평화유지군(558명)과 의료진(163명) 등 파견하고 있다. 또한 지부티 등 4개소에 해군기지의 건설과 나이지리아 및 이집트 등의 국가에 훈련기 및 전투기, 전투함의 수출을 추진하고 있다.; 국방대학교 PKO센터, 위의 책, p. 15.

#### 4. 일본의 대 아프리카 정책

일본은 아프리카와의 경제안보협력을 통해 안정적인 자원 확보와 국제사회에서의 영향력을 확대하고 침체된 경제 활성화를 전략적인 이익으로 판단하고 있다. 일본은 '일본-아프리카개발회의(TICAD)'를 통해 주요 거점국가들을 중심으로 경제 및 안보, 자원 및 인프라 구축 등 아이템별로 맞춤형 협력 전략으로 접근하고 있다. 일본은 특히 자원문제를 국가안보 차원에서 접근하여 석유, 희토류 등 천연자원 보유국에 대해 집중투자를 하는 등 적극적인 자원 확보 노력을 경주하고 있다.<sup>12)</sup>

또한 일본은 2014년 12월, 에볼라와 관련하여 1억 4,500만 달러를 지원하였고, 방호복 50만 세트를 제공하고 10명의 의료 인력을 파견하였다. 2012년 1월부터 남수단임무단(UNMISS)에 공병 부대를 파견하는 등 인도적 지원 및 국제평화활동에 적극 참여를 통해 UN 안보리 상임이사국 진출 및 자국의 안보정책에 대한 지지확대를 도모하고 있다. 아베 일본 총리는 2014년 1월 코트디부아르, 모잠비크, 에티오피아, 소말리아, 지부티 등을 순방하면서 각국 정상회담 시 '적극적 평화주의'에 대한 홍보활동에 주력하였다. 일본은 대 아프리카 군사협력을 강화하기 위해 2014년 7월부터 아프리카 지역 무관부를 2개국에서 9개국으로 확대 개설하여 군사 분야의 교류협력과 PKO 역량 강화를 지원하고 있다.<sup>13)</sup>

이 밖에도 영국은 장기간의 식민중주국으로서의 영향력을 기반으로, 프랑스는 아프리카에 대한 월등한 정보력과 효율적인 네트워크를 이용하여 각각의 기득권을 유지하고 있으며, 러시아는 군사장비면에서, 인도는 지리적 접근성과 영국식민통치라는 역사적 유사성을 내세워 아프리카에 적극적으로 접근하고 있다.

### Ⅲ. 대한민국의 대 AU 관계의 경과와 현재

#### 1. 한국과 아프리카의 외교관계 경과

한국과 아프리카의 외교관계는 다음과 같은 경과를 거쳐 오늘에 이르고 있다. 1950년, 6.25전쟁 때 에티오피아의 육군부대와 남아공의 비행중대가 UN군의 일원으로 참전하였으며, 1960년대에 들어 아프리카의 17개국이 영국, 프랑스 등 유럽제국으로부터 독립하자 한국은 이들과 외교관계를 수립하고 우호 협력을 강화해나갔다. 그러나 1960-70년대의 대 아프리카 외교는 냉전 체제하에서 북한과의 경쟁외교가 중심이 되었다.

12) 심경옥외, 앞의 책, p. 118.

13) 일본의 대 아프리카 군사협력은 2011년 7월, 지부티에 해외 항공기지(항공기 계류장, 정비용 격납고, 항공자위대 170명 주둔)를 건설하여 소말리아 해상의 해적 대처와 중동 지역 자위대 국제공헌 활동의 거점으로 활용하는 동시에 PKO 역량 강화를 지원하고 있다.

1982년 전두환 전 대통령이 케냐, 세네갈, 가봉, 나이지리아를 순방하였고, 아프리카 제국에서도 9명의 정상이 방한하여 실질적인 경제·기술협력을 전개하였다. 2006년 3월 노무현 전 대통령은 이집트, 나이지리아, 알제리를 순방하여 ‘아프리카 개발을 위한 한국 이니셔티브’를 발표하였으며,<sup>14)</sup> 2006년 8월, 가나와 수교함으로써 아프리카 53개국과 국교를 수립하였다. 2010년 7월, 이명박 전 대통령이 남아공, 에티오피아, DR콩고를 순방하여 협력노선을 강화하였고, 2011년 7월에는 신생독립국인 남수단과 수교함으로써 아프리카 54개국 모두와 국교를 맺게 되었다. 2016년 5월에는 박근혜 대통령이 AU 본부가 있는 에티오피아, 우간다, 케냐를 순방하여 ‘상생의 협력 체제’를 구축하였다.

한편, 한국 내에는 아프리카에 대한 인식 제고와 협력의 활성화를 위한 알리기 방안으로 국회 아프리카 새 시대포럼, 아프리카의 친구들, 아프리카 미래전략센터, 대학의 아프리카연구소 등이 민관의 교류 증진을 위해 노력하고 있다. 한국과 아프리카의 교역은 1990년 12억 달러에서 2014년 180억 달러로 증가하였으나, 아직 한국 수출총액의 1.6%에 불과하며, 에너지자원 개발과 인프라 건설 및 IT 분야로의 한국 기업의 진출이 확대되고 있는 추세이다.

## 2. 한국과 AU의 외교협력 관계의 발전

한국은 아프리카의 총 54개 국가 중 24개국에 공관을 상주시키고 있으며, 서울에는 19개 아프리카 국가의 공관이 주재하고 있다. 최근 아프리카 국가들이 정치·경제 등 다방면에서 발전을 가속화함에 따라 아프리카는 ‘무한한 성장 잠재력을 지닌 대륙’으로서 국제적 관심이 집중되고 있다. 한국도 이러한 추세에 맞추어 아프리카와의 교류와 협력을 여러 분야에서 심화·확대 시킬 필요성이 증대 되었다.

한국은 미래지향적인 한-아프리카협력 파트너십 구축을 위해, 2006년 3월 “아프리카 개발을 위한 한국의 이니셔티브”를 천명하였다. 또한 공적개발원조와 인적자원 개발을 지원하기 위한 연수생 초청 등 한국과 아프리카 간의 실질적·미래지향적인 협력방안을 모색해 나갔다. 이후 한국과 아프리카 국가들 간 정례적 협의체로서 ‘한-아프리카 포럼’을 설립하여 협의를 지속하고 있다. 2006년 11월, 제1차 한-아프리카 포럼(KAF)을 개최하여 5개국의 정상 등 30여개 국가에서 참석하였으며, 이후 2013년까지 총 3차례의 포럼을 개최하였고,<sup>15)</sup> 제4차 포럼은 2016년 12월 AU본부가 있는 에티오피아 아디스

14) 한국 정부는 2006년 21세기 세계평화와 공동번영을 아프리카 국가들과 함께 구현하고자 하는 비전과 목표아래 아프리카의 빈곤 퇴치 등 인도적 분야의 협력과 경제, 사회개발 지원을 위한 기여를 대폭 확대하기 위해 ‘아프리카 개발을 위한 이니셔티브’를 발표했다.; 권혜룡, 『개발협력을 위한 한국의 이니셔티브』, (서울: 도서출판 삶과 꿈, 2006), p.

15) 2009년 11월에는 AU와 공동으로 제2차 한-아프리카 포럼을 개최하여 15개국이 참여하였으며, 2012년 10월 제3차 한-아프리카 포럼을 개최하여 AU와 한국의 유관기관(KAFACI, KOPIA, KIDA 등)간 협력 채널의 확대 등 AU와의 구체적인 협력사업의 추진에 합의하였다.; 외교부 홈페이지/이슈별자료실/지역별 이슈/아프리카중동/한-아프리카 포럼(<http://www.mofa.go.kr>, 검색일: 2016.10.7.)

아바바에서 개최할 예정이다. <표-2>는 2000년대 이후 한국이 AU와 외교·경제면에서 협력을 강화해 온 노력들을 정리한 것이다.<sup>16)</sup>

<표-2> 한국의 대 AU 외교관계

구 분	시 기	내 용
AU 옵저버 자격 획득	2005년 4월	
AU 정상회의 참석 (AU회의에 옵저버 참석)	제6차(2006. 1.) 수단 Khartom으로부터 제27차 (2016. 7.) 르완다 Kigali 까지 연2회 개최	외교부 장관(정책실장) 및 주 에티오피아 대사 등 참석
한-아프리카 포럼(KAF)	- 제1차(2006.11.7.-9) - 제2차(2009.11.24.-25) - 제3차(2012.10.16.-18) - 제4차(2016.12. 예정)	서울, 외교통상부, KIEF 서울, 외교통상부, AU 서울, 외교통상부, AU 아디스아비바(AU본부)
대 AU 재정 기여 현황	- 2004. 9월. - 2007년 - 2008. 8월. - 2008. 10월. - 2009. 4월. - 2013. 12월 - 2014. 12월 - 2015. 12월 - 2016. 1월	분쟁해결 지원 20만불 수단파병 재정지원 20만불 기자재 기증 20만불 소말리아 의약품 10만불 AMISOM 기금 50만불 AU 협력기금 50만불 AU 협력기금 50만불 AU 협력기금 50만불 AU 협력기금 100만불

## IV. 대한민국의 대 아프리카 국방외교 전략

### 1. 한국의 외교·안보 전략과 국방정책 방향

아프리카대륙은 21세기 들어 ‘새로운 기회의 땅’, ‘지구상의 마지막 남은 성장엔진’으로 주목받고 있다. 따라서 대한민국도 아프리카의 전략적 가치를 간파하고 다양한 접근과 협력을 시도해 오고 있다. 한국은 2006년 고 노무현 대통령이 이집트 등 3개국을 순방하였고 아프리카의 53개 모든 국가와 수교하였다. 2010년에는 이명박 전 대통령이 남아공 등 3개국을 순방하였고, 2011년 신생국인 남수단을 포함하여 54개국 모두와 수교하였다. 이 논문에서는 한국이 아프리카와 본격적인 외교협력관계를 구축하여 지속 발전시키고 있는 최근의 2개 정부(이명박·박근혜)의 전략을 기술하고자 한다.

16) 외교통상부 홈페이지/제2차 한-아프리카 포럼 협의를 위한 아프리카연합(AU) 대표단 방한 (<http://www.mofa.go.kr>, 검색일: 2016.10.13.)

2008년 2월 출범한 이명박 정부는 국정지표 중 하나로 ‘성숙한 세계국가(Global Korea)’를 설정하였다. 이와 관련하여 한반도의 새로운 평화구조 창출, 국익 우선의 세계기여, 실용외교, 굳건한 선진안보체제 구축, 품격 있고 존중받는 국가형성이라는 4개의 국정 전략과 20개의 국정과제를 추진하였다.<sup>17)</sup> 이명박 정부는 ‘세계로 나가는 선진 안보 구축’으로 다양한 안보위협에 대응할 수 있도록 포괄안보 분야에서의 역량을 구축하며, 국제평화와 재건활동에 적극적으로 참여하고자 하였다.<sup>18)</sup>

2013년 출범한 박근혜 정부에서도 ‘신뢰외교’의 기초 하에 ‘한반도와 동북아의 평화 정착과 통일기반 조성, 경제외교를 통한 경제 부흥 선도, 인류공영에 기여하는 중견국 실현, 국민권의 증진과 문화융성 구현’이라는 4대 목표를 설정하여 추진하고 있다. 이 중에서 국제사회의 평화와 안정을 위해 PKO, 비확산, 사이버 안보 등에 적극 참여하고 있다. 이를 통해 인류 보편적 가치 및 규범 확산에 기여하고자 ‘포괄적·다층적 지역 외교’를 전개하고 복합적인 글로벌 네트워크를 구축하여 신뢰 인프라를 구축해 나가고 있다. 이를 기반으로 한 현 정부의 안보·국방정책은 <표-3> 와 같이 ‘한미동맹을 기반으로 주변국들과 양자 및 다자 협력을 추진하여 한반도와 동북아 지역의 평화와 안정을 증진’시키는 것이다. 아울러 동남아, 중동, 중남미, 아프리카 등으로 국방외교의 외연을 확대하고 다자안보협의체에 적극적으로 참여함으로써 세계평화 기여를 확대하는 것이다. 한국은 2010년 이후부터 유지해온 이명박 정부의 포괄적 실리외교와 국제사회에서의 역할과 위상 제고를 통한 세계평화와 안정에 기여, 그리고 박근혜 정부의 신뢰외교와 국방외연의 확대 및 국제평화의 기여는 큰 틀에서 그 맥을 함께 하고 있다고 볼 수 있다.

## 2. 한국의 對 아프리카 국방외교 추진 방향

한국 정부 입장에서의 아프리카 대륙은 천연자원과 에너지 자원의 공급처로서 아프리카 내부 정세와 국제적 여론 등을 고려하면서 주요 국가들과 국방교류협력의 기반을 구축해 나가야 한다. 이 같은 측면에서 아프리카는 ① 초국가적 안보 역량 강화를 위한 발판, ② 새로운 경제 성장의 동력원, ③ 자원의 새로운 공급처로서의 역할, ④ 잠재적 방산시장으로서의 전략적 가치를 가지고 있다고 평가할 수 있다.

따라서 한국의 대 아프리카 외교안보의 방향은 첫째, 아프리카 내에 산적한 초국가적인 안보(테러, 질병, 재난, 해적 등)에 대한 참여 요구와, 둘째, 아프리카의 신흥부국들의 군 현대화지지를 감안해 볼 때 향후 방산시장으로의 개척 가능성이 증대, 셋째, 군부의 영향력이 큰 아프리카 국가들을 대상으로 한 적극적인 국방협력을 통해 범정부 차원에서의 경제·자원·안보외교를 병행, 넷째, 북한의 대 아프리카 접근을 봉쇄하여 한국의 안보·통일정책에 대한 아프리카 제국의 지지를 확보하여 세계 평화와 안정, 그

17) 전재성 외, 『이명박 정부 외교정책의 세부 실천방안』 (서울: 통일연구원, 2009), p. 6.

18) 홍규덕, “한반도 안보환경 전망과 국군의 국제 역할”, (서울: 국방저널 제421호, 2009), p. 29.

리고 국가이익에 기여하도록 해야 할 것이다.

<표-3> 박근혜 정부의 국가안보 및 국방정책

국가비전 : 희망의 새 시대 -> 경제부흥, 국민행복, 문화융성, 평화통일 기반 구축			
국가안보·외교 분야		국방군사 분야	
비전		비전	정예화 된 선진강군
안보 목표	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 영토·주권수호와 국민안전 행복</li> <li>- 한반도 평화정착과 통일시대 준비</li> <li>- 동북아 협력증진과 <b>세계평화발전에 기여</b></li> </ul>	국방 목표	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 외부의 군사적 위협과 침략으로부터 국가를 보위</li> <li>- 평화통일을 뒷받침</li> <li>- <b>지역의 안정과 세계평화에 기여</b></li> </ul>
안보 전략 기초	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 튼튼한 안보태세 구축</li> <li>- 한반도 신뢰프로세스 추진</li> <li>- <b>신뢰외교 전개</b></li> </ul>	국방 정책 기초	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 확고한 국방태세 확립</li> <li>- 미래지향적 자주국방 역량 강화</li> <li>- 한미 군사동맹 발전 및 <b>국방외교 협력 강화</b></li> <li>- 남북관계 변화에 부합하는 군사적 조치 및 대비</li> <li>- 혁신적 국방경영과 방위산업 활성화</li> </ul>
외교 정책 기초	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 한반도와 동북아의 평화 정착과 통일 기반 조성</li> <li>- 경제외교를 통한 경제부흥 선도</li> <li>- <b>인류공영에 기여하는 중견국 실현</b></li> <li>- 국민권의 증진과 문화융성 구현</li> </ul>	국방 정책 지침	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 한미군사동맹 심화발전 주변국 국방협력 강화</li> <li>- <b>국방외교 외연 확대, 국제평화 기여 확대</b></li> <li>- 국방경영 효율화 지속 추진</li> <li>- 국방전력발전업무체계의 합리적 발전</li> <li>- 방위산업의 활성화</li> </ul>

출처: 국방부, 『국방백서 2014』, (서울: 국방부, 2014.12.) pp. 34-40.

## V. 아프리카에서의 PKO 활동 확대를 위한 정책 추진

### 1. 한국의 국제평화활동 25년 회고

#### 가. 국제평화활동의 경과

한국은 1991년 유엔에 가입한 이후 2016년 현재까지 해외파병을 통해 국내 및 국제 사회로부터 큰 신뢰를 획득하였고 국가위상을 제고시킨 바 있다.<sup>19)</sup> 그러나 국제 안보 상황에 따라 파병의 성격이 변화하고 있는데, 유엔 가입 직후부터는 주로 UN PKO 위주의 활동이, 2000년대 들어 9.11테러로 인한 대테러전쟁 참여에 따른 다국적군 활동 위주의 파병활동이 이루어 졌다. 2010년대 이후에는 UAE의 아크부대 파병을 비롯한 아

19) 한국군 파병부대에 대한 현지의 평가와 찬사로는, “다국적군의 왕(동티모르 상륙수부대), 신이내린 선물(이라크 자이툰부대), 형제의 나라(UAE 아크부대), 레오간의 천사(아이티 단비부대)” 등이 있다.; 국방부, 『2012 국방백서: 특별부록2 해외파병 20주년 회고와 성과』 (서울: 대한민국 국방부, 2012), p. 281.

이티 지진 및 에볼라와 같은 전염병 등에 대한 비전투 지원 등과 국방교류협력의 측면으로 변화·확대되고 있는 추세이다.<sup>20)</sup>

한국은 1991년 9월 유엔 가입을 계기로 25년 동안 적극적으로 활동해 왔으며, 2016년 10월 기준으로 총 13개국에 약 1,118명<sup>21)</sup>을 파병하여 병력공여 38위, 재정기여 12위에 해당하는 다양한 활동을 통해 국제사회의 책임 있는 일원으로 세계평화와 국가이익에 기여하고 있으며, 그 세부적인 현황은 <표-4>와 같이 요약할 수 있다.

<표-4> 한국의 국제평화활동 추진 현황 (진한글자 : 현재 임무중)

구 분	특징	부 대 파 병	개인·참모요원 파병
1단계 (1991-2001)	UN PKO 위주	1993년 소말리아 상륙수부대 1994년 서부사하라의료지원단 1995년 앙골라 상륙수부대 1999년 동티모르 상륙수부대	1994 소말리아 UNOSOM-II(6명) <b>1994 인·파 정전감시단(7명)</b> 1994 조지아 정전감시단(5명)
2단계 (2001-2010)	다국 적군 위주	2001년 아프간 해성부대 2001년 아프간 청마부대 2002년 아프간 동의부대 2003년 아프간 다산부대 2003년 이라크 서희부대 2003년 이라크 제마부대 2004년 이라크 자이툰부대 2004년 이라크 다이만 부대 <b>2007년 레바논 동명부대(U)</b> <b>2009년 소말리아해청해부대(M)</b>	<b>2001 미국 중부사령부(2명)</b> 2002 사이프러스 임무단(1명) 2003 지부티 CJTF-HOA(1명) 2003 아프간 임무단(1명) 2003 아프간 CJTF-76(2명) 2003 라이베리아 임무단(2명) 2004 부룬디 임무단(4명) 2004 이라크 MNF-I협조단(6명) 2005 수단정전감시 임무단(7명) <b>2007 레바논 평화유지군(4명)</b> 2007 네팔 임무단(5명) <b>2007 수단다푸르 임무단(2명)</b>
3단계 (2010-현재)	평화 활동 다양 화	2010년 아이티 단비부대 2010년 아프간 오쉬노부대 <b>2011년 UAE 아크부대(D)</b> 2013년 필리핀 아라우부대 <b>2013년 남수단 한빛부대(U)</b>	<b>2009 바레인연합해군사(14명)</b> <b>2009 지부티 CJTF-HOA(2명)</b> 2009 아프간 CSTC-A(4명) <b>2009 코트디부아르 임무단(2명)</b> <b>2009 서부사하라선거감시단(2명)</b> 2009 아이티 안정화임무단(2명) <b>2011 남수단 임무단(7명)</b> 2014 시에라리온 에볼라 긴급구호대(5명) <b>2016 미 아프리카사령부 협조장교(1명)</b>

출처: KIDA, 해외파병정책토론회(2015.5.13.) 「해외파병의 국가 전략적 접근 및 발전 방안」 발제문에서 요약, pp. 33-54.

20) 신범철, “해외 파병 패러다임 변화 모색”, (서울: 국방저널 제444호, 2011), p. 31.

21) 국방부, 『2014 국방백서』 (서울: 대한민국 국방부, 2014), p. 131.

## 나. 아프리카지역에 대한 한국군의 평화활동

한국이 UN PKO의 일원으로 아프리카지역에 평화유지활동을 시작한 것은 1993년 소말리아에 250명 규모의 공병 부대를 파견한 것이다. 이를 계기로 1994년부터 2006년까지 서부사하라에 의료지원단을, 1995년에는 앙골라에 공병 부대를 파견하여 성공적으로 임무를 완수하였다. 2016년 10월 현재, 아프리카지역에서의 한국군 파병활동은 <그림-2>에서 보는 바와 같이 소말리아해역의 청해 부대와 남수단의 한빛부대, 그리고 개인파병으로 서부사하라 선거감시단과 라이베리아 등 3개 국가의 임무단 등 4개 지역에서 활동 중이다.

현재 파병임무를 수행중인 소말리아 해역의 청해부대는 2008년 6월 2일, UN 안보리 결의(1838호)를 근거로 2008년 10월 24일, 다국적군으로 한국 해군 함정의 소말리아 해역파견을 요청에 의해 이루어졌다. 국제사회는 2009년 1월, 소말리아해적퇴치연락그룹(CGPCS)<sup>22)</sup>을 창설하여 60여 개국, 20여개 해운업체(기관)가 동참하였으며, 한국은 2009년 1월, '해상에서의 안전과 테러 대응을 위한 국제적 노력에 동참하고, 선박의 안전한 활동을 지원하기 위해 4,500톤급 구축함 1척(LYNX헬기 1대, 고속단정 3정, 병력 310명)을 아덴만 해역으로 파견'하였다.<sup>23)</sup>

남수단의 한빛부대는 UN 안보리 결의 제1996호에 의거 2013년 3월, 아프리카의 신생독립국인 남수단의 평화정착 및 재건지원을 통해 국제평화와 안전에 기여하기 위하여 「UN 남수단임무단(UNMISS)<sup>24)</sup>」에 공병 부대(남수단재건지원단)을 파견한 것이다. 한빛부대는<sup>25)</sup> 남수단 보르(BOR)지역에 주둔하여 도로, 비행장, 교량 건설 및 보수 등 재건지원 활동과 의료지원 및 백 나일강 차수벽 공사 등 민군작전, 난민 보호소 신설, 식수 및 방역 등 인도적 지원 임무를 성공적으로 수행하고 있다.


22) 소말리아 해적퇴치 연락그룹(The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia)은 5개로 구분, 해적근절을 위한 공조체계 구축과 대 해적활동을 위한 임무(군사작전, 정보공유, 사법처리, 상선의 자구책 마련, 자금차단 등) 도출하였다.; 해군본부, 『청해부대 백서』, (충남: 해군본부, 2014.), PP. 55-62.

23) 국회사무처, 제281회 임시회, 「국군부대의 소말리아해역 파견동의안」, 2009.3.2; 청해 부대는 지난 5년 동안 458척의 한국 선박과 1,671척의 타국 선박을 호송하였고, 285회 617일의 해양안보작전과 21회의 해적퇴치 활동을 수행하였다. 해군본부, 『청해부대 백서』, (충남: 해군본부, 2014.), PP. 242-247.

24) 유엔 남수단임무단(UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan) : 2011년 7월 9일, 남수단 독립과 함께 유엔안보리 결의 제1996호에 근거하여 창설된 군 병력 7천명과 경찰력 900명으로 편성되어 평화 정착 및 국가건설, 분쟁예방과 민간인 보호 등을 지원하고 있으며, 총 61개국 5,700여명이 활동하고 있다.; 국방대학교 PKO센터 『유엔 남수단임무단 귀국보고서(UNMISS)』, (서울: 국방대, 2011.) p. ii.; 국방대학교 PKO 센터, 『SOUTH SUDAN HANDBOOK』(서울: 국방대, 2012.), pp. 68-75.

25) 한빛부대는 남수단 재건 지원과 인도주의적 활동을 통해 '세상을 이끄는 환한 큰 빛'이 되라는 의미의 별칭이다.; 국방부, 『국방백서 2014』, (서울: 국방부, 2015.), p. 133.

<그림-2> 아프리카 지역 내 한국군 파병현황(2016.10월 현재)



### 다. 국제평화활동의 성과와 특징

한국은 1993년부터 2016년 현재까지, 26개국 36개 지역에서 부대파병을 통한 국제평화활동을 전개해 오고 있다. 그동안 한국의 총 파병인원은 45,868명이며, 활동 중 사망인원은 10명<sup>26)</sup>으로서 파병인원 대비 0.02%에 해당한다. 또한 해외파병에 따른 국고지출은 2014년 말을 기준으로 총 1조 2,417억 원이었다. 지난 25년간 한국의 국제평화활동의 성과는 다음과 같이 요약할 수 있다.

첫째, 군사적 측면에서의 실전경험 축적이다. 한국군은 6.25전쟁과 베트남전쟁이후 실전을 경험하지 못하였으나, 해외파병은 다양한 작전환경 속에서 전장의 실상을 직접 체험해 볼 수 있는 기회가 되었다. 다국적군 지휘체제하에서의 동맹군과의 연합작전 수행능력, 원거리 전력의 전개를 위한 해상 및 공중수송을 포함한 전략적 보급수송능력의 배양은 장차전을 수행하는데 매우 소중한 자산이 될 것이다. 또한 군사적 작전에 후속하여 이루어지는 안정화작전과 지방재건팀(PRT)은 한반도 통일과정에서도 적용하게 될 새로운 개념의 작전경험이 될 것이다.

둘째, 국제정치적 측면에서 한반도 유사시의 국제적 지원에 대한 명분과 자산 획득이다. 한국은 6.25전쟁 시 유엔과 세계로부터 인적·물적 지원을 받아 오늘의 민주주의

26) 2003년 3월 동티모르 UN PKO 활동 중 급류에 휩쓸려 5명 사망하였으며, 네팔, 그루지야, 이라크 다산부대, 자이툰부대에서 각각 1명씩 사망함.

와 경제를 발전시켰다. 그러나 한국은 아직도 남북이 분단되어 참여한 이데올로기의 체제경쟁을 계속하고 있으며, 심각한 북핵의 위협에 놓여 있다. 한국이 국제사회의 일원으로 그동안 활발하게 국제평화활동을 해 온 것은, 장차 한반도 유사시 국제사회의 지원을 받을 수 있는 명분과 근거를 확보한 것이다.

셋째, 외교적 측면에서 한미동맹 균형발전이 촉진되었다. 한국은 베트남전의 파병을 비롯하여 미국이 주도하는 걸프전, 아프가니스탄, 이라크전 등의 주요 다국적군에 참여하여 '함께 피 흘리며 싸웠다'는 혈맹의 인식과 파트너 십을 공고히 한 동시에 한미 양국군의 해외분쟁지역 근무 연과 주한미군의 역할을 포함하여 향후 한반도의 통일과 동북아에서의 세력균형유지에도 매우 긴요하게 작용할 것이다.

넷째, 경제적 측면에서 해외에 진출한 기업 및 국민의 보호이다. 한국은 국제화시대를 맞아 해외여행인구 1,000만, 무역 1조 달러, 재외 한인기업 20여 만 개 등 세계를 무대로 활동하고 있다. 해외파병은 세계 곳곳에 진출 해 있는 한국의 이익을 보호하고 있다. 유엔 PKO 활동을 하고 있는 레바논의 동명부대와 남수단의 한빛부대를 비롯하여, 새로운 파병의 형태인 UAE의 아크부대의 파병이 가져오는 효과는 다양한 측면과 복합적인 요소로 해석할 수 있다. 해외파병활동은 에너지자원의 확보, 재건사업에 한국기업의 진출 및 상품교역 시장의 확보 등 교두보의 역할을 통해 장기적인 경제안보에 기여하고 있다.

그러나 한국군의 국제평화활동은 긍정적인 효과가 있었던 반면 다음과 같은 특징과 한계를 나타내고 있다. 첫째, 국제평화활동에 대한 전략이나 정책이 부재한 상태에서 소극적이고 수동적으로 파병해 온 점이다. 한국은 한미동맹의 유지와 북한이라는 위협이 상존했다는 점은 있었지만 유엔의 회원국으로서, 대한민국의 국가위상에 맞는 선제적이고 적극적인 파병을 하지 못하고 유엔이나 다국적군 주도국의 요청에 끌려가는 파병을 해왔다고 볼 수 있다.

둘째, 전투부대 보다는 비전투부대의 파병위주로 이루어 졌다. 파병정책결정과정에서 국민적인 여론과 파병의 명분 등에 밀려 전투부대 보다는 의료, 수송, 건설공병 등의 비전투부대의 파병을 하였으며, 파병임무 또한 비교적 안전이 확보된 비 분쟁지역이나 후방에서 인도적지원이나 재건임무위주로 수행되었다.

셋째, 파병의 규모면에서 군사력 대비 소규모의 파병이다. 물론 한국은 북한과의 대치상태와 수시로 자행되어 온 도발에 대한 고려를 하지 않을 수는 없으나 베트남전에서의 한국군 총병력의 7-8%수준까지도 파병한 적이 있으나, 2015년 5월 현재 한국군의 0.17%만이 파병되어 임무를 수행 중이다.

넷째, 군인 위주의 파병이 이루어졌다. 법적인 제약과 국민안전 등의 이유로 군 위주의 파병활동은 현장에서의 다양한 임무에 대해 융통성 있는 수행이 제한되었으며, 파병임무가 종료된 이후의 후속조치와 관계의 지속과 성과의 확대 측면에서도 제한적

이었다. 오늘날의 국제평화활동은 국제기구, 개별국가, 시민단체, 현지주민 등이 참여하는 민·관·군 통합·혼성·합동작전으로 발전하고 있다.

## 2. 최근 유엔 PKO 활동의 논의 방향

최근의 PKO 활동의 동향에 대해 한국의 관련 실무그룹에서 참석하여 논의된 결과를 정리하면 다음과 같다.<sup>27)</sup> PKO가 점차 평화가 정착되지 않은 지역에 파병되는 경우가 증대함에 따른 대응의 필요성으로 ‘전통적 평화유지 범위의 확대 및 대안’을 두 가지로 정리하였다. 첫째, 정전감시 및 교전단체 분리 등 전통적 활동에서 평화정착을 위한 민간인 보호(POC)<sup>28)</sup>, 인도적 지원, 선거 지원, 국가역량 지원 등 다차원적으로 진화를 거듭해야 한다. 둘째, 임무의 다양화와 함께 공병·의무부대, 경찰 및 여성의 참여 확대 필요성이 강조되고 있다.

### ① 작전 능력의 강화

유엔은 임무단내에 우수 경찰 인력과 여성의 참여활동을 촉구하여 현장 활동은 물론 정책결정과정에도 적극적인 여성의 참여를 권고하고 있다. 또한 평화유지군에 대한 직접적인 공격행위가 증가되고 있어 평화유지군에 대한 안전의 확보<sup>29)</sup>와 임무단간 협력의 성공적 이행에 대해서도 강조되고 있다. 또한 PKO 활동의 역량강화를 위해 군용 헬기 부족 상황을 개선하기 위해 회원국들의 협력과 장비 및 기술, 훈련 등의 소프트웨어 분야에서도 각국의 기여 확대를 촉구하고 있다.

### ② 복합적 평화유지활동 전략

- 평화구축 : PKO 임무에 평화구축(Peace Building) 활동을 보다 명확히 규정하고 유엔평화구축위원회(PBC)<sup>30)</sup>와 PKO 임무단간의 긴밀한 협조의 필요성이 강조되고 있다.
- 치안분야의 개혁과 법치주의의 확립 : 항구적 평화 및 발전의 기초 형성을 위해

27) PKO귀국보고서(박현일), 『주 유엔 한국대표부 국방주재관 귀국보고서(2013.2.26.-2014.12.31.)』 (서울: 국방대 PKO센터, 2015); 합참 해외파병과, “유엔 평화활동 아태지역회의(2015.7.27.-28.)참석결과”; 해외파병과, “UN 평화유지 국방장관회의 참석결과(2016.9.)”; PKO귀국보고서(최성이), 『유엔 평화유지활동 귀국보고서(2012.3.14.-2015.3.13.)』 (서울: 국방대 PKO센터, 2015)

28) 민간인 보호는 1999년 시에라리온 상황과 관련하여 안보리 결의 1270호에서 UNAMSIL mandate에서 최초로 임무에 포함된 이래 현재 모든 PKO 임무에 명시되고 있다.

29) 2011.6월-2013년 6월까지 2년간 UN PKO에서 발생한 사고는 사망, 납치 등 총 29건으로, 공격 유형은 매복 16건, 직접공격 3, 급조 폭발물 및 지뢰공격 각 1건으로 사망 42명, 부상 91명이며, 수단 다푸르 임무단(UNMID)에서 사망 22, 부상 37명으로 가장 많은 피해가 발생 했다.; PKO 귀국보고서, 『주 유엔 한국대표부 국방주재관 귀국보고서(2013.2.26.-2014.12.31.)』 (서울: 국방대 PKO센터, 2015.1.16.). p. 14.

30) 국제연합평화구축위원회(Peace Building Commission, PBC)는 2005년 제60차 유엔총회 정상회의에서 설립되었는데, 특정지역의 분쟁이 종료된 후에 국가의 재건과 평화정착을 위한 유엔의 체계적이고 지속적인 관여시스템을 확립하기 위한 기구이다.; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/partnerships.shtml> (2015.10.22. 검색)

총체적이고 종합적인 법치주의 확립을 위한 지원의 필요성이 강조되고 있다.

- 여성과 아동에 관한 관심의 증대 : 분쟁상황에서 성적 착취 및 성폭력 예방 및 보호를 위해 현장 임무단에 여성보호자문관의 조속한 배치와 PKO 임무에 아동보호와 권리와 관련한 자문관 파견과 교육체계를 확립하고 있다.

### ③ 재정기여 문제

미국 및 EU국가들은 모든 회원국이 공정하게 비용을 분담해야 한다는 원칙하에 싱가포르, UAE, 카타르 등 1인당 GNI가 높음에도 할인혜택을 받고 있는 Level C국가들에 대한 재검토의 필요성이 제기 되고 있다.<sup>31)</sup>

### ④ 핵심임무 수행을 위한 병력공여국의 준비상태<sup>32)</sup>

현재의 분쟁상황이 급변하고 있고 다양한 도전과제에 효과적이고 시기적절한 대응을 위해서 충분한 장비와 물자의 확보가 필요하고 교육훈련이 잘 되어있는 게 필수불가결한 요소이다. 부가적으로 작전 대비태세, 평가 기준, 파병전 교육훈련, 능력 표준화, 명확한 임무분담 등이 강조되고 있다. 이를 통해 파병소요가 결정되고 90일 이내에 현장전개를 요구하고 있으며 UN-파병국-피파병국간의 삼각협력과 MOU 체결의 중요성이 강조되고 있다.

### ⑤ 아프리카에 대한 평화유지 역량 강화

아프리카 지역에서 분쟁 상황 발생시 신속한 대응과 분쟁의 예방 및 평화구축을 위해 AU 평화안보이사회와 UN 안보리간의 협조체제 구축과 아프리카 국가들의 평화유지 역량강화와 평화유지활동에 참여 및 훈련센터에 대한 지원의 필요성이 강조되고 있다.

## 3. 한국의 PKO 활동 확대를 위한 기본 방향

한국은 지난 25년간 국제평화활동을 통해 많은 경험과 성과를 얻었다. 해외파병은 국제적인 협력을 전제로 하는 특수한 외교활동으로서 국제안보환경의 변화로 그 중요성이 점차 증가하고 있다. UN PKO는 2016년 10월 현재 193개 유엔회원국이 인원·장비·자금을 지원하고 있으며, 120여 국가에서 파견한 군인·경찰·민간인 등 12만 5천여 명이 16개 지역에서 임무수행 중이다.<sup>33)</sup> 최근 국제적 분쟁이나 대형 재해가 발생하는

31) PKO 재정분담률 산정은 WAI(전 회원국의 1인당 GNP 평균)을 고려하여 A-J까지 10개 등급으로 구분하여 PKO 비용을 분담하는데 안보리 상임이사국은 A(정규분담률+α), 한국은 B그룹으로 정규분담률의 100%를 제공하고 있으며, 최빈국인 J그룹은 정규분담률의 10%를 분담하고 있다.

32) 2016년 10월 현재 파병 공약국가는 총 60개국으로 이중 43개국이 PCRS(유엔 파병준비국 관리시스템)에 등록을 하여, 한국 등 32개국을 1단계로 승인하였다. 유엔은 상황발생에 대한 임기응변적 대응에서 탈피하여 능력을 갖춘 부대를 확보하여 2016년 내로 약 15,000명 규모의 평화임무단 창설능력을 확보하고, 향후 3-5년을 고려한 전략적인 추진을 검토하고 있다.

33) UNDPKO 홈페이지, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/partnerships.shtml> (2016.10.6. 검색).

경우와 같이 UN의 역할이 더욱 강조되고 있으나, 한편으로는 미국과 같은 강대국이나 지역안보기구 등에 의해 주도되는 다국적군 평화활동과 비 분쟁지역에서 양국 간의 국방군사고류차원에서 파병도 더욱 확대될 전망이다.

국제평화활동은 지원이 필요한 국가와 지역과 요소에 대해 장기적이고 종합적인 접근이어야 한다. 이들에 대해 우선적으로 평화와 안정을 확보 및 유지하고, 이를 바탕으로 선거, 법률, 치안, 의료, 재건 등의 측면에서 발전시스템을 구축해 주어야 하며, 인간으로서 함께 자유와 행복을 누릴 수 있도록 하는 것이다. 따라서 향후 한국이 수행해야 할 국제평화활동의 방향을 다음과 같이 정리해 보았다.

### 가. 국가차원의 통합된 중·장기 전략의 수립과 추진

① 한국은 국제평화활동은 국가 전략적인 비전과 청사진을 가지고 종합적이고 체계적으로 추진해야 한다. 현대의 외교 영역은 군사·자원·경제외교 등이 통합적으로 추진되고 있다. 21세기에 들면서 초국가적으로 대응해야 할 문제로써 기후변화, 테러, 마약, 대형사고, 전염병, 사이버 등이 새로운 위협으로 등장하였다. 이러한 측면에서 한국은 평화와 자유민주주의를 수호하는 국제적 위상 제고, 미국과의 동맹관계 심화, 에너지 및 자원의 확보와 기업의 해외진출 기반의 마련, 재외 국민의 보호와 안전한 경제활동 유도, 군의 다양한 환경 하에서의 훈련과 실전 경험의 전수 등의 지속가능한 경제발전과 한반도의 평화와 통일과정에서의 기여할 경험 축적 등 국가차원에서의 종합적이고 장기적인 전략을 수립하여 추진해야 할 것이다.

② PKO 활동을 군 중심에서 경찰, 소방, 의료, 구호의 전문분야에 대해 민간 인력과 정부기관, 시민단체가 통합되어 가장 잘 역량을 발휘할 수 있도록 통합하는 것이 필요하다. 군은 경계와 안전을 보장하고 정찰과 감시, 그리고 필요시 작전활동을 제공하는 등의 기능에 한정하고 치안유지, 방재 및 구호, 의료지원 등 전문성을 고려하여 복합적인 활동을 전개해 나가야 한다.

③ 군내에서도 육군 위주의 파병에서 해·공군 및 해병대의 특성을 고려한 파병을 확대해야 할 것이다. 이러한 면에서 아프가니스탄 파병은 큰 교훈을 얻을 수 있다. 9.11테러가 발생하자 미국은 대테러 전쟁에 국제적인 동참을 요구하여 한국은 해군수송지원부대(해성)와 공군57공수지원단(청마부대), 의료지원부대(동의), 건설공병지원부대(다산), 경계부대(오쉬노)와 UH-60헬기 및 지뢰제거 장비, 대사관 경계를 위해 해병대 포함 등 육·해·공군, 해병대가 모두 파병되었다. 또한 전후의 아프가니스탄 정부재건을 위한 PRT에는 경찰, 선거관리위원회, 한국국제협력단(KOICA), 초록우산 등의 시민단체가 참여한 사례가 있다.

## 나. 국제평화활동업무의 효율성 제고를 위한 시스템 구축

① 국제사회의 파병요구에 적극적 주도적으로 파병을 하기 위한 준비로 해당지역(아프리카)에 대한 연구가 선행되어야 한다. 파병을 하고자 하면 현지의 환경(자원, 인구, 안정성, 국가이익)등에 대해 종합적인 연구 시스템이 필요하다고 본다. 외교부 및 국방부 내의 연구기관(KIDA, ADD 등)은 물론 대학의 지역연구소, 민간의 기업연구소 등에서 현지연구에 대한 자료를 공유하고 파병에 관련된 제반 요소들을 cross check할 수 있는 시스템을 갖출 필요가 있다.

② 파병 이후에는 파병현장에서 정보공유와 업무협조 시스템을 구축해야 한다. 내부적으로는 국방부-합동참모본부-현장파병임무단-주 UN 대표부가 정보를 공유하여 계획으로부터 활동사항에 대한 지속적인 업데이트가 이루어져 순조롭게 업무수행이 보장되어야 한다. 외부적으로는 국제기구인 UN DPKO 및 AU(평화안보이사회), 그리고 각국의 파병부대(임무단), 현지 지방정부와 임무, 훈련, 지원 사항 등에 대한 긴밀한 시스템이 있어야 한다.

한국 단독의 파병에서 지정학적, 지경학적, 외교적으로 밀접한 연관성이 있는 국가와의 연합파병으로 효율적인 임무수행을 보장하고 파병의 이점을 공유해야 할 것이다. 예를 들어 한국과 일본이 아프리카 지역에 파병을 할 경우 부대의 전개와 교대 시 수송 소요와 군수지원의 소요를 통합한다면 많은 비용을 절감과 협조체제를 긴밀하게 할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 한국의 주도하에 일본, 중국, 몽골 등 동북아 4개국이 협의회를 만들어 파병교육을 통합하고, 파병에 대한 정보와 경험을 공유하며, 필요시 각국의 특·장점 요소를 통합한 파병(한국은 공병 및 의료, 몽골은 경계병력, 일본은 수송 및 군수지원, 중국은 재정적 기여 등)도 매우 바람직할 것이다. 미국과 한국은 한반도에서의 동맹관계 뿐만 아니라, 해외에서도 70여 년간 구축한 신뢰와 연합작전 경험을 바탕으로 PKO 활동을 전개한다면 이는 한미동맹의 해외투사의 형태가 되어 한미관계의 긍정적인 역할을 할 것으로 기대되는 바이다.

③ 파병이후의 사후 관리를 지속적이고 체계적으로 해야 한다. 우리의 파병부대들은 국가대표로서, 군사외교관으로서 열악한 환경 하에서 늘 나름대로 최선의 노력을 다해왔다. 기본 임무수행은 물론 틈틈이 주민봉사활동, 태권도 전수, 한국의 교실 운영 등을 통해 한국의 문화와 평화애호의 이미지 구축하였다. 임무를 완수하고 철수 시에는 시설과 장비의 공여를 통해 파병의 여운을 남기고 향후의 발전적인 관계를 기대하였다. 그러나 정부차원에서의 종합적인 접근과 후속조치가 미흡하여 애써 공들인 흔적들이 단절되는 경우가 많았다. 정부는 외교·경제·문화적인 차원에서 종합적인 전략을 마련하여 민간 기업과 시민단체가 진출하여 국가이익에 기여하는 활동을 할 수 있도록 끈을 놓지 말아야 할 것이다.

### 다. 인적 자원에 대한 종합적인 준비와 활용

① 파병자원의 선발 경쟁비(남수단 한빛부대 7진의 경우)는 총 4.9:1로, 장교는 4.5:1, 준·부사관의 경우는 2.6:1, 병의 경우에는 5.5:1의 치열한 경쟁을 해야 한다. 그러나 이러한 우수자원들이 외국에서 6개월 또는 8개월 및 1년간 소중한 경험을 하고 복귀해서는 보직관리, 진급선발 등에 대해 혜택을 받지 못해 차기 계급으로의 진출은 물론, 파병업무와 관련된 직무에 활용되지 않고 있다. 파병경험인력은 현지 지역에 대한 작전 환경의 이해와 임무수행 경험, 각국 임무단과의 친밀도 형성, 언어소통의 장애 극복 등 향후 군에서 활용해야 할 분야가 많을 것이다. 이들은 인력 POOL을 구성하여 평상시에는 개인단위의 재 파병이나 파병관련 부서에서 그 능력과 know-how를 발휘할 수 있도록 해야 한다. 그리고 장차 한국의 통일과정에서는 북한지역에 대한 안정화작전에 활용하도록 하고, 통일 후에는 국제평화와 안정에 기여할 수 있는 전문적인 집단으로 관리하고 활용해야 할 것이다.

② 여성의 인력을 확대해야 한다. UN PKO활동의 대부분이 중동과 아프리카 지역에서 전개되고 있는 점을 감안해 볼 때 현지 여성에 대한 신체 수색이나, 군의 수준보다도 우수한 의료, 구호, 방재 등의 업무에 한국의 여성인력을 확대해야 할 것이다. 2016년 6월 30일 기준, 우리 군의 여성인력은 총 군 간부의 5.5%이나 PKO에 참여비율은 26명(0.27%)으로 우수한 여성인력이 적극 활용되어야 할 것이다.

## 4. 한국의 대 아프리카 PKO의 단기적 추진

### 가. 남수단 한빛부대의 전략거점화

한빛부대는 2011년 8월 유엔의 파견 요청에 의해 2013년 3월에 300명 규모의 1진(공병장비 45대, 기동장비 89대, 일반장비 14대 등)을 보르지역에 파견하였다. 이들은 2016년 10월 현재 7진이 신생독립국인 남수단의 재건지원(도로, 비행장, 교량 건설 및 보수 등)과 인도주의적 활동 및 의료지원 등 민군작전을 실시하고 있다.<sup>34)</sup> 한빛부대는 중국, 일본 등 타 파병국에 비해 큰 성과와 친한화(親韓化)를 달성하여 인지도가 탁월한 것으로 평가받고 있다. 그러나 한국은 한빛부대의 파병을 통해 아프리카 진출의 기반은 조성되었으나, 범국가적인 전략과 중·장기 군사정책 발전은 미흡한 실정이다. 또한 한국으로 부터의 원거리인 동시에 해상으로의 접근이 불가능한 등 지리적인 고립성과 남수단의 정세 등을 이유로 아직까지는 민간부분의 진출은 적극적으로 추진되지 않고 있는 상태이다.

34) 한빛부대는 그동안 보르 공항의 확장과 보수, 보르 - 망겔라 간 도로(125km) 보수, 쓰레기 매립장 4개소의 건설 등 UNMISS 부여임무수행을 비롯하여, 의료·주거시설·고아원 지원 등 주민숙원사업과 태권도 및 축구교실 등의 친한화 활동 등을 추진하였으며, 15,000여명에 대한 의료지원과 UN캠프 내 피난민에 대한 식수공급 및 방역활동 등 난민보호소 지원 사업 등을 실시하였다.; 국방대 PKO센터, 『한빛부대 5진 파병성과 및 교훈집』, (서울: 국방대, 2016.)

따라서 과거 70년 전 대한민국이 비슷한 처지에서 빠른 속도로 정치적 민주화와 경제적 선진화를 이룩한 나라로서, 한국이 갖는 차별적 우월성을 바탕으로 한 전략적 거점화를 위한 통합 네트워크 구축과 군사협조체제를 강화해야 할 것이다. 그 추진 방향으로는 첫째, 재건지원 차원의 민군작전을 확대하는 것으로, 정부차원의 협업분야를 발굴해야 할 것이다. 둘째, 아프리카 지역의 전략적 거점 역할을 수행하도록 하기 위하여 미 아프리카사령부(Africom)에 협조체제를 구축하고, 남수단이 요청한 간부 양성교육 등 군사협력을 추진해 나가야 할 것이다. 셋째, 정부·민간·기업·NGO 등의 협업으로 아프리카 시장개척의 발판을 제공하고 기 참여중인 민간기구와 재건지원 작전을 연계하는 전략을 발전시켜야 할 것이다.

### 나. VIP 공약의 우선적 이행

2015년 9월 UN총회와 2016년 5월 AU총회 특별연설에서 박근혜 대통령은 유엔 평화활동 역량 강화에 적극 기여할 것을 공약하였는데, 그 첫째가 분쟁지역의 재건 지원과 인도적 활동을 위해 공병 부대(1개 중대 규모)를 추가 파병하는 것이다. 유엔은 임무수행능력을 구비한 부대를 평상시에 확보하기 위한 전략적인 측면에서 약 15,000명 규모의 평화임무단 창설을 위해 노력 중이다. 2016년 현재 총 60개국이 유엔에 파병을 공약하였으며, 이 중 43개국이 '유엔파병준비국관리시스템(PCRS : Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System)<sup>35)</sup>에 등록하였으며, UN은 2016년 3월에 한국 등 32개국을 1단계로 승인하였다.

한국은 2016년 3월말 외교·국방부의 실무자가 유엔본부를 방문·협의하였고, 4월에 유엔 평가자문단을 초청·평가를 통해 7월에 2단계로 격상되었다. 공병 부대를 공약한 국가는 14개국이며 한국의 공병 부대(1개 중대규모)는 예상 파병지역을 부룬디와 DR콩고로 선정하여 유엔 요청 시 즉각 파병할 수 있도록 대비계획을 수립 중이다.<sup>36)</sup>

둘째, 한국 정부가 UN 및 AU를 통해 Level-II급 의료시설을 지원하는 것은 'UN 말리평화유지임무단(MINUSMA'을 대상으로 컨테이너 형 의료시설과 의료장비 등(약 20억 원 상당)을 AU평화기금을 통한 현물 지원 방식으로 2017년 상반기에 공여하는 것으로 한-AU간 관련 MOU를 체결 준비 중에 있다.

셋째, 아프리카의 분쟁예방과 평화구축을 위한 재정적 기여의 확대는 외교통상부에서 평화구축상비기금(BPF, Peacebuilding Fund)으로 2015년 52만 불에서 2016년에는 60만 불로, 분쟁예방 비용은 100만 불에서 150만 불로 증액하여 지원하였으며, 2017년

35) 유엔 파병준비국관리시스템(PCRS): 등록(자료입력-유엔 검토) ⇒ 1단계(평가자문 방문) ⇒ 2단계(MOU 초안 작성, 적재목록 제출) ⇒ 3단계(신속파병 검증) ⇒ 4단계(신속배치 단계)

36) 부룬디는 UN지원 우선순위 3개국(남수단, 부룬디, 소말리아)중 한국이 파병하지 않은 국가이며, UN임무단이 2006년도에 철수하여 정부군과 무장반군이 대립하고 사회가 불안정함. DR콩고는 중부아프리카의 거점국가이며 광물자원이 풍부하고 UN 51개국이 활동중인 국가로 한국의 국제사회 기여와 외교역량의 강화, 국익증진 및 파병활동의 여건 측면에서 파병우선 순위가 높은 것으로 판단함.

의 예산도 증액하여 심의를 추진 중에 있다.<sup>37)</sup>

### 다. 법적 정비와 국제평화활동에 대한 공감대 확산

한국군의 해외 파견은 헌법 제60조 제2항에 의해 포괄적으로 규정하고 있다.<sup>38)</sup> 이러한 헌법의 포괄적인 국회 동의권을 근거로 하여 1991년 UN 가입과 함께 참여한 각종 국제평화활동을 위한 국군의 해외파병은 그 때마다 명분과 절차에 대해 많은 논란과 갈등을 겪어 왔다. 그러다 2010년 법률 제13123호 「국제연합 평화유지활동 참여에 관한 법률」(약칭 UN PKO법, 2010.1.25.공포)을 제정하여 UN PKO 활동에 대해서만 법률적 근거를 마련하였다.<sup>39)</sup> 그러나 위 법령의 단서조항의 제한으로 인하여 다국적군으로 참여했던 아프간이나 이라크의 파병과, 2010년 이후의 국방교류협력에 의한 아크부대를 비롯하여, 대형 재해재난과 전염병 등으로 부터의 구호를 위한 비전투부대의 파견활동 등이 확대되고 있는 시점에서 해외파견활동에 관한 법률을 제정하는 것은 매우 시급한 과제이다.

2013년 6월, 19대 국회에서 발의한 “국군의 해외파견활동 참여에 관한 법률안”은 임기만으로 폐기(2016.5.29.)되었다. 20대 국회에서 2016년 8월 25일 김영우 의원이 “국군의 해외파견활동에 관한 법률(안)”을 대표 발의하여 법무심사를 진행 중이다. 법률안에서는 파병의 목적을 헌법이념을 구현하도록 명시해야 할 것이며, 파병의 유형도 UN PKO 이외에, **다국적군, 국방교류협력, 기타 파견활동**<sup>40)</sup> 등으로 기준을 명확하게 규정해야 할 것이다. 또한 해외파견의 절차에 있어서도 사전검토->국회 동의 및 보고절차 ->파견 연장 및 종료->철수 등에 대해 명문화해야 할 것이다.<sup>41)</sup>

이를 통해 국군의 파견활동에 대한 명분과 유형 및 절차 등을 체계적으로 규정함으로써 법적 정당성을 확보하며, 국군의 파견에 대한 국회의 민주적 통제 절차와 권한을 강화하며, 파병 참여 장병들의 권익을 보장할 수 있을 것이다. 결과적으로 이를 통해 국제사회의 요구에 신속히 대응하고 한국의 위상에 맞는 국제평화활동에 참여함으로써

37) 한국의 대 AU 평화 및 안보협력 강화, 외교부 홈페이지(<http://www.mofa.go.kr>, 검색일: 2016.10.11.)

38) 대한민국 헌법 제60조 제2항 “국회는 선전포고, 국군의 외국에의 파견 또는 외국 군대의 대한민국 영역 안에서의 주류(駐留)에 대한 동위권을 가진다.”

39) 이 법률은 제2조 ‘정의’에서 “국제연합평화유지활동이란 국제연합의 안전보장이사회가 채택한 결의에 따라 국제연합사무총장이 임명하는 사령관의 지휘 하에 국제연합의 재정 부담으로 특정국가(또는 지역) 내에서 수행되는 평화협정 이행 지원, 정전 감시, 치안 및 안정유지, 선거지원, 인도적 구호, 복구 재건 및 개발지원 등을 비롯한 제반 활동을 말한다. 다만, 개별 또는 집단의 국가가 국제연합의 승인을 받아 독립적으로 수행하는 평화유지 또는 그 밖의 군사적 활동은 포함하지 아니한다.”라고 명시함으로써 UN PKO만을 그 적용대상으로 하고 있으므로 ‘UN PKO법’ 또는 ‘유엔평화유지활동법’이라고 한다.

40) ‘기타 파병’은 예측치 못한 형태의 해외파견소요 발생시를 대비한 것으로, UN 안보리 외 ‘다른 이사회(UN 총회, 경제사회이사회 등)’의 결정에 따른 파병, ‘다른 국제기구(AU 등)’ 요청에 따른 파병, 정부가 봉기된 상태에서 민간단체 요청에 의한 파병을 고려할 수 있음.

41) 국방부, 「국군의 해외파견활동에 관한 법률」 바로알기, (<http://www.mnd.go.kr>, 검색일: 2016.10.10.)

써 국제기구 및 주둔국과의 관계개선을 통해 국익을 증진시킬 수 있을 것이다.


### 5. 권역별 거점국가 선정 및 단계별 협력(중·장기적 추진)

한국은 아프리카에서 중·장기적으로 전략적 가치가 높은 국가를 중심으로 권역별 거점국가를 선정하여 전략적으로 안보협력을 증진함으로써 경제·자원·안보외교를 뒷받침해야 할 것이다. 또한 군의 선진 경험을 전수하고 아프리카에서의 역할을 확대함으로써 방산수출 등 안보협력분야의 새로운 Blue Ocean으로 개발해 나가야 한다. 여기서는 한국이 중·장기적으로 권역별 거점국가 선정하여 단계별 협력을 추진하는 방안을 제시 한다.

#### 가. 권역별 거점국가 선정

아프리카를 5개 권역으로 구분하여 전략적으로 역량을 집중할 거점 국가를 선정하고, 이들 국가를 중심으로 한 단계별 전략 수립하여 외교협력을 추진하는 것이다. 거점국가 선정은 권역 내 국가의 위상과 대표성, 한국정부의 협력 용이성, 그리고 경제적 능력·방산협력 가능성 등 협력 성과 보장 여부 등을 기준으로 <그림-3>과 같이 선정하였으며, 거점국가의 선정이유는 <표-5>와 같다.

< 그림-3> 아프리카 권역별 거점국가 개황



<표-5> AU 권역별 거점국가 선정 및 선정 이유<sup>42)</sup>

권역	거점국가 및 권역별 국가명	거점국가 선정 근거
서부 (16)	<b>나이지리아</b> , 모리타니, 말리, 니제르, 카보베르데, 세네갈, 감비아, 기니비사우, 기니 부르키나파소, 시에라리온 등	. 군사강국이자 아프리카내 최대인구 보유국 . 국방예산 증액 추이 관측 . 대북 대응외교 필요(駐북한 상주 공관 설치국) ※ 치안 불안 잔존, 사안별 고려 필요
중부 (9)	<b>콩고민주공화국(DR콩고)</b> , 차드, 적도 기니, 카메룬, 중앙아프리카공화국 등	. 아프리카 중앙(9개국과 접경)이라는 전략적 위치 . 아프리카 내 국방비 증가율('07년~'12년) 4위 ※ 치안 불안 잔존, 사안별 고려 필요
북부 (6)	<b>이집트</b> , 모로코, 알제리, 튀니지, 리비아, 수단	. 유럽중동아프리카의 전략적 요충지, 무관부 既설치 . 방산·군수협력 MOU 既 체결 . 대북 대응외교 필요(駐북한 상주 공관 설치국)
동부 (18)	<b>에티오피아</b> , 에리트레아, 남수단, 지부티, 르완다, 우간다, 케냐, 소말리아, 부룬디, 탄자니아, 세이셸, 잠비아 등	. 6.25 참전국으로 보훈외교 핵심국, AU본부 위치 . '15년 무관부 설치 국가 . 舊소련/북한산 노후무기 교체 의지 표명('12.5월 국방협력단 파견 시)
남부 (5)	<b>남아프리카공화국</b> , 나미비아, 보츠와나, 레소토, 스와질랜드	. 아프리카내 유일한 G20 회원국, 무관부 既설치 . 영국 식민통치시 해외방산기지로 활용되며 방산역량 축적 / 독자적 무기개발생산 가능

### 나. 단계별 추진전략

권역별 거점국가를 선정한 후에는 해당지역의 정세(내전·쿠데타·테러 등)와 국제사회의 제재현황(무기금수조치, 자산동결 등)을 고려하여 사안별로 신중하게 협력을 추진할 필요가 있다. 따라서 5단계로 구분하여 1단계: 전략 수립, 2단계: 교류 활성화, 3단계: 제도적 기반구축, 4단계: 본격적 협력 추진, 5단계: 협력 확대의 순차로 추진하는 것이다.

#### ① 1단계 : 전략수립 (거점 국가별 정보수집·분석을 통한 수립)

먼저 파견 무관 등을 활용하여 거점 국가별 국방협력 전략의 검토방향을 중심으로 정보를 수집하고 분석해야 한다. 아프리카와의 국방협력을 위한 전문 인력이 부족한 상황에서 단기적으로는 '외교부 아프리카미래전략센터(Korea-Africa Future Strategy Center)' 등 연구기관과 연계하여 산업, 의료, 문화 등 제 분야의 전문가를 활용하고, 장기적으로는 국방 전문 인력을 발굴·양성하여 활용해야 한다. 이와 같이 관련 역량을 보유한 민·관 혼성의 인력풀을 활용하여 맞춤형 세부협력 방안을 공동으로 연구하고 자문 받아야 한다. 필요시 실무급 실사단을 파견하여 전략수립을 위한 방향을 검토하고 협력의 모멘텀을 마련해야 한다.

42) 심경욱외, 앞의 책. pp. 182-186. 국방부 국제정책과 자료

## ② 2단계 : 교류 (고위급 인사와의 인사교류 활성화)

군부 영향력이 큰 아프리카 국가의 의사결정 시스템을 고려하여 軍 고위급 인사교류 및 후속조치를 통해 교류의 실효성 제고해야 한다. 정부는 ADEX 등 행사를 계기로 고위급 인사의 참가를 유도하고 적극 초청하여 정상 교류 시 국방협력 의제를 적극적으로 발굴·반영해야 한다. 軍 고위급 인사교류와 병행하여 한인회, KOTRA·수출입은행·한국전력공사 등 경제 유관기관 지사 등 아프리카 내 우리 민간 분야 인사와의 협업을 통해 아프리카 민간 인사와의 친분도 강화하는 등 다양한 인적 네트워크 구축해 나가야 한다.

## ③ 3단계, 제도화 (국방협력의 제도적 기반 구축)

한국은 2016년 10월 현재, 국방협력 MOU를 남부의 남아공과 북부의 이집트 등 권역별 거점 국가와 체결하여 협력의 토대 마련하고 있으며, 에티오피아, 나이지리아, DR콩고와는 국방협력 MOU 체결 추진 중에 있다. 양국 간의 국방협력 MOU 체결 시 이를 기반으로 정례협의체(국장급 또는 실무)를 단계적으로 개설해 나가야 한다.

## ④ 4단계 : 협력 (국방협력 본격화)

군사교육교류를 활성화하여 국방대, 합동군사대 등에 아프리카 국가의 차세대 장교 유치를 통해 친한(親韓) 인사 양성해야 한다. 참고적으로 2014년을 기준으로 수탁교육이 진행 중인 국가는 나이지리아(10명)와 이집트(7명)가 시행 중이다. 한국군의 선진화 경험을 전수받으려는 아프리카 국가들의 기대에 부응하여, KIDA, ADD 등 연구기관에 장·단기 교육·연수 프로그램을 개발하는 것도 검토해 볼 수 있다. 다음으로 방산·군수 협력 MOU 체결 등을 통해 국가별·권역별 방산협력 기반 조성 및 협력이 가능한 분야를 모색하여, 국가별 맞춤형 마케팅 전략을 수립하고 한국의 진출 가능성이 높은 방산 협력 분야를 적극 발굴해야 할 것이다.<sup>43)</sup>

## ⑤ 5단계 : 확대 (국방협력의 외연 확대)

한국은 현재, 아프리카에 상주 무관부를 4개국(이집트, 남아공, 에티오피아, 우간다)에 운용하고 있다. 국방협력의 외연을 확대하기 위해서는 권역별 거점국가인 나이지리아(동부)와 DR콩고(중부)에 무관부를 신설하여 국방협력을 활성화 시켜야 할 것이다. 또한 국방행정 경력의 관료와 예비역 장교 및 연구원 등 민·관 인력으로 구성된 (가칭) 국방교류협력단을 운용하여 국방협력 콘텐츠 개발과 관련한 자문을 제공하고, 필요 시 현지에서 파견되어 한국군의 선진화과정 및 전력운용 경험을 전수하는 역할 등을 수행하여 협력을 확대해 나가야 할 것이다.<sup>44)</sup>

43) 남아공은 원·근해 해상작전용 경비정 및 초계함 등 6척과 방공무기 등 도입 계획을 가지고 있으며, 나이지리아는 군용차량·수상함·기본훈련기 성능개선 및 신규 도입 계획을, DR콩고는 동부 호수 및 강안 지역에 출몰하는 반군 대응용 고속정 및 경비정 도입 계획 등이 있는 것으로 확인되고 있다.; 안영수, “국방산업의 수출산업화를 통한 발전 전략”, (서울: 국방저널 제444호, 2011), p. 25.

44) 심경욱외, 앞의 책, pp. 286-288.

## VI. 결론 및 제언

한국은 2016년 10월 현재, UN PKO 활동으로 레바논 정전감시를 위해 동명부대(350명)를, 남수단 재건지원을 위해 한빛부대(300명)를, 다국적군 평화활동으로 소말리아 해역의 청해부대(320명), 국방교류협력으로 UAE에 파견된 아크부대(150명) 등 4개부대가 해외에 파견되어 세계평화와 안정에 기여하고 있다. 지난 7월, 국방부가 여론조사 전문기관인 한국리서치에 의뢰하여 전국 만 19세 이상 성인남녀 1,000명을 대상으로 해외 파병 정책에 대한 국민의식 조사결과 74.1%가 찬성하는 것으로 나타났다.<sup>45)</sup> 특히 소말리아 해역에서 다국적군 평화활동 중인 청해 부대는 74.9%, UAE에서 국방협력활동 중인 아크부대는 73.4%의 찬성하여 긍정적으로 인식하고 있는 것으로 나타났다.

본 연구의 결론으로서 향후 아프리카 지역을 포함하여 한국의 국제평화활동에 일조할 수 있는 몇 가지를 제언을 하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 파병에 대한 패러다임의 전환으로 지금까지의 파병의 관례를 벗어나 보다 전향적인 정책이 필요하다. 파병 규모는 한 책임지역을 담당할 수 있는 독립중(대)대급 이상으로, 파병 성격은 보병·공병 부대 위주의 파병으로, 파병지역 또한 안전이 확보된 지역보다는 분쟁의 핵심지역에서 임무를 수행해야 파병의 효과를 극대화 할 수 있을 것이다. 민·관·경찰, 여성인력 등이 확대되어 각 기능별로 특장점을 발휘할 수 있도록 전문화하여 통합적인 활동을 뒷받침해야 할 것이다.

둘째, 파병에 대한 범국민적인 공감대 형성이다. 정부는 파병정책을 추진하기 전에 국민과 충분한 소통을 하여 지지기반을 확보해야 한다. 해외파병의 국제평화와 안전에 기여하고 국가위상을 제고하는 당위성과 포괄적 국가이익에 대한 기대효과를 충분히 설명하고 파병장병의 안전에 대해서도 최대한 고려하여 국민들의 우려를 불식시켜야 한다. 해외파병은 국제평화와 안정을 증진함에 있으므로 이를 긍정적으로 인식할 수 있도록 정부가 국민들에게 기회를 제공해야 할 것이다.

셋째, 해외파병에 관한 법적·제도적 정비가 시급하다. 2010년에 제정된 ‘유엔 PKO참여법’<sup>46)</sup>은 다국적군 평화유지활동과 국방교류협력에 의한 파병의 법적 근거를 제공해주지 못하고 있을 뿐만 아니라 최근 UN이 제시한 AU등 지역기구와 협력하는 평화활동 또한 준거가 될 수 없다.<sup>47)</sup> 따라서 이러한 모든 유형의 파견 명분과 절차에 대한 포괄적인 입법이 20대 국회에서의 조속한 제정이 필요하다.

국가적인 차원에서 국제평화활동에 관한 업무의 효율적 추진을 위한 외교·안보·통

45) 국방부 보도자료, 「해외파병정책에 대한 국민인식 조사 결과」, (서울: 국방부 국제평화협력과, 2016.7.29.)

46) 법률 제11690호 「국제연합 평화유지활동 참여에 관한 법률」, 2010.2.

47) 2015.6. 고위급 독립패널 보고서: UN은 AU국가들의 역량강화를 위한 교육·훈련 목적의 파견 등을 수행할 것을 UN회원국에게 권고하였음. 2015.9.28. 박근혜 대통령은 UN 평화유지 정상회의에 참석하여 아프리카 내 평화유지활동의 역량제고를 위해 AU를 통해 실질적인 파트너 십을 강화해 나가겠다고 하였음. ; 노컷 뉴스 [www.nocutnews.co.kr](http://www.nocutnews.co.kr) (검색일: 2016.8.3.)

일·경제·인도주의적 지원을 통합할 수 있도록 국무총리실이나 청와대 국가안보실에 컨트롤 타워의 기능을 보강할 필요가 있다. 또한 국방부 내에서도 정책실, 합참, 국방대 KIPO센터, 국제평화지원단 등의 기능을 효율적으로 통합하고 보강해야 하며, 파병경험 장병들에 대한 인재풀을 구성하여 연합작전과 안정화 및 민사작전의 계획준비와 노하우의 확산을 통해 유사시를 대비해야 할 것이다.

한국군의 해외파병은 높은 성과를 거두면서 국내 및 국제사회로부터 커다란 신뢰를 획득하고 국가위상 제고에 크게 기여하였다. 그러나 국제 안보상황의 변화에 따라 파병의 성격이 바뀌고 있으나 국민적 지지와 법적·제도적·정책적 뒷받침이 다소 미흡했다고 볼 수 있다. 특히 자원의 마지막 보고이자 글로벌 기여외교의 대상지로서 그 전략적 중요성이 높은 아프리카에 대해 '신뢰외교'를 기초로 상생의 방법을 찾는 국가 차원의 전략과 통합된 노력에 따라 국익창출과 세계평화에 크게 기여할 수 있도록 사전 준비와 노력이 필요함을 인식해야 한다.

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**사회자·발표자·토론자 프로필**  
**Profiles of the Panels**



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Dr. Hong served as the Deputy Minister of Defense Reform at the Ministry of National Defense during the Lee Myung-bak government. He returned to Sookmyung University where he has taught international relations over 24 years. He becomes the co-chair of CSCAP's new study group on Enhancing East Asian Contributions on PKO that started from November 2016 and he will also organize the 30th annual ACUNS(Academic Council on the UN System) meeting in Seoul on June 15-17, 2017 as the President of KACUNS. He is currently working for National Unification Advisory Council as Chairman of the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Security. He is still taking the leadership of IPSI-Kor (International Policy Studies Institute-Korea) and holds annual conference in Tokyo with Japanese experts to discuss about the potential cooperation in the area security. He is the author of many articles and book chapters, and one of the active participants in international conferences and workshops on security issues.

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### **발표자 (Speakers)**

#### **박원대 (PARK, Wondaee)**

Colonel Park graduated from Korea Military Academy in 1990, and was commissioned as ENGR officer the same year. He received MSC from GIS in Netherlands in 1997. From 2004, he served as the Tactical Instructor of Army War College. Colonel Park was dispatched to the Iraque Reconstruction Division as Liasion Officer to MNC-I in 2006. From 2007, he served as the ENGR Battalion CO of 37th Infantry Division. In 2014, he was dispatched to South Sudan as ROK HMEC(Horizontal Mechanical Engineering Company) CO. After returning to Korea, he was appointed to the Chief of Staff of 5th ENGR Brigade in 2015. Currently, he is the Team Leader of Military Installation Standard in Army HQs.

#### **마틴 세바스찬 (Martin A. Sebastian)**

Maritime Institute of Malaysia Capt. Martin A. Sebastian, Royal Malaysian Navy, joined MIMA in Nov 2011 as Fellow and Centre Head of the Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy. Prior to joining MIMA, Capt. Martin completed three years of Secondment with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Headquarters, New York. He served in the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) as a Strategic Planner in the Military Planning Service (MPS).

In OMA, he was appointed as Team Leader for Africa Planning Team II covering West African peacekeeping missions. He pioneered the setting up of a maritime planning section in MPS and was appointed as the OMA Team Leader for the Maritime Working Group, which monitored planning requirements for the UNIFIL Multinational Maritime Operations in Lebanon and riverine operations in peacekeeping missions. Capt. Martin is credited for leading a team in the drafting of a UN Policy for Maritime and Riverine Operations in Peacekeeping.

He is country representative in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Maritime Security Study Group. He has presented in the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF - ISM MS), ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Expert Working Group (ADMM Plus EWG), ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the annual Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.

His field of expertise on Maritime Security is in Diplomatic engagements, Conventional Operations, Law Enforcement, Maritime Industry and Maritime Search and Rescue; and Humanitarian Disaster Relief from the Sea.

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Yunmi Choi is a Research Professor at the Center for International Peace & Security, Sookmyung Women's University. She also holds a position of Project Manager of KACUNS. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh, UK, in 2013. Before joining the academia, Yunmi had held various work experiences; producer and journalist for CNN in Seoul(2003-04); special advisor on Peacekeeping for the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN(2010); and a Secretary-General of the EU Center(2013). She was also in charge of managing one of the Korean Government's ODA projects conducted in Vietnam(2015). Her research interests lie in multilateral/regional cooperation in security, women's role in UN Peace Operations, EU's CFSP, Northeast Asian security cooperation, and the trust-building process on the Korean peninsula.

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### **김성수 (KIM, Sung-soo)**

SUNGSOO KIM works as a professor at Department of Political Science and International Relations and director of Institute for Euro-African Studies (hereafter, IEAS) in Hanyang University of Seoul Korea. His area of interest involves on a rationale for mediating conflict between democracy and capitalism. He receives a long term research fund by National Research Foundation and Department of Education of Korea. Accordingly, he and his institute, IEAS, carries out in-depth studies on national characteristics on political, economic and sociological features of major emerging nations in Africa and by analyzing the opportunity and risks in accordance with the co-operation of Korea for seeking desirable exchanges. He and IEAS aim to expand the cooperation footholds towards African countries to provide reasonable guidelines on advancing Korean enterprises along with focusing on issues related urban planning, infrastructure, ODA, appropriate technology as well as public diplomacy.

Prior to joining Hanyang University, Professor Kim completed his PhD program at University of Southern California, majoring comparative politics as well as political economy. While he was in graduate school, he was granted a Korea Heritage Foundation Fund and Graduate School Fellowship. He was also recognized and later selected as a recipient of research grant by Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society. Upon graduating, he worked

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### **엠마 프란스와드 이슴빙가보 (Emma-Françoise ISUMBINGABO)**

H.E. Emma-Françoise ISUMBINGABO has been serving as the Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda to the Republic of Korea since July 2014. Before she carries out her diplomatic missions in the Republic of Korea, she served as the Minister of State in Charge of Energy and Water, in the Ministry of Infrastructure, Kigali, Rwanda for 3 years. H.E. ISUMBINGABO's area of expertise are energy and power electronics. She was a senior hydro electrical engineer in the Energy, Water and Sanitation Authority (EWSA) of Rwanda. In addition, she has teaching experiences at University of Cape Town in South Africa and Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in Rwanda, and Saint KIZITO, a technical school in the Southern Province, Rwanda. She received her Master Degree in Electrical Engineering and Power Electronics from Univ. of Cape Town, South Africa and Bachelor Degree in Electromechanical Engineering Technology from Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in Rwanda.

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Professor Lim joined Korea Military Academy in 1983 and commissioned as Infantry officer in 1987. He had Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from KMA. He served various position in Korea Army including Commander of 125th Mechanized Battalion, 26th MD, Company Commander in 11th Regiment, 1st ID.

He was also United Nations military observer in UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan(UNMOGIP) from 1996 to 1997. He participated Training of Trainer for Protection of Civilians Course in Malaysia Peacekeeping Center and UN Military Expert Mission Course in Finnish Defense Force International Center. In 2006 he was appointed as Director of National Crisis Management Center, The Office of President. After serving in the Office of President, He worked in US Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS from 2009 to 2012. From 2012 to 2015, he taught at Korea Army College after turning back from US. He retired from active duty in 2016 and working in Korea International Peace Operations Center since then.

He studied at US Army Command and General Staff College in 2000 and he graduated with honor from Korea Joint Staff College in 2004. He received Master's Degree(MSA) from Central Michigan University at Mt. Pleasant, US, and Master's Degree(MA) from Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea.

He published books including American Civil War(2005), Five Myths about Nuclear Weapons(2013), Why Nations Go to War(2009) and Presidential Decisions for the War(2008). He also wrote several articles including A study on the Decapitation Attack, A Comparison Study Wars in Afghanistan etc.

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### **보리스 콘도크 (Boris Kondoch)**

Boris Kondoch is currently a Professor at Far East University/South Korea and Editor of the Journal of International Peacekeeping published by Brill. He worked at different universities in South Korea, among others as a guest professor/ lecturer at the graduate school of law and the political science department of Korea University where he taught international law and ethics in international relations. From 1998-2002 he worked as a research fellow for the President of the German Society of International Law, Prof. Dr. Michael Bothe at the Institute of Public Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. His main research interests are the international law of military operations, peacekeeping, international criminal law, human rights and Northeast Asian relations.

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### **박동순 (PARK, Dong-soon)**

Park Dong-Soon is currently serving as Army Colonel at the Institute for Military History under the Ministry of National Defense. He received Ph.D in Political Science from Kyungnam University. He completed his dissertation paper on "A Study on the Decision of the Korean Combat Forces to Deploy her Troops Overseas in the Post-Cold War Era." Currently, he is conducting research on the Peace-Keeping Operations of the UN and other International Organizations, International Conflict, Vietnam War, and Overseas Deployment Policy of the Korean Armed Forces.

Colonel Park is also the author of many books. His publications include Combat Unit Deployment Policy of the Korean Armed Forces, Introduction to Military Studies, Peacekeeping Operations of the Korean forces in Afghanistan, and others.

### **토론자 (Discussants)**

#### **최영범 (CHOI, Young-Bum)**

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