

A4P와 연계한 평화유지요원 안전 증진과 여성 역할 확대

Improving Peacekeepers' Safety and Expanding
Women's Role in line with A4P

| 일자 | 2023. 9. 21. (목)

| Date | 21. Sep. 2023. (Thu)

| 장소 | 서울 용산 나인트리 프리미어 로카우스 호텔

| Venue | Nine Tree Premier ROKAUS Hotel Seoul Yongsan

| 주최 | 국방대학교 국제평화활동센터, 주한 캐나다 대사관

| Host | ROK PKO Center, Embassy of Canada to Korea

프로그램 / Program

| 시간 / Time | 내용 / Program | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 09:30 ~ 09:50 | 개 식 사 Opening Remarks | 국제평화활동센터장 Director, PKO Center, KNDU |
| | 환 영 사 Welcome Remark | 국방대학교 총장 President, KNDU |
| | 축 사 Congratulatory Remark | 국방부 차관 Vice Defense Minister |
| | 기조연설 Keynote Speech | 주한 캐나다 대사 Ambassador of Canada to Korea |
| 09:50 ~ 10:00 | 기념 사진 촬영 / Group Photograph | |
| 10:00 ~ 10:50 | ① 최근 평화유지활동 환경에서의 도전요소 평가 The Challenges in the Contemporary PKO Environment | |
| | 발 제 자 Speaker | 국방대학교 국제평화활동센터 교수 문진혁 Dr. Jinhyeok Moon, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU |
| | 토 론 자 Discussant | 유엔 통합훈련처 중령 이브라힘 압둘와합 Lt. Col. Ibrahim Abdulwahab, Nigeria Army, UN ITS 국방대학교 국제평화활동센터 교수 임종권 Dr. ChongKwon Lim, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU |
| 11:00 ~ 11:50 | ② 평화유지활동에서 무력사용의 적절성 및 합법성 고찰 Relevance and Legitimacy of the Use of Force in PKO | |
| | 발 제 자 Speaker | 캐나다 국방대학교 교수 월터 돈 Dr. Walter Dorn, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada |
| | 토 론 자 Discussant | 인도 통합연구소 예)소장 샤르마 MG(R) BK Sharma, AVSM, SM, Director General, USI, India 국방대학교 국제평화활동센터 교수 김정필 Dr. Jungpil Kim, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU |
| 12:00 ~ 13:00 | 오찬 / Lunch | |
| 13:00 ~ 13:50 | ③ 평화유지활동에서 오정보 및 역정보 대응 전략 Responding Misinformation and Disinformation in Peacekeeping Operational Operations | |
| | 발 제 자 Speaker | 인도 통합연구소 예)소장 고스와미 MG(R) PK Goswami, VSM, Deputy Director General, USI, India |
| | 토 론 자 Discussant | 국립외교원 교수 송태은 Dr. Tae Eun Song, Assistant Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy UN사령부 소령 마이클 브로디 룬드비 Major Michael Brody Lundeby, UCJ 39, UNC/CFC/USFK |
| 14:00 ~ 15:00 | ④ 평화유지활동에서 여성의 역할 확대 방안 Expanding Women Peacekeepers' Role in PKO | |
| | 발 제 자 Speaker | 캐나다 국방대학교 대령 머린 웰우드 Colonel Maureen Wellwood, Canadian Armed Forces |
| | 토 론 자 Discussant | 육군사관학교 교수 구도경 Major Dokyoung Koo, Assistant Professor, Korea Military Academy 국방대학교 국제평화활동센터 교수 강효경 Dr. Hyo-Kyung Kang, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU |
| 15:00 | 폐 식 사 Closing Remarks | 국제평화활동센터장 Director, PKO Center, KNDU |

* 사회 : 국방대학교 국제평화활동센터 교수 임윤갑

* All sessions are moderated by Dr. Yoonkap LIM, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU

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국방대학교 국제평화활동센터 · 주한 캐나다 대사관 공동 주관

제19회 평화유지활동 세미나 개념서

‘평화 유지를 위한 행동계획과 연계한 유엔 평화유지 요원의 안전 증진과 여성 역할 확대’

배경

유엔이 평화유지활동 임무를 처음 시작한 것은 창설한 지 3년이 채 안 되었던 1948년이었다. 이후 유엔은 70년 동안 평화유지활동을 계속하였으며 그 결과는 복합적이었다. 그간 평화유지활동은 물론 분쟁의 양상도 변화하였다. 오늘날 평화유지 요원들이 당면한 도전은 복잡한 작전 환경, 특히 최근에는 임무 달성이 거의 불가능한 상황, 즉 지켜야 할 평화가 존재하지 않는 상황(No peace to keep)에서 마저 직접적으로 해결해야 할 임무를 부여받는 것으로부터 기인한다.

현재 유엔 평화유지활동은 12개 임무단 10만여 명이 전개하여 활동하고 있으며 여기에는 군과 경찰 그리고 민간인이 포함된다. 이들에게 지불되는 예산은 연간 70억 달러이다. 유엔 평화유지활동 임무단은 영토를 두고 벌이는 국가 간 전쟁에 대응하기 위한 전통적 평화유지활동으로부터 이른바 보호와 안정 임무(Protection and Stabilization Missions)로 민간인을 보호하거나 폭력적 극단 주의로부터 위협을 받는 합법적 정부를 지원하는 다차원 평화유지활동(Multidimensional Operations)으로 진화하였다.

그간 평화유지활동은 성공을 거두기는 경우도 있었고 실패로 귀결되기도 하였다.

이러한 성공과 실패를 이해하기 위해서는 평화유지활동 자체에 대한 논의와 평화유지활동이 분쟁의 해결을 위한 조건에 충족하지 못하는가에 대한 이해가 전제되어야 한다. 특히 유엔 평화유지활동의 무력 사용의 제한 원칙과 최근 오정보와 역정보가 평화유지활동에 어떻게 작용하였는가 연구할 필요가 있다.

평화유지 활동은 국제 평화와 안보를 증진하고 유지하기 위한 유엔의 가장 효과적인 도구 중 하나이다. 그러나 평화유지군은 임무 수행 능력을 약화하는 몇 가지 도전에 직면해 있다. 다양한 환경에서 발생하는 복잡한 위협으로 평화유지군의 사망과 부상이 증가하고 있다. 1948년 유엔이 평화유지활동을 시작한 이래 4,298명이 사망하였고 비교적 최근인 2017년 134명, 2021년 125명이 사망하였으며 2023년 22명이 사망하였다. 이러한 도전에 대응하기 위해 유엔 사무총장은 2018년 3월 28일 평화유지활동에 대한 상호 정치적 약속을 새롭게 하고자 '평화 유지를 위한 행동계획(A4P)'을 시작하였다.

한편 과거와 달리 최근 유엔 평화유지 활동은 평화유지 요원이 무장 세력에 무기를 판매한다거나, 테러리스트를 지원한다거나 또는 천연자원을 갈취한다거나 하는 점증하는 역정보(Disinformation)의 위협에 직면하고 있다. 유엔 평화유지 요원에 대한 거짓된 정보는 새로운 것이 아니다. 이와 같은 소문은 오랫동안 주둔국 사회에서 무성하였고 평화유지 요원들은 장기간의 평화유지를 위한 노력에도 불구하고 현재 진행형의 불안정한 상황 때문에 깊은 절망에 빠지기도 하였다.

새로운 사실은 거짓 정보가 사회관계망을 통해 대량으로 생산되어 급속하게 전파한다는 것이다. 즉, 주둔국 국민이 평화를 갈구하는 과정에서 느끼는 절망감에 더하여 유엔의 잘못된 행동을 과대 포장하여 사회관계망에 전파하는 이와 같은 행위는 평화유지 활동의 위임명령 이행을 더욱 어렵게 하고 있으며 평화유지 요원의 안전마저

위협하고 있다.

한편 평화유지 활동에서 여성의 대표성은 여전히 낮다. 오늘날 평화유지 활동에서 군과 경찰 평화유지 요원으로 활동하는 여성은 전체의 7.8%에 불과하다. 이는 유엔 안전보장이사회 결의안 제2242(2015)호가 통과된 2015년 10월 이후 4.2% 증가한 수치이며, 유엔 평화유지 활동에 여성이 의미 있게 참여할 기회를 감소시키는 많은 장벽과 편견이 여전히 남아 있음을 의미한다. 유엔과 국제사회는 그간 군과 경찰 역할에서 여성의 대표성을 개선하기 위해 노력해 왔으며 이러한 맥락에서 유엔 평화유지 활동에서 여성의 역할 확대를 이번 세미나를 통해 논하고자 한다.

목표

이번 세미나는 앞서 언급한 변화하는 안보 환경에서 유엔 평화유지 요원의 희생을 방지하고 효과적인 임무수행을 위해 다음과 같은 목표를 설정하였다.

- ① 최근 안보 환경 변화에 따른 도전 평가
- ② 유엔 평화 활동에서 무력 사용의 적절성과 합법성
- ③ 임무단에서 오정보와 역정보의 위험을 감소하기 위한 대책
- ④ 평화 활동에서 여성의 역할 확대 방안

Concept Note Seminar on

‘Improving Peacekeepers’ Safety and Expanding Women’s Role in line with A4P’

Co-hosted by PKO Center NDU and Canadian Embassy in Seoul
Seoul, 21 September 2023

Background

The first UN peacekeeping mission began in 1948, less than three years after its establishment. Since then, the UN has continued its peacekeeping activities for 70 years, albeit with mixed results. In the meantime, not only peacekeeping activities, but also the characteristics of conflicts have changed. The challenges facing peacekeepers today range from being directly assigned tasks to be addressed in complex operational environments, especially in more recent times when it is nearly impossible to accomplish the mission caused by where the ‘No peace to keep’

Currently, UN peacekeeping operations are deployed and operated by 100,000 people in 12 mission groups, including the military, police and civilians. The budget paid to them is \$7 billion a year. Currently, UN peacekeeping missions, has been evolved from traditional peacekeeping operations in response to inter-state wars over territories to multidimensional peacekeeping operation so called Protection and Stabilization Missions, to protect civilians or to protect legitimate governments threatened by violent extremism.

Until now, peacekeeping activities have been successful in some cases and have resulted in failures in others. In order to understand these successes and failures, it is necessary to discuss peacekeeping activities themselves and understand whether peacekeeping activities do not meet the conditions for conflict resolution. In particular, it is necessary to study the principle of limiting the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations and how recent misinformation and disinformation have affected peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping is one of the United Nations' most effective tools for promoting and maintaining international peace and security. However, peacekeepers face several challenges that undermine their ability to carry out their missions. The deaths and injuries of peacekeepers are on the rise due to complex threats arising from a variety of environments. Since the UN started peacekeeping operations in 1948, 4,298 people have died, and relatively recently, 134 people died in 2017, 125 people died in 2021, and 22 people died in 2023. To respond to these challenges, the UN Secretary-General launched the 'Action for Peacekeeping(A4P)' Initiative on March 28, 2018 to renew mutual political commitments to peacekeeping operations.

Meanwhile, unlike in the past, UN peacekeeping operations today face a growing risk of disinformation about peacekeepers selling weapons to militants, supporting terrorists, or extorting natural resources. Disinformation about UN peacekeepers is not new. Rumors like this have been rife in the society of the host country for a long time, and peacekeepers have fallen into deep despair because of the ongoing unstable situation despite long-term efforts to maintain peace.

What is new is that false information is mass-produced and rapidly disseminated

through social networks. In other words, in addition to the despair felt by the people of the host country in the process of seeking peace, such an act of exaggerating the UN's wrongdoing and spreading it through social networks makes it more difficult to fulfill the mandate for peacekeeping operations and threatens the safety of peacekeepers.

In addition, women's representation in peace operations remains low: today, only 7.8% of those working as military and police peacekeepers are women—a 4.2% increase since October 2015 when Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015) was passed. Many barriers and biases remain in place that reduce women's ability to participate meaningfully in UN peace operations. The UN and the international community have struggled most to improve the representation of women in military and police roles.

Objectives

In order to create enabling conditions in the changing security environment, so that UN peacekeepers can effectively carry out their missions to fulfil given mandate and also ensure safety of peacekeepers, we need to deliberate on few important issues related to this. The Seminar will discuss the following themes as a part of A4P:

- ① Challenges due to changing the UN missions' operational environment.
- ② Relevance and legitimacy of the use of force in the UN peace operations.
- ③ Measures to minimise and remove the menace of misinformation and disinformation on the missions.
- ④ The role of women in peace operations' activities and measures required to enhance of women's participation in peace operations.

제19회 PKO 발전 세미나

The 19th Peacekeeping Operations Seminar

A4P와 연계한 평화유지요원 안전 증진과 여성 역할 확대

Improving Peacekeepers' Safety and Expanding
Women's Role in line with A4P

제1주제 / The 1st Session

최근 평화유지활동 환경에서의 도전요소 평가

The Challenges in the Contemporary PKO
Environment

발제자 / Speaker

- **문진혁** 교수 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터)
Dr. Jinhyeok Moon, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU

토론자 / Discussant

- **이브라힘 압둘와합** 중령 (유엔 통합훈련처)
Lt. Col. Ibrahim Abdulwahab, Nigeria Army, UN ITS
- **임종권** 교수 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터)
Dr. ChongKwon Lim, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU





21 Sept 2023



Challenges of Contemporary UN PKOs

Robust Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians



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Republic of Korea

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Lieutenant-General (Ret'd), the Honourable Roméo Dallaire



▪ Rwanda Massacre



▪ Ret. General Roméo Dallaire



My Journey from Rwanda to Humanitarianism
Today



PKO Center
Republic of Korea

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- **Current Peacekeeping Operations**
- **Robust Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians**
- **Conclusions**




Armed Conflicts Changing Rapidly(1/2)



- **Intra-state** rather than inter-state conflicts
 - ✓ Engaging a changing profile of armed groups using **terrorist tactics targeting peacekeepers**.
 - ✓ Interconnected with **organized crimes**

FIGURE 4.2
Number of conflicts per year by type of conflict, 1976–2021
Internationalised intrastate conflicts are now as common as intrastate conflicts.





Armed Conflicts Changing Rapidly(2/2)



Increased UN risks and fatalities


- ✓ Radical groups
- ✓ Regional interference
- ✓ IED rich environment
- ✓ Drone strikes

Complex array of actors / threats

- ✓ Hostile forces disregarding UN
- ✓ UN banner offers no protection

Total number of armed groups using drone strikes, 2018 to 2022

The number of non-state groups using drones doubled from 2018 to 2022.⁷



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
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Current Peacekeeping Operations



□ About 90,000 peacekeepers in 12 operations around the globe



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
Trend of UN PKOs



- Contraction of UN PKOs




- Decreasing annual budget



ROK Contributions to UN PKOs



- Troop contribution



- Financial contribution: 157 million USD(2.574%)
* 2022/2023 UN PKO budget: 6.4 billion USD



Contemporary Challenges




- Force Generation
- Regionalization
- Use of Force
- **Protection of Civilians**
- Gender
- Misinformation and Disinformation
- **Robust Peacekeeping**
- Fighting the Pandemic
- Others



Robust Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians

Robust Peacekeeping

Peace Index 2023




IMPROVEMENTS
84
countries recorded improvements in peacefulness

DETERIORATIONS
79
countries recorded deteriorations in peacefulness

OVERALL AVERAGE CHANGE (%)
+0.42
The average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.42 per cent in the 2022 Global Peace Index.

Peace Operations




- Neutralize armed groups that pose imminent threats to civilians, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC
- Capture members of armed groups who pose imminent threats to civilians
- Respond to threats and attacks on civilians

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Protection of Civilians in DR Congo (MONUSCO)

Violent incidents involving civilian fatalities in North Kivu, 2013-2015




Violent incidents involving civilian fatalities

Violent incidents not involving civilian fatalities

Jun 2012 Feb 2013 Sept 2013 May 2013 Dec 2014 Aug 2015

Nov 2012, Fall of Goma Mar 2013, Creation of FIB Nov 2013, Defeat of M-23

Civilian fatalities, 2010-2022



| DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 8,310 Total Events | 18,317 Reported Fatalities |
| EVENT TYPE | |
| 8,310 Violence against civilians | |

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12/27




Protection of Civilians in DR Congo (MONUSCO)



- Peace deal in 2013, yet it was not implemented.
- Renewed advance of M-23 between 2022 and 2023

DR Congo signs peace deal with M23 rebels

The Democratic Republic of Congo has signed a peace deal with the M23 rebels, it was announced Thursday, confirming the group's dissolution a month after it ended its 18-month insurgency against the government.



M23 offensive 2022 - 2023



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Protection of Civilians in South Sudan (UNMISS)




- Protection of Civilian sites and IDP camps in South Sudan



UN Protection of Civilians sites begin transitioning to conventional displacement camps

- Civilian fatalities, 2011-2022



| SOUTH SUDAN | |
|--------------------|----------------------------|
| 3,726 Total Events | 17,791 Reported Fatalities |
| EVENT TYPE | |
| 3,726 | Violence against civilians |



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Republic of Korea

14/27




Protection of Civilians in Mali (MINUSMA)



- UN presence in key areas of Mali
- An integrated team, escorted by peacekeepers, conducts interview.



- Civilian fatalities, 2013-2022




Unintended Consequences of Robust Peacekeeping



- 1 Tension with the principles of peacekeeping**
 - POC and consent, POC and impartiality
- 2 Impact on the effectiveness of UN PKOs**
 - Render civilians vulnerable
 - Growing attacks on UN peacekeepers and properties
 - Increasing pushback and disinformation
- 3 Impact on the integrated efforts of UN PKOs**
 - Challenges in humanitarian access

1. Tension with Principles of Peacekeeping

POC and Consent, POC and Impartiality



- Moura massacre(March 2022)
 - Army, foreign fighters killed more than 500 people
- UN report on Moura massacre (May 2023)
- Drawdown and withdrawal of MINUSMA
 - UNSCR(2690) 30/06/2023



MINUSMA presents its withdrawal plan to the Malian Foreign Minister

2. Impact on the Effectiveness of PKOs

Render civilians vulnerable

- The use of force by peacekeepers can result in harm to the very people the operation is intended to protect.
- Revenge attack on villagers after some operations in DR Congo.



At least a dozen killed in eastern DR Congo attack

Men armed with knives and other weapons attacked Bulongo village, in the latest attack blamed on notorious ADF fighters.



The ADF killed about 100 people last year, according to UN figures (The Africa Report/AFR)



2. Impact on the Effectiveness of PKOs

Growing Attacks on UN Peacekeepers and Properties



- Deaths of peacekeepers in helicopter crash(29 MAR 2022)
- The helicopter was on a reconnaissance mission when it went down over the province of north Kivu, where there have been clashes between the Congolese military and the rebel group, M23.



2. Impact on the Effectiveness of PKOs

Increasing Pushback and Disinformation



- Since 2022, DRC has seen a series of protests against MONUSCO.
- The protests took place in multiple cities in eastern DRC, which has recently seen an increase in armed group activity.

Death toll reaches 36 in eastern DRC as protesters turn on UN peacekeepers

- Protesters target the UN peacekeeping mission in Goma. The perception is that MONUSCO is failing to stop attacks by armed groups.



Protesters target the UN peacekeeping mission in Goma in July. The perception is that Monusco is failing to stop attacks by armed groups. Photograph: Michel Lunanga/AT7/Getty Images



- USG attended a memorial in Goma for peacekeepers that lost their lives

3. Impact on the Integrated Efforts in UN PKOs Making Humanitarian Access Difficult

- Humanitarian and social organizations



- Humanitarian relief efforts by drones

UN launches unmanned surveillance aircraft to better protect civilians in vast DR Congo



- UAS in D.R. Congo

How to balance Positive and Negative Effects of Robust Peacekeeping?



Does UN Peacekeeping work? Here's what the data says

Some of UN Peacekeeping's successful operations so far:

1. Namibia 1989-1990
2. Cambodia 1992-1993
3. Mozambique 1992-1994
4. El Salvador 1991-1995
5. Guatemala 1997-1997
6. E. Slavonia/Croatia 1996-1998
7. Timor Leste 1999-2002
8. Sierra Leone 1999-2005
9. Burundi 2004-2006
10. Timor Leste 2006-2012
11. Côte d'Ivoire 2004-2017
12. Liberia 2003-2018



Conclusions(1/2)



- Despite both the positive and negative effects of robust peacekeeping, **it will remain consistently necessary to reduce levels of atrocious violence.**
- As such, peacekeepers must use force **if there are no other alternatives to protect civilians from battlefield violence.**
- Still, there is a distinction between **using force defensively and offensively.**
- **After all, it is political solutions** that are the answer to questions of sustainable peace in the contemporary UN peacekeeping environment.




Conclusions(2/2)



- **Advanced digital technologies** are required for the self-defense of peacekeepers and the efficiency of civilian protection operations.
- **Preparedness for the use of non-lethal force** is needed to address the risks inherent in robust peacekeeping and to mitigate collateral civilian harms.
Tear gas gun, smoke shell, taser gun, suppression and detention tactics
- **Analyzing the dynamics of potential perpetrators of violence**, such as state actors, non-state actors, foreign mercenaries, and **conducting operations based on the analyzed threats**, will effectively prevent, preempt, deter, and respond to violence against civilians.
Threat analysis
Risk analysis and danger level assessment

UN Peacekeeping Capability Requirements



2023 United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial

- Hosted by [Ghana](#) on 5-6 December 2023
- **Focus on** protection of civilians, strategic communications (including addressing mis-disinformation and hate speech), safety and security, the mental health of peacekeepers, and women in peacekeeping.





Thank You



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Republic of Korea

27/27

제19회 PKO 발전 세미나

The 19th Peacekeeping Operations Seminar

A4P와 연계한 평화유지요원 안전 증진과 여성 역할 확대

Improving Peacekeepers' Safety and Expanding
Women's Role in line with A4P

제2주제 / The 2nd Session

평화유지활동에서 무력사용의 적절성 및 합법성 고찰 Relevance and Legitimacy of the Use of Force in PKO

발제자 / Speaker

■ 월터 돈 교수 (캐나다 국방대학교)

Dr. Walter Dorn, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada

토론자 / Discussant

■ 샤르마 예)소장 (인도 통합연구소)

MG(R) BK Sharma, AVSM, SM, Director General, USI, India

■ 김정필 교수 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터)

Dr. Jungpil Kim, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU





Use of Force in Peacekeeping

Dr. Walter Dorn, Royal Military College & Canadian Forces College
PKO Seminar, National Defense University, Korea, 21 September 2023



Observer missions



Peacekeeping forces

Political



Military



Humanitarian



Police



Judicial



Social



Reconstruction



Economic



Multidimension peace ops: POC

Difficult Situations 1993-95



Somalia



Rwanda




Bosnia



NATO peace support in Bosnia

PSO Types (NATO & UN doctrine)



+ Conflict Prevention

Source: adapted from PSTC, EO 401.02



Attack helicopters in peace operations:
oxymoron or essential tool?

- Attack helicopter (AH); Utility helicopter (UH)
- Advanced tech in both developing/ed countries





Mi-24 (Ukraine) in UNTAES



Mi-24 (HIND) in Africa (SL; Liberia)

UN Photo







Forward-looking Infrared (FLIR)



C.A.R: Mi-35 (Senegal)



FPRC: Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique

- Azor Kalite

UPC: Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique

- Ali Darassa

2017

- UN redline around Bambari
 - TOB Ippy
- FPRC attack force
 - January 21: 150 men
 - February 10: 300 men, 7 pickup trucks



Red line enforcement: Firing to stop FPRC attack on Bambari



Blowback

Azor Kalite to MINUSCA rep:

- if his FPRC forces were not allowed to move on Bambari, “target MINUSCA staff, vehicles and NGOs wherever they can.”
- antiaircraft weapons
- attack UPC members in Bria and other locations.
- “the only way to prevent further clashes is to remove the UPC leader Ali Darassa from Bambari.”



- UN POC
 - Darassa Human shield
 - FC Balla Keita, Op Bepka
 - Mi-35 above Darassa's house
- March 6: Darassa leaves
- Oct 9: ceasefire agreement



- May 2020
 - Kalite arrested by UN forces after rushed Portuguese QRF

- CAR Armed Groups, Govt Begin New Peace Talks

– November 10,
2020




<https://humanglemedia.com/car-armed-groups-govt-begin-new-peace-talks>

Conclusions

- Understanding pros/cons
 - Positive: save lives, strengthen credibility, deter/dissuade aggression
 - Negative: escalate force, make UN a party to conflict, risk fatalities, risk to humanitarian work (innocents), damage reputation, bad example
- Capabilities needed
 - Weapons (AH), PKI, C4ISR, training/simulation
- Balancing: spectrum of force
 - Underuse, overuse and just right
 - Deal with blowback

Lessons – “Wider Peacekeeping”



Peacekeeping is ...
... a continuing adventure ...



The Evolution of the Use of Force in Peacekeeping

A. Walter Dorn and H. Peter Langille

25 August 2024

Abstract

The use of force is a continuing dilemma for UN peacekeeping missions and for the troop-contributing countries. How to use force while not becoming party to a conflict? This paper provides a chronological review of the UN's operational experience in the use and non-use of force, showing the benefits and drawbacks of both. It highlights the period of crisis in the mid-1990s, when the UN could not summon the political will or the means to use the required force in the face of crises in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. But, after absorbing these painful lessons, the United Nations showed in the new century it could use force in Sierra Leone, D.R. Congo, Haiti, and the Central African Republic. In all of the Africa cases, attack helicopters played a major role in robust peacekeeping. The helicopters not only provide mobility for rapid access, but also protection, close air support, a deterrent and a unique force multiplier. As such, they justify the designation of 'key enabler' – one that the United Nations is chronically short of and which warrants further provision and support from Member States. This paper provides insights into the diverse challenges, expectations and requirements for use of force. At the same time, it discusses the concerns caused by the shift to peace enforcement. This

paradigm shift must be handled well if the United Nations is to move from a reactive to a pro-active approach and to make a long overdue shift from post-conflict stabilization to the prevention of conflict.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Operational experience

Evolving norms on the use of force

Conclusion: The continuing dilemma

Introduction

The environments of modern peacekeeping operations are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the peacekeepers, peacebuilders and the civilian population. With globalization and new forms of war, belligerents often have access to markets supplying advanced weapons. UN peacekeepers should not be at a comparative disadvantage in areas where they operate, especially as illegal forces may attack both the peacekeepers and civilians.

The United Nations has acquired considerable experience in the use of force for peacekeeping. At the end of the Cold War, the Organisation managed a difficult shift from the traditional interpositional operations between two conflicting states to multidimensional operations characterized by the pursuit of comprehensive peace agreements to resolve internal conflicts, with elements of humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians (POC), prevention and peace enforcement.

Corresponding shifts were also needed in the use of force. From a near-consensus on traditional peacekeeping in the early years that force was limited to self-defence, more challenging circumstances prompted the use of force in defence of the mandate, which later expanded to ambitious mandates like POC. Recent precedents also suggest that when force is used by rebel groups and spoilers against both civilians and UN operations, the United Nations may designate targets and use offensive force, while still allowing targeted groups to be part of negotiations and the peace process.

Since 1999, there has been an accompanying shift from operations authorized under Chapter VI to an emphasis on Chapter VII, with all necessary means.

For over a decade, the United Nations has benefitted from sophisticated doctrine and guidelines, as well as explicit policy on the use of force in peace operations. Officials have struggled to ensure a robust deterrent capacity in modern UN peace operations. On few occasions, however, sufficient capacity has been provided by member states. Frequently, such capacity has been direly needed, but unavailable. The recurring phenomena ‘of too-little, too-late’ has diminished wider confidence in the Organization. Seldom has the use of force been deliberately misused, abused or indiscriminately applied in UN peace operations. Rather it is the non-use of force that caused outrage. UN peacekeepers have even been taken hostage (e.g., Bosnia in 1995, Sierra Leone in 2000 and Golan Heights in 2014). In addition, UN contingents have experienced losses and casualties in the service of peace.¹

1 In 2022, 96 peacekeepers died in UN operations, bringing the total since 1947 to 4,280. Of the total, 35% died from illness, 32% through accidents, 26% by malicious acts and 7% other/unknown. For UN statistics, see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>.

An overview of the UN's experience with the use of force would prove valuable to further understand the UN's evolution and struggles on the use of force.

Operational experience

The early UN peacekeeping missions in Greece, Indonesia, Korea, Palestine and Kashmir only deployed peacekeepers who were unarmed.² The **Suez crisis** in 1956 pushed an idea of deploying armed peacekeepers into reality with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Within days, the core principles of traditional peacekeeping were developed to support 'impartiality, consent of the host nation and the non-use of force except in self defence.' This 'trinity' was promptly consolidated and it would endure, with several exceptions, for over 35 years of traditional UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, with few exceptions. When UNEF II was created after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the UN expanded the exception from self-defence by adding "defence of the mandate." But force was rarely used by UNEF II.

The **UN operation in Congo (ONUC)** became the Cold War's primary (perhaps only) example of robust peacekeeping. As the mission encountered armed resistance that pushed it into peace enforcement, it shattered the illusion that peacekeepers could not engage in the use of force. It also demonstrated the costs and consequences of using force in a peacekeeping operation that degenerated into combat and an arms race between the United Nations and the secessionist province of Katanga.³ The forceful

2 Prior to the Korean War, the UN established two small peacekeeping missions in Korea: United Nations Temporary Commission in Korea (UNTCK), and United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK). Shortly after the Korea War broke out, the UN Security Council created UN Command, which was a purely enforcement mission, designed to repel the North Korean forces. Naturally, UN Command was and is not a peacekeeping mission.

3 See A. Walter Dorn, "Combat Air Power in the Congo, 2003-," Chapter 14 in *Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace* (A. Walter Dorn, Ed.), Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK, 2014, pp. 241-253.

action allowed the United Nations to prevail and the Congo did not break apart.

With the **end of the Cold War** in 1990, the United Nations encountered a new turbulent environment under the twin pressures of globalization and state fragmentation. The demise of a bipolar order under controlled spheres of influence released grievances and struggles for power, particularly in ethnic and identity conflicts, which posed new political and operational challenges that the UN system was neither accustomed to nor prepared for.

For instance, tragic UN operations in the **former Yugoslavia** (UNPROFOR), particularly in Srebrenica, **Somalia** (UNOSOM), and in **Rwanda** (UNAMIR) humiliated UN peacekeepers, the Organization and its most powerful Member State, the United States. Without the mandate or the means to protect, the peacekeepers had to stand by as thousands of civilians were systematically slaughtered nearby.

The traditional principle of non-use of force effectively paralyzed UN troops in the UN Protection Force in Bosnia, leaving many peacekeepers with the impression that UN rules had left them in the middle of a vicious fight to watch the innocent people being killed while the peacekeepers had their arms tied behind their backs.

The **Somalia** operation demonstrated an initial worst-case example of what might go wrong with the use of force under different operations, purposes and contributors. With the absence of a central Somali government and factional fighting between competing militia forces, a nation-wide famine threatened over 4.5 million people.

At first, a traditional UN observer operation (UNSOM I) was deployed,

followed promptly by a UN-sanctioned US-led multinational ‘Unified Task Force’ (UNITAF also known under the name Operation Restore Hope [1992]), and later a separate American military mission (Operation Gothic Serpent [1993]). UNSOM I was soon scaled-up into UNSOM II to engage in enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with authorization for the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations...” (Security Council Resolution 794 (1992)). The operational objectives included humanitarian assistance to address a famine, restoring order in the midst of a civil war, ensuring protection of relief efforts and, eventually, the capture a Somali warlord. Confusion was further compounded by diverse mandates, chains of command, control, communication and rules of engagement. As the lines of each blurred, coherence, cooperation and deterrence diminished.

Belligerent militia forces lost respect. One group attacked Pakistani peacekeepers. In response, the United States used its operation to carry out an “international arrest warrant” for the clan leader. The Battle of Mogadishu in October of 1993 led to the deaths of over 800 Somalis and 18 American troops. Two US Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by ground fire.⁴ Hundreds of innocent civilians were caught in the crossfire. The United States determined that too much would be needed to sustain the war against the clan. It withdrew its forces, and UNOSOM II was closed out shortly thereafter.

This battle would have far-reaching effects on UN peace operations as it led the United States and numerous Northern troop contributors to retreat from participation

4 Aside from MH-60 Black Hawks, the American mission deployed AH-6 and MH-6 Little Birds, and Kiowa warrior helicopters.

in UN operations more generally. President Bill Clinton's response in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 placed restrictions on support for UN operations that would have dire and near-immediate consequences for subsequent missions, particularly in Africa.

The **Rwandan genocide** followed in 1994. Despite ample early-warning of a planned atrocity from the UNAMIR operation, over 800,000 people – mostly ethnic Tutsis and some moderate Hutus – were killed by Hutu extremists over a period of 100 days. UNAMIR had been deployed to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords of August 1993 to end the Rwandan civil war. The UN's initial plans were for a traditional peacekeeping operation.

In January 1994, UNAMIR informed UN headquarters of new weapon shipments and stockpiles, of intense hate propaganda, and of plans to commence attacks on the Tutsi population. UNAMIR's force commander, Brigadier-General Roméo Dallaire, sought permission from UN headquarters to conduct offensive operations to stem the dispersal of weapons and militia training. In response, the United Nations ordered no intervention and no use of force.⁵

The genocide was unleashed on an unprepared world on 6 April 1994. After the early murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers and New York's reluctance to assume further risks or deploy additional troops, UNAMIR was weakened further by the departure of a primary troop contributor, Belgium. Worse, in the midst of murderous mayhem, with civilians and peacekeepers under attack, the UN Security Council reduced UNAMIR's

⁵ For a brief overview see, Romeo Dallaire, "Author Linda Melvern's Intent to Deceive details the planned genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi - and subsequent efforts to deny it", (book review), The Globe and Mail, 25 February 2020.

strength in April 1994. From 2,548 troops, what remained was a small UN contingent, consisting of only 300 soldiers.

To its credit, the UN mission managed to save over 20,000 Rwandan lives at locations under its control or observation. By mid-May, the Security Council agreed to increase UNAMIR's strength to 5,500 troops, but they would require over six months to deploy.⁶

After leaving the mission, Brigadier-General Dallaire suggested that he could have stopped the genocide in Kigali if he had been provided with 5,000 well-trained troops. This may well have prevented the spread and escalation of killing that ensued. Yet neither the United States nor Britain on the UN Security Council would approve more flexible rules of engagement for the use of force or a rapid reinforcement of the UNAMIR operation, especially given the debacle in Somalia the previous year. Rwanda promptly became known as another 'UN failure'.

Meanwhile, Srebrenica in **Bosnia** had been declared the first 'safe area' under UN protection in 1993. Two years later, the Dutch UN battalion of UNPROFOR (which replaced the Canadians) found itself too small and under-equipped to deter or stop aggression by a far larger force of the Bosnian Serb army (Army of Republika Srpska & Scorpions paramilitary group). The UNPROFOR mission lacked a rapid response force to reinforce its safe area. The absence of a credible option to use force emboldened the Serb army to exploit their advantage and push the Dutch battalion aside to simply observe the killing.

⁶ See, United Nations Peacekeeping, 'UNAMIR Background' <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirS.htm>

The result was a massacre of over 8,000 Muslim Bosniak men and boys in July 1995, with a subsequent ethnic cleansing of women and girls, both constituting crimes of genocide. Srebrenica remains another black mark in the history of peacekeeping operations. However, the United Nations and NATO did respond with armed force and the tide turned away from the Serb side, leading to the Dayton Peace Accords of December 1995.

In 1998–99, a conflict over control of **Kosovo** initially escalated into a war between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army. As diplomatic approaches faltered, NATO intervened with alliance air forces, justified as a ‘humanitarian war’. A NATO bombing campaign, without UN Security Council authorization (due to the threat of a Russian veto), forced a Serb backdown. It also prompted serious divisions in the UN Security Council, with Russia alarmed by what was seen as NATO’s unwarranted use of force. A subsequent UN operation (UNMIK) was established to ensure conditions for peace and normality for Kosovars and to advance regional stability in the Western Balkans. Yet cooperation among the P-5 members would decline, with problematic consequences for UN peace operations, especially around the legitimate use of force.

Confronted by mass atrocity crimes occurring in a prolonged civil war in **Sierra Leone** and a series of coup d’états, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping operation (UNAMSIL) in 1999. The primary objectives were to complement a regional mission of West African forces (ECOMOG), to help end the war and implement the Lomé Peace Accord. Each would prove to be far more demanding than initially anticipated. An earlier observer mission (UNOMSIL) was evacuated. Within months, the Security Council bolstered the initial strength of UNAMSIL from 6,000

military personnel to 11,100, then 13,000, then 17,500.

An enduring precedent was established within five months when the UN Security Council expanded UNAMSIL's mandate, authorizing operations under Chapter VII to take the necessary action to provide security and, "...within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence..."⁷ Protection of civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would be embedded in subsequent Security Council mandates for multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

On September 11th, 2001, attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States prompted the latter to declare a **global war on terrorism** (GWOT). Within days, priorities shifted. Within weeks, political support and military resources mobilized worldwide. Scant consideration would be accorded to international organizations, international law or conventions regarding use of force. An 'axis of evil' (Iran, Iraq and North Korea) was cited by President George W. Bush and two punitive wars pursued (Iraq being added to Afghanistan). Both failed to achieve their stated objectives, but both prompted wider violence and massive suffering. UN peace operations would continue, albeit without substantial troop contributions from NATO members until 2015.

Confronted in 2011 by a humanitarian crisis in **Libya** – a socialist African state, accused of supporting terrorism and what was perceived as 'the potential for genocide', the UN Security Council called upon the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to cease attacks on civilians and uphold the responsibility to protect. With

7 United Nations, 'Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Mandate' (Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000)
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/mandate.html>

little assurance of compliance and fears of worse, the Council authorized a military intervention by the NATO alliance (Operation Unified Protector) under Chapter VII to implement an arms embargo, a no-fly zone and to use all means necessary, aside from foreign occupation, to protect Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas. This was a UN enforcement operation (to repel aggression under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), not peace enforcement, which occurs within the context of a peace agreement and is usually carried out by a peacekeeping force. The Arab League proposal for a peacekeeping force was rejected.

All-too-often violent conflicts that arose in one area would have a spillover effect leading to instability and further violence in the region. When the Gaddafi regime fall, many of its supporters returned with their weapons to other parts of Africa, including Mali. Civil war soon broke out.

A similar spillover had happened earlier in Central Africa, with the spread of conflict from Rwanda into neighboring states and throughout much of the Great Lakes region. After the genocide, over a million Hutus moved into the Eastern Kivu region of Zaire, what is now the Democratic Republic of the **Congo** (DRC), sparking armed conflict in an area populated by ethnic Tutsis.⁸

Between 1996 and 2003, the combination of a civil war, famine and disease killed millions in the DRC.⁹ In response to the conflict, the United Nations deployed MONUC in 1999. It was only after suffering early tragedies and losses, the United

8 See United Nations, 'MONUC Background', <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/background.shtml>

9 See, Armin Rosen, "The Origins of War in the DRC: How the region became overrun by warlords and lacking any kind of functional government". The Atlantic, 26 June 2013. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/the-origins-of-war-in-the-drc/277131/>

Nations increased its capacity to use force.

Repeated massacres in 2002 drew international condemnation.¹⁰ An early shock stemmed from atrocities in the DRC city of **Kisangani** by the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebel movement who engaged in widespread killing, executions, rape and pillage.¹¹ UN peacekeepers did not succeed in stressing a peaceful resolution to the situation without the use of force.¹² Spiraling violence bordering on genocide also arose in the district of **Ituri**. As UN peacekeepers failed to stem the fighting in June 2003 a European Union, French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) deployed ‘Operation Artemis’ to restore peace and humanitarian relief in Ituri and Bunia.¹³

Under competent leadership for a period, MONUC developed and trialed new mechanisms and innovative approaches to the use of force.¹⁴ Yet this would not be enough to bring peace to a country double the size of France, with neighboring countries (Rwanda and Uganda) using their invading forces and later relying on numerous armed militias to exploit the rich natural resources.

10 Approximately 60,000 Pygmy civilians and 10,000 combatants were also killed between 2002 and 2003 in an extermination campaign known as “Effacer le tableau” by the Movement for the Liberation of Congo.

11 “Congo: War Crimes in Kisangani”, Human Rights Watch, 20 August 2002. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/20/congo-war-crimes-kisangani>

12 “DR of Congo: concerned over tension in Kisangani, UN urges restraint by parties”, UN News, 16 May 2002. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2002/05/35342-dr-congo-concerned-over-tension-kisangani-un-urges-restraint-parties>

13 “Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri”, International Crisis Group, report 64, 13 June 2003. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congo-crisis-military-intervention-ituri>

14 See, Major-General Patrick Cammaert, “Learning to Use Force on the Hoof in Peacekeeping: Reflections on the experience of MONUC’s Eastern Division”, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 3 April 2007. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONUCSITREPAPR07.PDF>

In 2012, the M23 rebel group briefly seized the city of **Goma** despite the presence of 1,500 UN troops and 7,000 Congolese army soldiers based in the city. In response, the Security Council established a new precedent with a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013 under the UN mission called MONUSCO since 2010. The FIB would be composed of regional African forces (from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi) operating within MONUSCO, with a mandate to carry out targeted “offensive” operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security. This was a major jump to peace enforcement with UN forces specifically tasked for combat operations.¹⁵ The FIB managed to neutralize the M23, at least for many years.

The UN mission in the Congo probably used more force than any other UN peace operation, though still not enough to respond in a timely fashion to the numerous attacks on civilians in the “Wild East” of the DRC. But it did gain experience using force against Congolese illegal armed groups (IAGs), like the ADF, CNDP, FDLR, FRPI, and M23.¹⁶

Another case of a violent spill-over arose after NATO’s air campaign to destroy the Libyan government. Initially, NATO’s use of advanced air power was celebrated for fast, decisive results. Yet a subsequent UN Support Mission in **Libya** (UNSMIL) was provided with few, if any, means to stem factional fighting or contain the spread

15 See, Christoph Vogel, “DRC: Assessing the performance of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade”, African Arguments, 14 July 2014. . <http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/14/drc-assessing-the-performance-of-monuscoss-force-intervention-brigade-by-christoph-vogel/> For elaboration on the implications, see, Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case, “The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” New York: International Peace Institute, November 2014. http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_e_pub_legal_issues_drc_brigade.pdf

16 A. Walter Dorn, “Peacekeepers in Combat: Protecting Civilians in the D.R. Congo”, *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 26 (2023), 31.

of conflict. It struggles to mediate a civil war and deal with external meddling. Neither NATO nor the UN had planned for the wider consequences, which included a flood of fighters and weapons moving South into the Sahel, and onto Mali and the Central African Republic. A volatile situation was briefly stemmed by the external military intervention of France. But their efforts would also be insufficient to stop the spread. New UN operations were promptly required in this vast region. Once again, they were slow to deploy.

The years 2013-to-2014 were pivotal, with a marked increase in the UN's willingness to use armed force. Aside from authorizing a force intervention brigade in the DRC, new operations in **Mali** (MINUSMA)¹⁷ and in the **Central African Republic** (MINUSCA)¹⁸ were also given mandates that verge on peace enforcement, with orders to use all necessary measures to 'stabilize' both countries. MINUSMA attack helicopters fired on rebel forces when they threatened a town. MINUSCA used attack helicopters on numerous occasions, notably in order to protect civilians in the town of Bambari.

Attack Helicopter's for Protection of Civilians in CAR¹⁹

When fighting between two armed groups threatened population centers, the United Nations felt compelled to act. The Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC)

17 See United Nations Security Council (S/RES/2164), 25 June 2014. [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2164\(2014\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2164(2014)). Notably, the priority tasks mandated for MINUSMA include: security, stabilization and protection of civilians; to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas; and to expand its operational coordination with the Malian Defence and Security Forces.

18 See, United Nations Security Council, (S/RES/2149), 10 April 2014. <https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1429581.pdf>

19 A more detailed description (from which this summary is taken) is provided in A. Walter Dorn, "Crucial Technologies for the Protection of Civilians by UN Peace Operations," *Global Governance* 29 (2023) 245-258.

and the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) were at war. The UPC along with its leader, Ali Darassa, was based in Bambari, while FPRC and its leader Azor Kalite had a stronghold in Bria. In late 2016 and early 2017, after numerous clashes, the FPRC moved to attack Bambari and remove Darassa by force. To prevent such an attack, MINUSCA declared a redline around Bambari—that was not to be crossed by attackers—and set up a UN temporary operating base (TOB) in nearby Ippy, which is along the road between Bambari and Bria. The UN also sponsored high-level talks with the leaders of the two groups to stop human rights violations, enhance POC, and promote peace, while at the same time declaring its determination to use robust measures to prevent attacks against civilians.²⁰

On 10–11 February 2017, the FPRC moved a large attack force of about 300 men in a column toward Bambari. They were armed with automatic weapons (AK-47s) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and were assisted by seven pickup trucks on the Ippy-Bambari road. Their goal was to attack and sack the town of Bambari and remove the UPC leader Darassa. With this crossing of the UN’s redline, the UN force sent an Mi-35 attack helicopter on 11 February to a location near the village of Ngawa (12 kilometers east of Ippy), where it observed and reported the rebels’ movement.

After firing a warning shot, the Mi-35 engaged the armed convoy with rockets and machine-gunfire, destroying four pickup trucks and scattering the rebels into the bush. The UN action successfully stopped the rebel attack on Bambari and demonstrated the UN’s use of force and deterrence capabilities. But the FPRC leader,

20 MINUSCA (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic). “Daily Situation Report Covering Period: 9 February 2017 (0001– 2400).” 10 February 2017a (actually covers to 13 February) and MINUSCA. SAGE incident and event database, “C3 BAMBARI FO.” 20 February 2017b.

Azor Kalite, accused the mission of favoring his enemy, the UPC. He threatened that, if his FPRC forces were not allowed to move on Bambari, they would “target MINUSCA staff, vehicles and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] wherever they can.”⁷ Kalite stipulated that “the only way to prevent further clashes is to remove the UPC leader Ali Darassa from Bambari.”²¹

The UN mission realized that the continuing presence of UPC leader Ali Darassa in Bambari was a liability. MINUSCA had to act impartially and be seen to be doing so, even by the FPRC. In coordination with the CAR government, it requested Darassa to leave Bambari. He had been using the town’s population as a de facto human shield against attack, and the UN could not permit the possibility of fighting in populated areas. To encourage his departure, MINUSCA made a strong show of force, surrounding Darassa’s house and even positioned the attack helicopter directly above it.²² Known as Operation Bekpa, the action also sought to increase the MINUSCA presence in the town and stabilize the security situation in case of pro-Darassa demonstrations, which were often fomented by Darassa himself.

The crisis was averted on 21 February, when Darassa announced that he would leave Bambari. The FPRC and UPC signed a cease-fire agreement on 9 October in Ippy, though both groups continued to commit human rights violations afterward.

FPRC leader Kalite was arrested by UN forces in May 2020, after his forces conducted a series of attacks against civilians and brazenly attempted to rush against

21 MINUSCA. SAGE database (21/02/2017), citing “IPPY-BAMBARI/21 FEB (C3 MAURBATT FLASH REPORT).” 2017c.

22 Balla Keita, lieutenant general, MINUSCA Force Commander, conversation with W. Dorn, Montreal, 12 June 2019; United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic.” UN Doc. S/2017/473 (2 June 2017), pp. 3 and 6.

the Portuguese Quick Reaction Force, one of MINUSCA's most robust units. He went on trial before the Special Criminal Court, established in 2018 to judge mass atrocity crimes in CAR.

Despite some blowback, MINUSCA demonstrated in 2017 that it could engage in POC tasks and protect civilians threatened with imminent attack using Mi-35 attack helicopters provided by a developing African country. Not only were these helicopters equipped with effective weapons systems and defensive armor, they also had surveillance technology for intelligence gathering. Being deployed from Bangui, the Mi-35 had significant freedom of movement for several hundred kilometers and easily overcame the natural barriers that ground forces face, like poor and impassable roads. It was a technology that worked robustly and provided the United Nations with a key enabling capability.

MINUSMA and MINUSCA both applied force via attack helicopters to protect civilians, but the forces could not stop a coup d'état in Mali and the growing Russian influence in both Mali and CAR.

Evolving Norms on the Use of Force

This brief historical overview demonstrates an ongoing evolution with aspects of continuity yet distinctly different approaches, and some major setbacks. UN peacekeeping commenced with **traditional** peacekeeping: unarmed observation missions and then armed interposed forces as a form of international conflict management during the Cold War. Even with armed peacekeepers, the use of force was strictly limited to self-defence. In this era, nations frequently deployed forces rapidly to the UN operations, allowing the world organization to stem the escalation or spread

of violent conflict – thus, limiting the use of force. Direct challenges and attacks on UN missions were rare.

The turbulence that ensued with end of the Cold War and the fragmentation demanded a new approach. In response to the internal conflicts of the 1990s the United Nations launched more complex **multidimensional**/multifunctional operations. Initially they were deployed into brutal conflicts with neither the mandates nor credible presence to use force. With confusion at all levels, too many UN operations would be humiliated, bullied and pushed aside. The consequences for civilians were far worse. Among the innovative approaches trialed were preventive deployment, partnerships, peacebuilding, and humanitarian intervention. Gradually a broader term than peacekeeping was used to describe the these: peace operations.

Post-conflict stabilization and support of the state became central to UN priorities in the twenty-first century. Some criticized UN operations as reinforcing a neo-liberal order, even as a form of neo-imperialism.²³ Increasingly, the UN Security Council authorized operations under Chapter VII with ‘all necessary measures’ to deter attacks and protect civilians under imminent threat. Mandates also expanded and encouraged more robust use of force. The larger operations with heavier national forces and **robust** rules were often required to stay for long periods. The majority of peacekeepers came from the developed world, which was also bearing the brunt of the fatalities.

23 See for example, Michael Pugh, “Peacekeeping and critical theory”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, Issue,1, 2004, pp. 39–58. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1353331042000228445>. Also see, Phillip Cunliffe, “Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 19, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 426–442. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2012.709751>

By 2013, persistent fighting and atrocity crimes prompted the UN Security Council to authorize a trial of peace enforcement, with *offensive* combat operations in the D.R. Congo. Robust peacekeeping appeared insufficient to make a difference in the toughest missions. ‘Stabilization’ operations were already being undertaken by US and NATO forces, and the UN Security Council adopted the term and the methods, including increased authorization for force. The Security Council tasked new missions with the protection of civilians, enforcement and stabilization.²⁴

Overall, the United Nations managed to gain some **success** from its more robust posture, especially in the neutralization of the M23, though that group resurfaced almost a decade later with the active assistance of Rwanda. And the UN operations that are widely perceived as the worst – Rwanda, Srebrenica, Somalia, and Darfur– are remembered both for the victims and the failure to use force when desperately needed. But successful use of force was clearly demonstrated in CAR and DRC. So the UN seemed to have learned valuable lessons from the earlier tragedies.

Conclusion: The continuing dilemma

Despite the historical evolution, the use of force remains contentious, as seen in the numerous conceptual reviews of the UN’s use of force.²⁵ This non-consensus over the use of force reflects the diverse interests, capabilities and experiences of key contributors.

24 Cedric de Coning, “How UN Peacekeeping Operations Can Adapt to New Multipolar World”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 26, no. 5, October 2019. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2019.1677286>

25 See for example, Mats Berdahl, “What Are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?” in Cedric de Coning and Mateja Peter (eds.), *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_6. Also see, Patryk Labuda, “How Much Force is Necessary to Protect Civilians?”, *Global Observatory*, International Peace Institute, 24 September 2019. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/09/how-much-force-necessary-protect-civilians/>

Divergent perspectives over the use of force – its purpose, role and appropriate practice – are also reflected within the UN System.²⁶ The use of force influences and affects each level of the system – from political, financial, strategic, operational and tactical – and may suggest a system-wide challenge, with no easy consensus likely to arise in the short-term. Even as some studies like the Santos Cruz report push for more robust use of force,²⁷ others are hesitant to rise to that level, including troop contributors fearful of the repercussions. Since consensus within this system usually comes at the lowest common denominator, agreements and operations often proceed with ambiguity and with individual leaders in the field deciding on when and how force may be used. Unlike in national or alliance military operations, the UN’s headquarters has much less operational control over the actions of the field missions. However, the combination of precedence and clarity in UN headquarters guidelines and policies are helping to diminish controversy.

For over a decade, opinion was distinctly divided between proponents of robust force and those who viewed any deviation from the trinity of ‘principled peacekeeping’ (adherence to the three core principles) as problematic and confirmed as such by

26 This system remains the sum of its parts, with the dominant part being its diverse 193 sovereign Member States, especially the UN Security Council, followed by the Member State Troop Contributing Countries’, Police Contributors (PCCs) and Financial Contributors (FCCs). Central to the working of the system are the UN Secretary-General, the UN Secretariat, with related Departments of Peace Operations (DPO), Political Affairs and Peacebuilding (DPPA), Operational Support (DOS), Department of Safety and Security (DSS), numerous offices, as well as regional organizations and partners.

27 Carlos dos Santos Cruz, “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business”, 19 December 2017, <https://www.un.org/en/unpdf/report-on-improving-security-of-peacekeepers>; see also Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Peacekeepers Must ‘Not Fear to Use Force’ to Foil Attacks, Report Says, New York Times”, 22 January 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/africa/un-peacekeepers-fatalities.html>.

recent experience.²⁸ Others claim that, “UN peacekeeping was not designed to wield force, and the UN’s permanent five (P-5), veto-wielding Security Council members do not want the UN to develop a military capacity.”²⁹ Understandably, disagreements are to be expected when UN peace operations are mandated to use offensive force against specified groups.

The UN’s use of force in peace operations shares similarities to a double-edged sword: there may be advantages and immediate benefits on one side of the blade yet also severe costs and long-term risks on the other side.

On the positive side, the use of force can save lives and strengthen the credibility of UN missions. It may also help to stem the escalation and spread of armed conflicts. Even demonstrating credible capacity to use force may deter and dissuade aggression and abuse from belligerent parties and spoilers. In operations with the appropriate mandate, leadership and composition, the use of force is also essential to protect civilians.

On the negative side, there are inherent risks in the use of force. If unprepared and lacking sufficient capacity, the UN’s use of force can escalate a conflict, embolden spoilers, encourage aggression and incur prompt retaliation. In the words of Sir Adam Roberts:

28 For an example advocating strict adherence to ‘principled peacekeeping’ see, Cedric de Coning, (ibid) “How UN Peacekeeping Operations Can Adapt to a New Multipolar World”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 26. No.5, 2019, pp. 536–539.

29 See, Lise Morjé Howard and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal, “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping”, *International Organization*, Volume 72, Issue 1, Cambridge University Press, Winter 2018, pp. 71–103. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/use-of-force-in-un-peacekeeping/FEC0C6E0B4B6D4017D242171602A7E01>

The problem of UN uses or threats of force in connection with ongoing peacekeeping or humanitarian operations remains serious. They include risks to the UN's reputation for impartiality, and dangers of UN or related personnel on the ground being taken hostage [or retaliated against] ... Many events of recent years suggest that too direct an association with military force, which inevitably involves tragedies and failures of many kinds, could seriously undermine the UN's, and more especially Secretary-General's reputation and capabilities.³⁰

Clearly, to use or not to use force entails consequences and difficult decisions. These may include allowing mass atrocities vs risks of 'collateral damage' (deaths of innocents), non-action vs crimes of omission or commission, performing mandated tasks vs retreating at the risk of operational failure, loss or gain of credibility and respect, and either diminished or increased support for the United Nations.

Further, there is no easy way to be sure of the short- or mid-to-long-term consequences in the use of force. What may appear as an immediate solution to a pressing need may lead to a worse situation over time. And, once used, lethal force is seldom an easy course to reverse.

Confusion and threats inevitably arise in the 'fog of war' where peacekeepers must operate. There is no easy solution aside from being better prepared and acting wisely.

30 Adam Roberts, "Proposals For UN Standing Forces: A Critical History", in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, (eds.), *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 125-128.

Confusion can also be reduced by technology that improves situational awareness and the ability to act with more precision.³¹ The emerging norm of Peacekeeping Intelligence is essential to provide early-warning and a clear understanding of the options, including preventive action.

The risks associated with the use of force will decline with the appropriate systems for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Unwanted casualties will also decline with better defensive and protective systems, as well as non-lethal weapons so the United Nations can move more deliberately along the spectrum of force.

Further, many threats may be offset by a credible, well-equipped UN presence – one deemed capable of both defensive and offensive operations. This should enhance deterrence and compliance in a UN peace operation. But the appearance and capability of the use of force may create the need to actually use force. Prior preparation, with general and specialized training remain crucial.

Confronted by new challenges and expectations, there is wider awareness of the need for flexibility and adaptation. Experience has demonstrated the need for a combination of ‘carrots and sticks’: appealing incentives (financial aid and other support) as well as potential punishments (various sanctions) to support compliance with peace agreements and international standards. Along with force, an array of useful services are needed to encourage cooperation. The withdrawal of those services discourages non-cooperation.

31 A. Walter Dorn, *Keeping watch: Monitoring, technology and innovation in UN peace operations*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011.

At present, the use of force is encouraged as a ‘duty to protect’ when civilians are at imminent risk. Accordingly, with three exceptions (MONUSCO, MINUSMA & MINURCA), offensive operations are confined to the tactical level, where force may be required to counter spoilers and deter armed aggression.

The United Nations, despite all its flaws and failures, is learning and evolving. Though not always linearly, the lessons of the past have helped to create better and gradually more robust peace operations, able to use force for the common good. Eventually, a standing force for quick interventions of the peacekeeping and peacekeeping kind may be created.³²

As stated by President (and General) Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Though force can protect in emergency, only justice, fairness, consideration and cooperation can finally lead men [humanity] to the dawn of eternal peace.”

32 H. Peter Langille. *Developing a United Nations Emergency Peace Service*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

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Responding Misinformation and Disinformation in
Peacekeeping Operational Operations

발제자 / Speaker

■ **고스와미** 예)소장 (인도 통합연구소)

MG(R) PK Goswami, VSM, Deputy Director General, USI, India

토론자 / Discussant


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Dr. Tae Eun Song, Assistant Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

■ **마이클 브로디 룬드비** 소령 (UN사령부)

Major Michael Brody Lundebj, UCJ 39, UNC/CFC/USFK







Misinformation and Disinformation in UN Peace Operations



Oldest and youngest



are more susceptible to
"fake news": 41% of
consumers ages 18-34
and 44% ages 65+ admit
to falling for it.



"Old and young US adults most susceptible to fake news."
PewCo+ June 13, 2018

#DidYouKnow







Case Study



Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

2019 - Ebola virus - mistrust and violence against healthcare workers. Fake news and misinfo about Ebola, Covid-19 vaccines.

“white people came with Ebola”. “You white people come for your own interest, to make money off Ebola”. “people who died from Ebola are deliberately being killed”.

130 attacks on healthcare facilities. Affected UN peacekeepers and other organisations to work with the local communities to prevent the spread of the disease.

2022 - 25-26 July 2022 - Attack on the UN facility, 15 people killed in a violent demonstration in the North Kivu, DRC; including two Indian police officers and a Moroccan ‘blue helmet’.

Local criticism - perceived inability to stop fighting in the conflict-torn East DRC, whereas peacekeepers are to protect civilians.

SRSG - “Fear, anxiety, and trauma are all having an impact on how we carry out our mandates.”



Case Study



Mali & CAR

Mali - A fake letter alleging peacekeepers collaborating with armed groups viral on Facebook and WhatsApp. Contributed to anti-UN sentiment and attacks against peacekeepers.

Challenging for mission to gain trust and cooperation of local population & vital task of protecting civilians that much difficult.

Mistrust & blame game led to withdrawal of Peace Mission.

CAR - Rumors and false information about intentions of peacekeepers led to anti-UN sentiment & attacks.

2021 - France suspended financial support & military coop, accusing CAR of being complicit in a Russian-backed disinformation campaign targeting France’s presence in Africa.

Challenging for mission to build relationships with the local community and effectively carry out their mandate.



Case Study - South Sudan



Social media platforms widely used to spread false information and hate speech - escalation of violence and the displacement of civilians.

The spread of false information undermined the credibility of the peace process and became more challenging for the UN mission to mediate between warring parties.

A free and vibrant media is one of the best ways to combat fake news and hate speech but the government created a near blackout of independent journalism. Unfriendly news outlets were closed, journalists arrested and intimidated.

This allowed outside influence through Facebook posts.



Managing Information Landscape



**Training
Strategic Communication**



Strategic Communication

Strategic communications to be integrated into planning cycles and risk management efforts.

To promote successes, manage expectations, and help address misinformation, disinformation and hate speech.

It must also be recognized as a senior leadership responsibility and function, requiring a whole-of-mission, coordinated approach; at operational level.

It must be fully supported at Strategic level ie UN HQ.



Managing Information Landscape

Training

Strategic Communication

Fact checking

Partnership

Monitoring and Reporting

Accountability

HOW TO SPOT FAKE NEWS

- CONSIDER THE SOURCE**
Click away from the story to investigate the site, its mission and its contact info.
- READ BEYOND**
Headlines can be outrageous in an effort to get clicks. What's the whole story?
- CHECK THE AUTHOR**
Do a quick search on the author. Are they credible? Are they real?
- SUPPORTING SOURCES?**
Click on those links. Determine if the info given actually supports the story.
- CHECK THE DATE**
Reposting old news stories doesn't mean they're relevant to current events.
- IS IT A JOKE?**
If it is too outlandish, it might be satire. Research the site and author to be sure.
- CHECK YOUR BIASES**
Consider if your own beliefs could affect your judgement.
- ASK THE EXPERTS**
Ask a librarian, or consult a fact-checking site.

International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions

Managing Information Landscape

- Training
- Strategic Communication
- Fact checking
- Partnership
- Monitoring and Reporting
- Accountability



Addressing disinformation is not solely a task for missions' leadership; but effectively tackling disinformation requires putting it in the broader **political context and understanding its **drivers** - a task that falls to address a broad array of actors within and outside of the UN, both at **UN HQ and mission leadership and host govt.****

Misinformation and Disinformation in UN Peace Operations

Introduction

Peacekeeping is one of the most effective tools available to the United Nations in promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Unfortunately, in many endless internal conflicts, political solutions are often absent or not acceptable to the warring factions, thus ceding space to the internal or external spoilers. This kind of conflicts are prevalent, pervasive, durable, and insoluble, since the issues of the dispute are emotionally charged. They give people their sense of belonging, through their bond with her or his community and defining the source of satisfaction for her or his need for identity¹. Even when an UN peace operation is launched, sometimes mission's mandate lacks focus and clear priorities; thus, present-day peace operations face several intractable challenges. Multifaceted threats in the prevailing operational environments are on the rise, triggering avoidable fatalities and injuries to the peacekeepers. Another challenge is in delivering on protection mandates and in contributing to long-term, sustainable peace and development. Moreso in today's social media driven environment, missions face lack of situational awareness, inadequate resources (personnel and equipment) and sometime UN force's reluctance to take risks to tackle these threats. This volatile situation has been further accentuated by **Mis and dis-information**, which creates an extremely unfavorable environment for UN peace operations.

In today's digitally connected world, significance of **information and**

1 David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly (1998). Characteristics of Deep-Rooted Conflict: In Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (Ed.). <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/democracy-and-deep-rooted-conflict.pdf>

communication needs no explanation. Information has real-life consequences, as it can prove to be a life-saver – when it’s authentic and true; but unfortunately, the opposite also happens. Today’s global youth are digital native and more likely to be connected online than the rest of the population, making them the most digitally connected generation in history. In conflict-affected areas, people have little access to fair and impartial news media. Lack of information in the face of endless violence, ever evolving uncertainty, adds to the frustration and anger on the perceived failure of UN or other foreign intervention. This eco-system is a fertile ground for twisting the facts, planting stories against the peacekeepers and creating well-crafted disinformation. At the same time easy spread of information by social media and messaging applications, further aggravates the issue. This has cumulatively resulted in the rapid spread of wrong information: **misinformation and disinformation**. These two words, **misinformation and disinformation** so often used **interchangeably, are merely one letter apart**. But behind that **one letter is hidden the critical distinction between these confusable words ie intent**. Unfortunately, it is the peacekeepers who are experiencing its ill-effects on ground.

Misinformation is ‘false or inaccurate information’. Examples include rumours, insults, and pranks. **Disinformation** is deliberate and includes malicious content such as hoaxes, spear phishing and propaganda. It spreads fear and suspicion among the population². Therefore, disinformation is misinformation that is intentionally spread, with intent to deceive and mislead; and it makes **Disinformation more powerful, potentially destructive, and disruptive**, especially in times of crisis, emergency or conflict. False information about UN peacekeepers is also nothing

2 UNHCR (2022). Using social media in community-based protection: a guide. Retrieved from: <https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Factsheet-4.pdf>

new; what is new is the scale at which false information is being mass-produced and the speed at which it spreads today. A growing barrage of motivated disinformation has targeted UN peace operations, particularly the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and South Sudan (UNMISS). Disinformation like – peacekeepers are exploiting natural resources, colluding with armed groups or jihadists, sexual exploitation and even supporting foreign troops, are part of local campaign. It ultimately transforms **Blue Flag** from a symbol of security into a target for attack and fuels open violence against UN personnel and partners.

Some unfortunate and reprehensible instances of grave misconduct by UN peacekeepers like sexual exploitation and abuse of vulnerable population, provides ready credibility to the local campaign and makes even the false allegations against peacekeepers more reliable. Advent of Artificial Intelligence has further strengthened disinformation by creating synthetic media, fake photographs and cloning of voices of known personalities, called deep-fakes. Thus, disinformation makes it more difficult for peace operations to implement their mandates and aggravates the safety of peacekeepers. In the overall analysis, disinformation is an integral part of broader challenges that are confronted by the UN peace operations. These may also include international and regional geopolitics and most often prevailing tense relationships with the host-state governments and populations³.

Case Study

Disinformation and misinformation campaigns have repeatedly targeted the UN

³ Albert Trithart (2022). Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations. Retrieved from https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/2212_Disinformation-against-UN-Peacekeeping-Ops.pdf

peacekeepers in Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These campaigns run from inside as well as outside the countries, increased in frequency and scope since 2022, endangering contingents, and jeopardising the missions' ability to implement their mandates.⁴ To illustrate the impact of misinformation and disinformation, some cases from the ongoing UN peace operations are as under:

In the **DRC**, the spread of rumors and false information about the Ebola virus, contributed to mistrust and violence against healthcare workers in 2019. “Fake news and misinformation about Ebola, Covid-19 and the vaccines that can curb these deadly diseases, was rife and there was a lot of mistrust within communities,” Yakubu Mohammed Saani, country director of ActionAid DRC explained⁵. Few rumors were like - “white people came with Ebola” though they were around before Ebola. “You white people come for your own interest, to make money off Ebola⁶,” “people who died from Ebola are deliberately being killed in treatment centers”. This type of disinformation contributed to more than 130 attacks on healthcare facilities, during which dozens of people were killed. This made it difficult for UN peacekeepers and other organisations to work with the local communities to prevent the spread of the disease.

4 Albert Trithart (2022). Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations.

5 ActionAid (2021). Women's groups lead fight against misinformation as Ebola returns to DRC; from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/women-s-groups-lead-fight-against-misinformation-ebola-returns-drc>

6 Sally Haydon (2019). How Misinformation Is Making It Almost Impossible to Contain the Ebola Outbreak in DRC; Time, USA, June 2023.

In 2022, consequences of misinformation and disinformation campaign by locals led to events of 25-26 July 2022, as narrated by Bintou Keita, SRSG, DRC; during a seminar at USI in Oct 22. Angst against the peacekeepers was created through a sustained disinformation about the UN role. The local attack on the UN facility resulted in the death of at least 15 people in a violent demonstration in the North Kivu, DRC. Those killed included two Indian police officers and a Moroccan ‘blue helmet’. MONUSCO came under local criticism for its perceived inability to stop fighting in the conflict-torn East DRC, whereas peacekeepers are in the region to protect civilians. The SRSG added “Fear, anxiety, and trauma are all having an impact on how we carry out our mandates⁷”.

In **Mali**, a fake letter alleging peacekeepers were collaborating with armed groups was posted on Facebook and it went viral on WhatsApp⁸. False rumors and conspiracy theories about the UN peacekeeping mission contributed to anti-UN sentiment and attacks against peacekeepers. Thus, it has become more challenging for the UN mission to gain trust and cooperation of local population as well as making their vital task of protecting civilians that much difficult.

In the **CAR**, rumors and false information about the intentions of peacekeepers contributed to anti-UN sentiment and attacks against

7 USI (2022). Proceedings of the Seminar.

8 <https://nationalpost.com/pmnn/news-pmnn/un-stresses-key-communications-role-to-combat-disinformation>. July 2022.

peacekeepers. This made it more challenging for the UN mission to build relationships with the local community and effectively carry out their mandate. In 2021, France suspended financial support and military cooperation with the CAR, accusing it of being complicit in a Russian-backed disinformation campaign targeting France's presence in Africa⁹.

In **South Sudan**, social media platforms have been used to spread false information and hate speech, contributing to the escalation of violence and the displacement of civilians. The spread of false information has also undermined the credibility of the peace process and made it more challenging for the UN mission to mediate between warring parties. The government of South Sudan is also to blame for the same. A free and vibrant media is one of the best ways to combat fake news and hate speech but the South Sudanese government had created a near blackout of independent journalism in the country. Unfriendly news outlets were closed, journalists arrested and intimidated¹⁰. This allowed outside influence through Facebook posts.

9 Sarah Elzas (2021). France accuses CAR of complicity in disinformation campaign, suspends support; <https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210608-france-accuses-car-of-complicity-in-disinformation-campaign-suspends-support-russia-wagner-mercenaries-social-media-politics-protests>

10 Justine Lynch (2017). In South Sudan, Fake News Has Deadly Consequences. Accessed from: <https://slate.com/technology/2017/06/in-south-sudan-fake-news-has-deadly-consequences.html>

Books and papers

Facts and Other Lies: Welcome to the Disinformation Age by Ed Coper: 2022.

Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators; Editors: Peter Harris and Ben Reilly. (International IDEA)1998.

Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations by Albert Trithart November 2022, International Peace Institute.

Managing Information Landscape

Disinformation is a significant challenge to UN peacekeeping missions, as it undermines the trust of local communities, complicate negotiations, and even fuel conflict. New technologies have totally revolutionised the information landscape and today, these channels of communication and influence constitute both critical assets and significant challenges for missions. Thus, information management has to be an integrated part of all mission planning, execution, and evaluation. It remains a challenge for mission leadership, to proactively mitigate and contain mis- and disinformation risks. To succeed, UN peace operations need to be equipped with the necessary strategies, competencies, and resources. In the multi-faceted approach to tackle Mis- and Disinformation **Training and Strategic Communication**, both at Operational and Tactical Level, are considered most important. In this regard following steps are being taken:

Training: Peacekeepers are being trained to identify and counter disinformation. For this they must be aware of:

- Host nation's media landscape, its politicisation, polarisation and propaganda machinery.
- Perception management plays a major roll to counter disinformation. In UNIFIL strength of mission was increased in 2006 from 2000 to 13000 but it was perceived as interference of West in Arab Countries, which was not acceptable. Similarly, mission leadership, at all level, must clear perception of local population about responsibilities/tasks of mission by highlighting mandate.

- To provide training to journalists and civil society organizations on how to recognize and report disinformation.
- Use of technology assists peacekeepers, but it has its own limitations – no tool available to analyse Arabic, due to variety of dialects.
- Though it's a very important but issue, but missions have limited resources and capabilities to counter.
- UN to provide guidance on training, including collecting and sharing best practices with troop contributing countries.

Strategic Communication: Disinformation is not merely a technical or tactical issue; but more of a political and strategic issue that requires the proactive attention of mission leaders. It requires a mission-wide approach and could be mitigated by building missions' strategic communications capacity.

Communications which is credible, accurate and human-centred, is one of the best and most cost-effective instruments to counter disinformation. While we live in an increasingly digital world, but direct person to person communication often remains the most powerful way to build trust and counter false narratives. Missions must conduct town-hall style gatherings in local communities with village elders, young people, women's groups and others to learn and to listen; to provide them with accurate information, to dispel rumours and build trust. It strengthens the understanding amongst the local population of our missions and

mandates and in return, strengthens peacekeepers' understanding of the local population's concerns, grievances, expectations and hopes. But, to be effective, it must be grounded in evidence, based on verified data, open to dialogue, rooted in storytelling and delivered by credible messengers. UN missions also must publicise its success stories on local, regional and national level. The missions to also work with local media and civil society organizations to promote accurate reporting and educate the public about the mission's objectives and activities.

Fact checking: Accurate and timely information is essential for decision making and the successful achievement of the mission's objectives. Missions to establish fact-checking mechanisms to verify information before disseminating it, to ensure that the information shared is accurate and reliable. Missions must maintain transparent communication with the public to help build trust and dispel false rumours and misconceptions.

Partnership: The missions to partner with host government, civil society organizations, local media, and other stakeholders to promote accurate information and counter disinformation.

Monitoring and Reporting: The missions to monitor and report on disinformation and misinformation campaigns, which helps to raise awareness and build resilience against such tactics. To ensure effectiveness we must adjust as necessary and adapting our strategy to the tactical necessities of the specific contexts we operate in.

Accountability: The missions to enforce measures to hold those who spread disinformation accountable, including through investigations and legal action.

Conclusion

Both at headquarters and on the ground, UN personnel are attempting to address disinformation against the UN. Nonetheless, the scale at which this challenge has grown far exceeds the UN ability to respond. They need greater capacity and coordination to monitor and analyse disinformation both online and offline. They need more streamlined approval processes so that they respond to disinformation more quickly. In the longer term, they need to shift toward preventive approaches, including proactively reshaping narratives about the UN and contributing to a healthier information environment through support to local journalists.

At Mission level, adopting a whole-of-mission approach across uniformed and civilian components to foster a networked communication in the field will be beneficial. For this, military, police and civilian officers skilled in strategic communications be considered or trained for.

Thus, addressing disinformation is not solely a task for missions' leadership; but effectively tackling disinformation requires putting it in the broader political context and understanding its drivers - a task that falls to address a broad array of actors within and outside of the UN, both at UN HQ and mission leadership and host govt.

제19회 PKO 발전 세미나

The 19th Peacekeeping Operations Seminar

A4P와 연계한 평화유지요원 안전 증진과 여성 역할 확대

Improving Peacekeepers' Safety and Expanding Women's Role in line with A4P

제4주제 / The 4th Session

평화유지활동에서 여성의 역할 확대 방안

Expanding Women Peacekeepers' Role in PKO

발제자 / Speaker

- **머린 웰우드** 대령 (캐나다 국방대학교)
Colonel Maureen Wellwood, Canadian Armed Forces

토론자 / Discussant

- **구도경** 교수 (육군사관학교)
Major Dokyoung Koo, Assistant Professor, Korea Military Academy
- **강효경** 교수 (국방대학교 국제평화활동센터)
Dr. Hyo-Kyung Kang, Professor, PKO Center, KNDU



Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

PROTECT STABILIZE CONSOLIDATE PEACE

Expanding Women Peacekeepers' Role in PKO

Col B Maureen Wellwood, OMM, CD
Deputy Chief of Staff Operations and Plans MONUSCO Jul 21-Aug 22

MISSION DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA STABILISATION EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

1

Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

PROTECT STABILIZE CONSOLIDATE PEACE

MONUSCO

The slide features a composite image. On the left is a world map with latitude and longitude lines. In the center is a map of Africa with various countries labeled. On the right is a map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, color-coded by province, with Kinshasa marked. To the right of the maps is a photograph showing a rural settlement with several small, simple houses and people walking around.

2

Scope

- Participation of Women Peacekeepers
- Barriers prior to deployment
 - Tangible/Intangible
- Barriers during deployment
 - Operational/Interpersonal
- Potential Solutions
- Summary

3



Participation of Women Peacekeepers (MONUSCO 2022)

MSOs = 326 (22%, 74 Women)
MILOBs = 165 (26%, 43 Women)
Contingent = 12522 (5%, 670 Women)

4

Barriers prior to deployment

Tangible

- Living quarters
- Latrines
- Security
- Health care delivery
- Trg and skills development in home military (drivers licence to staff college)
- Support to families of deployed members

Intangible

- Lack of role models
- Lack of networking opportunities
- Gender bias in UN and national recruitment and selection
- Gender stereotypes



5

Barriers during deployment

Operational

- SEA and sexual harrasment
- Lack of empowerment of Engagement Teams (toilets, telephones & tasks)
- Female translators
- Perception of « combattant »

Interpersonal

- Lack of meaningful employment
- Cultural cognition in interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and WPS policies
- Observation of how other women are treated (ex SRSG, Dir PoC,...)
- Assignment of domestic tasks within the deployed team
- Use of gendered language
- Toxic masculinity



6

Potential Solutions



- Professional and personal RESPECT
- Resourcing
- Specific projects and operations aimed at providing security to women of HN
- Equal opportunities at home and with the UN
- Support to families
- Networking and moral support

7

Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
pour la Stabilisation en
République Démocratique du Congo



United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo

PROTECT

STABILIZE

CONSOLIDATE PEACE

Summary



MISSION DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA STABILISATION EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

8



MEMO



MEMO