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[Special contribution]

Navigating a New World: The Evolving Challenges and alliances in Global Security

Graham Allison

Revisiting South Korea's Peace Operations:

Public Diplomatic Achievements of Korean PRT in Afghanistan

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Suggestions on Measures to Strengthen South Korea-India Space Cooperation in the New Space Era

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[Special contribution]

Navigating a New World: The Evolving Challenges and alliances in Global Security

Graham Allison

Sorry I can't be with you in person at the National Defense university Forum which I've had the opportunity to attend previously, but I'm happy to offer a few comments about this Brave New World that we're all struggling with. To note that The International Security order is rapidly changing and in ways that we hadn't anticipated but that will present to you as professionals dealing with South Korea's security as well as Americans and others severe new tests is a truism. But it's often worthwhile pausing for a little bit to think about a platitude or a truism something we all know to reflect on what it actually means. There is no question that South Korea and the ROK-U.S. Alliance have provided a very firm foundation for one of the miracles of the past 70 years in which a war-torn nation has emerged as one of the most vibrant democracies, economies, and technology leaders. South Korea has taken its place among the major middle powers of the world so we can celebrate that and we do celebrate that.

But we should also notice that the international chessboard is changing so rapidly that the answers that we gave to the challenges that we faced in 1953 or 1993 are not necessarily sufficient answers to the questions we face today in 2023 or may face in 2033. So before I comment on the challenges I thought I would first pause to reflect on what has been accomplished because I think it's important to understand that foundation. Then I'll turn to the more difficult question about what at least at this point we can say about the challenges ahead.

We have all been celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the end of the Korean War - seven decades in which the Armistice has allowed South Korea, despite the threats from North Korea and despite provocations from North Korea, to emerge thanks to the hard work of its people and government. South Koreans have seen more improvement in their well-being, in their lives, in their health, and in their

incomes than in any seven decades in all of Korean history.

I continue to say what a miracle it is, how fantastic a country you have built, how proud you should be of it, and how proud everyone is and indeed how proud Americans are to have played a part in creating the environment in which these achievements were able to take place. Now I note this is not just the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War – this week we marked the 78th anniversary of the end of World War II, with the unconditional surrender of Japan. Few have noticed that the end of that war was also the beginning of the long peace in which for the past 78 years there have been no great power wars. So as historians we should look and remember that is extremely anomalous. It is actually very hard to find an analogous period in which over 78 years there were no wars between major powers. There have been wars of course - smaller Wars - but no great power war. That is not to be taken for granted and it cannot be taken for granted in the future, but it is a big accomplishment.

Secondly, we have built and preserved a nuclear order that no one could have imagined if we go back 78 years ago to the end of World War II and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If anybody had said that for the next 78 years you would not see another nuclear weapon used in war they would have given a thousand to one or ten thousand to one odds against. I mean it is quite miraculous that over these 78 years there has emerged a strong taboo against any use of nuclear weapons in war. We cannot take this for granted, but it is nonetheless something to note and be thankful for.

Thirdly, who could have imagined there would only be nine nuclear weapon States today when there are probably 40 or 50 states – including South Korea - which could develop their own nuclear arsenals if they chose to. The non-proliferation regime in which South Korea has been a shining example and pillar is something in which we can all take pride but which we should also notice is not natural or necessarily permanent. It is always under stress and I think what President Yoon did with the Washington declaration just a couple of months ago was another example of the way South Korea's leadership in this realm has contributed to the global nonproliferation regime that has left us all safer than we would be otherwise. So there is much to be thankful for looking back. Now, what about looking ahead?

Looking ahead, the summary bottom line is things are going to be much more severe and test us in ways that we haven't been tested over these past seven decades. I will mention five features of what I call the grave new world. First, the post-Cold War era is over, dead, and buried. Secretary of Defense Mattis in his National Defense strategy conducted the formal burial of the so-called unipolar order in his 2018 National Defense Strategy. As he said, we became accustomed to thinking we could use our forces to fly anywhere, sail anywhere, land anywhere, and fight anywhere with uncontested Supremacy - but that was then. Now we

recognize that in every arena of warfare and every domain we are fully contested by others - in particular by China, but also to some extent by Russia and other middle powers. So again, as the U.S. tries to take care of its own security and fulfill its commitment to others it is dealing with adversaries which contest American power in every domain. Secondly, a multipolar geopolitical landscape is emerging. It will not be a unipolar or bipolar world, but a multi-aligned, multi-dimensional world in which alignments will be more subtle and complex. Interstate relationships will be tight in some areas and loose in others. States will be thick cooperators in some domains and fierce rivals in others. For example, South Korea will continue to have China as its major trading partner, but at the same time depend on its relationship with the U.S. for its security. While there will be claims that you need to choose one or the other, we are going to be in a world that is beyond the old black and white paradigm. We must become accustomed to what I call "50 Shades of alignment and opposition." Going to that will be painful for Americans and others and require a lot more intelligence and agility.

Third, the defining geopolitical challenge of today and the rest of our professional lives as far as any eye can see will be the rapid rise of China and its impact on the U.S. and the Global Security order of which the US has been the principal architect and guardian. As I wrote in *Destined for War*, a Thucydidean Rivalry occurs when a rapidly rising power seriously threatens to displace a major ruling power. These circumstance involve is a severely heightened risk of war. Twelve of the sixteen Thucydidean rivalries of the past 500 years the last 16 times this ended in war - frequently wars neither party intended. Today, Thucydidean dynamics are magnifying the potential for misperception and miscalculation in relations between the U.S. and China. Under such circumstances, accidents or provocations by third parties are more likely to lead to a crisis or war.

Fourth, Russia has launched a war against Ukraine that it cannot win, thanks to the resilience and courage of the Ukrainians and the support that they've received from the West. But at the same time it is a war that Putin cannot lose if he is to maintain his position as leader of Russia. Putin may resort to nuclear use if he were to conclude it is the only alternative to suffering a humiliating defeat. If that were to happen, we would be dragged into a striking New World in which the incentives for further nuclear proliferation may become irresistible. That is another reason why the Biden Administration has worked so hard to manage this war in order to not fight World War III over Ukraine.

Fifth, South Korea is forced to continue surviving next door to a very erratic and sometimes seemingly irrational North Korea that has an a powerful conventional Army and an robust nuclear arsenal which is increasingly able to threaten even the United States. Living beside Kim Jong-un and the North Korean regime has been very challenging for South Korea for 70 years and is likely to become more challenging in the period ahead.

So again, we are in what I call a grave new world with many rapidly changing challenges which forces us to step back and assess the answers we have given to the big questions of the last 78 years. We are fortunate that those have been good answers and we have a solid foundation to build on but those old answers may not be sufficient in today's rapidly changing conditions. Accordingly, it is important to ask serious questions about the status and strength of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance. My view is that the alliance was reaffirmed with the Washington Declaration this past April. It is tighter and stronger than it has been in decades and will continue to be so in the future, but I think that is a question you need to look at for yourselves.

Secondly, the meeting this past weekend at Camp David in which South Korean President Yoon, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, and President Biden met showed that even in the difficult relations between South Korea and Japan the tides are shifting due to the challenge posed by China and the common interests of Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. in dealing with a more erratic North Korea. These forces are driving leaders to take big steps, despite difficult political challenges at home, and even in our own minds to

What will Asia look like going forward? My bet is that we're going to see an emerging, multi-dimensional, and subtle balance of power in which you will see a spectrum of alignments and oppositions across various dimensions. The South Korea-Japan-U.S. relationship will not be part of the Quad. AUKUS will be distinct from the Washington Declaration. India will not be a formal U.S. ally. The Philippines and others in Southeast Asia are going to have to find their way, but you can see the straws in the wind.

Over the next year and next decade I believe we will see the emergence of what in traditional terms would be called a balance of power, but it will be one that is more multi-dimensional and complicated. In some dimensions you'll have very thick partnerships between two parties who will be serious rivals in other dimensions.

To conclude, I believe that Americans and Chinese are going to have to get beyond the kind of black-or-white, either-or style of thinking that we're accustomed to. We must think in terms of at least 50 Shades of complexity in a relationship that I hope will eventually be characterized as a rivalry partnership in which in some domains the U.S. and China will be the fiercest rivals history has ever seen and in other domains they will find themselves having to be thick Partners so that each country can ensure its own Survival.

So again, thank you for letting me have a chance to offer two cents worth for the conference. I'm sorry I can't be there to hear the rest of the presentations and participate in the conversation. I would simply conclude that as a longtime Watcher and admirer of South Korea and - especially its Security Forces - I have been very impressed by South Korea accomplishments and by what Alliance has

done in providing security for South Korea, the region, and indeed for the world. The period ahead is going to be even tougher but I think we have the wind at our back. Thank you very much.

Revisiting South Korea's Peace Operations: Public Diplomatic Achievements of Korean PRT in Afghanistan

Youngin Kim, Yeonu Son

Abstract

This study examined the outcomes of Korea's peace operations in terms of public diplomacy. It focuses on the analysis of peacebuilding among peace operations. Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Parwan province, Afghanistan carried out local stabilization and humanitarian assistance activities in Afghanistan from July 2010 to June 2014. Korean PRT directly shared the development experience of Korea with Afghans and conducted civilian field activities to reach out to local residents. As a result, the Korean PRT earned a positive evaluation from the Afghan government and the appellation of "Friends of the Afghans" from local people. The peacebuilding activities of the Korean PRT involved the private-led participation of various actors, utilization of soft power, and interactive communication, which can be understood in terms of public diplomacy. This study expands the scope of peace operations research by examining the achievements of the Korean PRT in Afghanistan from a non-military point of view.

Key Words: *Korea's Peace Operations, Peacebuilding, Public Diplomacy, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, Korean PRT*

Introduction

As international conflict resolution and management have increased in the post-Cold War era, South Korea, a member of the UN and a U.S. ally, has been active in peace operations.¹⁾ This is in distinct contrast to Korea's passive role in international security during the Cold War. However, in most cases, Korea's peace operations have received negative evaluations based on the domestic and international security situations, lack of public consensus, and challenges with related laws and institutions.²⁾ By and large, existing studies on peace operations of Korea have focused on the determinants of defense and security policies or suggestions for future development. Exploring non-military aspects, this study aims to analyze the positive outcomes of Korea's peace operations. Accordingly, it focuses on 'peacebuilding' operations, a significant part of the UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era, to assess the outcomes of Korea's international peace efforts.

This study examines the public diplomacy outcomes of peacebuilding operations, which have been emerging as a central part of foreign policies in the 21st century and have significant implications in public diplomacy as they aim at rebuilding and stabilizing conflict areas and providing humanitarian support to local people in need. In the post-Cold War era, mid- to long-term goals of the operations could be achieved through soft power that appeals to local communities in addition to hard power such as military and economic power. Peacebuilding operations are an effective means of public diplomacy in the 21st century to promote horizontal and interactive communication with local people through sharing experiences, transferring knowledge, and providing educational, cultural, and medical benefits.

This research explores the outcomes of public diplomacy in the Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.³⁾ The Korean PRT conducted peacebuilding operations from July 2010 to June 2014 for rebuilding

1) Since Korea sent the Military Medical Assistance Corps and the Air Force Transport Corps to the multinational forces in the Gulf War that broke out in January 1991, it has sent 54 units and 61,044 personnel overseas in 27 regions by the end of December 2022. As of June 2023, a total of 852 soldiers, professionals, and more, including 571 for UN peacekeeping operations and 281 for multinational forces peace operations, have been deployed for overseas military missions (The Ministry of National Defense).

2) Shin-wha Lee, "A Study on 'PKO Divide' in Korean International Peacekeeping Operations: UN-led PKO vs. Non-UN-led PKO," *The Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2013), p. 195.

3) Apart from the performances of the Korean PRT in Afghanistan, there are also a number of negative assessments of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led stabilization operations in Afghanistan, which include a lack of operational capacity and situation control, failure to negotiate with Taliban forces, inability to set law and order in the country, and lack of unity and solidarity among ethnic groups (Rietjens 2022, 1001-1012; Bayir 2022, 217-244).

Parwan Province, Afghanistan, in four areas: education and training, health, rural development, and consultation to the provincial government. Compared to military-led reconstruction efforts in other countries, it has focused on stabilizing the region and improving the quality of lives of Afghans by offering political, economic, and cultural support through civilian-led efforts. This allowed Korea to be favorably viewed as a trusted country and a friend of Afghans by the Afghan government and its people. Thus, this study aims to empirically analyze the community-friendly activities of the Korean PRT and the outcomes of public diplomacy in Afghanistan.

To do so, we will review the existing studies on the peace operations of Korea and discuss their limitations. Next, we will identify the public diplomatic aspects of peacebuilding operations as a paradigm shift in international peace efforts of the post-Cold War era. Then, we will examine the processes of Korea's participation in the Afghanistan PRT and then review the peacebuilding operations and its public diplomatic outcomes. In the last section of the study, based on the findings of this research, we will draw policy implications for Korean peacebuilding efforts as public diplomacy.

Literature Review

Two major streams of research on Korea's peace operations have emerged. One stream of scholarship adopts an approach that analyzes the determinants of peace operations of Korea. Some studies suggest that South Korea joins peace operations to maintain its relations with its allies.⁴⁾ They explain that South Korea, under the threat of North Korea, participates in U.S.-led multinational peace operations to resolve the asymmetric alliance with the United States and to strengthen military and security cooperation with the United States in the 21st century. Other studies identify the growing national power as a determinant for South Korea to engage in peace operations.⁵⁾ These analyses basically examine the key factors that Korea has

4) Balbina Hwang, "Peacekeeping." in Scott Snyder (ed.) *The US-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges*. (2012) Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 173-194.; Hannah Kim, "*Dong-maeng-gwa Pa-byung-oi-gyo-ui Sang-ho-yeon-gye-sung: Han-guk-ui Vietnam Mit Iraq Pa-gyung-ui Gong-tong-yo-in* (Interconnectedness of Alliance and Troop Deployment Diplomacy: Common Factors in Korea's Troop Dispatch to Vietnam and Iraq)," Master's thesis, Korea University, (2007), pp. 1-104. ; Seok-woo Lee, "Security Dilemma of ROK-US Alliance Troops Dispatches to Iraq and Afghanistan," Doctoral dissertation, Yonsei University, (2015), pp. 1-210.

5) Balbina Hwang, "Korea and PKO: Is Korea Contributing to Global Peace?," *Global Korea: South Korea's Contributions to International Security*. (2012), pp. 13-27.; Min Ye, Uk Heo, and Quan Li, "Economic Development and South Korea's UN PKO Participation," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 5, (2018), pp. 666-684.; GAB-SEONG LEE, "An Analysis of the Policy Decision Making Process for the Participation in Multinational Force of ROK Troops focusing on the State Autonomy," Doctoral dissertation, Yonsei University, (2015).

participated in UN peace operations since the 1990s in the context of economic development and national autonomy. Another group of studies pays special attention to domestic politics.⁶⁾ This literature adopted an analytical approach that focuses on the political leadership factors of the Korean president and the model of bureaucratic politics as well as changes in domestic public opinion and institutions. Moreover, some scholars highlight the role of the idea in South Korea's decision to commit to peace operations.⁷⁾ These studies emphasize that Korea's normative motivation for solving human rights problems in the international community led to participation in peace operations. Lastly, some studies associate Korea's participation in UN PKO with the changes in the perception of security that favored humanitarianism in the post-Cold War era.

The other stream of scholarship subscribes to an approach that examines the challenges and development of Korea's peace operations. The studies focusing on the role of the middle power suggest peace operations as a strategic means for Korea to contribute to the international community.⁸⁾ Scholars studying soft power promotion emphasize that Korea's participation in peace operations could enhance its useful diplomatic asset, soft power.⁹⁾ Other studies examining the

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- 6) Eun-sook Chung, "Korea's Law on UNPKO and Its Role in International Peacekeeping Missions," *Korea Focus*, Vol. 18, No.2. (2010), pp. 98-102.; Sangtu Ko, "Korea's Middle Power Activism and Peacekeeping Operations," *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2012), pp.287-299.; Heung-Soon Park, "UN PKOs and Domestic Politics of Korea," in Soo-Gil Park and Sung-Hack Kang (eds.), *UN, PKO and East Asian Security: Currents, Trends and Prospects* (Seoul: Korean Academic Council on the United Nations System, 2002), pp. 197-215.; KyudokHong, "Han-guk-ui Iraq Pa-byeong-ui Mok-jeok, Yeok-hal, Jeon-mang (Purpose, Role, and Prospect of Korea's Troop Dispatch to Iraq)," in Gang, Seong-Hak(eds.) *UN-gwa Guk-je-wi-gi-gwan-ri (The UN and International Crisis Management)*, Seoul: LeeBook, 183-208.
- 7) Sangtu Ko, "The Foreign Policy Goal of South Korea's UN Peacekeeping Operations," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.22, No.1 (2015), pp. 65-80.; Key-young Son, "From a Garrison State to a Humanitarian Power?: Security Identities, Constitutive Norms and South Korea's Overseas Troop Dispatches," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.23, No.4 (December 2011), pp. 557-573.
- 8) Brendan M. Howe, "Korea's role for peacebuilding and development in Asia," *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 5-2 (November 2017), pp. 243-266; Geumryul Kim, Kangkyong Lee, & Hyeonju Seol, "Strategies for the Development of International Peace Activities of the Korean Army in Conjunction with the UN's Action for Peacekeeping(A4P)." *STRATEGIC STUDIES*, Vol. 29, No. 3. (2013), pp. 43-83. ; Terence Roehrig, "South Korea, Foreign Aid, and UN Peacekeeping: Contributing to International Peace and Security as a Middle Power," *Korea Observer*, Vol.44, No.4 (Winter, 2013), pp. 623-645.; Dae-sun Son, "A Study on the UN PKO of Republic of Korea, as a Middle Power for Exercising Its Leadership: Focusing on the Producing Dignitaries," *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* Vol. 33, No. 1 (2017), pp. 59-95.
- 9) Young-Ho Kim, "Smart Power Strategy and the Korean Armed Forces' Peace Operations," *THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, Vo.12, No.2 (2009e), pp. 47-67.; Jaechun KIM & Hyun AHN, "Korea's National Strategy for Global Governance Participation: With

implementation of civil-military operations assess the outcomes and limitations of Korea's civil-military operations and suggest policy directions that could be applied in the future.¹⁰⁾ Lastly, the public diplomacy studies regard peace operations as a new paradigm of public diplomacy and emphasize the need of public diplomacy for the development of peace operations.¹¹⁾

As we have reviewed, there is no shortage of studies on South Korea's peace operations, which affirms the salience of the research on the peace operations of military intervention or overseas deployment even though the country is under constant threats from North Korea and is not as capable as the great powers in terms of military capability. However, the existing discussions focus heavily on exploring determinants of South Korea's participation in peace operations and presenting development plans. They have shown little interest in analyzing what Korean peace operations have achieved empirically. Rather, researchers seem to have stayed in epistemological skepticism that treats Korea's peace operations as foreign policies, which the country should engage in as little as possible as a means of military and security.

With a different analytical perspective from the existing approaches, this study aims to positively portray South Korea's role in contributing to international security in the post-Cold War era by tracking the achievements of South Korea's peace operations. This analytical attempt intends to challenge the realist paradigm that views Korea's foreign and security policy as a dependent variable, which is significantly influenced by power or structure. By confirming and accumulating the significant achievements of Korean peace operations, this study aims to explore the theoretical and policy balance of Korean security policy in the future. This research

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- 10) John Hemmings, "The ROK Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan," in Scott Bruce et al. (eds.), *Global Korea: South Korea's Contributions to International Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2012), pp. 45-60.; Kyudok Hong, "South Korean Approaches to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 23, No.1 (Spring/Summer 2009), pp. 23-45.; Byung Ok Kil, "Development Direction of ROK's Civil Military Operations and Future Tasks," *Military Studies*, No.54 (Summer, 2008), pp. 88-110.
- 11) Sun-Tae Kim, "Case Studies of ROK Military Diplomacy: Focused on the Perspective of Public Diplomacy," *East and West Studies*, Vol. 22, No.2 (2010a), pp. 223-250.; Keumsoo Kim & Hyekeun Jee, "The Direction of International Peace Activities in Korea from the Perspective of Public Diplomacy," *Military Studies*, No.106 (2021), pp. 505-619.; Shin-wha Lee, "International PKO as 'Security Public Diplomacy'," *OUGHTOPIA*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2019), pp. 7-42.; Yeong Mi Yun, "A Study of the New Paradigm of Public Diplomacy: Focusing on the Cooperative Activities with the Ashena Base and the Provincial Reconstruction Team(PRT) in Afghanistan," *The Korean Association of Area Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2012), pp. 253-278.

revisits the peace operations of Korea in the post-Cold War era from a diplomatic point of view rather than that of the military, focusing on the process of policy implementation rather than policy-making.

Theoretical Discussion

Origin and Enhancement of Peacebuilding Capabilities since Post-Cold War Era

The UN was authorized to manage international conflicts during the post-Cold War era and has emphasized the ‘peacebuilding’ function in peace operations. Since the 1990s, the proliferation of high-intensity conflicts has led peace operations to gradually encompass the concept of peace enforcement,¹²⁾ but the UN has continued to appear to emphasize its peacebuilding mission.¹³⁾ In the post-Cold War era, the UN sought to expand more active and complex peace operations than before, which included rebuilding failed states, promoting political reconciliation among conflict groups, and enhancing the human rights through political, economic, and social support such as election support and monitoring, reorganization and enhancement of government institutions, cross-party controlling arms, refugee return, and humanitarian relief.¹⁴⁾

The conceptual definition of peace reconstruction can be found in the report 「Agenda for Peace」 released in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 6th Secretary-General of the UN. Peacebuilding was defined as “action to identify and support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”¹⁵⁾ In other words, peacebuilding can be interpreted as an active peace activity mission to prevent a return to conflict by supporting structures that strengthen and clarify the state of peace.

Since then, the concept of peacebuilding has often been mentioned as a key function of peace operations. the UK Ministry of Defense summarized peacebuilding as “peace support operations employing complementary diplomatic, civil and, when necessary, military means to address the underlying causes of

12) Peace enforcement involves “the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force with the authorization of the Security Council”. These measures empower the Security Council to restore international peace and security in threats to peace or aggression (UNDPKO and UNDFS 2008, 17).

13) Paul F. Diehl, *Peace Operations*. Malden (MA: Polity, 2008), p.8.; Yeoul Soo Kim, *National Security: The Dilemma of Threats and Vulnerabilities*(Paju: Bobmunsa, 2010b), p.103.

14) In-Hwan Song, “An Analysis of Decision Factors of ROK's Troops Dispatch to Iraq,” Master's thesis, Honam University (2006a), p. 97.; Dong-soon Park & Hyung-hwoi Gu, *International Conflict and Peace Activities*(Seoul: Sunin, 2019), pp. 2-19, 251.

15) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*(New York: UN, 1992), p. 11.

conflicts and the longer-term needs of the people.”¹⁶⁾ Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond defined peacebuilding in a broad sense as a comprehensive operation encompassing political reconciliation, security, economic reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance, social integration, and human rights protection.¹⁷⁾

The UN has also gradually evolved the concept of peacebuilding in the 21st century. The 「Brahimi Report」 published in 2000 characterized peacebuilding as an activity that builds a foundation beyond the 'absence of war' and called for a combination of political and developmental roles to mitigate the cause of armed conflict.¹⁸⁾ The UN pledged to establish a Peacebuilding Commission at the 60th UN General Assembly Millennium Summit in September 2005 and was created in June 2006 based on Resolution 1645 adopted by UN Security Council in December 2005 and General Assembly Resolution 60/180. Since then, it has contributed to building and restoring peace in 23 countries and regions by 2021 with integrated efforts.¹⁹⁾ It has also raised international awareness for post-conflict peacebuilding as a coordinator that orchestrate peace activities of various UN agencies, international financial institutions, and donor countries and raised and distributed funds for stability in target countries with the Peacebuilding Fund.²⁰⁾

Public Diplomatic Aspects of Peacebuilding Operations

In the 21st century, peacebuilding is considered a core function of peace operations that the UN has actively promoted with policy priorities.²¹⁾ It also has

16) The Ministry of Defense, U. K. *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 (JWP 3-50), 2nd edition (London: The Ministry of Defense, 1998), p. Glossary-8.

17) Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009), pp.8-9.

18) United Nations. “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report).” *General Assembly and Security Council (A55/305-S/2000/809)*, Aug. 21, 2000.

19) United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. “INFORMATIVE BROCHURE.” available at https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/psc_brochure_eng_corr.pdf (accessed on April 27, 2023).

20) Department of International Organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *2022 UN Gae-hwang (2022 United Nations Overview)*(2022), pp. 102-103. ; The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is a special United Nations fund created in 2006 to provide rapid and flexible financial resources for peacebuilding. The fund is used to assist the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, provide essential administrative services, and promote reconstruction through capacity building, and stimulate the economy (Department of International Organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022, 104).

21) Public diplomacy began in earnest in the 1960s as the Cold War intensified with nongovernmental diplomacy targeting communist areas. It became much less emphasized

important implications for public diplomacy as an influential tool in foreign policy in the 21st century. Public diplomacy is a form of direct communication to the people in another country, usually aiming to win the hearts of the people of other countries, which elevates a country's image and brand and build trust by spreading consensus on the values, cultures, policies, and visions of the country in the other countries.

This study seeks to claim that peacebuilding operations aimed at rebuilding post-conflict areas and providing assistance to affected populations are inherently a form of new public diplomacy in the 21st century. Actors in peacebuilding operations have been diversified over the years. Today, peacekeeping and reconstruction missions in conflict zones and disaster-affected areas are staffed by international organizations, including the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In countries that have been called upon for peacekeeping and reconstruction activities, reconstruction teams comprised of not only military personnel but also civilians such as police, medical personnel, and election and vocational training experts have been organized to actively participate in peacekeeping and reconstruction support activities on the ground.²²⁾ As such, the establishment of good governance at the international level and the coordination of various actors at the domestic level, including civil, public, and military personnel, are crucial to the success of peacebuilding efforts.

In addition, soft power has become important as a means of peacebuilding operations. Because peace operations are tasked with preventing armed conflicts and protecting security, hard power centered on military and economic power is inevitably emphasized. Today, however, in addition to their military and financial roles in dispatched regions, peace operations can only be effective when they secure the favor and trust of the locals. At the mid- to long-term level, security and stability can never be achieved without the support and help of locals. The 21st-century peacebuilding efforts focus on outreach to the local community through various civil affairs operations²³⁾ and attempt to engage with them to make connections and win their hearts. In peacebuilding, soft power can be

with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s but began to be revived in the wake of the 9 • 11 terrorist attack as the limits of hard power were exposed. In the 21st century, most countries have recognized the importance of public diplomacy by using intangible assets like art, knowledge, information, culture, and sports for the private sector (Public Diplomacy and Cultural Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), p.14.

22) Shin-wha Lee, "International PKO as 'Security Public Diplomacy'," p. 8.

23) Civil affairs operations refer to all activities that involve the interaction between military forces, government agencies, and civilians in areas where military forces are stationed or operate. The main objectives of civil affairs include (1) supporting the civilian sector to facilitate military operations, (2) preventing civilians from undertaking disruptive activities, (3) acquiring and controlling local resources, (4) assisting government administrative agencies, (5) public outreach activities, and (6) aiding civil defense tasks (Choi 2006, 192).

significant in that it can help establish favorable relations with the host country and also enhance a positive reputation and goodwill in the international community. In addition, communication with the public in other countries targeted by peacebuilding efforts is becoming more horizontal and interactive.

The achievements of peacebuilding operations as a form of public diplomacy can be assessed in the political, economic, and social domains. First, the political domain involves capacity building in administrative governance to establish a system of governance at the institutional level that ensures democratic principles are in effect. This type of activity could include providing political consultation or advice to government officials or officials, or capacity-building support and training programs for local governments. The economic domain includes activities to repair or rehabilitate social overhead capital such as roads, railroads, schools, and hospitals that have been destroyed or rendered inoperable by conflict, disaster, or catastrophe, as well as food and medical assistance activities directly related to survival. Lastly, the social domain encompasses activities such as enlightenment education, goodwill events, and public outreach to foster a sense of unity with residents. Rural development education, farming practices, running vocational training centers, building schools, and organizing cultural events would be good examples of such activities.

Case Study

The Timeline of South Korea's Participation in the Afghanistan PRT

In late December 2001, the U.S. shifted to stabilization operations to achieve early successes in the War on Terrorism, including the collapse of the Taliban regime, and to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. With the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a military organization under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was created. On March 28, 2002, the UN subsequently adopted Security Council Resolution 1401 to create the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which began to engage in stabilization operations in a robust manner.²⁴⁾ The triangular cooperation of the U.S., NATO, and the UN in stabilizing Afghanistan, however, was not effective in terms of strategy and efficiency, and the war in Afghanistan entered a protracted phase as a result. In the midst of these circumstances, the Obama administration, which took office in January 2009, sought an exit strategy that would withdraw U.S. troops with

24) Institute for Military History, the Ministry of Defense, Guk-gun-ui Afghanistan Pyeong-hwa-hwal-dong 9 The ROK Armed Forces' Peace Operations in Afghanistan), (Seoul: Institute for Military History, 2016), pp. 38-41.

substantial support for Afghanistan's stabilization and national reconstruction.

On April 16, 2009, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. State Department's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, visited Korea to express the U.S. opinion on the appropriate role of Korea in supporting Afghanistan. On Oct. 21, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates indirectly addressed the need for Korea to send troops back to Afghanistan, noting that Korea's military contribution to the international community would benefit Korea's security and core national interests.²⁵⁾ On May 6, 2009, the ROK government decided to support Afghanistan with a Cabinet resolution, amidst increasing requests for reconstruction assistance from the Afghan government and the international community. On Oct. 30, the government officially announced its deployment of a PRT to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan.

Moon Tae-young, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, said, "Apart from the medical-vocational training team currently operating at the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram, the PRT was designed to provide comprehensive support for local reconstruction projects, including enhanced state administrative capacity building, economic reconstruction, infrastructure construction, and humanitarian assistance." The government also announced that it would dispatch military security forces to protect Korean personnel and its own security, in accordance with the National Assembly's agreement.²⁶⁾ On December 8, the government confirmed the final deployment plan at a Cabinet meeting and on December 11, submitted 「Motion to Send Armed Forces to Afghanistan」 to the National Assembly. The motion was passed with 148 votes in favor, 5 against, and 10 abstentions on February 25 (National Assembly Secretariat, 2010).

The government explained the reason for the deployment to Afghanistan, saying, "In accordance with the resolution of the UN Security Council and the request of the Afghan government, the Korean PRT and the ROK military to protect them will be sent to Afghanistan to fulfill the role as a responsible member of the international community and enhance the international status of Korea."²⁷⁾ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (currently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) noted that the decision to establish the Afghan PRT was made as "to fulfill its role as an honorable and responsible member of the international community in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1833 and 1890 urging UN member states to provide

25) Secretary Robert Gates said, "In the past, Korea's (overseas) deployments have been perceived as benefiting the U.S., but in the future, Korea's international military contributions should be recognized as benefiting Korea's security and vital national interests.;" Won-je Son, "Gates" *Guk Gun-sa-gi-yeo, Guk-ik-e Do-um*(Gates, "Contributing to Korea's military helps national interest"), *Hankyoreh*. Oct. 21, 2009.

26) Public Communications Office, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, "Jeong-bu, Afghan Ji-bang-jae-geon-team Hwak-dae-ki-ro(Government Expands Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team to Include)," *Korea Policy Briefing*, Oct. 30, 2009.

27) National Assembly Secretariat. *Minutes of the 287th National Assembly Plenary Session No. 10* (Feb. 25, 2010).

manpower, equipment, and other resources to the International Security Assistance Forces and the UN Security Council Resolution 1868, which requests international supports for the Afghan government's capacity building and human resource development.”²⁸⁾

Peacebuilding Operations of the Korean PRT

The Korean PRT in Afghanistan officially initiated its mission in July 2010 with the goal of reconstructing Parwan province of more than 642,000 people lacking basic infrastructure and in desperate need of development assistance.²⁹⁾ In January 2011, the Korean PRT moved into its own base, Charikar, where it operated a hospital, a school, and a police training center. After transferring the base from Charikar to Parwan in December 2012, Korea continued to assist with reconstruction work for Afghan residents at the U.S. base, Bagram Airfield, and ended its four-year mission of the PRT in June 2014.³⁰⁾ Unlike other countries focusing on the military activity, the Korean PRT was characterized by an integrated civil-public-military structure that included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, Oshino Unit,³¹⁾ the police, the Korea International Cooperation Agency(KOICA), and hospital and vocational training personnel.³²⁾

The Korean government's contribution to Afghanistan in the Bagram base continued even after the end of PRT operations. Since the completion of the PRT activities from 2011 to 2014, the South Korean forces have still been working with U.S. counterparts.³³⁾ Even though the PRT mission ended, they had planned to turn the hospital and the training centers into the official development aid (ODA),³⁴⁾ and

28) Public Communications Office, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, “Government Expands Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team to Include,” *Korea Policy Briefing*, Oct. 30, 2009.

29) U.S. Army, “Afghan, US Leaders Thank Korea for Medical, Educational Support to Parwan Province,” (Mar. 18, 2015). available at https://www.army.mil/article/144761/afghan_us_leaders_thank_korea_for_medical_educational_support_to_parwan_province (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).

30) In December 2014, Korea withdrew its PRT as part of the overall withdrawal of nations as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission came to an end (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014).; Soo-yeon Kim, “S.Korea's Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan Ends 4-year Mission,” *Yonhap News Agency*, Jun. 24, 2014. available at <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20140624002900315> (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).

31) The Oshino Unit was an Army Headquarters whose mission was to protect the garrison and the activities of the PRT from July 2010 to June 23, 2014, so that it could safely carry out its reconstruction mission (The Ministry of National Defense).

32) Soonhyang Park, “A study on the Civil-Military Cooperation in the Peace Operations: Focusing on the PRT(Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Afghanistan,” Doctoral dissertation, Chonnam National University (2012), pp.93-94.

33) U.S. Air Forces, CENTAF Releases Airpower Summary (Jul. 25. 2006).

34) Byoung-chul Kang, “*Afghan Ji-bang-jae-geon-team' Im-mu-jong-ryo...Oshino-bu-dae-do*

the hospital remained open to serve those in need.³⁵⁾

The reconstruction project of the PRT focused on the following four areas.³⁶⁾ First, in the field of education and training, the Korean government established a vocational training center in the Bagram Base in March 2010 to offer five courses on automobile, welding, architecture, electricity, and computers. As a result, a total of 439 people graduated by 2013, contributing to job creation. The PRT operated the Charika Police Training Center from September 2010 to December 2012 for a stable security environment, which as the basis for national reconstruction, trained 355 local police officers. From August 2011 to December 2012, the Charika Education and Culture Center provided literacy training, children's education, sewing, and barbering skills to a total of 322 people, which helped establish a foundation for self-reliance. In addition, 140 to 160 people were invited to Korea every year to learn about Korea's post-war development experience such as the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement) and the know-how for building law and order.³⁷⁾

Second, in the field of health, the Korean government provided medical assistance to Afghans since opening Bagram Hospital in May 2009, treating 150,000 patients as of March 2014. The civilian-staffed Bagram Hospital provided access to specialized health facilities for Afghans who had been deprived of basic medical services. In addition, Charika Hospital opened in January 2012 and treated 16,500 people for a year, providing medical care by Korean medical staff. Overall, the Korean PRT supported local people with “tireless medical treatment” and the Bagram Korean Hospital cared for 300,000 patients.³⁸⁾ It provided \$2 million worth of support, including ambulances and medical equipment, and built three health centers providing direct medical support to the Afghans.³⁹⁾

Cheol-su. (‘Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team’ Mission Ends...Oshino Troops also Withdraw),” *Yonhap News Agency*, Jun. 24, 2014, available at <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20140624053800043> (accessed on Oct. 6, 2023).

- 35) Sung-hee Hwang, “Korea Completes Reconstruction Mission in Afghanistan,” *Arirang News*, Jun. 24, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJplhsN_k98 (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).
- 36) The Government of the Republic of Korea. *Lee-myung-bak-jeong-bu Guk-jeong-baek-seo: Je-4-kwon global-leadership-gwa Guk-geok Je-go (The White Book on State Affairs of The Lee Myung-bak Administration: Global Leadership and National Status Enhancement, Volume 4)*(2013), p. 179.
- 37) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “*Afghan-in-deul-e-ge Mi-rae-ui Hui-mang-eul Sim-go, Global Partnership Gi-yeo-han Dae-han-min-guk Afghan Ji-bang-jae-geon-team(PRT)-ui Gong-sik Im-mu Jong-ryo (Jun. 23)*(Official Mission of the Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan Ends (Jun. 23), Giving Afghans Hope for the Future and Contributing to Global Partnerships),” Jun. 24, 2014, available at https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=350848 (accessed on May 19, 2023).
- 38) U.S. Army, “Afghan, US Leaders Thank Korea for Medical, Educational Support to Parwan Province,” Mar. 18, 2015.
- 39) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Official Mission of the Korean Provincial Reconstruction

Third, in the area of rural development, in December 2013, the Korean government started an agricultural school project to improve the productivity of agriculture which accounts for 80% of Afghanistan's industry. In addition, while operating a \$3-million model farm and agricultural products processing plant, the South Korean government invited Afghan agricultural experts to collaborate with the agricultural sector and contributed to the dissemination of agricultural technology.

Fourth, in the field of advisory to the state government, from June 2010 to May 2011, the first advisory group worked in areas such as health care, education, rural development, crop cultivation, administrative system, economic development, and gender. For example, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) invited around 100 senior Afghan provincial officials to Korea every year for capacity-building training and site visits that were needed for national reconstruction.⁴⁰⁾

In summary, the Korean PRT focused on empowering government officials in Parwan for the Rule of Law, building infrastructure, and transferring professional skills to local Afghan people as it opened a new medical center, police training center, and the Korean Educational and Cultural Center.⁴¹⁾ The PRT consisted of three domains: ① police, army, and civilian personnel in public healthcare; ② education and vocational training and agricultural and rural development; and ③ police training. The Korean PRT genuinely sought to improve the lives of Afghanistan.⁴²⁾

Public Diplomatic Achievements of the Korean PRT

From 2010 to June 2014, the Korean government deployed 2,500 military and civilian personnel to stabilize Afghanistan and carry out provincial reconstruction operations. Such deployments have substantially improved the quality of life and contributed to the economic and social development of Afghans. The prioritized

Team (PRT) in Afghanistan Ends (Jun. 23), Giving Afghans Hope for the Future and Contributing to Global Partnerships),” Jun. 24, 2014.

40) Hyun-min Yu, “*Afghan PRT, Parwan-ju Jae-geon-ji-won 'Bon-gyeok-hwa'* (Afghan PRT 'Full-scale' Support for Reconstruction in Parwan Province).” *Yonhap News Agency*. Feb. 16, 2012, available at <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20120216004800038> (assessed on Oct. 8, 2023).

41) Chris Fahey, “Republic of Korea PRT Invests in Afghan Capabilities, Plans for Afghan Sustainability,” *Defense Visual Information Distribution Service*, Jan. 27, 2012, available at <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/83109/republic-korea-prt-invests-afghan-capabilities-plans-afghan-sustainability> (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).

42) Office for Government Policy Coordination, “ROK’s PRT Base in Afghanistan to be Transferred to the Host Country,” Nov. 7, 2012, available at http://www.odakorea.go.kr/bbs/selectArticleDetail?bbsId=eng_101&ntfId=13228&menuNo=12031000&searchWrd=&insTypeCd=&pageIndex=261&searchCnd=4 (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).

need of the Afghan government was in education and economic development to rebuild the state, the areas in which Korea could play even more active roles.⁴³⁾ Through this, Korea substantially contributed to improving the life quality of Parwan by driving economic and social development within a short amount of time; the income increased, student enrollment rate increased, access to health facilities improved, infrastructure facilities expanded, women's participation in social activities increased, and security conditions improved.

The Korean PRT can be understood in terms of public diplomacy as they focused on sharing Korea's development experiences directly with Afghans and conducting local-friendly activities. It offered interactive activities led by the private sector to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people through soft power, including education and cultural projects, medical and health activities, and transmission of rural development experience and job training.⁴⁴⁾ Through this, Korea has been recognized by the Afghans as a trusted country that always keeps promises and Koreans have also been regarded as true friends of Afghans.⁴⁵⁾

Koreans thought that the troop deployment in 2010 became an opportunity for long-term and systematic expansion of human exchange and active cooperation between Korea and Afghanistan.⁴⁶⁾ "Ashena," the name of the Korean unit means a "friend" or "colleague" in the local language. The U.S. Army's report quoted the comments of Afghan government officers and U.S. officers about on the Korean PRT operations:⁴⁷⁾ "I thank the Korean friends for their compassion and selfless support," Parwan Provincial Governor Adul Basir Salagi said. "For the past five years, the Republic of Korea Provincial Reconstruction Team and its successor, the Korea Bagram Office, achieved remarkable progress towards peace and reconstruction in Parwan by providing medical care and educational opportunities for the people of Afghanistan." "Although they will be gone, the memory of the good they have done here in Afghanistan will live on," the Commander of the U.S. Army of Bagram Airfield Maj. Gen. John Murray said. "You have made a profound

43) Hyun-kyung Kang, "Koreans Sow Seeds of Hope in Afghanistan," *The Korea Times*, Sep. 5, 2023, available at https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/09/113_176527.html (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).

44) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Official Mission of the Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan Ends (Jun. 23), Giving Afghans Hope for the Future and Contributing to Global Partnerships," Jun. 24, 2014.

45) Yoon-gyung Son, "*Afghan, Neo-e-ge U-rin, U-ri-e-gen Neon* (Afghans, We to You, You to us)." *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*. Aug. 28, 2021, available at <https://m.khan.co.kr/politics/politics-general/article/202108281417001#c2b> (assessed on Oct. 8th, 2023).

46) Nam-sik In, "Recommendations for Korea's Future Policy Regarding Afghanistan," *IFANS Brief*, 2014-18, May. 29, 2014.

47) U.S. Army, "Afghan, US Leaders Thank Korea for Medical, Educational Support to Parwan Province," Mar. 18, 2015.

difference in the lives of people who had no other alternative to the medical care you brought to Afghanistan.” “The Korean staff have done an amazing job,” Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, principal officer to the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, said. “and the Afghan people are grateful for their services.” In a recent interview with the Afghan Ambassador to Korea, Mohammad Saleem Sayeb said, “With strong work ethic, the Koreans won the hearts of the Afghan people.”⁴⁸⁾

During the provincial reconstruction operations, the Korea Foundation provided a development- cooperation program to encourage the willingness of trainees to support themselves and communicate with local people. In order to meet the expectations and demands of the Afghan people to learn about the economic development, democratization, and culture of Korea, the foundation operated customized projects for the people that linked the Korean Wave, Hallyu, and taekwondo.⁴⁹⁾ Afghans came to have trust in the local reconstruction projects by the Korea International Cooperation Agency and greeted in Korean style. The Korean Police Training Center, which trained Afghan police officers and taught arrest techniques and Taekwondo, has helped maintain Afghan security and has been officially approved by the Afghan government as a “local police training center.”⁵⁰⁾ The Oshino unit actively carried out a local support project called ‘Operation Hanultari’ and received positive reviews from local residents.⁵¹⁾

The public diplomacy achievements of the Korean PRT are affirmed by key figures in Afghanistan. “Afghans consider Koreans to be true friends,” Governor Abdul Basir Salangi, who visited Korea at the invitation of the KOICA in November 2010, said. “They came to us in times of need and genuinely help us, but it's not just about the material help. We appreciate the perseverance, hard work, and creative efforts of the Korean people who have built a highly prosperous country symbolized by the Miracle of the Han River standing up from the ruins of war.”⁵²⁾

48) Hyun-kyung Kang, “Koreans Sow Seeds of Hope in Afghanistan,” *The Korea Times*, Sep. 5, 2023.

49) Yeong Mi Yun, “A Study of the New Paradigm of Public Diplomacy: Focusing on the Cooperative Activities with the Ashena Base and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan,” *The Korean Association of Area Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2012, p. 265.

50) Public Communications Office, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, “*Afghan-e Ggum-eul Sim-eoh-ju-neun ‘Han-guk Dream-team’* (‘Korean Dream Team’ Instills Dreams in Afghanistan),” *Korea Policy Briefing*. Mar. 30, 2012.

51) The Oshino unit focused on strengthening ties with local residents by repairing mosques and school facilities, providing humanitarian supplies, and hosting events by inviting residents. The Ministry of the Interior and Safety.; National Archives of Korea. 2015. “Oshino Unit Activities,” available at <https://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=009712&sitePage=> (accessed on May 21, 2023)

52) In another interview, the governor of Parwan positively evaluated the activities of the Korean PRT, saying, “Thank you for your efforts to improve the quality of life and it has greatly helped the people to build the foundation for themselves.” (Kookbangilbo, July 17, 2013).; Hyun-min Yu, “<Interview> Salanggi Afghan Parwan Ju-ji-sa(“<Interview> Salangi, Afghan

In a local radio interview, the head of agriculture in Parwan said, “The Korean PRT has been carrying out operations for the pure purpose of reconstruction. Local residents should join in protecting them,” expressing support and confidence in the Korean PRT.⁵³⁾ The emotional and political link between people in two countries meant Korea could take the connection to Central Asia and expand its scope of global reach beyond Northeast Asia.⁵⁴⁾

In the case of Afghanistan, the Korean reconstruction team has won the hearts of the locals. “The Korean reconstruction team has been of great help to me and has completely turned my life around,” Faisal Safi, a graduate of Bagram Vocational Training Center, said. “I have learned electrical technology for four years and now have the ability to support my family as an expert,” sharing his appreciation of the Korean PRT.⁵⁵⁾ “The Vocational Training Center is a top-notch facility that cannot be found in Afghanistan,” Mohammad Zarif who learned mechanic skills at the Bagram Vocational Training Center said. “I want to become a great mechanic and serve the Afghan people.”⁵⁶⁾ Rahmat Bibi, who underwent heart surgery at Bagram Hospital on the verge of death, said, “I’m happy to be able to go home and meet my son I miss,” and appreciated the medical support of the Korean PRT.⁵⁷⁾

Since its deployment in July 2010, the Korean PRT in Afghanistan has successfully carried out its mission, receiving positive reviews from the Afghan government and local residents as ‘Korean brothers’.⁵⁸⁾ The Korean PRT carried out community-friendly activities that reached out to the hearts and minds of the Afghan people with the causes of “mission, service, and constructive contribution.”⁵⁹⁾ By

Parwan Governor).” *Yonhap News Agency*, Nov. 5, 2010, available at <https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/001/0004746716?sid=100> (assessed on Oct. 8, 2023).

- 53) After watching a video on economic development, 25 politicians and economic officials from Parwan who were invited by the Korean PRT advisors said, “We also want to be like Korea. Please help me to be like this.” (The SeoulShinmun, May 16, 2011).; Jin-wook Gang, “*Afghan Dang-guk, Ja-guk-min Han-guk PRT Bo-ho Chok-gu* (Afghan Authorities Urge Nationals to Protect South Korea's PRT).” *Yonhap News Agency*, Aug. 18, 2011.
- 54) Jae H. Ku, Drew Thompson, & Daniel Wertz. *Northeast Asia in Afghanistan: Whose Silk Road?* (US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2011). available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11156> (assessed on Sep. 5, 2023).
- 55) Hye-gyung Hwang, “*Afghan PRT Sa-nyeon Im-mu-jong-ryo... ” Ju-min Ma-eum Eot-eot-eo-yo* (“Afghan PRT ends four-year mission... “We won the hearts of the residents”),” *YTN*, Jun. 28, 2014.
- 56) Byoung-chul Kang, “‘Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team’ Mission Ends... Oshino Troops also Withdraw,” *Yonhap News Agency*, Jun. 24, 2014.
- 57) Gi-jong Lee, “‘*Afghan Mae-um Eot-eot-da’... Ji-bang-jae-geon-team 4-nyeon Hwal-dong Jong-ryo* (“Afghan Hearts Won”... Provincial Reconstruction Team Ends Four Years of Work),” *MBN News*, Jun. 29, 2014, available at <https://m.mbn.co.kr/tv/552/1074475>.
- 58) The Ministry of National Defense. “*Afghanistan Oshino-bu-dae* (Jul. 2010 – Jun. 2015) (Oshino Unit in Afghanistan (Jul. 2010 – Jun. 2015).” available at https://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd/subview.jsp?id=mnd_010902010000 (accessed on May 21, 2023).

hiring personnel who can speak the local language, the Korean PRT was able to communicate smoothly for tasks that require a lot of interaction with local residents. In humanitarian relief activities, by directly distributing goods to residents rather than going through public officials, the Korean PRT provided practical help to improve the rights to life and the quality of life (Park 2012, 124).

In summary, in public diplomacy, Korea actively shared its unique development experience of transitioning from a recipient country to a donor country in a short time through the provincial reconstruction operations reaching the local level, which contributed to peacebuilding in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

This study examined the performance of the Korean-Afghan PRT in terms of the perspective of public diplomacy. The Korean PRT took the initiative to have various actors of the civic sector engage in the process of rebuilding and stabilizing Parwan and adopted the approach of two-way communications as a way of soft power. It is different from traditional conflict management, which unilaterally provides benefits to residents in conflict areas, relying on military or economic power. In particular, the Korean PRT focused on resident-friendly operations in four areas: education and training, health, rural development, and state advisory, which consequently built a good image of Korea and earned Koreans the trust of the Afghan public and government officials. As such, Korea's peace operations in the 21st century have the potential to achieve positive results not only in the military and security spheres but also in the public diplomacy sphere.

In April 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres released the 「Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace」, which further emphasizes the role of peacebuilding in peace operations. It states that in order for peacebuilding operations to be effective, various international actors, such as international organizations, donor countries, and host countries, must be allowed to participate throughout the entire process of conflicts (United Nations 2018). Amid such heightened international interests in “sustaining peace”, South Korea has been taking on policy coordination and bridging roles between the UN agencies and member states for peacebuilding, serving as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2017 and 2018. The reputation of Korea has been elevated by serving as a pivotal middle power in the field of peacebuilding, which the UN has identified as a mechanism to stabilize post-conflict regions.

To summarize, this study contributes to expanding the boundaries of peace

59) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Official Mission of the Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan Ends (Jun. 23), Giving Afghans Hope for the Future and Contributing to Global Partnerships,” Jun. 24, 2014.

operations research by analyzing Korean peacebuilding operations, which have received relatively little attention in academia. Considering peace operations as a matter of public diplomacy, it also reviews the achievements of peace operations that have been recently emerged as a vital means of foreign policy. Based on this, we propose that a basic understanding of diplomacy is necessary for successful peacebuilding operations, which have become a core function of international peacework today.

More importantly, this study hopes to provide valuable lessons for South Korea's anticipated participation in the reconstruction of Ukraine after the Russian-Ukrainian War. Depending on post-war political and economic conditions, government capacity, and democratic development in Ukraine, the reconstruction efforts of Korea in Ukraine will differ from those of PRT in Afghanistan in both the way they operate and the amount of support they provide. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from this study that a public diplomacy approach to win the hearts and minds of the local people is crucial to the success of peaceful reconstruction efforts in Ukraine.

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Suggestions on Measures to Strengthen South Korea-India Space Cooperation in the New Space Era

Geunho Song

Abstract

This study explores ways to strengthen space cooperation between South Korea and India to enhance Korea's space power while discerning the cutting-edge space exploration capabilities of India, which recently succeeded in landing a moon rover on the moon's south pole for the first time in the world. Along with the United States, Russia, and China, India is recognized for its state-of-the-art space technology. It is the sixth country in the world to launch a practical satellite on its own in 1980 and the fourth country in the world to successfully send a lunar probe in 2008. India's success of Chandrayaan-3 landing on the south pole of the Moon in August 2023 surprised the world once again. Until now, there has been little international space cooperation between Korea and India when compared to the extent of South Korea's space cooperation with the United States, Russia, and European countries. South Korea must find ways to increase its national space power in the era of the space economy through space cooperation with India, an emerging powerhouse with advance technology, which continues to advance its space technology through international cooperation. Thus, South Korea's space cooperation with India can help improve Korea's space science technology in the future, including successful moon landing and Mars exploration.

Key Words: *Space cooperation, Chandrayaan-3, India Space Research Organization (ISRO), Korea Aerospace Agency (KASA)*

Introduction

On August 26, 2023, India's Chandrayaan-3 Moon Lander successfully landed on the moon's south pole. India is the fourth country in the world to land on the moon, following the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The success of the moon's landing on the south pole was India's first remarkable achievement in the world, although India has a long history of space activities as an advanced country in space development. India's lunar exploration marked a milestone for mankind's exploration and settlement of the moon and its establishment an outpost for future Mars exploration through the study of icy water on the moon's south pole.

In November 2022, President Yoon Suk Yeol released a roadmap for the future space economy that included plans to successfully land the moon by 2032 and send a probe to Mars by 2045, which would help the Republic of Korea become a space economy powerhouse. It proposed policies that would allow Seoul to explore the moon and Mars, leap to become a space technology power house, foster the space industry, cultivate space talent, realize space security, and strengthen international cooperation in the direction of six major policies.¹⁾ It announced plans to expand Korea's economic sphere to the space domain and strengthen international cooperation with advanced space powers to enhance Korea's space power.

In the era of New Space, where the private sector has emerged as a subject of space technology innovation and rocket launch costs have decreased significantly, major space-advanced countries are creating innovative space technologies through cooperation between the private sector and government to strengthen their space industry competitiveness and building space military forces to strengthen security.²⁾ In addition, global companies are using artificial intelligence and IT technology developing into the fourth industrial revolution to compete for new areas in the space market such as space Internet and space tourism services, which would provide new space services such as reusable space rockets and space debris removal.³⁾ Korea has been enhancing its space power through international cooperation and technological exchanges with countries such as the United States, European countries, and Russia while undertaking its own space development plans. South Korea must recognize the necessity of international cooperation in the era of new space as it seeks to become an advanced space powerhouse.

1) Presidential Office, "President Yoon Announces Future Space Economy Roadmap," Nov. 28, 2022, <https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148908812>(accessed on Oct. 27. 2023).

2) Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, "The New Space Era," <https://hcss.nl/space/>(accessed on Oct. 26. 2023).

3) Ahn Hyun-joon and Park Hyun-joon. 2021. "A plan to expand public-private cooperation to enhance the competitiveness of the space industry in the new space era." *STEP Insight*, No. 273.

Until now, research on Indian space activities has focused on analyzing India's development of space launch vehicles, such as its evolution and history of rocket development. Reviewing India's rocket development trends, Yoo Jae-han analyzed the types and development process of space launch vehicles in India.⁴⁾ Han Young-min examined the ability to develop space launch vehicles, concluding that India's space programs developed satellites and space launch vehicles on its own with a focus on direct space development that would provide convenience for their citizens.⁵⁾ While analyzing India's space development budget, Lee Jun noted India's current interests in satellite communication, satellite navigation, space exploration, Earth observation, and space launch vehicle, as well as major space project plans.⁶⁾ Scholars overseas have studied India's international space cooperation. In one of the seminal works on the subject, Khalid pointed out that the United States and India have been in space cooperation since 1962 to deal with the common security threat of China. Khalid added that US aerospace companies are conducting various space development cooperation programs with ISRO.⁷⁾ Grupurasad paid attention to India's space development cooperation with advanced countries such as the United States, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Israel. India has improved its space technology through international space cooperation. Recognized as a major partner in international space development and commercial benefits, India has successfully carried out the national space program, which is internationally recognized for excellent space technology.⁸⁾ Sourbès-Verger emphasized the importance of space in a number of global security areas, including defense, climate change, natural disasters, environmental and water management, while recognizing space as an important area in security. Through space cooperation, India and the EU can achieve the goals of both countries, such as promoting mutual interests in the international community.⁹⁾ Samson said that the United States and India, major space powers,

4) Yoo Jae-han. "Rocket Development Trends in India." 2021 Spring Conference of the Korean Society for Propulsion Engineering (2021): pp. 1-2.

5) Han Young-min et al., "History and development trends of space launch vehicles in India." *Aerospace Technology Development Trends* Vol. 9, No. 2, (2011), pp. 128-137.

6) Lee Joon et al., "Trends in Government Space Programs 2016." *Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace*, vol. 15, no. 2, (2017), pp. 57-58.

7) Munazza Khalid, "India-US space cooperation: Implications for the South Asian strategic stability." *Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS)*, Vol. 2, No. 2(July-December 2021), pp. 55-66, <https://ideapublishers.org/index.php/jhsms/article/view/475> (accessed on Nov. 24. 2023).

8) B. R. Guruprasad, "Understanding India's International Space Cooperation Endeavour: Evolution, Challenges and Accomplishments," *India Quarterly*, Volume 74, Issue 4, December 2018, pp. 455-481, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928418802077> (accessed on Nov. 24. 2023).

9) Isabelle Sourbes-Verger, "EU-India Cooperation on Space and Security," *IAI(Instituto Affari Internazionali) Working Paper 16*, 2016. pp. 1-20,

have long cooperated in the private space sector but less in space security. India claimed that it could contribute to strengthening U.S. space security while insisting on promoting the strategic partnership between the two countries in space.¹⁰⁾

The review of the previous studies reveals that there has been little research by Korean scholars on international cooperation between Korea and India; if any, most of the studies were about India's satellites, rocket development, and space programs. However, overseas research is often concerned with India's space cooperation with major advanced space countries. Through their cooperation with India, developed countries are strengthening their space security and updating space technology. It is imperative to research international space cooperation between Korea and India as advanced countries in space actively cooperate with India.

India emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in space development in its 2023 space policy. India, which has emerged as a space powerhouse, is strengthening international cooperation to promote patriotism of the people and provide convenience to people's lives by securing advanced space technology. In the face of increasing international space cooperation, South Korea must strengthen its space power through international cooperation with advanced space countries. This study aims to discover the areas for space cooperation between Korea and India and to establish ways to strengthen their cooperation in space development. By comparing and analyzing the space capabilities of both countries to identify strengths, weaknesses, and complementary factors, South Korea and India will be able to strengthen their relationship as partners in space cooperation and strengthen their space capabilities in the future.

International trend of cooperation in space cooperation

Changes in the World Space Activity Environment

In the era of new space, the private sector has become the main body of space technology innovation and development, as its role in traditional government-led space development has been greatly expanded due to the development of private capital and high-tech capabilities. Competition in space exploration has become fierce worldwide as developed countries plan on manned exploration to the moon

<https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/IAI-EU-India%20Cooperation%20on%20Space%20and%20Security.pdf> (accessed on Nov. 24. 2023).

10) Victoria Samson, "U.S.–India strategic partnership in space, A path toward cooperation," *The future of U.S.–India security cooperation*, 30 Mar 2021, <https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526155160/9781526155160.00018.xml> (accessed on Nov. 24. 2023).

and Mars. Since its launch in 2022, South Korea's lunar orbiter has been in operation and getting ready to explore lunar resources. Space-advanced countries have established and promoted space activity policies with an emphasis on expanding space exploration and fostering the private space industry. It promotes a shared understanding of space and creates new values and economies through new technologies. Particular areas for international cooperation include space exploration, satellite navigation systems, and space security, which require large budgets, because international cooperation enables the continuous operation of space programs and safe space services. The international community is working together to solve the common problems of mankind: major disasters, climate change, food security, and space threats. As space technology improves the quality of life and becomes a key factor in social and economic development, international cooperation in outer space will increase.¹¹⁾

Areas and targets of international space cooperation

In the era of new space where private companies lead space activities, Korea can develop advanced space technology and develop Korea's space power through international cooperation with advanced space technology countries. Among a variety of space activities, we identify the following four areas where South Korea's space cooperation with India will greatly enhance South Korea's space power: 1) satellite navigation and the use of satellite information; 2) space exploration; 3) space transportation services; 4) and the training of experts in the space sector necessary for the development of Korea's space power. The first is satellite navigation and satellite utilization. India successfully launched and operated the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) satellite from 2013 to 2018, providing navigation and location information to the public. South Korea began to build the Korean Positioning System (KPS) in 2022. Technical cooperation with India, which has experience in developing regional navigation satellite systems, will no doubt help South Korea build its own.

Second, space exploration of the moon and Mars, resource discovery, and solar system research should be conducted. South Korea should have the ability to respond to the space exploration competition of advanced countries through its cooperation with India in space exploration, operating the U.S. Shadow Cam to shoot permanent shadow areas with NASA.

Third is the provision of space transport services. As an advanced country in the area of space launch vehicles, India has recently been conducting research on reusable launch vehicles and providing many services to the commercial space launch market. South Korea needs to secure technology to reuse space launch

11) Jeong Heon-joo, Baek Yu-na and Jeong Yoon-young. "Space and international development cooperation: an exploratory analysis of the achievement of sustainable development goals using space technology." *Social Science Research* 33, no. 2 (2022): p. 129.

vehicles to lower the cost of space launch vehicles and secure the ability to develop small launch vehicles to meet the demand for small satellite launches.

Fourth, training professional space personnel is a key component of the development of advanced space technology. Thus, Korea should promote international educational cooperation to train experts in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) through exchanges with advanced space and IT talents in India.

As an analysis tool for the development of Korea's space power in this study, the scope and targets of space cooperation between Korea and India are as follows.

<Table 1> Areas and Contents of South Korea-India Space Cooperation

Category	Space cooperation field	Details
Korea-India Space Cooperation	Satellite navigation and satellite application	Regional satellite navigation service, satellite imagery analysis using AI and producing satellite information
	Space exploration	Space exploration and resource exploration activities such as lunar landing technology and Mars exploration
	Space transport service	Development of small SLVs, cooperation in the development of recycled SLV technology
	Training space experts	Cooperation in human exchange and STEM field education, internship program

Korea-India Space Policy and Space Power

Indian Space Policy and Space Power

Indian Space Policy

India's space development policy aims to support the people with space services, manage its large land efficiently, generate profits from space development, and strengthen its space status around the world through space exploration.¹²⁾

In a new Indian space policy issued by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in May 2023,¹³⁾ India announced that it would focus on promoting private enterprise's participation and high-tech R&D in the space sector as it enters a new

12) Ahn Hyunjoon, "A Proposal of National Space Governance Reform according to Expansion of Space Development," *Policy Research* 2022-24, (2022): p.3.

13) ISRO, "Indian Space Policy 2023," April 6th, 2023, https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/IndianSpacePolicy2023.pdf (accessed on Oct. 24. 2023).

space era. India's space policy is expected to play a major role in establishing standards for the domestic space industry, promoting space activities, and expanding the space ecosystem. This revised the role of ISRO to focus on advanced space development research.

To overcome the limitations of India's space development, the new space policy focuses on promoting industrialization of space development by encouraging private activities and re-establishing the role of various organizations in the development of advanced space technology. It aims to expand India's space economy value from the current 2% to 10%, reduce dependence on foreign countries, and strengthen India's independent economic system.¹⁴⁾ It also sets a vision to enable, encourage, and develop a thriving commercial presence in space, acknowledging that the private sector is an important stakeholder in the overall value of the space economy.

India's newly announced space policy defined the role of ISRO in private-led space development. It emphasized the activities of various government departments and agencies to allow more private companies to participate, focused on high-tech research and development, and adjusted the scope of responsibilities that no longer require it to manufacture repetitive satellites and SLVs. According to ISRO, in the future, it will focus only on high-tech R&D while IN-SPACe (Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre) will be in charge of India's space ecology development.¹⁵⁾ India recognized the limitations of government-led space development and specified its direction to become a space powerhouse through participation in private companies.¹⁶⁾

India also stressed the importance of the space domain in national security and announced its first national security strategy in 2019, saying it would develop military deterrence against possible conflict in space and protect India's space assets.¹⁷⁾

Indian Space Power

India began space development in earnest when it established the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in 1969. To improve people's lives by developing satellites and space launch vehicles with its own technology, space development was carried out with national support. In 1980, India successfully launched a satellite using an Indian-developed Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) developed and successfully launched the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in 1994. In 2014, it successfully developed a Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV)

14) ISRO, "Indian Space Policy 2023," pp. 5-6.

15) ISRO, "Indian Space Policy 2023," pp. 6-8.

16) Lee Seung-gi, "India's Upgraded Space Policy," *KOTRA Overseas Markets News*, 2023.5.15., https://dream.kotra.or.kr/dream/cms/news/actionKotraBoardDetail.do?MENU_ID=2430&pNttSn=202512# (accessed on Oct. 24, 2023).

17) India's National Security Strategy, March 2019, p. 41, https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.pdf(accessed on Oct. 24, 2023).

capable of putting satellites into a geostationary orbit that operates telecommunications and meteorological satellites. Korea's Uri Star 3 satellite was successfully launched by India's PSLV. PSLV succeeded in 50 out of 59 launches while GSLV succeeded 9 times out of 15 launches. The GSLVM-3 is the largest rocket in India's rockets, which improved the performance of the payload by improving the thrust of boosters and engines in the GSLV. The GSLVM-3 has succeeded in all seven of its seven launches, demonstrating the high reliability and superior rocket technology of India's space launch vehicle.¹⁸⁾

Since India participated in the international satellite launch market and, particularly, helped Algeria launch a satellite in 2010, it has maintained its competitiveness in the international satellite launch market. India is preparing to launch manned spacecraft and undertake space exploration. While developing space technology to secure independent technology, India's pace of scientific and technological innovation through international cooperation was accelerated, and its achievements in space activities were made possible through private-led technological innovation.

India began lunar exploration in 2008 with the development of the Chandrayaan-1 Orbiter. Chandrayaan-1, which used NASA's payload, contributed to confirming the existence of water on the moon. Although Chandrayaan-2's Vikram Lander crashed due to an operational failure of the thrusters, caused by a software error during a lunar landing descent, ISRO solved the problem by analyzing the cause of the crash.

Chandrayaan-3, an Indian unmanned lunar probe, made the world's first landing on the moon's south pole on Aug. 23, 2023.¹⁹⁾ Immediately after landing on the moon, the Pragyaan rover (exploration robot) mounted on the Vikram Lander explored 100m of the lunar surface and found traces of sulfur and metal. Before India landed on the moon, ISPACE, a Japanese private space company, crashed into the lunar surface due to an altitude recognition error, and Russia's Luna 25 failed to land. Therefore, India's successful landing on the moon was welcomed news around the world.²⁰⁾

The Moon's south pole is considered a critical area of lunar exploration as a large amount of water is likely to exist in ice. If water exists in the lunar south pole, it will be possible to obtain drinking water and oxygen, as well as hydrogen, which can be used as rocket fuel. Such a discovery will reduce the difficulty of exploring Mars and the outer planets of the solar system. In addition, the lunar south pole is rich in helium

18) ISRO, LVM3(Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mk III), https://www.isro.gov.in/GSLVmk3_CON.html (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

19) Lee Joon-ki, "Independent development, cost-effectiveness..." "Like Space Innovation India," *Digital Times*, 2023.8.2. (accessed on Oct. 20. 2023).

20) Nature, "India's Moon landing is a stellar achievement — and a win for science," Aug. 24, 2023, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02685-4> (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

isotopes (Helium-3) (the fuel for nuclear fusion) and rare mineral titanium, which increases the economic value of lunar resource mining.²¹⁾

India's Mars orbiter, Mangalyaan (Mars Craft), succeeded in entering Mars' orbit in September 2014. Mangalyaan orbited Mars, photographed the surface of Mars, collected atmospheric information, and sent it to Earth. India became the first Asian country and the fourth country in the world to send a probe to Mars, following the United States, the European Union, and Russia.²²⁾ As such, India is solidifying its status as an advanced space country in all areas of space, including space launch vehicles, satellite production, and space exploration.

Indian Prime Minister Modi announced his plan to send Indian astronauts to the moon by 2040.²³⁾ India is also developing a manned space development program to send Indian astronauts into Earth's 400 km orbit under the Gaganyaan Project, which has carried out major tests and plans to build a space station by 2035.

The Korean Government's Space Policy and Space Power

South Korea's Space Policy

In the era of New Space, where private companies lead the space industry, it is very important for Korea to expand the private sector's participation in space development projects. The Yoon Suk Yeol government has released a roadmap for the Republic of Korea to become a space economy powerhouse, which includes the policy direction until 2045. The six policy directives were proposed to lead the exploration of the moon and Mars, become a space technology power, foster the space industry, develop space talent, realize space security, and form international cooperation.

In December 2022, the National Space Development Commission reviewed and confirmed the 4th Basic Plan for the Promotion of Space Development. The 4th Basic Plan for the Promotion of Space Development is a major plan for the implementation of Korea's space economy roadmap in the future. To grow into a global space economy powerhouse by 2045, Korea has set five long-term space development missions for its space economy, seeking to expand investment in space activities and increase Korea's share of the global market from 1% to 10% by 2045.²⁴⁾

The first mission is to expand space exploration. The South Korean government

21) Park Jeong-yeon, "India's unmanned lunar lander successfully landed 'Moon's south pole for the first time in mankind." Dong-A Science, 2023.8.24.

<https://www.dongascience.com/news.php?idx=61326> (accessed on October 22, 2023).

22) NASA, "Mars Orbiter Mission," <https://science.nasa.gov/mission/mom/> (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

23) Sharmila Kuthunur, "India wants to land astronauts on the moon in 2040," Oct 19, 2023, <https://www.space.com/india-land-astronauts-moon-2040> (accessed on Oct. 27. 2023).

24) Ministry of ICT, "The 4th Basic Plan for the Space Development Promotion ('23-27)," <https://www.msit.go.kr/publicinfo/view.do?sCode=user&mPid=62&mId=63&publicSeqNo=3&publicListSeqNo=3&formMode=R&referKey=3,3> (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

announced its goal of successfully landing on the moon by 2023 and landing on Mars by 2045 to promote its independent space exploration plan to expand the space economy territory. It plans to secure unmanned exploration capabilities independently and strategically promote human space exploration, space stations, and exploration bases through international cooperation. Second, Seoul seeks to enhance space transport capability and build a space transport base as a hub for Asian space transport. By 2030, it plans to build unmanned transportation capabilities by improving launch capabilities and develop manned transportation rockets by 2045. Third, South Korea plans to grow the space sector into a major industry and build a world-class space industry ecosystem. Fourth, South Korea will establish space security. To ensure public safety, the South Korean government plans to build a space strategy that facilitates international cooperation by building the ability to respond to risks in space, such as collisions and falls of space objects, and by equipping Korea's space assets to ensure national security. Fifth, South Korea aims to expand space science. It plans to lead space research globally by cultivating space science talents, strengthening research capabilities, and introducing long-term space science research programs.

Discussions are underway on the establishment and operation of the Korea Aerospace Agency, which will serve as a control tower for Korean space activities. Providing initiatives to develop the aerospace industry by utilizing technologies such as electronics, electricity, and batteries as well as SLVs and satellite technologies will contribute to Korea's emergence as a powerhouse in the new space era.²⁵⁾ The Korea Aerospace Agency should play a major role in establishing and implementing the national space policy in the future.

South Korea's Space Power

On May 25, 2023, Korea successfully launched the next-generation small satellite-2 manufactured by KAIST into orbit by the Korean space launch vehicle(KSLV II), Nuri. With the success of the third launch of Nuri, South Korea has the ability to land a domestic practical satellite into space orbit. With the success of the third launch, along with the improvement of the reliability of the KSLV-II Nuri, Korea has secured its own space transport capabilities and gained independent national space development capabilities.²⁶⁾

South Korea has been operating satellites for various purposes since 1999. It

25) Kim Hyundai, "We must not miss the launch window of the Korea Aerospace Exploration Agency," *Maeil Economy*, 2023.10.20., <https://www.hankyung.com/article/2023102041351>(accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

26) Ministry of Science and ICT, "Our own technology 'Nuri Lake' has been successfully launched for the third time... New Space Era Opens in earnest", *Policy Briefing*, May 26, 2023, <https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148915600> (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

operates the multipurpose practical satellite (KOMPSAT), which is tasked with Earth observation missions, to provide remote sensing data to the public. Multi-purpose satellites contribute to national land monitoring, geological information, agricultural information, and disaster response by collecting various satellite information such as earth observation information using various sensors such as optics, infrared, and radar in low-Earth orbit.²⁷⁾ In the earth's geostationary orbit at an altitude of 36,000km, weather and environmental satellites are operated to produce weather, marine, and environmental information over the Korean Peninsula and provide public service.

Korea uses navigation services using GPS from the United States, but Korea does not have its own navigation satellite system. Accordingly, the Korean government began a project on the development of a satellite navigation system, the Korean Positioning System (KPS), in 2022 that would provide the location, navigation, and time (PNT) information essential for the operation of key national infrastructure such as transportation, communication, and finance. The KPS project will develop major KPS systems by 2035 and deploy and operate a total of eight satellites over the Korean Peninsula and geostationary orbit. Korea needs international cooperation with Japan and India as well as the United States and Europe to establish and operate its own satellite navigation system.²⁸⁾

In April 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol proposed the establishment of the Korea Aerospace Agency (KASA), also known as the Korean NASA, to lead the country's space activities in general. In Korea, the establishment and operation of the Korea Aerospace Agency is essential to actively respond to the new space era in which private companies lead space activities and international cooperation. In the future, the Korea Aerospace Agency, a control tower for space development, should play an important role if Korea seeks to become an advanced space country.

About the global space program budget, the U.S. has the highest budget at \$61.97 billion, China has \$11.94 billion, France has \$4.20 billion, Germany has \$2.53 billion, and India has \$1.93 billion. By comparison, Korea has a very small space budget of \$724 million.²⁹⁾ It is very important to expand the space budget to support research and development in the aerospace field, implement the national space development plan, and improve Korea's national space technology.

27) KARI, "Korea Multipurpose Satellite (Arirang),"

https://www.kari.re.kr/kor/sub03_03_01.do (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).


28) Ahn So-hee said, "The development of a Korean satellite navigation system is just around the corner... Leap Towers a Space Power", *Dong-A Ilbo*, 2022.9.20,

<https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20220919/115518383/1> (accessed on Oct. 22. 2023).

29) Euroconsult, "Government Space Programs", 2021,

<https://www.euroconsult-ec.com/press-release/new-record-in-government-space-defense-spending-driven-by-investments-in-space-security-and-early-warning/> (accessed on Oct. 24. 2023).

<Figure 1> Governments with the largest space budgets



Source: Martin Armstrong, "The Governments With the Largest Space Budgets," Mar 7, 2023, <https://www.statista.com/chart/29454/governments-with-the-largest-space-budgets/> (accessed on Oct. 24, 2023).

System and Strategy for Strengthening Korea-India Space Cooperation

Korea-India Space Development Cooperation System and International Cooperation Status

The launch of the Korean Star 3 satellite using an Indian launch vehicle in 1999 highlighted the need for space cooperation between South Korea and India. In 2010, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) signed an MOU with the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) for space cooperation in remote exploration, communication and navigation, space science, and manpower exchange. In addition, the Implementing Arrangement (IA) was signed between KARI and ISRO in 2014 to cooperate in space science and utilization, facilitate mutual cooperation in education and training, share space exploration scientific data, and hold joint workshops. In 2019, with the Indian prime minister's visit to Korea, a bilateral agreement was signed to promote cooperation between the two countries in space exploration and implement joint efforts to undertake space exploration.³⁰⁾ In the meantime, the MOU and IA on space cooperation between Korea and India have been concluded. Unfortunately, tangible results such as

long-term joint research projects, space exploration between the two countries, and space technology exchanges related to satellite utilization services were limited. Such a disappointing outcome was due to the lack of funds that supported the space cooperation project between Korea and India; a low level of South Korea's interest in space cooperation with India did not help. However, the leaders of the two countries agreed to strengthen space cooperation at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023 and the G20 summit in India in September 2023, laying the foundation for future space cooperation between the two countries.

India and the United States are pushing to expand space cooperation between the two countries, led by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). At the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held in April 2022, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on expanding space cooperation and planned to continue to cooperate on various projects, including the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite scheduled to be launched in 2024.³¹⁾ In addition, India is collaborating with Japan on Lunar Polar Exploration (LUPLEX) to explore space resources on the moon. India will build a lunar lander, which Japan will launch with an H3 rocket, and Japan's Rover will explore the existence of water on the lunar surface.³²⁾

In order for Korea to strengthen space cooperation with India, Korea can analyze India's international cooperation cases and develop space cooperation programs and joint research fields.

South Korea's space development cooperation with India has been limited when compared to its cooperation with other advanced space countries such as the United States and Europe. South Korea's development of satellites was thanks to its technical cooperation with the United States, Israel, France, and Italy, while the development of rockets resulted from its technical cooperation with Russia and Ukraine. South Korea is recognized for its excellent space technology demonstrated by a number of Earth observation satellites and communication satellites and Nuri, the world's seventh-largest spacecraft to carry more than 1.5 tons of payloads. However, it lacks satellite transport and space exploration capabilities in geostationary orbit that other advanced space countries possess.

Instead of cooperating with India, South Korea has focused on space cooperation with the United States, Europe, and Russia. In addition, Korea's space cooperation with India was limited because it evaluated that India had cooperating on space programs such as SLV, navigation satellites, and manned spaceflight

30) Ministry of ICT, Space development white paper(2022), p. 296.

31) Congressional Research Service, "India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress" June 16, 2023, p.11, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47597> (accessed on Oct. 24. 2023).

32) JAXA Space Exploration Center (JSEC), "Lunar Polar Exploration (LUPLEX) Project Underway," <https://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/jaxas/no092/02.html> (accessed on Oct. 24. 2023).

while introducing rocket and satellite technologies from the Soviet Union.³³⁾

India began space development more than 30 years before South Korea did. India installed the world's first space ministry in 1972 and is an advanced space development country that developed space launch vehicles and satellites on its own. India, which focuses on private-led space development, has a lot of know-how in space development for Korea to learn from. India invests three times more in space budget than Korea, and ISRO has 10 times more space development personnel than KARI. Korea and India can identify various space fields for cooperation, starting from lunar exploration technology to future resources, private SLVs using science rockets, and joint science and technology talent training programs. Korea should enhance its space power and establish and implement plans for future space cooperation with India, which has the world's best space technology and IT talents. Recently, Korea was reported to have low participation in the Artemis program led by the United States. Thus, it is necessary to further develop Korea's space capabilities and space technology to play a main role in NASA's Artemis missions

In order for Korea to become a space powerhouse, Korea should participate as an indispensable partner country through continuous joint cooperation with advanced countries in space development and strive to recognize Korea as a major country in the international space community.

South Korea-India Space Cooperation Task and Strategy

Both India, an advanced space technology powerhouse, and South Korea regard each other as an ideal partner for space cooperation. At the 2023 summit between Korea and India, the two countries agreed to strengthen space cooperation. Since India actively attracts foreign direct investment in the private sector and wants to cooperate with Korea's excellent electronics and manufacturing companies in the private sector, cooperation between Korea and India in space, such as satellite development and utilization and ground test facilities, can be expanded.³⁴⁾ In the future, combining Korea's cutting-edge IT technology with India's world-class R&D capabilities through space cooperation

33) Namrata Goswami, "The Lunar Race Between India and Russia: What's at Stake?," August 17, 2023, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/the-lunar-race-between-india-and-russia-whats-at-stake/> (accessed on Dec 5, 2023); Aditya Pareek, Dr. Andrey Gubin, "India-Russia Space Cooperation: A Way Forward," *Takshashila Discussion Document 2021-7*, October 13, 2021, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/622866005041cb42e02390f5/1646814722652/India-Russia-Space-Cooperation-A-Way-Forward.pdf> (accessed on Dec 5, 2023).

34) Lee Gye-hyuk, "Moon's South pole Landing Successful Indian Space Administration Needs Cooperation with Korean Companies," *KBC*, Oct. 15, 2023, <http://www.ikbc.co.kr/article/view/kbc202310130025>(accessed on Dec 5, 2023).

between Korea and India will provide an opportunity to create great synergy in space development.³⁵⁾

The possible areas of mutual cooperation between Korea and India are satellite navigation and satellite utilization, space exploration and space observation research, space transport services, and space expert education. International space cooperation between Korea and India is very important for South Korea to secure space science and technology, which will help South Korea become a space power.

Satellite navigation and satellite utilization

India has developed and operated the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) successfully. For the Korean Positioning System (KPS) construction project, Korea has been implementing with India and the EU on satellite navigation since 2015. In order to develop and operate KPS, Korea should successfully carry out the KPS project by sharing important technologies, system development with India, and operation know-how of India's regional navigation satellite system.³⁶⁾

Satellite utilization is a field of greater economic value than satellite manufacturing and launch vehicle services. Recently, there has been an increase in international cooperation related to satellite utilization, such as artificial intelligence technology, global satellite Internet network construction projects, and space information sharing using big data. Since South Korea is able to predict climate change and disasters through satellite image analysis, using artificial intelligence and big data analysis, it will be able to strengthen international cooperation with India by boosting investment and exchanges in satellite utilization with India, the world's leading space technology and IT powerhouse.

Space exploration and space observation research

1) Space exploration

After successfully launching the Danuri lunar probe into lunar orbit in 2022, South Korea plans to operate it over the next three years. Space exploration is no longer just a story of other advanced space countries. Since Korea plans to launch a lunar lander in 2032, cooperation in space exploration with India is essential. India's successful landing on the moon's south pole in 2023 could greatly help South Korea's moon landing plans. India's successful landing on the lunar south pole for the first time in the world amid a series of failures of Japanese and

35) Ji Cha-soo, "Korea Institute of Engineering, 'Space Development' theme, 6th Korea-India workshop held," *Segye Daily*, August 28, 2023, <https://www.segye.com/newsView/20230828509267?OutUrl=naver> (accessed on Dec 5, 2023).

36) ISRO, "Satellite Navigation Services- Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC)," <https://www.isro.gov.in/SatelliteNavigationServices.html> (accessed on Oct. 24, 2023).

Russian lunar landers exhibited the world's best lunar landing technology India possessed. However, India's Vikram lander and Pragyan rover have switched to sleep mode, which changes day and night every 14 days, but have not been able to communicate with the cold of the night above minus 100 degrees Celsius on the lunar south pole.³⁷⁾ In the future, for a joint lunar landing program with India, Korea could utilize its excellent satellite production capabilities to develop the lander's thermal insulation and improve durability.

2) Space observation research

On September 2, 2023, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) launched Aditya L1, a solar observation satellite, that will travel around the sun and study the sun's atmosphere.³⁸⁾ Aditya L1 will study not only the solar atmosphere but also the solar magnetic storm and its effects on the Earth's surrounding environment.³⁹⁾ In the past, the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI) has collaborated with NASA on solar coronagraphs. Thus, space cooperation between South Korea and India on solar observation research is a real possibility.

Space transport service

The operation of Space X's reusable space launch vehicle in the United States has shortened the satellite launch cycle and reduced launch costs. As an advanced country in space launch vehicle development, recently, India began to conduct research on reusable space launch vehicles with a plan to expand India's service area to the commercial space launch market. South Korea is trying to develop reusable SLV technology while carrying out the next-generation Korean SLV project (KSLV-III). It would benefit South Korea if it cooperates with India on technology to reuse space launch vehicles for space development purposes. It is also very important to develop small space launch vehicles and provide space services to meet the global demand for small satellite launches. India has advanced technology while developing long-term scientific rockets. It is imperative that South Korea cooperate with India on the development of small space launch vehicles. South Korea should develop space vehicle reuse technology through cooperation with India on space transport service technology to secure the ability

37) Hannah Ellis-Petersen, "Hopes fade for India's moon lander after it fails to 'wake up' following lunar night," *The Guardian*, Sep 26, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/26/india-chandrayaan-3-vikram-lander-pragyan-sleep-mode-failure> (accessed on Oct 24, 2023).

38) Nature, "India's first Sun mission will investigate the origins of space weather," <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02811-2> (accessed on Oct 24, 2023).

39) Geeta Pandey, "Aditya-L1: India successfully launches its first mission of the Sun" BBC, Sep. 2, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66643805> (accessed on Oct 22, 2023).

to build small SLVs, lower the cost of space vehicles, and meet the demand for small satellite launches.

Space expert education

The field of outer space requires advanced science and technology capabilities. Training human resources with advanced technological capabilities, such as artificial intelligence, software, and autonomous driving, is essential to successful space activities. India is the world's leading IT powerhouse. In Bengaluru, India, also known as the Silicon Valley of Asia, the world's top IT companies, such as Google, IBM, and Microsoft, have moved in, and the IT industry is booming thanks to Indian scientific talent. It was also selected as the most dynamic city in the world in 2017 and 2019.⁴⁰⁾ The Seoul Metropolitan Government and Gyeonggi Province are investing in joint IT development between Korea and India through the IT Development Center in Bengaluru. Korean students and start-ups can enhance Korea's international status by participating in the development of cutting-edge technologies in India through international exchanges in the IT and space sectors.⁴¹⁾ Developing international space education programs and providing opportunities for mutual exchange between Korean and Indian students amid the recent high interest of young people around the world in Korea will promote international exchanges related to cutting-edge space education such as space technology, space launch vehicles, propulsion systems, and space flight mechanics.

Korea should promote cooperation with India systematically and strategically. The exchange of manpower should be improved so that India's young talent can be attracted to Korea and participate in Korea's space development.⁴²⁾

Expected Effects of Korea-India Space Cooperation

Both Korea and India have developed space technology and successfully carried out national space programs through space cooperation with other space-developed countries. Space cooperation between South Korea and India can only continue if the two countries build trust through international space cooperation and identify common interests they share. It is necessary to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of Korea and India in the space field and identify the areas of research and cooperation that can complement each other. Space

40) Pavithra Dennis, "How Bangalore became Asia's Silicon Valley," Jun 24, 2020, <https://thescalers.com/how-bangalore-became-asias-silicon-valley/> (accessed on Oct 24, 2023).

41) Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre(IN-SPACe), "IN-SPACe vision," 2023. p. 4.

42) Song Chiwoong, "Why to Embrace India's Young Talent," *e-newspaper*, July 12, 2023, <https://www.etnews.com/20230712000002> (accessed on Oct 24, 2023).

cooperation between Korea and India is expected to render the following effects.

First, in terms of national interests, as major countries in the Indo-Pacific region, Seoul and New Delhi can develop national space power and strengthen diplomacy between the two countries while maintaining national security through space cooperation and implementing major national space plans. Second, thanks to the artificial intelligence technology and advanced IT talents possessed by Korea and India, the two countries can increase profit creation in the space utilization field such as satellite imaging and communication services in the global space market. Third, Korea's advanced production capabilities of electronic components can be utilized to contribute to the space exploration missions in India. Fourth, taking advantage of major talents in the space field who can carry out joint research projects, the two countries can facilitate exchanges between professionals and strengthen science and technology research cooperation between them. Fifth, Korean space companies will be able to contribute to boosting local investment in India by entering India and conducting joint technology research.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

South Korea can use the lack of space cooperation with India as a new opportunity. To successfully implement the lunar lander project in 2032, South Korea must consider that India's Chandrayaan-3 lunar lander failed to withstand the extreme cold of the lunar South Pole and , learn the know-how of developing lunar landers by participating in India's lunar exploration project, and use Korea's satellite production technology to contribute to improving the performance of the lunar probe built by India. Through upward technological exchanges in international cooperation, Korea will emerge as an important partner for India in space development.

India has participated in space development since 1960 and succeeded in developing space launch vehicles and satellites with its technology. It is now one of the world's top space powerhouses. India has succeeded in building a commercial space industry that launches satellites from other countries, using its own space launch vehicles, and has space exploration technologies needed for moon and Mars exploration. In order to strengthen space cooperation between Korea and India, this study intends to present the following policy suggestions.

First, in the new space era, Korea should develop advanced space technology through international cooperation with advanced space countries and strengthen partnerships with space powers. India is a space power whose role in the global space market continues to grow. Korea should establish and implement measures to reinforce Korea's space capabilities by analyzing India's space development with its technological capabilities and small budget and drawing lessons applicable to the

case of South Korea.

Second, the South Korean government should review India's latest space policy and space program, identify the potential areas of cooperation with India, and reflect them in its space development plan. India has provided space-based services to the Indian people through space development and focused on the development of space technology and commercial profits of private companies. Korean space start-ups should be given the opportunity to participate in space technology development projects with world-class IT companies in Bengaluru, India, as well as Korea, and grow into technology-recognized companies in the global market.

Third, it is imperative that South Korea participate in international education programs with excellent space technology and IT talents in India to cultivate and secure excellent scientific personnel in Korea. Domestic and international space education programs can help train space-related personnel, but it takes a long time to develop such programs. India operates an international space education program, which will provide opportunities to facilitate human exchanges between the two countries' top talents through the development and participation of international education programs and serve as a stepping stone for Korea's top personnel to enter the world.

Fourth, South Korea and India should promote cooperation in the defense sector to jointly respond to threats in outer space. India has built space power to respond to China's threats and inspired patriotism among its people. Space cooperation between South Korea and India should begin in the private sector, but in the future, they should consider space cooperation in the defense sector. India is also planning a defense space program, recognizing the importance of space in terms of military. Notably, its diplomatic and military relations with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region have been reinforced. This year marks the 50th anniversary of Korea-India diplomatic relations, and both countries' collaborative efforts in space development in the private and defense sectors will multiply as the two countries promised to strengthen strategic communication and cooperation as key partners in the Indo-Pacific region through the G20 summit.

Fifth, Korea should establish and operate the Korea Aerospace Agency (KASA) as soon as possible to promote international cooperation with space organizations in the advanced space countries. The agreement on the opening of the KASA is delayed until the second half of 2023, which may hamper opportunities for international cooperation. The establishment of the Korea Aerospace Agency is essential to promote Korea's space cooperation with advanced space development countries and lead Korea's space activities. The Korea Aerospace Agency (KASA) should be in charge of overall international cooperation, as well as establishing and developing Korean aerospace policies, fostering domestic private space companies, and nurturing space professionals.⁴³⁾ The establishment and operation of the Korea Aerospace Agency will promote international space cooperation and play a leading

role in space activities.

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43) Yoon Jeong-hyun and Lee Sung-hoon, "Changing Public-Private Cooperation in the New Space Era and Exploring the Direction of Korean-style Development," *National Strategy* 29, no.3 (2023), p. 199.

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Military Aid as an Alternative Strategy: Understanding Japan's OSA through a Comparative Analysis with the U.S. FMF

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Abstract

The amalgam of security-related issues that Japan faces in the region of East Asia, such as tensions due to the rise of China and inter-state relations, has become increasingly problematic for Japan as it navigates its foreign policies. Under such convoluted conditions, Japan announced the concept of Official Security Assistance (OSA) in 2022. While OSA is yet to be fully understood, this study aims to comprehend the intentions behind Japan's new military aid by comparing its conceptualization with the U.S. Foreign Military Financing as a reference point.

The research compares Japan's OSA and the U.S.' Foreign Military Financing. Specifically, the study focuses on two points: (1) the presence of threats to the countries and (2) the role of military aid as an alternative strategy in dealing with security conditions. Through this juxtaposition, we assert that the intention of military aid acted as an alternative strategy by avoiding certain risks and enhancing and diversifying the means of deterrence against a potential threat. Moreover, the study seeks to analyze the trajectory of military aid provided by the U.S. and the challenges and outcomes OSA may experience. As Japan emphasizes its Indo-Pacific strategy and its resurgence as an active actor in the East Asian security realm, this new concept may prove to be a significant turning point.

Key Words: *Official Security Assistance (OSA), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Japanese National Security Strategy, Military Aid, Alternative Strategy*

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INTRODUCTION

Japan's presence in the field of security entered a new chapter at the end of 2022 as the Japanese government released several official documents related to its security policies. The three documents of Japan's National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program all resonate the same theme of Japan's confrontation of convoluted security-related conditions that are as concerning as the days at the end of the Second World War. On this theme, Japan's NSS illustrates its objectives as follows:

“As a major global actor, Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries, and others to achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In so doing, Japan will prevent the emergence of situations in which any one state can unilaterally change the status quo easily, and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law”¹⁾

As a middle power in East Asia, Japan's security challenges have escalated mainly due to the rise of China. In a situation where Japan is facing a shift in the regional power balance and threats being newly defined in the Asia-Pacific region, pursuing the norm of pacifism and abiding by its constitutional guidelines are being challenged. In this light, Japan has been seeking to strengthen its relations with like-minded partners and enhance its security-related capabilities to defend itself amidst an increasingly complex security environment. With this objective, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Kishida has set out specific goals such as increasing its military budget, strengthening its missile defense and counter-strike capabilities, and reinforcing its ties. While scholars are split on whether or not these measures have enough potential to make a significant change due to concerns ranging from budgetary matters to domestic support, this study argues that these goals indicate a shift in Japan's security strategy with aims to prepare the successful management of various security-related issues.

In this aspect, it has become pivotal to understand the newly coined term, Official Security Assistance or OSA. Although there is not enough information to thoroughly assess and examine the intended outcomes of this concept, the current conditions in which Japan is situated can be compared with cases where other states have utilized military aid. Thus, this research attempts to analyze OSA through a comparative analysis with the U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) -- a form of military aid with multiple similarities to OSA in terms of states'

1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “National Security Strategy (NSS),” Dec. 16, 2022, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

intentions behind implementation. The analysis focuses on two major aspects: 1) the characteristics of the security situation that the U.S. and Japan confronted and 2) the rationale for choosing military aid as a solution. By employing this analysis, we seek to juxtapose the similarities between the U.S.' strategies in utilizing FMF and OSA in order to assert that, through the provision of military aid, both countries intended to solve security issues without directly engaging in them. In other words, it is to claim that military aid increased the influence donor states had towards their aid recipients and thus acquired alternative deterrence mechanisms for pursuing national interests. In the last sections of the paper, by reviewing the analysis of the effectiveness of the FMF, this research seeks to provide the possible trajectories of OSA.

Reviewing Japan's new security framework and the implementation of OSA are significant academically on two fronts. First, there exists a limited amount of research related to OSA, as it has been less than a year since it was created. In this light, while most of the newly conducted research on OSA focuses on weapon exports, our research examines a significant shift in Japan's security strategy. Therefore, by exploring Japan's intentions for OSA, we highlight OSA's expected contributions to Japan's national security strategy as well as the challenges it may face. Second, scholarly attention has mainly been given to the role of security aid provided by Western donors. Current literature lacks research on the security aid by other countries situated in different regional power dynamics as in the case of East Asia. It is not difficult to see that donor countries' international stance and security concerns affect the intentions and outcomes of security aid. Therefore, by focusing on the unique security conditions that Japan is situated in, especially in terms of the power dynamics with the surrounding countries, Japan's form of military aid can be understood from a perspective outside of the Western context.

In sum, as OSA signifies Japan's new and comprehensive security strategy to maintain stability, the study explores OSA as an alternative option. Although Japan faces emerging challenges and increasing pressure from in and outside of the region, it has been limited in increasing its role in the field of security due to inter-state struggles and legality issues. On this note, the research claims that by adopting a non-traditional security mechanism approach that can alter the current security architecture, the framework of OSA serves as an alternative foundation to mitigate the security struggle that Japan has been experiencing. Thus, exploring the initial directions of OSA and the preliminary analysis of its purpose can help assess Japan's new opportunities in the security sector as well as the potential changes it can make in the security dynamics within the region.

Defining OSA

Conceptualization of OSA

The term OSA was introduced in December 2022 with the official approval of the Japanese Cabinet. Japan treated the concept of OSA as a new cooperation framework that is different from the existing concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The following <Table 1> presents similarities and differences in their definition, official purpose, key trends, and characteristics.

<Table 1> Comparison between Japan's ODA and OSA

		Official Development Assistance (ODA)	Official Security Assistance (OSA)
	Definition	Non-military government support targeting the socio-economic development of developing countries in various sectors such as social infrastructure, services, and economic infrastructure	Government support to strengthen the security of like-minded countries by providing equipment and supplies
	Similarities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provision of assistance to developing countries, focusing on Asian countries ● Catering to the national interests of Japan 	
Differences	Official Purpose	Economic and social development of developing countries for quality growth and promotion of free and open international order based on the rule of law	Deepening regional security cooperation, reinforcing the comprehensive defense architecture, and strengthening deterrence capacities
	Key Trends and Characteristics	The Development Cooperation Charter addresses increasingly complex and serious global challenges and the importance of international cooperation in initiatives including (a) climate change and environment, (b) health, (c) disaster risk reduction, and (d) education	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan specifies that OSA applies to fields not directly relating to any international conflict, including (a) activities for ensuring peace, (b) stability and security based on the rule of law, (c) humanitarian activities, and (d) international peace cooperation operations

Source: Kazuki Uechi, Anri Takahashi, Yoshihiko Tajima, "Where is "Doshikuni"? Ambiguous definition, Japan steps into military assistance, What is OSA?" Asahi, Apr. 6, 2023. [in Japanese]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "National Security Strategy (NSS)," Dec. 16, 2022, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023). ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Official Security Assistance (OSA)," Nov. 13, 2023, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/lpc/page4e_001366.html (accessed on Nov. 14, 2023).

As shown, both ODA and OSA provide forms of assistance to developing countries, with Japan's strategic focus on Asian countries. In addition to providing aid to developing states, the assistance seeks to cater to the national interests of Japan, including building coalitions with nearby countries. The two differ, however, in that OSA targets building security cooperation with countries and deterrence capacities of developing countries while ODA targets the overall well-being, economic, and social development of developing countries.²⁾ The National Security Council of Japan clarifies that OSA serves as a means to foster stable and highly predictable international security dynamics based on the rule of law. It is important to note that Japan has already been delivering security-related assistance to militaries of nearby developing countries mainly by providing them with Self-Defense Forces equipment as well as education and training. The conceptualization of OSA, thereby, can be interpreted as an extended or enhanced version of assistance that focuses more on security-related strategic cooperation from a country to its security partners located in Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Conditions and Principles of OSA

The provision of military aid is controversial and often intertwined with political and moral criticism. The main criticism against military assistance is due to a concern about exacerbating tensions that could potentially increase the instability in the recipient country or the region, subject to factors such as recipients' governance capacity or the vulnerability of regimes.³⁾ Other criticisms may be about donor states politicizing aid with ulterior motives other than developmental purposes. Against this backdrop, to maintain its philosophy of a peace-loving country, Japan has set specific principles of OSA in its Implementation Guidelines for Japan's Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfer.

The Japanese National Security Council announces that OSA applies to areas unrelated to direct international conflicts, focusing on activities aimed at preserving peace, stability, and security. This goal is expected to be achieved through adhering to the rule of law and as part of humanitarian efforts and engagements in international peace cooperation. In addition to advancing a free and open global order and enhancing recipient countries' security and deterrence

2) Ogi Hirohito, "How Japan Can Make the Most of Its Latest Diplomatic Tool," *The Japan Times*, August 27, 2023, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2023/08/27/japan/new-security-policy-tool/> (accessed on Sep. 23, 2023).

3) Amira Jadoon, "Conflict Aggravation or Alleviation? A Cross-National Examination of U.S. Military Aid's Effect on Conflict Dynamics with Insights from Pakistan," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 135, Issue 4 (Winter, 2020), pp. 665-695.; Andrew Boutton, "Military Aid, Regime Vulnerability and the Escalation of Political Violence," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2021), pp. 507-525

capabilities, OSA also addresses the need for humanitarian assistance. These include assistance in response to natural disasters, search and rescue operations, and provision of medical care. Moreover, Japan attaches high importance to international peace cooperation activities, including participation in United Nations Peacekeeping operations.

To maintain appropriateness, transparency, and international peace, Japan devises OSA within the framework of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines. To ensure that OSA does not violate any regulations, maintenance of appropriateness and transparency, disclosure of information, assessment and monitoring of the programs, proper management, and conformation to the principles of the United Nations Charter are thoroughly discussed in Japan's proposal of OSA. In strictly abiding by the norms of international peace and cooperation, especially in the legal aspect, the scheme of OSA aims to deviate itself from controversies of military aid and provocative narratives.

Research Framework

As the comprehensive understanding of OSA is still at an early stage, our primary objective is to examine the underlying motives and characteristics behind Japan's recent form of military assistance through a comparative study. The focus of the comparison is on two levels: the characteristics of the security environment that a state faces and how military aid was able to serve its security-related purpose.

First, we examine how national security interests were threatened by the unstable security conditions in the Middle East and Asian states to compare the U.S. FMF to the Middle East and Japan's OSA to Asian states. To better understand the level of interest the United States had in the region, we identify and analyze a number of concerns that it had about the spread of nuclear weapons, escalation of arms competition, acts of terrorism, and Iran's evolving threats that had instilled fear of destabilization. Meanwhile, Japan was mainly concerned with the rise of China, which increased its military spending in recent years. In addition to the direct threat heightened by China's military capabilities, there was growing tension in the region as China rigorously attempted to increase its influence in the region. We investigate not only China's friction with surrounding states but also with the U.S., which is deeply involved in the region. By doing so, we seek to propose that amidst such security challenges, FMF and OSA appear to hold regional security threats in check and contribute to stability. Against this backdrop, the research focuses on certain risks and limitations the states may face as they directly engage in the areas of interest, which led to the strategy of military aid and

capability building. In this study, by enhancing the military capabilities of like-minded states in turbulent regions, we uncover that the two states intended to stabilize and secure security interests in the region without escalating security tension, increasing domestic opposition, violating legal constraints, or losing more money in dealing with the conflict.

In the last section of the analysis, we assess the feasibility of military aid as an alternative strategy. By looking at the success rate of the U.S. FMF in reaching its intended purpose and the challenges in its relations with the recipient states, we shed light on the challenges and the outlook of Japan's OSA.

U.S. Intentions on Foreign Military Financing

FMF is an ideal program for comparison to understand the purposes of OSA. Established in 1961 under the Foreign Assistance Act, FMF is a program of the U.S. Office of Security Assistance within the State Department that funds defense equipment, military training, and services to allies and security partners through grants or direct loans. <Table 2> below displays the yearly payment waived disbursement of FMF in Middle Eastern countries. The table shows a significant difference in the size of FMF provided to Israel compared to other states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. It has been the largest recipient of U.S. military aid, with more than 158 billion dollars accumulated after the Second World War. With this background, we focus on the case of the military aid provided to Israel.⁴⁾

<Table 2> Yearly Payment Waived Disbursement of FMF by Country

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Israel	3.175	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.3
Egypt	0.195	1	1.3	1.3	1.095
Jordan	0.470	0.425	0.379	0.472	0.425
Iraq	0.250	0.250	0.174	0.497	0.250

* \$ in billion in all cases

Source: ForeignAssistance.gov. available at <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/>(accessed on Sep. 29, 2023).

4) Elias Yousif and Rachel Stohl, "In Shadow of War, a Snapshot of US Military Assistance to Israel," Stimson Center, Oct. 13, 2023, available at <https://www.stimson.org/2023/in-shadow-of-war-a-snapshot-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-israel/>(accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

In addition to the sheer size of military aid given to Israel, the Jewish state also enjoys certain privileges such as Cash Flow Financing, which allows more lenient payment upon purchasing, and multiple defense capability development programs with the U.S. These special arrangements of aid to Israel, in combination with the security dynamic the U.S. faces in the Middle East, present a unique form of providing military aid. In this regard, the obvious question that needs to be answered is why the U.S. is so committed to its relationship with Israel and how the U.S. intends to utilize military aid to manage its security interests strategically. In the next section, we will examine the security conditions related to Israel and the Middle East to understand the intention and the role that military aid had.

Security Threats and Interests in the Middle East

The Middle East has been a region of significant concern for the U.S.' national security interests. It was once a stage for a power struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the past and China now. It was also a target for retaliatory action after 9/11, which spurred fear of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms race, and terrorist activities, including Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah, buttressing instability in the region.⁵⁾ Generally, complicated security threats in the region have ranged from the Iraq War to Iran's relations with surrounding states, terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other regional conflicts.⁶⁾ Meanwhile, the economic value of the Middle East, including the stable supply of oil and the Suez Canal, which holds approximately 30% of the world's freight flows, makes the area still relevant.⁷⁾ Also, the U.S.' effort to maintain control and stability in the region through means like the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) among the states of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as well as fortifying ports and protecting energy infrastructures demonstrates how important the region is to the U.S. in both the economic and security aspects.⁸⁾ Thus, as Narea claims, the goal is "keeping at bay unrest that would threaten access to the regional oil supply on which America remains dependent."⁹⁾

5) Michael J. Koplow, "What Is Hizballah Waiting For," Israel Policy Forum, November 2, 2023, available at <https://israelpolicyforum.org/2023/11/02/what-is-hizballah-waiting-for/> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

6) Ibrahim M. Oweiss, "Why Did the United States Fail in Its War On Iraq?," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 8, 2010, available at <https://www.wrmea.org/2007-may-june/why-did-the-united-states-fail-in-its-war-on-iraq.html> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).; Samuel F. Wells, Mark A. Bruzonsky, *Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2020).

7) New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "The Importance of the Suez Canal to Global Trade," Apr. 18, 2021, available at <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/mfat-market-reports/the-importance-of-the-suez-canal-to-global-trade-18-april-2021> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

8) William Wunderle, Andre Briere, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel's Qualitative Military Edge: The Need for a Common Vision* (Washington DC: The Washington Institute, 2008).

In sum, the area has been, and still is, an essential area that the U.S. is deeply interested in preventing from destabilizing. While there are multiple political, economic, and historical objectives in the region, direct engagement has continuously led to unsuccessful results. Thus, the U.S. utilizes FMF as an alternative solution to direct engagement.

FMF as a Solution

First, we ask why the U.S. did not directly engage in the region but chose to find an alternative partner through military aid. As mentioned above, the U.S. saw changing interests in the region which ranged from battling the Soviet Union's influence to annihilation of Islamic terrorist groups and, more recently, state-building. Although the Middle East was a pivotal area, direct engagement had always been extremely costly, met with strong domestic opposition, but most importantly, unsuccessful. In one case, engaging in conflict with countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. saw costs growing exponentially with over 1.9 million accumulated personnel deployed in the Middle East with over eight trillion dollars being spent over the past 20 years.¹⁰⁾ As the Iraq War continued, fewer and fewer Americans endorsed the use of force in the region. This phenomenon is supported by Doherty and Kiley's 2023 work on how the public's positive assessment of the intervention in Iraq dropped from 54% in 2006 to 39% in 2018.¹¹⁾ This example shows that direct intervention was becoming less supported by the public and often met with fierce opposition. In another case, the multi-billion-dollar project to plant democracy in the region following the conflict has also failed with the U.S. having to pull back its forces from the region due to opposition.¹²⁾ In sum, direct intervention in the area was becoming less of an attractive option to pursue, which forced the U.S. to look for alternative options.

Against this backdrop, there are several rationales justifying why providing military aid to Israel was the adequate security strategy alternative to the U.S. To

9) Nicole Narea, "How the US Became Israel's Closest Ally," Vox, October 13, 2023, available at <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23916266/us-israel-support-ally-gaza-war-aid>(accessed on Sep. 29, 2023).

10) Institute of Medicine, *Returning Home from Iraq and Afghanistan: Assessment of Readjustment Needs of Veterans, Service Members, and Their Families* (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2013).; Jill Kimball, "Costs of the 20-Year War on Terror: \$8 Trillion and 900,000 Deaths," Brown University, September 1, 2021, available at <https://www.brown.edu/news/2021-09-01/costsofwar>(accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

11) Carroll Doherty and Jocelyn Kiley, "A Look Back at How Fear and False Beliefs Bolstered U.S. Public Support for War in Iraq," Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy, Mar. 14, 2023, available at <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/03/14/a-look-back-at-how-fear-and-false-beliefs-bolstered-u-s-public-support-for-war-in-iraq/>(accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

12) Daniele Archibugi, "Exporting Democracy: What Have We Learned from Iraq?" *Dissent*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 40-42.

begin, it is no coincidence that the extensive military support by the U.S. began with Israel's victory in the 1967 war. It is here that the U.S. saw an opportunity to utilize Israel as an instrument to stabilize the Middle East. As Zunes writes, "99% of U.S. military assistance to Israel since its establishment came only after Israel proved itself to be far stronger than any combination of Arab armies".¹³⁾ Thus, the FMF is not due to mere philanthropic interests but security-related strategic purposes that seek to have Israel stabilize and maintain dominance in the region on behalf of the U.S.¹⁴⁾ This idea was repeated by former President Bill Clinton as he signed the first 10-year military aid memorandum with the Israeli government to achieve peace in the region.

Once the mutually beneficial relationship was initiated, the U.S. adopted the concept of Qualitative Military Edge or QME, which is a stark example of the U.S.' effort to assist Israel in maintaining a superiority vis-a-vis its surrounding countries. The report written by the Congressional Research Service in 2020 on the topic of Israel's QME and the U.S.'s possible arms sale with the UAE shows the level of Washington's dedication to upholding this concept. The U.S. has not only given the first regional access to Israel on its defense technology, but it also has provided Israel with more advanced versions of equipment when the same platform was provided to other Arab countries.¹⁵⁾ Moreover, Israel's opinion on the arms sale of certain equipment to certain Arab countries has been influential while Israel is compensated with sufficient measures to nullify the capabilities of its adversaries.¹⁶⁾ The efforts made by the U.S. have also been seen through large amounts of investments in supporting the development of military equipment such as the Iron Dome and David's Sling.

All in all, FMF was a plausible solution for the U.S. in achieving its goal of stabilizing the Middle East by providing support for Israel. To the U.S. as a like-minded country, Israel prevented the risks of direct intervention while allowing the country to influence the region. Through extensive efforts of capability building, military aid has been an alternative strategy that can be seen as a mutually beneficial and, thus, sustainable solution.

13) Stephen Zunes, "Why the U.S. Supports Israel," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, May 1, 2022, available at https://fpif.org/why_the_us_supports_israel/(accessed on Sep. 29, 2023).

14) *Ibid.*

15) Jim Zanotti, "Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations - CRS Reports," Congressional Research Service, July 2022, available at <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44245>(accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

16) Jeremy M. Sharp et al., "Israel's Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates," Congressional Research Service, October 2020, available at <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46580>(accessed on Sept.30, 2023).

Japanese Intentions in Official Security Assistance

In comprehending the objectives of the newly established OSA, it is imperative to delve into the complex array of factors that have catalyzed Japan's transition into a more assertive posture within its security policies. This transition underscores a strategic evolution aimed at addressing emerging challenges and demands within the contemporary global security landscape that have urged significant changes from Japan's traditional security strategy within the region. Three factors can explain changing security dynamics: (1) the rise of China's military, (2) China's growing influence in Asia, and (3) escalating tensions due to the U.S.-China rivalry.

The Rise of China's Military

Security threats have intensified in East Asia with the considerable rise in Chinese military spending and capability. This is in contrast to the case of Japan, which has suffered from severe military restrictions, including Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the Three Principles of Arms Exports of 1967, and the updated Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfer in 2014. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China's military expenditure in 2023 is projected to reach 292 billion USD, doubling its budget within a mere decade.¹⁷⁾ China's noticeable increase in its military budget is being perceived as a security threat, opening possibilities of an arms race in East Asia.

In addition to an immense military budget gap between Japan and China, the capacity of the Chinese military has escalated in recent years. The recent drastic armament of China indicates an increase in both quantity and quality. According to the annual Global FirePower (GFP) review, among 145 countries, China ranked in the top 3 for military strength and continues to increase warfare capabilities.¹⁸⁾ Possessing the most significant military force in terms of the total army personnel, China's military is reported to be systematic and comprehensive with professional military capabilities.¹⁹⁾ Moreover, China's strategic municipalities are located along the extensive coastlines to reinforce its maritime supremacy.²⁰⁾ As such, China has undertaken a comprehensive modernization and expansion of its

17) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database," 2023, available at <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

18) Global Fire Power, available at https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=china (accessed on Sep. 29, 2023).

19) Roger Cliff, "China's Future Military Capabilities," US Army War College Press, April 2023

20) Edward Sing Yue Chan, *China's Maritime Security Strategy: The Evolution of a Growing Sea Power* (New York: Routledge, 2021).

military forces, spanning across the land, air, and maritime domains. Such military rise exerts considerable pressure on Japan, as it confronts a dual challenge regarding both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of military power projection.

China's Growing Influence in Asia

China's mounting influence in Asia is another pressing challenge in Japan's security dynamics. China has been displaying a strong presence in the South China Sea (SCS) and Pacific Rim, signifying its ambition to dominate power in the region through assertive claims and active interactions. Cases of the SCS disputes and the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) led to China's surging influence in Asia and the changing security dynamics of the region.

While the SCS disputes first became prominent in the late 1980s, conflicts have been most contentious in recent years. Mounting competition over maritime resources, the increasing importance of SCS for global trade, worsening geopolitical tensions, and the rising international trend of nationalism together escalated tensions in SCS. Several international conflicts occurred as a result, including the Sino-Japanese confrontation over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as well as conflicting maritime interests between China and other Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.²¹⁾ Strident assertions of sovereignty and controversial ownership of maritime resources have amplified instability in the Asia-Pacific region.

China's ambitious expansion of the BRI is another example demonstrating China's rising influence. Launched in 2013, BRI has heralded investments in diverse infrastructure projects spanning Asia and extending its reach globally. By 2022, the financial commitment and investments associated with BRI had reached an impressive approximate sum of 67.8 billion USD, with the accumulated assets exceeding 962 billion USD since the program's inception.²²⁾ Comprised of two principal components, the Silk Road Economic Belt, a land-based network, and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, a sea-based network, BRI signifies a cornerstone of President Xi Jinping's foreign policy, seamlessly aligning with the visionary conception of centralized trading.²³⁾ BRI extends China's influence in a profound manner, with its most significant impact discernible in emerging markets

21) Ian Storey, Lin Cheng Yi, *The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions* (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016).

22) Christoph N. Wang, "China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2022," Green Finance & Development Center, Feb. 3, 2023, available at <https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2022/> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

23) Hu Pingchao, *The Belt and Road Portal*, Jun. 21, 2023, available at <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/0T4ND13J.html> (accessed on Sep.30, 2023).

and developing nations located in SCS.²⁴⁾ In essence, China seeks to foster stronger strategic alliances with BRI participant countries, enabling it to secure coveted access to essential resources, uncharted markets, and promising investment opportunities. Such an expanding presence of China in the Pacific has alarmed Japan to precipitate its strategic relations with SCS as China increases pressure from Japan's perspective.

China's rising power as a potential regional, economic hegemon in Asia poses a big concern to Japan.²⁵⁾ Today, the Indo-Pacific region is of paramount importance to Japan in terms of trade. The southern theater plays a crucial role in global trade and any disruptions in the area can have significant consequences. Japan's security strategy takes into account stabilizing the Taiwan Strait and SCS. Japan's heavy reliance on imports, particularly petroleum, underscores the economic and energy-related dimensions of its security. The uninterrupted flow of resources is essential for Japan's financial stability, and any disruptions in the maritime routes through the region can lead to an immediate economic disaster.

Escalating Tensions Due to the U.S.-China Rivalry

Ikenberry introduced the concept of the security-economy nexus, which provides a framework for comprehending the intricate interplay between security and economy.²⁶⁾ In the context of Asia, the U.S. assumes the role of a security provider, while China takes the lead in the economic realm. This dynamic establishes a delicate equilibrium where each vies for influence in the region. When contemplating the most prudent diplomatic stance to adopt in pursuit of national interests, states often face the challenge of navigating the complex dynamics of the security-economy nexus. The question of which entity to align with - security-oriented the U.S. or economically-driven China - can be a perplexing one. The choice between the two giants greatly impacts a state's foreign policy, making it a crucial decision almost impossible to make.²⁷⁾ In such a situation, Japan's existing trajectory of alignment with the U.S. can risk the possibility of reactive measures from China.²⁸⁾ Furthermore, the perceived

24) Lauren A. Johnston, "The Belt and Road Initiative: What is in it for China?" *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (2018), pp. 40-58.

25) Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, "Japan's Effectiveness as a Geo-Economic Actor: Introduction," *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, March 28, 2022, available at <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/03/japans-effectiveness-as-a-geo-economic-actor-introduction/> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

26) John Ikenberry, "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 131, Issue 1 (Spring, 2016), pp. 9-43.

27) Yukio Hatoyama, "US-China Rivalry and Japan's Strategic Role," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 44, Issue 2 (2021), pp. 7-19.

28) Guanie Lim, Chengwei Xu, "The Political Economy of Japan's Development Strategy under

indecisiveness in Washington's policies along with the unclear strategic direction from the Trump administration has created a heightened security alarm from Japan's perspective.²⁹⁾ What can be a strategic leeway for Japan amidst the uncertainties of power struggles?

The fierce U.S.-China competition empowers the necessities for Japan in pursuit of a self-help-oriented diplomatic framework such as the OSA. In fact, preliminary research demonstrates the importance of having an alternative rather than having to choose between the alignment of either the U.S. or China.³⁰⁾ Japan's newly devised framework of OSA can be an answer to Japan's newfound security dilemmas.

OSA as a Solution

The first question is as follows: why not directly engage? The answer to the question is similar to the reasons for the U.S.'s reluctance to enter the Middle East. Like the U.S., Japan would suffer from too much potential risk and cost if it were to directly engage in the conflict. Japan also has to be careful in pursuing the objective of internal balancing as "power-projection forces are more likely to spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend."³¹⁾ In other words, Japan's option of expanding military capabilities could send the wrong message to China, as East Asian states could also fall within the anarchical security dilemma. The tendency of avoiding provocative behavior has been consistent in Japan's security strategies. Its defense budget as a share of its GDP has rarely been above one percent, while its neighbors of South Korea and Taiwan rarely dropped below the two-percent threshold. This aspect, along with the legal restriction that Japan faces, displays Japan's reluctance to risk the costs of being seen as an aggressor.

Thus, OSA can be understood as a way to find an alternative answer to the issues Japan faces as it does not have Japan directly engage in the conflictual situation or violate its own constitution. As OSA focuses on the provision of security-related assets and building capabilities for like-minded countries, it avoids the problem that can arise with methods such as internal balancing. Also, as OSA is built around the idea of providing states with non-lethal assets and infrastructure

China-US Rivalry: The Crane, the Dragon, and the Bald Eagle," *The Chinese Economy*, Vol 56, Issue 4 (2023), pp. 281-291.

29) Shin Kawashima, "Japan-US-China Relations during the Trump Administration and the Outlook for East Asia," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 24, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 23-36.

30) Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, "Japan's Effectiveness as a Geo-Economic Actor: Introduction," *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, March 28, 2022, available at <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/03/japans-effectiveness-as-a-geo-economic-actor-introduction/> (accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

31) Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), pp. 50.

building, the adoption of OSA eliminates concerns about Japan violating its constitution or the Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfer. Thus, without increasing the level of risk and costs that it may face, OSA can create leverage against the rising Chinese threat in the following aspect.

In the form of finding an alternative method of balancing, OSA can diversify its mode of security in terms of non-traditional capability building. The issue of maritime security is of great concern to Japan as conflicts in the South China Sea or the regions near the Taiwan Strait can cause security-related problems and severe economic damage. Matsumoto writes that “the main challenges that we are faced with now is to decide how to defend our territorial waters through non-military means while restraining from...the use of our military forces.”³²⁾ Japan’s focus on the provision of satellite communication systems and the emphasis on activities such as monitoring, surveillance, counter-terrorism, and counter-piracy, can be the starting point of a form of cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian states in the field of non-traditional security. As Japan already has an established relationship with many states in East Asia on the basis of ODA, the new framework of OSA can build loosely tied security coalitions by providing equipment related to enhancing non-traditional capabilities and receiving a joint sharing of intelligence as well as a chance to test their own equipment in real-life conditions in return. This resonates with Matsumoto’s idea mentioned above in terms of utilizing non-military means and his claim that “Japan seeks to establish a coalition of like-minded regional partners and render support to capacity building for enhancing regional maritime awareness.”³³⁾

Furthermore, OSA is plausible as Southeast Asian states are concerned about their maritime security as much as Japan. Nguyen writes that “maritime security and cooperation is one of the most important components of APSC” as their economic, security, and territorial interests are closely intertwined.³⁴⁾ This attempt has already shown basic levels of cooperation through the mode of ODA. Midford writes that “Japan has gradually expanded its role and voice in SCS maritime security, first through ODA and the promotion of multilateral security cooperation.”³⁵⁾ It is on this foundation that OSA attempts to create a contingency

32) Futoshi Matsumoto, “Japan’s Maritime Security Policy.” In *The Future of the Seas in East Asia: Forging a Common Maritime Future for ASEAN and Japan*, edited by Shafiah F. Muhibat, Audrey Stienon, pp. 40. Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015.

33) *Ibid.* p.43.

34) Nguyen H. Son, “ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Maritime.” In *Beyond 2015 ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia*, edited by Rizal Sukma, Soeya Yoshihide, *Nihon-No Midoru-Pawa Gaiko [Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy]* (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 2005).

35) Paul Midford, “Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55, Issue. 3 (2015), pp. 547.

plan that can not only respond to contingencies in the area but also diversify its security partners.

In sum, the mode of OSA can be a useful tool for Japan to circumvent the issues it has in engaging directly with China and violating its regulations. As Sullivan, Tessman, and Li write “military aid is a source of bargaining power because donors can link benefits to desired behavior by recipients,” the provision of non-traditional security aid to enhance the countries of East Asia in battling their non-traditional security issues can be mutually beneficial and thus sustainable.³⁶⁾ Furthermore, the purpose of Japan’s pursuit of OSA can be framed as establishing a method of alternative deterrence toward the rise of China and increasing tensions resulting from the U.S.-China competition.

Does Military Aid Work?

U.S. FMF Evaluation and Implications

Unlike OSA, FMF has been implemented for more than decades, and academic papers evaluating the roles and outcomes of FMF have been substantially discussed. To analyze how military aid can affect the behavior of recipient states, Sullivan, Tessman, and Li’s 2011 article presents the three models: Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower, and Reverse Leverage.³⁷⁾

First, the concept of Arms for Influence refers to a situation where the provision of aid can influence the recipient’s behavior in favor of the donor country’s interests. Military aid can be used as a tool for a donor country to create a dynamic with the recipient that will allow them to substantially influence the recipient. Second, the Lonely Superpower model suggests that with aid comes defiance rather than compliance. This can be understood as a behavior with the motive to offset any notion of the recipient country. Third, in the Reverse Leverage model, the donor state relies on the recipient country for military aid. It refers to a situation where the client can have more control over the patron in a patron-client relationship between the donor and the recipient, as it can pursue other alternatives that can interfere with the national interest of the patron.

Considering the analytical approach in evaluating the models of military aid, next, we analyze FMF’s outcomes. By reviewing the impacts of FMF, the paper looks into how Japan must deftly navigate its strategic decisions to maximize its influence. We present FMF’s evaluation and outcomes of FMF based on positives or negatives.

36) Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman, Xiaojun Li, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 7, Issue 3 (2011), pp. 275–294.

37) *Ibid.*

Positive Outcomes

Positive outcomes occur when the aid reaches its initial purpose in the donor country without significant side effects. Past literature has judged FMF's positive contributions once it has successfully had political, economic, or security influences over the recipient countries. The benefits of FMF may be narrowed down to three major points: (1) pursuit of common interest, (2) indirect intervention, and (3) sharing intelligence and technology.

First, as Iran was portrayed as the common enemy of Israel and neighboring states in the Middle East, it was easy for the U.S. to convince countries to coalesce forces, especially in addressing regional insecurities.³⁸⁾ The commonality of the regional interest in containing Iran or terrorist groups from power expansion creates a drive for countries to follow the superpower agenda. Nevertheless, the U.S. benefits from not being present in the region while addressing its national security interests.

Second, the concept of indirect intervention presents a pragmatic and resource-efficient approach to applying influence. FMF program emerges as a strategic conduit for the pursuit of the U.S.'s national interests through its collaboration with the proxy state, Israel. Jerusalem serves as a discerning diplomatic intermediary within the Middle East, capable of advocating the U.S.'s interests in the region and amplifying its influence within the regional landscape. This symbiotic relationship reflects the intricacies of the U.S. foreign policy implementation, where alliances and proxies play pivotal roles in shaping global dynamics.

Lastly, Israel and the U.S. share intelligence and technologies. While the U.S. has been focusing on keeping the QME program updated to the latest advanced versions of military goods, Israel has been able to develop its own technological capabilities over the past years, which helped enhance the intelligence missions in the region.³⁹⁾ HUMINT from Israel provides invaluable insight into the region's stability and aggressions. In addition, there exists the potential opportunities for testing equipment and sharing its effect between the two countries. On this note, military capabilities were enhanced dramatically throughout the procurement programs of Iron Dome and F-35 Lightning fighters.⁴⁰⁾ In terms of ballistic missile

38) William Wunderle, Andre Briere, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel's Qualitative Military Edge: The Need for a Common Vision* (Washington DC: The Washington Institute, 2008).

39) Jarrod Bernstein, "Ensuring Israel's Qualitative Military Edge," National Archives and Records Administration, November 17, 2011, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/17/ensuring-israels-qualitative-military-edge>(accessed on Sept. 30, 2023); Jeremy M. Sharp, Zim Zanotti, Kenneth Katzman, Christina L. Arabia, Clayton Thomas, "Israel's Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates," Congressional Research Service, October 2020.

40) Jeremy M. Sharp, Zim Zanotti, Kenneth Katzman, Christina L. Arabia, Clayton Thomas,

interception capabilities, which the Israeli Defense Minister praised as displaying exceptional performance, the Iron Dome is considered a substantial success for both Israel and the U.S.⁴¹⁾ This was exemplified when the next Palestine conflict occurred in 2021 and the Iron Dome successfully intercepted 90% of 1,500 rocket projectiles directed at the municipal areas.⁴²⁾

Negative outcomes

The potential of regional countries not wholeheartedly pledging allegiance to the U.S. should not be overlooked. Loyalty in such a volatile context is a complex matter, where the middle-state dilemma complicates initial assumptions. Ultimately, it seems that many Middle Eastern states are ensnared by the other two models: the Lonely Superpower model and the Reverse Leverage model. Bound by their core interests, countries often find their alignment with the U.S. to be multi-dimensional. Engaging in defiance and seeking increased funds in exchange for loyalty creates problems for both parties involved. The U.S. faces the difficult question of whether to allocate more funds or halt aid altogether while uncertainty increases.

First, the U.S. finds itself as the Lonely Superpower. While the contribution of multinational FMF programs was a necessary support for regional stability, there were cases where the recipients defied the donor to prevent excessive dependence on the donor. This can be understood through the idea of Miller and Sokolsky as they suggest that the U.S.' military aid was dysfunctional in the sense that its aid had not only "failed to make major strides in [the recipients'] capabilities" but also had seen a situation where recipient countries "generally - and successfully - resist[ed] Washington's request to modify their policies in exchange for assistance."⁴³⁾

Secondly, the recipients find themselves having Reverse Leverage within the framework of FMF programs. Although the QME programs through FMF were initiated with shared objectives and unwavering determination, the ever-evolving landscape of international politics was subject to change. Emerging from the

"Israel's Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates," Congressional Research Service, October 2020.; Jim Zanotti, "Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations - CRS Reports," Congressional Research Service, July 2022, available at <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44245>(accessed on Sep.30, 2023).

41) Jarrod Bernstein, "Ensuring Israel's Qualitative Military Edge," National Archives and Records Administration, November 17, 2011, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/17/ensuring-israels-qualitative-military-edge>(accessed on Sept. 30, 2023)

42) Jim Zanotti, "Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations - CRS Reports," Congressional Research Service, July 2022, available at <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44245>(accessed on Sep. 30, 2023).

43) Andrew Miller, Richard Sokolsky, "What has \$49 billion in foreign military aid bought us? not much," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace American Conservative, Feb. 27, 2018.

economic conflicts between the U.S. and China in the Middle East region, incidents of friction have come to light. This discord can be traced back to China's ambitious BRI investment plans, which caused ripples in its bilateral relationship with the U.S. Of particular concern is China's aggressive involvement in financing major infrastructure projects within Israel. The infiltration by China indicates the problem of alternative options for the recipient states. If the recipients can receive more aid or aid that is not earmarked for specific purposes from another donor, then the aid given by the U.S. loses its attractiveness. This worrisome reaction was exemplified by the Trump administration in 2019 when it raised a red flag regarding the need to curtail the expansion of China's investments within the nation.

Ultimately, upon careful consideration of the implications stemming from FMF in the Middle East, it is increasingly clear that these endeavors have, to a significant degree, engendered unfavorable outcomes. The reality is acutely pronounced in a region characterized by its tumultuous landscape, where the notion of enduring status quo remains elusive. In the Middle East, the propensity for profound transformations is heightened by the ascendance of extremist religious and ideological movements, contributing to the region's volatility. Moreover, Middle Eastern states' burgeoning partnership with China poses a potential disruption to the equilibrium necessary to maintain their robust bilateral relations with the U.S. This evolving partnership threatens to transform the Middle East into a contested arena, thereby complicating the already intricate web of international relations.

Challenges for Japan's OSA

Japan has several weak points in providing military aid. There is no comparison between the level of military aid that the U.S. can provide as a superpower with significant military budgets and technology and the level of military aid that Japan can hold in East Asia. In addition, the restriction currently imposed on Japan in terms of legalities prohibits Japan from supplying its recipients with perhaps adequate military assets. Moreover, the fact that Japan's system of providing aid has been heavily reliant on loans rather than grants and how Japan is geographically closer to the threat than the U.S. is to the threat can prevent Japan from further utilizing its influence and creating a coalition of like-minded nations.

These relatively weak points can lead to another issue. While East Asian countries are already heavily influenced by China, the limited form of military assistance that Japan can provide could be easily overshadowed by China. Over the issues related to the budget, legality, loan-based aid, and geographic proximity, Japan's leverage against its recipients could be overturned if China chooses to intervene. What increases the severity is that attempts to solve the relative

disadvantages are extremely difficult. Any attempt to make changes in the aforementioned sectors is bound to have severe domestic and international constraints. Additionally, Japan's proximity to China in the security dilemma affords China to keep a close eye on Japan. Under such conditions, the strong alternative that China could present would make it easy for Japan to find itself becoming an isolated regional power or succumbing to *reverse leverage*.

CONCLUSION

Amidst a highly complex security landscape and the dynamic interplay of regional power dynamics, Japan has crafted a comprehensive set of national security strategies: OSA. The paper delved into a thorough examination of Japan's underlying motives based on the security-related conditions by comparing it to military aid provided by the U.S. Although there are considerable differences between the security conditions, there are some substantial similarities that the two states share. They include the harsh security environment where both Japan and the U.S. were situated, their reluctance to enter directly into the area of conflict, and the use of aid to create an alternative solution to the problem by pursuing the acquisition of leverage over the recipients. Thus, by exploring these similarities, the study provides some foundation for future study.

Limitations

As it sought to establish a firmer foundation to assess Japan's OSA, this research suffers from some clear limitations. The first and perhaps the most significant weakness of this study lies in the lack of information and time. As aforementioned, the paper's major strength and weakness is that it is one of the earliest studies that attempt to conceptualize and understand the intentions and purpose of what Japan seeks to achieve with this form of military aid. Thus, as more concrete plans and interaction based on OSA proceeds in the future, the findings and conceptualization of this research may prove to be false.

Another limitation lies in the attempt to compare Japan and the U.S. horizontally. Although there were significant similarities between the intentions behind the military aid, there still exists stark differences in the situations and capabilities that the two states found themselves in. Japan's exceptionality in comparison with that of the U.S. can be found in multiple aspects. For example, in addition to the vast differences in military capabilities and spending, there are specific legal restrictions that bind Japan's military actions. As elucidated by Yoshihide, Japan's security posture reflects the Yoshida doctrine, which profoundly embeds pacifist principles in its political philosophy.⁴⁴ Likewise, Japan's TPDET and its Peace Constitution significantly limit the provision of lethal military assets to recipients. Unlike the

strategic intentions of FMF, these legal restrictions put Japan's OSA on a different foundation. The U.S.'s status of being free from such legal restrictions and its capability to provide a wider range of military assets through FMF is a major difference that sets the two types of military aid apart in assessing the reason for its establishment, utilization, as well as the extent of its influence.

Meanwhile, Japan's position in relation to its adversary is different from the U.S. Similar to the notion above, OSA is not an attempt to find the most effective strategy among others but an attempt to resolve the restrictions that it finds itself in. Japan's proximity to China, whose capabilities far outweigh that of Japan's, is a major factor that shapes Japan's strategies. These conditions that Japan is situated in extinguish Japan's options to build a stronger alliance, enhance defense capabilities, directly provide lethal military assets, or directly engage with China. They are not legally feasible, too risky, or vastly unpopular policies to pursue, which strikes a clear difference in regard to the relative advantage the U.S. held over its adversary.

Implications

Despite such limitations, exploring the motives and directions of Japan's OSA carries much significance as Japan deliberately implemented OSA as an alternative strategy to address its security agendas, not falling into internal or external balancing. To elaborate, the research intends to classify that if Japan's objective is to balance against China, internal balancing would be shown through a focus on efforts to increase its military capability while external balancing would be strengthening alliances to deter the expansion of Chinese influence. The brilliance of OSA is that it lies somewhere outside of this framework as a pursuit of a reserved, conservative approach to addressing emerging security risks without creating unnecessary tension.

First, Japan's OSA does not imply strengthening its military capability. OSA does not increase domestic weapon acquisition, which also goes against not only public opinion but also the Peace Constitution. Second, Japan's OSA does not imply creating a strong form of alliance between like-minded countries to battle against the rise of China. Instead, OSA is focused on regional capacity building, targeting non-traditional security issues such as natural disaster relief, piracy, and other regional crises. In this way, Japan can garner increased security and cooperation without sending the wrong signals to its neighbors. Thus, it is important to note that Japan aims to find answers to its security risks and cooperation with like-minded countries through military aid, which resembles the characteristics of the U.S. FMF. In sum, we proposed a framework that would help us understand Japan's OSA as an instrument to provide military aid as an alternative form of security strategy.

44) Soeya Yoshihide, *Nihon-No Midoru-Pawa Gaiko [Japan's Middle Power Diplomacy]* (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 2005).

Policy Recommendation

If OSA is built on the intentions explained in the study, there will be many challenges ahead for Japan in dealing with the problems that the U.S. has already experienced. For Japan to successfully navigate through troublesome waters, we recommend that Japan focus on the goal of non-traditional security-related cooperation. It cannot be stressed enough that Japan keeps a low profile as it establishes such cooperative relations with its recipients to avoid an unnecessary clash with China would have to be stressed in establishing such cooperative relationships with its recipients. Moreover, by enhancing the necessary defense capabilities of the recipients, Japan can benefit from intelligence sharing and reinvigorating its own defense industry through real-world testing of its equipment. In the end, this mutually beneficial and sustainable security strategy can be a pivotal tool in assisting Japan quietly and slowly but surely in changing the security dynamics of East Asia.

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
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