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# THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF SECURITY AFFAIRS

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## ***The Korean Journal of Security Affairs***

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# Integration and Distribution: Two Tenets of the United States Defense/Military Strategy Against China

Kang Kyu Lee

## Abstract

*What are the tenets of the U.S. defense and military strategies against China? While there have been many works analyzing the U.S. defense and military strategies, they seem to be short of identifying the common themes that synthesize the U.S. defense and military strategies. In this study, I propose that the United States defense and military strategy against China comprises two central tenets: integration and distribution. Integration is employed at the strategic level to deter China's ambition and overwhelm its military capabilities. It is manifested in initiative such as the U.S. Integrated Deterrence, the Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), and Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI). On the other hand, distribution is pursued at the operational level to paralyze Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD) and achieve military objectives. It characterizes initiatives such as the Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), along with the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). The findings of the study offer implications for South Korea, including the increased likelihood of US demanding South Korea to implement integration and distribution, China's response to enhance its capabilities, and the U.S. approaches in terms of North Korea's A2/AD.*

**Key Words:** *integration, distribution, US strategy against China, US operational concepts*

## Introduction

In 2022, the United States released some important strategic documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which could be characterized by one sentence: all are concerned about China. For example, the NSS explains the U.S. strategy against the People's Republic of China (PRC) with three axioms: to invest in the foundations of its strength domestically, to align its efforts with the network of allies and partners, and compete responsibly with the PRC to defend U.S. interests.<sup>1)</sup> They were already revealed by the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his speech at the George Washington University several months before the release of the NSS.<sup>2)</sup> In comparison to the U.S. foreign policy toward China, however, it is relatively hard to understand the bottom line of the U.S. defense strategy against China. Although the defense documents seriously address the China issues, the U.S. defense strategy against China has not been elucidated in those documents and remarks by high-ranking officials in defense and security fields, which, at best, imply it should be in line with the concept of "Integrated Deterrence."

Then, what are the U.S. defense and military strategies against the PRC's defense strategy of active defense<sup>3)</sup> and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)?<sup>4)</sup> I argue that strategic integration and operational distribution are the two main features of the strategy.<sup>5)</sup> Although the apparent meanings of the two concepts seem to be

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1) The White House, "National Security Strategy"(October 2022), p. 24.

2) Antony Blinken, "The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China"(May 26, 2022), U.S. Department of State (<https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>, accessed on January 22, 2023)

3) M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

4) China had allegedly adopted the concept of A2/AD in the mid-1980s, while the United States was reported to use the term first in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, it did not clearly mention A2/AD was the strategy of China. But it might be plausible that it considered China given the Office of Net Assessment's involvement in the QDR and its assessment of China threats. On the other hand, in the *Annual Report on The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2000*, area denial was not used whereas anti-access was mentioned once for information operations, not sea denial. For a more literature review on A2/AD, see Nick Impson, "The Next Warm War: How History's Anti-Access/Area Denial Campaigns Inform the Future of War," *Small Wars Journal* (January 14, 2020) (<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/next-warm-war-how-historys-anti-accessarea-denial-campaigns-inform-future-war>, accessed on March 25, 2024) and "An Anti-Access History Lesson," *The Diplomat* (May 25, 2012) (<https://thediplomat.com/2012/05/an-anti-access-history-lesson/>, accessed on March 25, 2024).

5) The idea of two pillars of the U.S. defense strategy against China was originally proposed by Captain Soonkun Oh, who has worked as the Korean military attaché at the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Honolulu.

incompatible, they share an underlying orientation: more is better. After reviewing pertinent studies and developing a theoretical framework, the article proceeds to examine the integration of U.S. defense strategy by looking into the Integrated Deterrence and other sub-capstones regarding integration such as the Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI), and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Then, it explores distribution by focusing on Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), along with sketching the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). The article concludes with a summary of the main arguments and some implications for South Korea.

## Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The conventional wisdom is inadequate in identifying the core elements of the U.S. military strategy against the People's Republic of China. This is because the U.S. defense and military strategy against China has been understudied in the academic community, although it has been of interest to policy researchers. Even though there are very few studies on the topic, they can be divided into three groups by their distinct approaches. First, the inclusive approach views the United States' defense and military strategy against China as a component of the country's national security strategy or general defense and military strategy.<sup>6)</sup> In this context, while the strategy may be applicable to China, it is uncertain whether it is specifically directed at the country. The second approach is concerned with the military balance between the United States and China, focusing on military capabilities rather than strategies.<sup>7)</sup> The third approach pays particular attention to a specific subject, such as the Taiwan contingency and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s modernization.<sup>8)</sup> Nevertheless, all these research focuses neglect

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6) See Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, "Dilemmas of Deterrence: The United States's Smart New Strategy Has Six Daunting Trade-offs," *The Marshall Papers* (CSIS), 2024; Dan Grazier, "A Rational China-Oriented Military Strategy," *Project on Government Oversight*, 2023; Terrence K. Kelly, James Dobbins, David A. Shlapak, David C. Gompert, Eric Heginbotham, Peter Chalk, and Lloyd Thrall, "The U.S. Army in Asia, 2030-2040," *RAND Corporation*, 2014.

7) See Graham Allison and Jonah Glick-Unterman, "The Great Military Rivalry: China vs the U.S." *The Harvard Belfer Center*, 2021; Thomas H. Shugart III, "Trends, Timelines, and Uncertainty: an Assessment of the Military Balance in the Indo-Pacific," *CNAS*, 2021; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Evolving Strategies in the U.S.-China Military Balance," *CSIS*, 2016.

8) See Derek Grossman and John S. Meyers, "Minding the Gaps: US Military Strategy toward China," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2019, pp. 105-121; Ashton B. Carter and Jennifer C. Bulkeley, "America's Strategic Response to China's Military Modernization," *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* vol. 9. no. 1. (Winter 2007), pp. 50-52; Luke P. Bellocchi, "The Strategic

the underlying maxim of the strategy.<sup>9)</sup> To fill the gap between those research approaches, the article aims to focus on the fundamentals of the U.S. defense and military strategy against China.

To add another stone to the tower of existing research accomplishments, we should start by thinking about simple ways to counter Chinese A2/AD. Penetrating into the anti-access by China is possible only when the United States possesses the overwhelming power. To do so, Washington should enhance its forces and capabilities to the fullest extent. Two heads are better than one, and two hands are better than one. In addition, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Thus, integration of capabilities is more desirable than just aggregation of them. The difference between the concentration of force or “mass,” which has been one of the fundamental principles of war for a long time,<sup>10)</sup> also illustrates the concept effectively. The most recent example is the “whole-of-government approach” employed by the United States.<sup>11)</sup> Furthermore, Washington’s consolidated power on its own or with its allies may play a pivotal role in prompting China to change its strategy from active defense to a more defensive one. Indeed, the United States can impede China’s assertive implementation of A2/AD in advance.

Meanwhile, unlike concentrated forces, dispersed forces can afford to move freely around an area without being interrupted. The logic of random dispersion in the ecosystem, a superior strategy for survival,<sup>12)</sup> can be applied to the military environment. Furthermore, the widely distributed military forces may increase the likelihood of identifying potential weaknesses in Chinese A2/AD capabilities. In response, China should allocate a greater proportion of its resources to maintain

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Importance of Taiwan to the United States and Its Allies: Part Two – Policy since the Start of the Russia-Ukraine War,” *Parameters* 53, no. 3, 2023; Michael R. Pompeo and Bryan Clark, “A New Strategic Concept Could Be Useful in the US Military’s Defense of Taiwan,” *The Hill* (April 2, 2024); Matt Salmon and Shay Stautz, “American Power and the Defense of Taiwan,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (March 9, 2023).

- 9) Some Korean researchers explored US strategy against China in terms of operational concepts, but they did not touch on an overarching conception of them. See Youngguen Choi and Hanbyeol Sohn, “Military Strategy against China of the Trump Administration,” *Krins-Quarterly* Vol 4, No.3, 2019, pp. 91-130; Inhyo Seol, “Indo-Pacific Military/Alliance Strategy and Defense Posture under the Biden Administration,” *Krins-Quarterly* Vol 7. No. 2, 2022, pp. 123-151. Although Kim (2020) analyzed the U.S. military strategy against China under the Trump administration by employing “competitive strategy” and “cost-imposing,” they cannot cover the strategies at the operational level. Taehyun Kim, “Trump’s US Military Strategy against China: Competitive Strategy and Cost-imposing,” *National Strategy* Vol 26, No 2, pp. 35-63.
- 10) David Evans, “Concentration of Force. In: War: A Matter of Principles.” *RUSI Defence Studies Series*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), pp. 70-79.
- 11) For the security side of this approach, see Brett Doyle, “The Whole-of-Nation and whole-of-Government Approaches in Action,” *InterAgency Journal* Vol. 10, No.1, 2019, pp.105-122.
- 12) Rinaldo B. Schinazi, “Does Random Dispersion Help Survival?” *Journal of Statistical Physics* 159, 2015, pp. 101-107.

the A2/AD posture corresponding to the distribution of U.S. forces. Although these concepts are not novel, the notions of integration and distribution are noteworthy in the context of China's strategies of active defense and A2/AD. It seems plausible that the United States is pursuing a counter-military strategy towards China with this in mind. In essence, the U.S. defense and military strategy against China is predicated on two notions: integration to thwart its ambition and distribution to survive Chinese attacks and mount counterattacks. We examine these arguments in the following examples.

## **Integration to Deter and Overwhelm**

The term integration has been drawing much attention among security students since its repeated mentions of "Integrated Deterrence" by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III. However, the concept itself was nothing new because many similar approaches to cooperation and collaboration and the whole-of-the-government approach have been stressed in various strategies of the United States. In addition, at the operational level, jointness has been a long-term goal for the military. As discussed above, no one questions the importance of concentrating all efforts to secure national interest and achieve a national goal. The point is that the United States needs to integrate all efforts to deter and overwhelm China's military capabilities at this moment.

### ***Integrated Deterrence***

Since the inauguration of the Biden administration, U.S. defense officials have raised integrated deterrence as an important defense strategy. In 2021, U.S. Defense Secretary Austin formalized integrated deterrence as a key concept for the next defense strategy, emphasizing that the concept of deterrence is a cornerstone of the U.S. defense strategy.<sup>13)</sup> In addition, the logic of integrated deterrence was elaborated on in the remarks by senior U.S. defense officials including Colin Khal, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Gregory M. Kausner, the Deputy Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Melissa Dalton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. In particular, Colin Khal stressed that integrated deterrence aimed to suppress pacing threats by China.<sup>14)</sup> As such, integrated deterrence had been expected to be

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13) C. Todd Lopez, "Defense Secretary Says 'Integrated Deterrence' Is Cornerstone of U.S. Defense," *DoD News* (April 30, 2021); Terri Moon Cronk, "DOD Official Says Concept of Integrated Deterrence Is Call to Action," *DoD News* (September 28, 2021).

14) Jim Garamone, "Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence," *DoD News* (June 2, 2021).

established at all levels of national strategy such as national security strategy, defense strategy, and military strategy, and China is at the center of this initiative.

Although the origin of the term integration has been ambiguous, the emergence of the term seems to be in line with the current trend and efforts of borrowing a lot of technological innovation represented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the defense sector.<sup>15)</sup> The emergence and emphasis of the term integrated deterrence is also understandable in this respect. Thus, the key is how the concept was constituted in the defense area. The meaning of integrated deterrence was first unveiled in the official documents of the 2022 NDS and its Fact Sheet followed by the 2022 NSS. Even though integrated deterrence is the core of defense strategy, it is also mentioned in the 2022 NSS. It implies that the concept is relevant beyond the scope of defense. The 2022 NSS describes the term integrated deterrence as “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.”<sup>16)</sup> In addition, the NSS presents five areas to be integrated: 1) integration across domains including military and non-military domains; 2) integration across regions such as the critical regions for the U.S. and its homeland, 3) integration across the spectrum of conflict close to the threshold of armed conflict, 4) integration across the U.S. Government from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions, and 5) integration with allies and partners.<sup>17)</sup>

In addition to integration in these areas, the 2022 NDS elucidates the ways and targets of integration. According to the strategy, integrated deterrence promotes the U.S. to “more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate,” making any competitor considering the press for advantage in one domain aware that the U.S. can respond in many others as well.<sup>18)</sup> When it comes to the ways to deter, it suggests four elements: deterrence by denial, deterrence by resilience, deterrence by direct and collective cost imposition, and role of information in deterrence.<sup>19)</sup> The use of deterrence by denial allows occupying territory and developing an asymmetric approach to deter a threat. Deterrence by resilience ensures the capability to resist, fight, and recover quickly from disruption of network and infrastructure. Deterrence by cost imposition imposes huge costs over benefits perceived by the enemy. Lastly, by sharing information, the United States can

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15) For example, the U.S. military employs the term agile and resilience. Sometimes this tendency provokes controversy over rhetoric. Frank G. Hoffman, “The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success,” *Institute for National Strategic Studies* (March 31, 2020).

16) The White House, “National Security Strategy”(2022.10.), p. 22.

17) Ibid.

18) U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy,” (2022.10.27), p.1.

19) U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy,” pp. 8-9.

signal its intent and capabilities to the enemy correctly and effectively, thereby deterring a threat. The 2022 NDS identifies six targets to deter,<sup>20)</sup> including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The first two targets are the homeland and strategic attack, respectively. To deter attacks against the homeland, the 2022 NDS stresses the cost-imposing on potential attackers, while urging Washington to modernize nuclear capabilities including extended deterrence to deter strategic attacks. For four potential adversaries, it takes similar but different efforts. The 2022 NDS encourages the United States to formulate new operational concepts and advanced warfighting capabilities against China while cooperating with NATO to deter Russia. For North Korea, the 2022 NDS asserts interoperability with South Korea along with other measures, whereas it concerns Iran's gray zone operations.

In the following year of the 2022 NDS release, the 2022 National Military Strategy (NMS) provides more specifics on its implementation at the operational level. It stipulates that the Joint Force's contribution to Integrated Deterrence is "combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent."<sup>21)</sup> Although there have been some criticisms about its ambiguity stemming from the lack of operationalization of integrated deterrence at the Joint Staff,<sup>22)</sup> the 2022 NMS is helpful to eradicate the doubts to some extent. Implementing the Integrated Deterrence strategy requires identifying the central military problem, setting the central idea of strategic discipline with ways of campaigning and building warfighting advantage, conducting ten Joint Force tasks, and finally achieving strategic objectives to defend the homeland, deter attack, prevail in conflict, and modernize the force.<sup>23)</sup> The central problem is how to address the pacing challenge of the PRC. The solution to the problem depends on the theory of success, which is to "exercise Strategic Discipline to continuously calibrate Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning and rapidly building warfighting advantage to deter now and reduce future risk."<sup>24)</sup> Ten tasks

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20) U.S. Department of Defense, "2022 National Defense Strategy," pp. 9-10.

21) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy 2022," (2023.5.8.), p.3. More interestingly, it distinguishes integrated deterrence from Integrated Deterrence by describing that "The NDS strategic approach employs three strategic ways (integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage) to foster Integrated Deterrence." Ibid, p. 3.

22) James Cartwright et al., "Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum," *The Atlantic Council* (June 8, 2023).

23) These tasks are different from the roles of the Joint Force suggested by the Joint Concept for Competing because the roles are not limited to implementing integrated deterrence. They are to deter aggression, prepare for armed conflict if deterrence and competition fail to protect vital U.S. national interests, counter adversaries' competitive strategies that threaten U.S. national interests, and support the efforts of interorganizational partners. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Competing," (February 10, 2023), p.24.

24) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy 2022," p.4.

conducted by the Joint Staff include strengthening homeland defense, enhancing deterrence, preparing to win, integrating Joint Force and combined efforts, leveraging opportunities in campaigning, reinforcing diplomacy, prioritizing concepts and resources, building a resilient Joint Force, and integrating capabilities rapidly.<sup>25)</sup>

### ***Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2)***

The second example of the spirit of integration is CJADC2. The CJADC2 is understood as a sort of update to the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2).<sup>26)</sup> The JADC2 aims to advance Joint Force's command and control (C2) capabilities that are essential to support U.S. national security interests,<sup>27)</sup> including having competitive advantage over China.<sup>28)</sup> JADC2 serves the Joint Force Commander to have effective C2 in performing real-world mission tasks. The key is to ensure the faster cycle of information and decision of the commander than that of the adversary. The cycle is composed of three stages: 1) "Sense" which refers to the integration of information across all domains and the electromagnetic spectrum; 2) "Make sense" which alludes to the understanding of the operational environment; and 3) "Act" which implies deciding and disseminating.<sup>29)</sup> The JADC2 strategy has five lines of efforts: 1) establishing the JADC2 data enterprise to seize, maintain, and protect information and decision advantage for accelerating decision-making; 2) establishing the JADC2 human enterprise to use effectively Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning tools; 3) establishing the JADC2 technical enterprise to have secure and worldwide communications networks with sufficient speed and bandwidth; 4) integrating Nuclear C2 and Communications with JADC2; and 5) modernizing mission partner information sharing.<sup>30)</sup> These efforts are guided by principles such as enterprising designed and scaled information sharing, securing, data and interoperability standards-driven, resilience in a degraded environment, utility of effort in capability development, and delivering JADC2 capabilities with speed.

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25) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy 2022," p.5.

26) Jordan McDonald, "DOD's JADC2 Concept is Now CJADC2," *GOVCIO* (October 18, 2023) (<https://govciomedia.com/dods-jadc2-concept-is-now-cjadc2/>, accessed on April 2, 2024).

27) U.S. Department of Defense, "Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy" (March 2022), p.3

28) Ironically, China makes efforts to build its own JADC2. Stew Magnuson, "SPECIAL REPORT: China Pursues Its Own Version of JADC2," *National Defense* (July 13, 2023) (<https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/13/china-pursues--its-own-version-of--jadc2>, accessed on March 31, 2024).

29) U.S. Department of Defense, "Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy," pp. 4-5.

30) U.S. Department of Defense, "Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy," pp. 5-7.

The term “combined” was added to the upgraded version of CJADC2 to emphasize the importance of the combined efforts with international partners and different military commands under one umbrella.<sup>31)</sup> While JADC2 itself is originally based on the concept of integration, the addition of the term combined adds more emphasis on integrating. This emphasis is consistent with the trend of integration in the private sector.<sup>32)</sup> Furthermore, it might be caused by the fact that each service wants to have its own JADC2.<sup>33)</sup> For example, the U.S. Army hosts a joint experiment of Project Convergence focusing on the integration of capabilities between operational military development headquarters, which had tested to integrate Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force systems.<sup>34)</sup> The Air Force runs the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) to build a digital infrastructure to enable sharing of information and provide situational awareness to the Air Force, Space Force, and joint forces.<sup>35)</sup> The Navy also has its own Project Overmatch to develop and deliver an operational architecture to support maritime and expeditionary operations.<sup>36)</sup>

### ***Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)***

Discussion on the IAMD preceded the rise of integrated deterrence. For example, the concept of the IAMD was implemented even during the Second World War and the Cold War.<sup>37)</sup> However, it was in the 2010s when the IAMD became important regarding China’s expansion in the region. The establishment of the Pacific Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center on October 1, 2014, substantiates the increasing importance of the IAMD.<sup>38)</sup> Hence, when it comes to

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31) Jordan McDonald, “DOD’s JADC2 Concept is Now CJADC2”; Jaspreet Gill, “Return of CJADC2: DoD officially moves ahead with ‘combined’ JADC2 in a rebrand focusing on partners,” *Breaking Defense* (May 16, 2023) (<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/return-of-cjadc2-dod-officially-moves-ahead-with-combined-jadc2-in-a-rebrand-focusing-on-partners/>, assessed on March 20, 2024).

32) Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “Joint Integration Emerging as the Solution for CJADC2,” *The Hudson Institute* (September 30, 2023) (<https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/joint-integration-emerging-solution-cjadc2-bryan-clark-dan-patt>, accessed on April 4, 2024).

33) Mark Pomerleau, “Military services ‘not aligned’ on JADC2 efforts, Air Force official warns,” *Fedscoop* (July 26, 2022) (<https://fedscoop.com/military-services-not-aligned-on-jadc2-efforts-air-force-official-warns/>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

34) Mark Pomerleau, “Military services ‘not aligned’ on JADC2 efforts, Air Force official warns,” *Fedscoop* (July 26, 2022) (<https://fedscoop.com/military-services-not-aligned-on-jadc2-efforts-air-force-official-warns/>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

35) *Ibid.*

36) *Ibid.*

37) Kenneth R. Dorner, William B. Hartman, and Jason M. Teague, “Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific,” *Air & Space Power Journal* 29, no. 1 (January–February 2015), pp. 64–65.

38) “PACAF establishes Pacific IAMD Center,” *Pacific Air Forces* (November 14, 2014)

countering China's A2/AD, the IAMD presented by INDOPACOM, especially the IAMD Vision 2028 in 2018, is noteworthy.<sup>39)</sup> Although the concept of IAMD has shown in many documents,<sup>40)</sup> INDOPACOM's version of the IAMD directly targets China. The IAMD is usually defined as "the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland and United States national interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary's ability to create adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities"<sup>41)</sup> Based on this definition, INDOPACOM's IAMD went further to pursue a network architecture that "all Allies and partners can share and any sensor, any shooter in the region can leverage to thwart an incoming threat" by proposing "a regional integrated and interoperable fire-control architecture and an advanced joint and combined IAMD battle management and engagement coordination system."<sup>42)</sup>

### ***Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI)***

The CNI may not be an obvious example of integration in the U.S. defense strategy against China because the term CNI is not found in any official document regarding defense strategy, including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.<sup>43)</sup> In addition, no official definition of CNI has been offered by the Department of Defense.<sup>44)</sup> Moreover, the CNI can be a threat, a phenomenon, and a measure at the same time, depending on how it is understood.<sup>45)</sup> Nevertheless, the CNI can be

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(<https://www.pacaf.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/591097/pacaf-establishes-pacific-iamd-center>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

- 39) Lynn Savage, "USINDOPACOM's IAMD Vision 2028: Integrated Deterrence toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," *Air & Space Operations Review* Vol. 1, No. 2, (Summer 2022), p. 42.
- 40) U.S. Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment, "Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)," (2023); U.S. Army, "Army Air and Missile Defense 2028," (March 2019); NATO, "NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence," (Jun 13, 2023) ([https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8206.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8206.htm), accessed on April 6, 2024). In particular, the Joint Chief of Staff explained that IAMD is "one where all capabilities - defensive, offensive, kinetic, non-kinetic - are melded into a comprehensive Joint and combined force capable of preventing an adversary from effectively employing any of its offensive air and missile weapons." The Joint Chief of Staff, "Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020," (December 5, 2013), p.5.
- 41) Kenneth R. Dorner, William B. Hartman, and Jason M. Teague, "Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific," p. 63.
- 42) Lynn Savage, "USINDOPACOM's IAMD Vision 2028: Integrated Deterrence toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," p. 43.
- 43) Doreen Horschig and Nicholas Adamopoulos, "Conventional-Nuclear Integration to Strengthen Deterrence," *CSIS* (October 4, 2023).
- 44) Gregory Giles, "Conventional-Nuclear Integration: Avoiding Misconceptions and Mistakes," *War on the Rocks* (August 21, 2021) (<https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/conventional-nuclear-integration-avoiding-misconceptions-and-mistakes/>, accessed on March 31, 2024).

an example of the U.S. integration strategy against China because the concept is reflected in the U.S. nuclear strategy that considers China's nuclear capabilities seriously. For example, in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review clearly states that "this NPR underscores the linkage between the conventional and nuclear elements of collective deterrence and defense."<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, its 2018 version records that "integrating and exercising all instruments of power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries integrate their military capabilities."<sup>47</sup> In practice, the CNI is included in the guidelines of the U.S.-Republic of Korea nuclear deterrence cooperation in 2023.<sup>48</sup> The CNI has been regarded as "a range of logistical and operational issues that arise when conventional and nuclear forces are operating in the same area of responsibility; being justified on the grounds that Russia, China, and North Korea have developed hybrid nuclear-conventional strategies; efforts to improve the ability of the U.S. and its allied forces to continue to operate in an environment that has been degraded by nuclear use; efforts to develop strike and command, control, and communications (C3) systems that can perform both conventional and nuclear mission."<sup>49</sup>

In sum, as discussed earlier, the finding shows that the key concept of integration is a common theme of the U.S. defense and military strategies against China as evidenced in the defense strategy of integrated deterrence to sub-strategies such as network strategy, CJADC2, missile defense strategy of IAMD, and nuclear strategy of CNI.

## **Distribution to Survive and Fight Back**

While integration is the core at the strategic level, distribution is the key at the operational level. In particular, the use of the concept of distribution aims to counter Chinese A2/AD directly. Thus, strategies and tactics carrying out distribution operations serve to complement the integrated deterrence on the one hand and are employed when the integrated deterrence fails on the other hand.<sup>50</sup>

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45) Justin Anderson and James R. McCue, "Deterring, Countering, and Defeating Conventional-Nuclear Integration," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Spring 2021), p. 31.

46) U.S. Department of Defense, "2022 Nuclear Posture Review," p. 1.

47) U.S. Department of Defense, "2018 Nuclear Posture Review," p. 21.

48) The White House, "Joint Press Statement on Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting," (December 16, 2023).

49) Adam Mount and Pranay Vaddi, "An Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture," *Federation of American Scientists* (2021), pp. 4-6. On the other hand, the CNI contributed to the post-Cold War emphasis on minimizing the U.S. nuclear role and a nuclear-free world, which, in turn, elevated the importance of conventional military power. It is also important to note that adversaries to the U.S. have increased the threat of tactical nuclear use as a means to overcome their disadvantage in conventional power against the U.S.

Such strategies and tactics include Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). They have been developed to counter Chinese A2/AD under the concept of Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) during the Trump administration. However, they are still effective under the new defense strategy of Integrated Deterrence because their core mission of countering Chinese A2/AD remains unchanged.<sup>51)</sup> In this regard, they share a similar nature with integration. Nevertheless, the characteristics of distribution set it apart from the concept of integration because integration is interpreted at the operational level differently than that at the strategic level. The intent of distribution here is to survive first, as discussed earlier in the theoretical framework, and then attack to paralyze Chinese A2/AD capabilities.

### *Agile Combat Employment (ACE)*

One example that reflects the concept of distribution is the U.S. Air Force's ACE.<sup>52)</sup> It is "an operational concept that supports joint all-domain operations (JADO)" and also "a proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power."<sup>53)</sup> In particular, "agile" indicates the ability to "outpace adversary action through movement and maneuver to achieve commander's intent."<sup>54)</sup> The Air Force aims to incorporate and coordinate ACE across the service to increase survivability and resilience in some tasks such as supporting Joint Warfighting Concept.<sup>55)</sup> In this vein, ACE is essentially a survival strategy to avoid or survive attacks from adversaries and to continue operating in the theater despite these attacks.<sup>56)</sup> Five core elements constitute the framework of ACE: posture, C2, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Of the five elements, posture, C2, and movement and maneuver are more closely related to distribution.

Posture serves as the starting position for other elements because "[f]orces

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50) Charles Pope, "Kendall Outlines 'Operational Imperatives,' Choices During Think Tank Appearance," *United States Space Force* (<https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2904727/kendall-outlines-operational-imperatives-choices-during-think-tank-appearance>, accessed on March 20, 2024); Andrew Feicker, "Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)," *Congressional Research Service* (April 22, 2021), p. 1.

51) This was confirmed by the Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on May 24, 2022, during my visit to INDOPACOM.

52) Strictly speaking, ACE has been developed by PACAF. James A. Leftwich et al., "Advancing Combat Support to Sustain Agile Combat Employment Concepts," (2023), *RAND*, p. 5.

53) U.S. Air Force, "Agile Combat Employment (Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21)" (2022), p. 1

54) *Ibid.*

55) PACAF Unclassified Briefing during my visit to PACAF on May 24, 2022.

56) Patrick Mills et al., "Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts," (2020), *RAND*, p. 1.

must be able to rapidly execute operations from various locations with integrated capabilities and interoperability across the core functions.”<sup>57)</sup> In terms of distribution, it relocates theater-assigned and follow-on forces to positions of advantage to implement support operations and increases the number of distributed locations that an enemy should target without massing personnel at locations within the reach of the enemy’s weapons.<sup>58)</sup> The distributed operations should support dispersed forces with sufficient critical operational resources. After all, the increased quality and quantity of distributed locations by ACE provides operational benefits to allies and partners while adding political and operational challenges to adversaries.<sup>59)</sup> Operating locations can be largely divided into enduring locations and contingency locations. The former is composed of main operating bases (MOB), forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security locations (CSL), whereas the latter includes semi-permanent contingency locations (SCL), temporary contingency sites (TCL), and initial contingency locations (ICL).<sup>60)</sup>

C2 of ACE has a framework that consists of centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution because ACE requires mobile, survivable, secure, and sustainable communications.<sup>61)</sup> Movement and maneuver are related to agility that enables dispersed operations to complicate adversaries’ targeting by either redistributing forces to multiple locations or redistributing forces within an established air base. Distribution, including the movement of forces to predetermined locations and the flow of dispersed forces back to an enduring location, allows friendly forces to maintain operational momentum through distributed control.<sup>62)</sup> Although survival by distribution is important, attack is also another part of ACE. For example, it needs to aggregate forces originating from different dispersed sites to deliver fires from all domains to attack a common target.<sup>63)</sup>

### ***Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO)***

As seen from the word “distributed,” the DMO has more obvious features of distribution than others. The concept of DMO can be traced back to the idea of distributed lethality discussed in “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Security (Version 2.0)” in 2018.<sup>64)</sup> Despite its evolution over the past few years, however,

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57) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 6.

58) Ibid.

59) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 7.

60) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 13.

61) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” pp. 7-8.

62) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 9.

63) U.S. Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment,” p. 12.

there have been no specific unclassified definitions of DMO. Although a 2022 document from the Chief of Naval Operations refers to DMO as “the Navy’s foundational operating concept,”<sup>65)</sup> this foundational concept seems to have yet to be conceptualized. However, unofficial working definitions are available to better understand the brief of DMO. To be sure, it is “the operating concept of the Department of the Navy for using U.S. naval forces in combat operations against an adversary, particularly China, that has substantial capabilities for detecting and attacking U.S. Navy surface ships with anti-ship missiles and other weapons.”<sup>66)</sup> One senior official said that it is “geographically distributed naval forces integrated to synchronize operations across all domains.”<sup>67)</sup>

Distribution is expected to have five contributions: to better accomplish the mission against a distant or distributed adversary; to improve maneuver options to gain a positional advantage to assault or engage more effectively with direct or indirect fires; to minimize the effects of enemy fires; to impose costs and induce uncertainty; to reduce traces to avoid detection.<sup>68)</sup> In the end, those contributions allow the naval forces to enhance battlespace awareness and influence; generate opportunities for naval forces to achieve surprise, to neutralize threats, and to overwhelm the adversary; and impose operational dilemmas on the adversary.<sup>69)</sup>

The DMO has key features of hard-to-find, hard-to-kill, and high lethality. First, it disperses Naval forces over a larger area within the theater of operation, making it harder for an adversary to detect and target them. Second, it spreads the Navy’s sensors and weapons across a wider array of ships and aircraft, reducing the fraction of them that would be lost when any ship or aircraft of the Navy is destroyed. Third, the DMO enables a greater use of longer-range weapons, unmanned vessels, and unmanned aircraft in support of the first and the second features. Last, it uses resilient communication links and networking technologies to knit the resulting widely dispersed force of manned and unmanned ships and aircraft into an integrated and coordinated force to survive attacks from the enemy and ensure resilience.<sup>70)</sup> In short, DMO pursues “the massing and convergence of fires from distributed forces, complicating adversary targeting and decision-making,

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64) Tom Clarity, “Distribute DMO to Tactical Commanders,” *Proceedings* Vol. 149 (January 2023).

65) Chief of Naval Operations, “Navigation Plan 2022,” p. 8.

66) Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept” (February 27, 2024), *Congressional Research Service*, p. 1.

67) Edward Lundquist, “DMO Is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea,” *Seapower* (2 February 2021) (<https://seapowermagazine.org/dmo-is-navys-operational-approach-to-winning-the-high-end-fight-at-sea>, accessed on March 2, 2024).

68) “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO),” *Marines* (August 2, 2021) (<https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708130/distributed-maritime-operations-dmo>, accessed on March 10, 2024).

69) Edward Lundquist, “DMO Is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea.”

70) Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept,” p. 1.

and networking effects across platforms and domains.”<sup>71)</sup> Having echoed to these features, the Navy suggests six enablers for DMO: 1) expand distance with long-range precision fires across all domains and increased survivability; 2) leverage deception to degrade enemy surveillance and increase uncertainty; 3) harden defense to disrupt attacks and keep naval forces survivable; 4) increase distribution with smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms; 5) ensure delivery with resilience of logistics; and 6) generate decision advantage to accelerate decision cycle to out-sense, out-decide, and out-fight ant adversary.<sup>72)</sup> Based on these features and enablers, the Navy has transformed its acquisition programs to be associated with DMO. The key is to have more ships that are less expensive in line with the concept of DMO.<sup>73)</sup>

### ***Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)***

Although the U.S. Marine Corps is a stakeholder of DMO, they have their own operational concept of EABO. Coupled closely with the Navy’s DMO, EABO was developed as an approach to warfighting that could mitigate the A2/AD threats posed by China.<sup>74)</sup> In line with DMO, EABO supports integrated yet distributable naval formation to secure sea denial and sea control.<sup>75)</sup> EABO refers to “a form of expeditionary warfare that involve the employment of mobile, low signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain naval expeditionary forces from a series of austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore within a contested or potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment.”<sup>76)</sup> Given this statement, EABO can be characterized by stand-in engagement, mobile distribution, persistent survival, low signature, integrated naval force, and cost-effective advantages.<sup>77)</sup> In particular, the mobile and distributable feature of EABO allows a force to adapt and

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71) Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, Pt. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and the Future of Naval Warfare,” *Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC)*, (February 23, 2023.) (<https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-1-defining-distributed-maritime-operations-and-the-future-of-naval-warfare>, accessed on April 4, 2024).

72) U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, “Navigation Plan 2022,” p. 8.

73) See Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service* (August 31, 2023).

74) Brian Kerg, “A Summary of Changes in the New EABO Manual,” *Proceedings* Vol. 149(July 2023). (<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/summary-changes-new-eabo-manual>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

75) Department of the Navy and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition),” p. 1-1.

76) Department of the Navy and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition),” (May 2023), p. 1-2.

77) “Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition),” (May 2023), p. 1-4.

regenerate more quickly whereas imposing difficult choices on adversaries. It has lethal and survival capability to enable naval and joint campaigning in all domains during distributed operations.<sup>78)</sup>

### ***Multi-Domain Operation (MDO)***

Although the U.S. Army's MDO has a long history allegedly evolved from Air-Land Battle doctrine in 1982<sup>79)</sup> and is also designed to counter Chinese A2/AD,<sup>80)</sup> its relevance to the concept of distribution is not apparent. According to the Army's Field Manual (FM) Operations (2022), MDO means "the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders."<sup>81)</sup> It might be because the armed conflict of ground forces between the U.S. and China is less likely to occur. Nevertheless, MDO has the feature of distribution in terms of agility. That is the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), which is designed to "operate in a distributed fashion while retaining the ability to deliver effects that create opportunities for joint force exploitation."<sup>82)</sup> The Army originally planned to create five MDTFs: two aligned to the Indo-Pacific region; one aligned to Europe; one stationed in the Arctic region and oriented on multiple threats; and a fifth MDTF aligned for global response. However, it is reported that one more MDTF will be installed in the Indo-Pacific region, probably in Japan.<sup>83)</sup>

## **Conclusion: Implications for South Korea**

Contrary to the U.S. foreign policy of the U.S. that puts forward clear principles against China, U.S. defense and military strategies are relatively ambiguous about China, despite the large portion of description about China in strategy documents. By interpreting the 2022 NDS and operational concepts of the services, I argue that U.S. defense and military strategies against China have two tenets: integration at the strategic level and distribution at the operational level.

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78) "Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (2nd Edition)," (May 2023), p. 5-1.

79) Brandon C. Kasubaski, "Exploring the Foundation of Multi-Domain Operations," *Small Wars Journal* (November 13, 2019) (<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/exploring-foundation-multi-domain-operations>, accessed on April 6, 2024).

80) Andrew Feickert, "Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)," *Congressional Research Service* (January 2, 2024), p. 1.

81) Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations (October 2022), p. 1-2.

82) FM 3-0 Operations (October 2022), p.4-18.

83) Andrew Feickert, "The Army's Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)," *Congressional Research Service* (March 25, 2024), p. 2.

My argument is substantiated by various concepts such as Integrated Deterrence, CJADC2, CNI, IAMD, ACE, DMO, EABO, and MDO. Furthermore, these two tenets share the notion that more is better. Integration requires more resources to deter and thwart China's ambition in peacetime and offensive measures in wartime, while distribution needs more locations to survive China's attacks and neutralize China's A2/AD. It is, however, important to note that operational distribution occurs when deterrence by integration fails.

In practice, the key is how the U.S. military incorporates those tenets into its operations in the real world. Despite the prevailing consensus on the importance of jointness, it is still challenging to assess the extent to which the U.S. military effectively implements it. Similarly, the integration and distribution of resources may be a laudable goal to be achieved at some future point in time, rather than a practical use in the present. Furthermore, inadequate integration may result in ineffectiveness and chaos in the field. Conversely, the distribution of forces is a risky proposition because it entails the acceptance of a weakened posture, which may be defeated by an adversary.

The two tenets provide implications for South Korea. First, at the strategic level, based on the idea of integration, the U.S. will demand more involvement from South Korea in many areas other than traditional defense areas. Given the transforming security environment where the scope of security is expanding from traditional military affairs to economy, technology, and cognitive influence, it is anticipated that South Korea will assume a more prominent role and make a greater contribution. Enhanced security cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan may be an example of this integration. Thus, it is imperative that South Korea be prepared to contribute to the alliance by enhancing its capabilities in various sectors, including defense, depending on its national interests.

Second, at the operational level, the United States might be much more likely to ask South Korea to allow the former more access and use of bases and ports in the latter, which may aid the United States in implementing its operational concepts. For instance, the Jeju Naval Base could be a potential site for U.S. military maneuvers against China in the region in the near future. In addition to the matter of locations, the United States will urge South Korea to initiate discussions about interoperability, intercompatibility, and interchangeability in not only equipment and gear but also data links and network systems between the two countries. It is conceivable that the shared AI could be employed in operations between the alliances when CJADC-2 is introduced to both militaries. Given that South Korea relatively lacks expertise in advanced technology, including AI, there is a risk that South Korea may depend on the United States excessively.

Third, all those demands can lead to changing the constitution of the United States Forces Korea (USFK). The potential expansion of the USFK's role has been a subject of considerable debate. The Army-oriented USFK may gradually have

more missions for ACE, DMO, and EABO, let alone MDO. For example, USFK has recently replaced the A-10 Thunderbolts with the Apaches helicopters of the AH-64E.<sup>84)</sup> The A-10s were operated by the Air Force, while the Apaches are under the command of the Army. This indicates that the USFK has more air fighters to fill the gap by retiring the A-10, which could be employed for ACE against China.

Building on the implications in the South Korea-U.S. relations, further implications can be derived in a broader context. First, it would be prudent for South Korea to monitor China's response to the United States' measures regarding integration and distribution. It is evident that China is endeavoring to fortify its active defense and A2/AD capabilities through a multifaceted approach, encompassing the construction of military bases in the South China Sea and the deployment of aircraft carriers, as well as the expansion of its influence over other countries that may potentially provide the United States with bases. China has pledged to the Pacific Islands Countries (PIC) that are of strategic significance due to their geographical locations in the Pacific between the United States and China, by providing security assistance and economic incentives. For example, China has signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, which paved the way for its military presence in the Islands.<sup>85)</sup> For South Korea, which implements its Indo-Pacific strategy concerning countries in the region, including those PICs, China's efforts to impede the US strategies should be of significant concern. Moreover, South Korea is no exception to China's strategies because it shares a sea border with China.

Second, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine provides a compelling illustration of the efficacy of integration and distribution. South Korea should not miss lessons from the war with regard to integration and distribution. It is Ukraine that employs A2/AD tactics, intentionally or unintentionally, against Russia using sea drones.<sup>86)</sup> Because the Russian military is unable to comprehend the concept of distribution, it is often crippled by Ukraine, despite the asymmetry in military capabilities. On the other hand, it is also Ukraine that benefits from integration with other states. Ukraine has directly engaged in combat against Russia alone. However, it has been fighting the war against Russia along with its partners such as the United States who have provided financial assistance and war resources. In addition, the interchangeability issue of military equipment and weapons, including artillery shells, has been raised from the beginning of the conflict.

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84) Sang-ho Song, "U.S. Forces Korea launches permanent Apache helicopter unit," *Yonhap News* (May 18, 2022).

85) Brian Harding and Camilla Pohle, "China's Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the Pacific Islands," *Unites States Institute of Peace* (July 21, 2022).

86) Andrew E. Kramer, "In a Tough Year on Land, Drones Give Ukraine Some Success at Sea," *The New York Times* (December 20, 2023).

Third, it is recommended that South Korea should actively embrace and pursue advances in defense science and technology. The United States faces the ironic challenge of requiring highly distributed forces with integrated capabilities. Much of this challenge can be addressed by deploying advanced technologies of futuristic command and control, shared information in the cloud, and, eventually, operations by AI.<sup>87)</sup> For instance, data from disparate locations, services, and allies can be integrated and migrated to a single cloud. This data will then be processed by an AI, which will determine the optimal distribution of forces. In the absence of this technological literacy in South Korea, it is unfeasible to construct a system that is used to realize integration and distribution for defense.

Fourth, South Korea must consider the United States' approaches to A2/AD as a point of reference, given that North Korea is developing A2/AD capabilities. Although South Korea possesses greater naval and air power than North Korea, the latter employs asymmetric warfare tactics, including the use of missiles and drones that can constitute A2/AD, which can paralyze the supremacy of South Korean forces.<sup>88)</sup> In particular, the distribution of forces to survive the initial strike by North Korea is of critical importance for South Korea in order to effectively counter the attack using integrated capabilities within South Korean forces and with its ally, the United States.

Finally, the protection of military bases is of paramount importance, as the lack of adequate defense at these facilities represents a significant obstacle to the distribution and survival of forces. Despite the increase in South Korea's defense budget in the Yoon Suk Yeol administration to implement the "three-axis" plan to counter the growing North Korean threat, particularly in regard to its missile capabilities, the protection of bases does not appear to be a significant concern. It is true that the three-axis plan places a clear emphasis on the defensive side, as it encompasses strike (Kill Chain), air defense (Korea Air and Missile Defense, KAMD), and retaliation (Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, KMPR). Consequently, efforts have been made to develop air defense capabilities, including the M-SAM and L-SAM systems. This plan is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the protection of military bases. Nevertheless, it is evident that further consideration is required in order to enhance the protection of military bases and naval vessels from the distribution perspective.

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87) Charles Cohen, "AI in Defense: Navigating Concerns, Seizing Opportunities," *National Defense* (July 25, 2023); Peter Selfridge, "Modernizing Defense for the Digital Age," *SAP News Center* (February 23, 2024).

88) Kiljoo Ban, "Tracing North Korea's A2/AD Strategy and Security Implications," *Peace Studies Vol. 30, No. 1*, pp. 113-147.

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# A Study on North Korea's Reconnaissance Satellite Development: Threats Analysis and Suggestion for the South Korean Military

Geunho Song

## Abstract

*This study aims to assess the threat posed by North Korea's launch of a reconnaissance satellite on November 21, 2023. After examining the current status, purpose, and capabilities of North Korean reconnaissance satellites, we evaluate the threats from spy satellites developed by North Korea and review the countermeasures by the South Korean military. Reconnaissance satellites were initially developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and later in China, Japan, France, and Germany. North Korea successfully launched satellites in 2012 and 2016, while South Korea has been operating its own satellites since the 1990s. North Korea and South Korea have launched and operated spy satellites since 2023, with North Korea claiming the development of spy satellites in response to perceived threats from the United States, Japan, and South Korea. However, given North Korea's capacity for a nuclear attack, the launch of a spy satellite by North Korea could lead to a security crisis. Therefore, South Korea needs to prepare measures for the South Korean military's countermeasures against North Korean spy satellites to ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.*

*Although analysts have determined that North Korea's satellite technology is in such a rudimentary stage and its satellites may not be capable of performing necessary military functions, it is still important to establish a countermeasure against North Korea's successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite in 2023. This should involve analyzing North Korea's intention to develop a reconnaissance satellite and its military threat; strengthening the joint response capabilities of South Korea, the United States, and Japan against military threats from North Korean reconnaissance satellites; and enhancing South Korea's surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to gain an upper hand in the competition with North Korea for the development of reconnaissance satellites.*

**Key Words:** Reconnaissance satellite, Chollima-1 SLV, Malligyong-1 satellite, Target intelligence, ISR

## I. Introduction

North Korea's successful launch of the reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 on November 21, 2023 started a new space race on the Korean Peninsula. On December 2, 2023, South Korea successfully launched its first reconnaissance satellite, which was developed as part of the 425 reconnaissance satellite project. North Korean-made Chollima space launch vehicle was used to launch Malligyong-1 from the Dongchang-ri West Sea satellite launch site, while South Korea's launch was assisted by Space X's Falcon 9 space launch vehicle at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, the United States. North Korea announced that it would launch three more reconnaissance satellites in 2024.<sup>1)</sup> South Korea successfully launched its second reconnaissance satellite with a high-performance SAR(Synthetic Aperture Radar) in Florida, the United States, on April 8, 2024.

As the United States and the Soviet Union began developing reconnaissance satellites during the Cold War, they collected information on major military targets such as intercontinental ballistic missile bases in hostile states. In the meantime, China, Japan, France, and Germany successfully developed and launched reconnaissance satellites. North Korea launched Kwangmyongsong satellites in 2012 and 2016. However, they appeared to malfunction and disappeared after entering the atmosphere in June and September 2023, respectively.<sup>2)</sup> Until now, North Korea's satellite launch has been regarded as its attempt to develop rocket technology used to build intercontinental ballistic missiles, not for Earth observation purposes. North Korea has insisted on monitoring its enemies such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea with spy satellites. Due to their low performance, in the past, North Korean satellites were not a threat to any of its enemy states. However, North Korea's ability to develop and operate spy satellites in combination with its nuclear attack capabilities can pose a significant threat to the Korean Peninsula and neighboring countries.

Research on North Korea's reconnaissance satellites has been insufficient. Most studies are concerned with North Korea's space power, the North Korean Space Development Act, and the North Korean space policy. Park Sang-joong evaluated North Korea's military space power based on his analysis of the North Korean space organization, the space development process, and the space launch vehicle test and emphasized the importance of establishing South Korea's response strategy.<sup>3)</sup> By analyzing North Korea's space development law and improving the

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1) *Rodong Sinmun*, December 31, 2023.

2) <https://www.n2yo.com/satellite/?s=39026#results>;  
<https://www.n2yo.com/satellite/?s=41332#results>.

3) Park Sang-joong and Cho Hong-je. "Evaluation and implications of North Korea's military space force," *Journal of Aerospace Policy and Law*, Vol 36, no.4 (2021): 245-267.

existing framework that rendered North Korea's justification for developing ballistic missiles, Choi Eun-seok argued that South Korea should induce North Korea to comply with international laws related to space development and seek institutional measures for peaceful space development between the two Koreas.<sup>4)</sup> To respond to North Korea's military use of space, Lee Woon-seok called attention to the need for an objective evaluation of North Korea's space capabilities while describing the characteristics surrounding building infrastructure for North Korea's space activities, securing space launch vehicles, and attempting to launch reconnaissance satellites based on chronological analysis of North Korea's space policy.<sup>5)</sup>

Previous studies focus on analyzing North Korea's space development program and evaluating North Korea's space capabilities before the successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite in 2023. There is a lack of studies assessing the performance and threats of Pyongyang's reconnaissance satellites and evaluating the countermeasures against them. By examining the concept, activity, and performance of the reconnaissance satellite, this study seeks to analyze the development process and military threat of the North Korean reconnaissance satellite and propose future South Korean military countermeasures.

## **II. Concepts of Reconnaissance Satellites and Analysis Methods**

### ***1. The concept of a spy satellite***

As a satellite that observes ground facilities from space above an altitude of 100 km, a reconnaissance satellite operates for military purposes and uses the obtained imagery information to support military operations or the determination of the national command.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union developed reconnaissance satellites to observe major military facilities and major targets in other countries and continuously improved the performance of reconnaissance cameras. The United States operated photographic reconnaissance satellites in the early days of the Cold War to identify the military weapons development activities of the Soviet Union and China. From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, photographic reconnaissance satellites were indispensable for the United States to obtain critical information about the Soviet nuclear threats and weapons

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4) Choi Eun-seok and Um Jung-sik, "Inter Korea's perceptions and legal analysis of North Korea's space development," *International Regional Studies*, volume 27, no. 3 (2023): pp. 117-141.

5) Lee Woo-suk and Jung Young-jin, "A study of North Korea's space policy during the Kim Jong-un period - focusing on the five-year national space development plan," *Journal of Aerospace Policy and Law*, Vol 38, no. 2 (2023): pp. 119-147.

development.<sup>6)</sup> Thanks to the development of Electro-Optical(EO) cameras from the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite program in 1976, it takes only mere minutes compared to the film-recovery-type satellite to receive images, which used to take weeks to a month.<sup>7)</sup>

In addition, based on the collected information on the Soviet strategic missile storage, the United States was able to proceed with the US-Russian strategic arms control agreement.<sup>8)</sup>

The main payloads of reconnaissance satellites include Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensors and SAR. EO/IR cameras use visible or infrared sensors to photograph targets and have high precision, although they are greatly affected by weather conditions such as clouds. The SAR payload emits radar waves to map the Earth’s surface and creates images by receiving signals reflected from the surface. It can acquire all-weather satellite images regardless of the weather. Signal intelligence (SIGINT) satellites collect communication intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). A missile-warning satellite contributes to missile defense and response operations as a major monitoring means by detecting the heat source of launches such as intercontinental ballistic missiles of enemy countries in space and quickly alerting our allies.

<Table 1> Types and characteristics of major sensors of spy satellites

Category	EO/IR	SAR	SIGINT	Missile Warning
Key Features	Electro Optical (Day) Infrared (Night)	It transmits radar radio waves and receives and processes reflected signals	COMINT, ELINT	Detects an ICBM heat source and provides an early warning
	Influenced by weather restrictions such as precipitation and clouds	Operational day and night, and it's possible to operate in bad weather		
	Good readability	Professional imagery analyst is needed and vulnerable to jamming		

6) Historical Data on the Development of U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites, National Museum of the United States Air Force, <https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/195923/cold-war-in-space-top-secret-reconnaissance-satellites-revealed/>; film-return capsule system (accessed on April 26, 2024).

7) AU-18, *Space Primer*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2009), p. 172.

8) Wawrzyniec Muszyński-Sulima, “Cold War in Space: Reconnaissance Satellites and US-Soviet Security Competition,” *European journal of American studies*, 18-2, 2023.

## ***2. Development of Reconnaissance Satellites in Developed Countries***

The development and operation of reconnaissance satellites dates back to the Cold War era characterized by competition between the Union of Soviet and the United States. The Soviet Union's 1960 shootdown of an American U-2 aircraft with a surface-to-air missile in Soviet airspace made it impossible to operate a reconnaissance aircraft and collect information from the airspace of other countries. The incident prompted the United States to replace reconnaissance aircraft with satellites to continue reconnaissance on Soviet territory. Surveillance and reconnaissance were possible in outer space, which allowed one to monitor enemies without the risk of airspace invasion.<sup>9)</sup>

Early reconnaissance satellites used a film recovery method in which targets were photographed, their images were stored in a film, and film containers were dropped to the ground. Since the 1990s, the development of Electro-Optical (EO) cameras has allowed image information to be transmitted to ground stations using radio waves, while SAR has been used to provide all weather radar imaging.

Reconnaissance satellites can conduct missions safely due to no risk of being shot down by surface-to-air missiles and are capable of surveillance and reconnaissance over large areas over a long period of time.<sup>10)</sup>

The United States operates the largest number of spy satellites in the world. The United States operates five KeyHole-12 electro-optical reconnaissance satellites and a Lacrosse SAR satellite, while Russia has two Persona optical reconnaissance satellites and a Kondo radar satellite.<sup>11)</sup> China operates 30 Yaogan reconnaissance satellites with SAR, EO, and ELINT sensors,<sup>12)</sup> and Japan operates 15 IGS (Information Gathering Satellite) EO/SAR satellites. Other countries include France with Helios and Germany operating SAR-Lupe reconnaissance satellites.

South Korea has developed satellites since the 1990s. Generally, reconnaissance satellites must have a resolution of less than 1 meter. South Korea's KOMPSAT 3 had a resolution of 0.7 meters in 2012; its KOMPSAT 3A boasted a resolution of 0.55 meters in 2015. In order to monitor North Korea's ballistic and nuclear missile attacks, South Korea successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite with a

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9) Kim Sung-bae, Shin Hyun-in. "The status and acquisition strategy of world spy satellites." *Defense Policy Study*, No. 51 (2000.12), pp. 89-90.

10) Lee Young-sang, Kim Woo-sang. "The impact of the alliance's possession of reconnaissance satellites on the deterrence of expansion," *East-West Study*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2023), p. 64.

11) Mark Krutov and Sergei Dobrynin, "In Russia's War On Ukraine, Effective Satellites Are Few And Far Between," April 11, 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-satellites-ukraine-war-gps/31797618.html>(accessed on April 26, 2024).

12) Junnosuke Kobara, "China and India lead Asia race to expand spy satellite networks," January 18, 2024, *Nikkei Asia*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/China-and-India-lead-Asia-race-to-expand-spy-satellite-networks>(accessed on April 26, 2024).; DIA, "Challenges to security in space," pp.22-23.

0.3-meter resolution in 2023.

### ***3. Scope and Target of Reconnaissance Satellite Research***

North Korea's development and launch of a reconnaissance satellite boosted by the Chollima Space Launch Vehicle marked the onset of competition on the Korean Peninsula for the development of reconnaissance satellites. After analyzing the causes of the failure of the first and second reconnaissance satellites, North Korea finally succeeded in launching the third reconnaissance satellite. After the successful launch of the North Korean reconnaissance satellite, there were reports that Russia provided technical assistance to North Korea, such as the provision of spy satellite blueprints and data analysis results in return for North Korea's provision of conventional weapons to Russia during the Russia-Ukraine War.<sup>13)</sup> North Korea's successful launch of the reconnaissance satellites with its own Chollima space launch vehicle calls attention to the gravity of evaluating North Korea's capability of developing reconnaissance satellites and urgency of devising countermeasures for South Korea's security.

To assess and analyze the threat posed by North Korea's spy satellite development, this study proposes three assessment factors: the goal of developing a North Korean spy satellite, the capability of a North Korean spy satellite, and the military threats of a North Korean spy satellite.

First, we investigate why North Korea aims to develop a reconnaissance satellite. After launching a satellite in 2016, North Korea did not launch a satellite until 2022. At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea announced a plan to develop a military reconnaissance satellite in the five key tasks of the five-year defense capability strengthening plan.<sup>14)</sup> A satellite launched in 2016 also deviated from orbit in June 2023 and disappeared in the atmosphere after failing to carry out its satellite mission. North Korea successfully developed nuclear and ICBM capabilities in 2017. For its regime survival, North Korea must deem it necessary to monitor threats posed by the United States and South Korea, which North Korea recognizes as enemies; promote the Kim Jong-un regime's scientific and technological advancement; inspire patriotism; create tension through increased security threats on the Korean Peninsula; and strengthen external bargaining power.

Second, we take into consideration the capability of North Korean spy satellites. For a spy satellite, its resolution is the most important technology. The resolution of the reconnaissance satellite launched by North Korea in 2023 was estimated to be 3 meters based on the data its cameras collected in international waters during the first

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13) Kim Min-seo, "The situation of providing satellite blueprint and data analysis to Russia, North Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, November 24, 2023, [https://www.chosun.com/politics/north\\_korea/2023/11/24/Ry6IUMNKTBGTZL7NQRZQRXULWQ/](https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2023/11/24/Ry6IUMNKTBGTZL7NQRZQRXULWQ/)(accessed on April 26, 2024).

14) *Rodong Sinmun*, January 13, 2021.

launch, and it had no military effect.<sup>15)</sup> To be considered as a reconnaissance satellite, a satellite must have a resolution of less than 1 meter, which is a sub-meter class. Although it is difficult to determine the exact capability of the reconnaissance satellite, it must be a low-level reconnaissance satellite since North Korea has not released the images of the reconnaissance satellite in 2023. Recently, North Korea was reported to have received Russian technology for its provision of military supplies to Russia in the Ukraine-Russia war. However, since a drastic improvement in satellite resolution within a short period of time is unfeasible, the resolution of images taken by the North Korean reconnaissance satellites will likely to remain low. Although it is difficult to determine the exact capabilities of North Korean reconnaissance satellites due to the lack of detailed analysis results, With limited data available, this study will evaluate the capabilities of North Korean reconnaissance satellites.

Third, we assess the military threat from North Korean spy satellites. It is imperative to predict the future military operation of reconnaissance satellites developed by North Korea. Studying the operational concepts and forecasting the threat level of North Korean reconnaissance satellites will help analyze their impact on South Korea's national security and establish South Korea's military countermeasures. North Korea will likely continue to develop and operate reconnaissance satellites in space orbit. Thus, we seek to analyze the development process and military threats to suggest future countermeasures for the South Korean

**<Table 2> The Scope and Target of Analysis of the Threat of North Korea's Spy Satellite Development**

Category	Criteria for Determining Threats	Details
Judgment of Threats of Spy Satellite Development	Purpose of developing spy satellites	Monitoring major military activities of enemies, enhancing national status, and strengthening national defense capabilities through the development of advanced space technology
	Reconnaissance satellite capability	Reconnaissance satellite resolution, orbit maintenance, imaging capability, ground station transmission/reception activity, revisit time
	Military threats of spy satellites	Military Operations of Reconnaissance Satellites, space attack, space weapons development (Provide precision target information when operating nuclear missiles)

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<sup>15)</sup> Ministry of National Defense, "Reports on the results of North Korea's reconnaissance satellite salvage analysis," July 5, 2023.

military. Below, we present criteria used to analyze the threats of North Korean reconnaissance satellites.

### III. Threats of North Korea's Reconnaissance Satellite Development

#### *1. Milestones in North Korea's Reconnaissance Satellite Development*

##### *(1) First Reconnaissance Satellite Launch (May 30, 2023)*

At 6:27 a.m. on May 30, 2023, North Korea launched its first reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 with its new satellite launch vehicle Chollima-1 from the West satellite launch sites, which is located in Dongchang-ri, Cholsan County, North Pyongan Province. It crashed into the West Sea due to a second-phase engine failure. The North's National Space Development Administration (NADA) announced that it would proceed with the second launch as soon as possible after the failed launch.<sup>16)</sup> At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party on June 16, Kim Jong-un noted the launch failure of a military reconnaissance satellite, the most important strategic project in space development, as the most consequential setback and ordered investigation of the possible causes of the failure and another launch of a reconnaissance satellite as soon as possible.<sup>17)</sup>

The South Korean military recovered and analyzed the debris of the Cheollima rocket that crashed in the West Sea and revealed the specifics of the North Korean spy satellite. The Ministry of National Defense determined that the North Korean spy satellite, equipped with an electronic optical camera, can only picture targets during the daytime with a 3-meter resolution and has no military effect.<sup>18)</sup>

##### *(2) Second Reconnaissance Satellite Launch (August 24, 2023)*

North Korea has been conducting intensive engine combustion tests since July to verify the reliability of the space launch vehicle and solve the problem with the first reconnaissance satellite that failed to launch.<sup>19)</sup> North Korea notified the Japanese government and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) of the satellite launch plan, which specified the duration of the satellite launch and the danger zone where rocket debris would fall. North Korea attempted to launch a second spy satellite on Aug. 24, 2023. At 3:50 a.m., the space launch vehicle carrying the spy satellite Malligyong 1 launched from the launch site in the West Sea.<sup>20)</sup> The

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16) Korean Central News Agency, 2023.5.31.

17) Korean Central News Agency, 2023.6.19.

18) Noh Seok-jo, "North reconnaissance satellite named 'Manli-kyung', level of the telescope when opened," *Chosun Ilbo*, 2024.7.6. <https://www.chosun.com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2023/07/06/H4243ES3KFBONO3MGCVNXYTXN4/>(accessed on April 26, 2024).

19) National Intelligence Service, *National Assembly Intelligence Committee report*, 2024.8.17.

Chollima rocket flew normally in both stages 1 and 2. However, the second reconnaissance satellite launch failed due to an error in the emergency explosion system during the third stage of the flight. North Korea announced that it would launch a third reconnaissance satellite in October after quickly identifying the causes of the second failure.<sup>21)</sup> North Korea's first and second reconnaissance satellites failed to enter space orbit due to problems with the engine and system of the space launch vehicle.

South Korea, the United States, and the United Nations strongly condemned North Korea's launch of a spy satellite. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres denounced North Korea's attempt to launch a military satellite, stressing that all missile launches using ballistic missile technology would violate relevant Security Council resolutions.<sup>22)</sup>

*(3) Third Reconnaissance Satellite Launch (November 21, 2023)*

At 10:42 p.m. on November 21, 2023, 89 days after the second failed launch of a reconnaissance satellite, North Korea launched the third Malligyong satellite. It informed the Japanese government beforehand that it would launch the satellite between midnight on November 22 and midnight on December 1. However, North Korea launched the satellite about an hour earlier than the scheduled launch time. Given the launch time, the reconnaissance satellite seemed to be sent off earlier than scheduled to avoid the intensive surveillance time of the South Korea-U.S. reconnaissance assets. However, it is more likely that the reconnaissance satellite was instructed to be launched before the pre-announced launch time by the satellite launch window calculation program and weather conditions such as upper wind and rainfall at the West Sea satellite launch site.<sup>23)</sup> The Chollima rocket was separated from the first stage, the fairing, the second stage, and the third stage before successfully entering orbit at 10:54 p.m. After the successful satellite launch, North Korea claimed that the launch of a reconnaissance satellite was North Korea's exercise of its legitimate right to strengthen its self-defense and that it would respond to military threats from its enemies and enhance its readiness for war.<sup>24)</sup> Kim Jong-un celebrated the success of the reconnaissance satellite launch, claiming that the country fulfilled its resolution of the 8th Party Congress of the North Korean Workers' Party was achieved most accurately.

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20) Korean Central News Agency, 2023.8.22.


21) Korean Central News Agency, 2023.8.24.

22) UN News, UN chief strongly condemns DPRK spy satellite launch, May 31, 2024, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1137192>(accessed on April 26, 2024).

23) The Malligyong1 reconnaissance satellite was calculated as 23:05 for the descending node and 10:17 for the ascending node during the period from November 21 to 30. <https://launchwindow.barnazagoni.com>.

24) Korean Central News Agency, 2023.11.22.

<Figure 1> Specifics of Malligyong-1 satellite



Source: <https://www.n2yo.com/satellite/?s=58400#results>(accessed on April 26, 2024).

As shown in Figure 1, the North Korean reconnaissance satellite Malligyong 1 was assigned an ID of 58400 by NORAD with a perigee of 499.6 km and an apogee of 515 km. The orbital inclination angle is 97.4 degrees, and the period of orbiting Earth is 94.6 minutes.

<Table 3> 5-Day Prediction for Malligyong-1 at Pyongyang Ground Station

Start	Max Altitude	End	Remark
Nov 24, 11:19 pm	11:25 pm	11:31 pm	Night
Nov 25, 09:56 am	10:02 am	10:08 am	Day
Nov 25, 11:00 pm	11:06 pm	11:12 pm	Night
Nov 26, 09:38 am	09:43 am	09:49 am	Day
Nov 26, 11:12 am	11:17 am	11:22 am	Day
Nov 26, 10:41 pm	10:47 pm	10:53 pm	Night

Source : <https://www.orbtrack.org/#> (accessed on Nov. 23, 2023).

As shown in <Table 3>, the North Korean reconnaissance satellite Malligyong 1 orbits the Earth at the north-south pole and visits the Korean Peninsula two to four times a day. At this time, it may communicate with the Pyongyang satellite control center for about 12 minutes. It may undertake reconnaissance of the major

targets in South Korea once or twice a day due to the nature of electronic optical cameras.

The average altitude of the satellite was lowered to 510 km, but in February 2023, the Malligyong 1 conducted five maneuvers to increase the altitude to 512 km.<sup>25)</sup> This means that North Korea's Malligyong1 satellite has gradually increased its altitude using a propulsion jet to offset the drop in altitude due to atmospheric drag, and satellite command and control are being performed between the Pyongyang Satellite Control Center ground station and the reconnaissance satellite.<sup>26)</sup>

Unlike in the past, when North Korean satellites were in orbit but there was no practical activity due to the inability to control their posture, the Malligyong 1 uses satellite control and thrusters to control its attitude, which indicates that Malligyong is communicating with the ground station. However, it may suggest that there are limitations in imagery transmission and reception because the radio waves used to transmit images by spy satellites to the Pyongyang ground station are not identified.

According to the Two Line Element (TLE) report of the Malligyong Reconnaissance Satellite, it is possible to check the communication time of the Pyongyang control station and the possible photographing time around the Korean Peninsula. Since the Malligyong Reconnaissance Satellite cannot photograph at night, it may photograph images of the Korean Peninsula around 10 o'clock, which is usually the daytime. Given that the frequency of 468 MHz UHF used for basic-level Cube satellite communication was collected from the Malligyong Reconnaissance Satellite so far, it seems that the reconnaissance satellite has not photographed and transmitted images to the ground station, and the satellite imagery has not been high resolution.

## ***2. Analysis and Evaluation of the Threats of North Korea's Reconnaissance Satellite Development***

### *(1) The purpose of developing spy satellites*

North Korea claims to have developed reconnaissance satellites to monitor the military activities of its enemies while strengthening its nuclear and missile capabilities to defend against aggression from hostile countries and unify the Korean Peninsula.

All countries have the right to use space peacefully, but North Korea continues

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25) Marco Lanbroek, "A North Korean satelliteshowing sign of life," *The Space Review*, March 4, 2024 (accessed on April 26, 2024).

26) Josh Smith, "North Korea's first spy satellite is 'alive', can maneuver, expert says" *Reuters*, February 29, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/north-koreas-first-spy-satellite-is-alive-can-manoeuvre-expert-says-2024-02-28/>(accessed on April 26, 2024).

to develop ICBMs using ballistic missile technology. The U.N. Security Council has banned North Korea from launching ICBM missiles since 2006. Because Pyongyang's reconnaissance satellite technology can be used for intercontinental ballistic missiles, its claim of peaceful space development is hard to accept.<sup>27)</sup>

After the successful launch of the Hwasong-15 ICBM in November 2017, North Korea declared the completion of its national nuclear force. After the breakdown of denuclearization negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea in 2019, it resumed its pursuit of the advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities.<sup>28)</sup> On September 8, 2022, North Korea adopted the North's nuclear force policy decree to justify a preemptive nuclear attack on South Korea.<sup>29)</sup> North Korea has justified that it can preemptively attack nuclear weapons if an attack by a hostile state is imminent or if it is deemed operatively inevitable.

In the 1960s, China developed hydrogen bombs, atomic bombs, and satellites surveilling enemies through the Two Bombs, One Satellite project.<sup>30)</sup> However, even after completing its nuclear armament, North Korea was unable to monitor its adversaries. North Korea launched a reconnaissance satellite in May 2023 because South Korea planned to launch its first reconnaissance satellite in December 2023.

To ensure the success of a nuclear attack, North Korea must be capable of proactively spying on major targets in the United States, US military bases in Japan, and South Korea. As a result, North Korea is concentrating its efforts on developing reconnaissance satellites, a major mission in the space sector. Additionally, North Korea seems to seek to build reconnaissance satellites, which use a sizable national budget, to threaten neighboring countries and enhance its bargaining position in denuclearization negotiations as its nuclear and missile capabilities advance.

Since the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il administrations were unable to develop and operate spy satellites, the success of the North Korean spy satellite launch will contribute to strengthening the power of the young leader, Kim Jong-un, by giving North Koreans pride in the North Korean regime and promoting the achievements of North Korea's space science and technology.

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27) Cho Sang-jin, "Department of Defense Pursues Korea-U.S. Space Force Exercise, North Korea's Space Launch Is Illegal" *VOA News*, April 19, 2024, <https://www.voakorea.com/a/7575970.html>(accessed on April 26, 2024).

28) Jeong Jang-jang, *Why should we become a nuclear power*, Seoul: Medici Media, 2023, p. 21.

29) *Rodong Sinmun*, September 9, 2022.

30) Liu Yanqiong, "Chinese Academy of Sciences and Project of Two Bombs, One Satellite," *Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences*, vol 34, September 2019, <https://bulletinofcas.researchcommons.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1359&context=journal>(accessed on April 28, 2024).

*(2) Reconnaissance satellite development capability*

In 2023, North Korea launched three reconnaissance satellites with its own space launch vehicles using technology acquired during the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. South Korea, on the other hand, has been utilizing foreign launch vehicles since 1999 to launch a multi-purpose satellite called KOMPSAT in orbit. While North Korea's successful launch of its own reconnaissance satellite is a noteworthy achievement, it is important to note that the resolution is inferior to that of standard reconnaissance satellites. Furthermore, there is no evidence of transmitted satellite images to ground stations or public disclosure. This raises questions about the actual capabilities of North Korea's reconnaissance satellite.

Thus, analyzing detailed data collected by North Korean spy satellites is necessary to assess North Korean spy satellites' capabilities. For example, the North Korean spy satellite increased the altitude five times between February 19 and February 24, 2024. It is speculated that this altitude adjustment was controlled by thrusters that counteracted the effects of low-orbit atmospheric drag and that ground stations transmitted commands to the Malligyong spy satellite.<sup>31)</sup> Kwangmyongsong satellites launched by North Korea in 2012 and 2016 failed in their mission due to problems with altitude control. However, it is anticipated that the reconnaissance satellite launched in 2023 may be capable of maintaining control and extending the lifespan of orbiting satellites through attitude control and altitude adjustments using thrusters. It is important to note that North Korean reconnaissance satellites lack IR sensors, limiting them to daily missions.

In terms of satellite resolution, South Korea has a 0.3-meter resolution, which is 10 times higher than North Korea's 3-meter resolution. This difference may be attributed to the fact that North Korea develops space launch vehicles and reconnaissance satellites utilizing similar rocket technology used for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

At the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, North Korea announced its plans to strengthen its defense capabilities and develop weapons.<sup>32)</sup> To successfully develop a defense weapons system, North Korea is anticipated to concentrate its national power and strengthen its diplomatic relations with Russia during the Russia-Ukraine War to acquire cutting-edge aerospace technology. As Pyongyang improves its space science and technology capabilities, including the development of reconnaissance satellites, Seoul should establish military response operations and enhance its surveillance capabilities against its counterpart.

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31) Marco Langbroek, "A North Korean satellite starts showing signs of life," *The SpaceReview*, March 4, 2024, <https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4753/1> (accessed on April 28, 2024).

32) Korean Central News Agency, 2021.1.9.

### (3) *Military threats of reconnaissance satellites*

Kim Jong-un celebrated acquiring the country's reconnaissance satellite capability indigenously developed after the third launch of the reconnaissance satellite, boasting that Pyongyang could surveil enemies from a distance and use nuclear force to attack distant enemies.<sup>33)</sup> However, North Korea's reconnaissance satellites may not be as threatening as it has claimed due to the satellite's low resolution. Although North Korea has a low ability to collect and produce information on the main targets, its nuclear missile attack should raise significant concerns among its adversaries. A nuclear missile is different from a Joint Direct Attack Munition(JDAM), a precision-guided munition fired from a fighter jet carrying out a precision attack. A wide range of attacks on military and civilian targets can also cause significant casualties. By using its own target coordinates on its own intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korea will be able to carry out more effective attacks on its main targets. Furthermore, it will be possible to increase the reliability of target information for attack by obtaining data that can be used for military targets rather than simple geographical coordinates from Internet map information.

North Korea successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite and announced that it would continue to launch more reconnaissance satellites in 2024.<sup>34)</sup> If North Korea builds and operates satellite constellations consisting of reconnaissance satellites in the future, it could pose a military threat to its adversaries as such constellations would enhance its capability of surveillance of its major targets on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the United States. North Korea will be able to advance space weapons technology by developing reconnaissance satellites and operating them. Fractional Orbital Bombardment System(FOBS), developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a weapon system that can fly in orbit, go off track to attack major military targets on the ground, and then descend to destroy enemy facilities. North Korea may attempt to acquire space technology that can build FOBS missiles in the future through the development of spy satellites.<sup>35)</sup>

Although North Korea's current spy satellite functionality is lacking, anticipating North Korea's future improved satellite development capabilities,

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33) SOZAKI Atsuhito, "North Korea's 'Successful' Spy Satellite Launch," January 04, 2024, <https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/north-koreas-successful-spy-satellite-launch/>(accessed on April 28, 2024).

34) *Rodong Sinmun*, December 31, 2023.

35) Koo Hyun-mo, "The meaning of confirming the self-pulling and control of North Korea's 'Manli-kyung-1,'" *World Daily*, March 26, 2024, <https://www.segye.com/newsView/20240325513876> (accessed on April 28, 2024).; Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, Since the Cold War era, Russia has shown keen interest in developing a partial orbital bombardment system. FOBS is a system that rotates the orbit like a satellite, not a ballistic missile like an ICBM, sprays a decelerating rocket close to a target point, and then enters the atmosphere to bomb it.

South Korea must establish and implement military response measures sooner rather than later.

#### **IV. South Korea's Response Plan**

While developing a variety of ballistic missiles to strengthen its nuclear and missile capabilities, North Korea will be able to strengthen surveillance of its enemies through the development of reconnaissance satellites and produce detailed target information on major military targets required in advance in case of a nuclear attack.

North Korea violated U.N. resolutions concerning ballistic missile tests by developing and launching reconnaissance satellites into space. South Korea must strengthen its military readiness by utilizing the South Korea-U.S.-Japan defense system while demanding North Korea's compliance with international law. This study recommends the following three countermeasures the South Korean military should consider against North Korea's reconnaissance satellite development.

First, South Korea should analyze North Korea's intention to develop a reconnaissance satellite and assess its military threat. The satellite cameras collected in the West Sea after North Korea's first failed reconnaissance satellite launch have a low resolution of 3 meters. The camera resolution determines the quality of performance of reconnaissance satellites. However, although North Korea's satellites have low resolution, they can still monitor important military and national sites in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. A high resolution is necessary to precisely identify targets for coordinating missile strikes during air force operations. However, nuclear attacks may not require high resolution as the goal is often to cause widespread damage through nuclear missiles.

If a reconnaissance satellite gathers data on targets for North Korea's nuclear missiles and then shares that target information with the same geographical coordinate system as the North Korean military's nuclear missiles operations, it could potentially enhance the accuracy of targeted strikes (CEP, Circular Error Probability) during nuclear missile attacks.

It is imperative to take the potential threat of North Korea's reconnaissance satellite seriously, despite the low resolution of the current satellites. South Korea must acknowledge the possibility of these satellites being used to target major national assets and military command centers in the South Korean metropolitan area. A more comprehensive and objective threat analysis of the military applications of North Korean reconnaissance satellites should be conducted.

Second, to enhance their collective response capabilities, South Korea, the United States, and Japan should collaborate on developing strategies to counter military threats in space posed by North Korea's reconnaissance satellites. At

present, the three allies promptly share information on North Korea's reconnaissance satellite launches and ICBM launches and engage in combined space exercises. Through these combined space exercises, they should establish a plan for combined space operations to address various space threats from North Korea and enhance their collective space operation capabilities.

North Korea is obtaining advanced military technology from Russia in exchange for supplying Russia with conventional weapons in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Russia's support will enable North Korea to acquire crucial technologies to bolster its nuclear weapons operational capabilities, such as miniaturization of nuclear weapons and reentry technologies, and other key technologies related to the development of reconnaissance satellites.<sup>36)</sup> As North Korea's nuclear attack capabilities and intelligence surveillance capabilities could further improve, it is essential for South Korea, the United States, and Japan to strengthen their joint responses to North Korea's growing nuclear and space threats.

Third, in order to gain a military advantage over North Korea, South Korea must focus on developing its reconnaissance satellite capabilities and enhancing its surveillance and reconnaissance abilities, both of which are key elements of Kill Chain. On December 2, 2023, South Korea launched its first reconnaissance satellite, an electro-optical satellite with a resolution of 30 centimeters, as part of the 425 project aimed at developing a military reconnaissance satellite. This satellite, which surpasses North Korea's capabilities, will provide crucial information for the South Korean military's Kill Chain and KAMD operations by detecting provocative movements of the North Korean military and issuing early warnings of potential threats. To further solidify its military advantage, South Korea should prioritize the development and operation of reconnaissance satellite, improvement of space surveillance capabilities, training of professional space personnel, and advancement of defense space technology.

## V. Conclusion

This paper explores North Korea's development of reconnaissance satellite from political and military perspectives. North Korea claims that it is building reconnaissance satellites to monitor hostile countries, defend against external aggression, and strengthen its defense capabilities. Despite economic difficulties and international sanctions, North Korea has developed reconnaissance satellites to gather target information for nuclear and missile attacks. Additionally, North

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36) Christy Lee, "Analysts: US, South Korea Should Be Ready for Russia-North Korea Alliance," *VOA*, Jan. 24, 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/analysts-us-south-korea-should-be-ready-for-russia-north-korea-alliance/7456346.html> (accessed on April 28, 2024).

Korea is also focusing on the development of reconnaissance satellites to reinforce the Kim Jong-un regime's governance, tighten internal control, and showcase the Kim Jong-un regime's scientific and technological achievements.

This study emphasizes the need for more attention to North Korean reconnaissance satellite development and understanding of their technical evaluation. It also highlights the urgency of devising countermeasures by the South Korean military to address the capabilities and threats posed by North Korea's reconnaissance satellites.

It is crucial to conduct a detailed analysis of the operation of North Korea's reconnaissance satellites to objectively determine potential threats. Satellite experts from South Korea, the United States, and Japan need to analyze the mission operation and orbit of North Korea's reconnaissance satellites to understand their intentions and potential threats.

It is important to establish countermeasures against North Korea's reconnaissance satellite operations in the event of their capability improvement, particularly for nuclear and missile operations. Furthermore, a comparative study between the reconnaissance satellites of the two Koreas, focusing on their development, capabilities, and military impacts, is essential, and more research in this area is needed.

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# **Analysis of Kim Il-Sung's Speech Before and After the Korean War: Comparison with Pericles' Speeches in the History of the Peloponnesian War**

Soojin Park

## **Abstract**

*This study analyzed and compared Kim Il-Sung and Pericles' speeches before and after the wars as political discourse. To analyze speeches, this article used a political discourse framework based on the three principles suggested by Aristotle: ethos, pathos, and logos.*

*The analyses of four speeches shows that to persuade the audience, both Pericles and Kim Il-Sung successfully used pathos to make their speeches more compelling. However, Kim Il-Sung's speeches were less persuasive than Pericles' speeches in terms of logos. Furthermore, in light of ethos, Pericles' speeches had persuasive power, while Kim Il-Sung's speeches had varying degrees of persuasion contingent on the audience. More particularly, Kim Il-Sung's speeches were compelling for North Korean residents who believed he brought freedom to Koreans, but not to others, in terms of ethos. These analyses demonstrate that Kim Il-Sung's speeches were less persuasive than Pericles' speech, and the power of persuasion could be stronger or weaker depending on whether the audience had faith and trust in Kim Il-Sung.*

**Key words:** *Kim Il-Sung, Pericles, Pericles' Speech, Kim Il-Sung's Speech, Political Speech, Politics of Speech*

## I. Introduction

North Koreans, including those who defected from North Korea, consider Kim Il-Sung as the most positive and respected person among the three “Supreme Leaders” in North Korea. Is there a reason why the North Koreans rank him higher than the others? To answer this question, previous research focused on the idolization policy in North Korea, which partly accounts for Kim Il-Sung’s popularity. However, in this study, I seek to investigate whether or not he possessed persuasive power through his speeches that appealed to North Koreans.

According to the survey on Jeon’s 2005 research of North Korean defectors, their perception of Kim Il-Sung was positive. 67.2% of North Korean defectors answered “Yes” to the question of whether they thought Kim Il-Sung was the “greatest man in the world” (Jeon, 2005: 51). This result reveals that even the North Korean defectors, who had escaped from North Korea with any reasons, respected Kim Il-Sung. The news articles about the death of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jung-Il reported that Kim Il-Sung was the most respectable leader among the three (VOA, 2010/07/08; Dong-A Ilbo, 2011/12/21). Given North Korean defectors’ perception of Kim Il-Sung, it is not hard to imagine the evaluation of him among North Koreans residing in North Korea.

How did Kim Il-Sung become the most positive figure among the three “Supreme Leaders” in North Korea? To answer this question, this study tested a hypothesis that Kim Il-Sung successfully persuaded North Koreans to believe that he was qualified as a leader, especially through public speeches, by comparing Kim Il-Sung’s speeches with well-known and highly rated speeches such as Pericles’ speeches. This comparative analysis will allow Kim’s speeches to be evaluated at the universal standards.

Pericles’ speeches are found in the book called *History of the Peloponnesian War*. As a democratic country, in Athens, critical decisions, such as going to war, were made by vote. Thus, through his speeches, Pericles had to persuade the people of his country, who had the right to vote, to support his position before starting a war. Thucydides recorded three of Pericles’ speeches in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*.<sup>1)</sup>

The two most famous speeches in the *History of the Peloponnesian War* are of Pericles. One speech was given before the war to convince people to begin fighting. The other one, well known as a “funeral speech,” was given after the war to commemorate the dead people of the war. This speech was so compelling that it effectively commemorated the dead people and bonded citizens together politically and socially.

Thucydides repeatedly praised Pericles as “the first man of his time at Athens”

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1) Each speech is included in the *History of the Peloponnesian War* 1.140-144, 2.35-46, 2.60-64.

and one of the best political leaders (Thucydides, 1:140:4; Jang, 2016: 26-27). Also, Pericles' speeches are known to have inspired speeches given by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt (Noh, 2009: 148; Lee, 2015). These claims serve as evidence of Pericles' powerful speeches that successfully persuaded not only people in Athens of his days but also people in this day and age (Kagan, 2020: 21, 30-31).

This study analyzes the structure of Pericles' well-known speeches to evaluate Kim Il-Sung's speeches. To do so, it chose two of Kim Il-Sung's speeches given before and after the Korean War. Two of Kim's speeches for analysis: "Go All Out for Victory in the War," which was addressed to the "entire Korean people" by radio on June 26, 1950; "On the Conclusion of the Armistice Agreement," which was addressed to the "entire Korean people" by radio on July 28, 1953.<sup>2)</sup> And two of Pericles' speeches were selected to compare with Kim Il-Sung's speeches. These two speeches were delivered before and after the war. Before the war, Pericles spoke to the citizens of Athens to convince them that the war was necessary; after the war ended, he spoke again to unite citizens by commemorating the dead soldiers.

The comparison serves the study for the following three reasons. First, both Pericles and Kim Il-Sung delivered speeches to persuade the audience to back their decisions about the war. Since Athens was a democratic state, Pericles spoke to persuade Athens to initiate and rebuild after the war. According to the concept of perpetual peace, starting a war is difficult or almost impossible in republican states because of the difficulty in persuading citizens of equality to support war. Immanuel Kant's thought was developed into the democratic peace theory, arguing that armed conflict among democratic states has not happened (Doyle, 2005: 463)<sup>3)</sup>. Immanuel Kant argued that they would not choose war because war could bring to them the miseries of war (Immanuel Kant, 1795/1917: 120-128).

In contrast, Kim Il-Sung did not have to persuade Koreans to start the Korean War prior to the war. However, Kim is associated with a positive image in North Korea and is seen as the liberator of Koreans. This perception explains why the Korean War is known as the "Fatherland Liberation War" in North Korea (Rim, 2023: 4, 30; Rodong Sinmun, 2023/07/24). Some of the North Korean defectors were reluctant to acknowledge that the Korean War occurred because North Korea

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2) North Korean authorities claim Kim Il-Sung's speech on June 26, 1950, was broadcast right before the outbreak of the Korean War or shortly after the *South Korean* attack. They also claim that Kim Il-Sung's speech on July 28, 1953, was broadcast after they won the war. However, their claims are false. *North Korea* attacked the southern part of the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950, and they signed an armistice the day before the speech on July 28, 1953. This study seeks to analyze political discourse in the speeches, not to assess the historical facts. Therefore, this study does not focus on examining what historical facts are but analyzes speeches based on the claims of North Korean authorities.

3) This study does not seek to argue about the democratic peace theory. That is beyond the scope of the study.

invaded South Korea (Jung, 2015: 110). This perception refutes that Kim was persuasive after the establishment of the North Korean regime while supporting that Kim's speeches were effectively persuasive enough to North Koreans after he became the "Supreme Leader" of North Korea.

Additionally, a country's leader's speeches before and after wars leave a big mark on the history of the war as well as the history of the world (Field, 2014: 8). In particular, the speeches delivered before initiating a war need to be highly persuasive.

Second, both leaders made public speeches before and after the civil wars within one nation, alliance, and country. Pericles spoke before and after the Peloponnesian War, which can be considered a civil war within the Peloponnesian Alliance (Hanson, 2009: 459). Kim Il-Sung delivered speeches before and after the Korean War, which can be seen as a civil war with the invasion of the southern part of the Korean peninsula by the North Korean People's Army.<sup>4)</sup>

Since this study concerns the Korean War, a brief account of the North Korean perception of the Korean War seems necessary. North Korean authorities called the Korean War the "Fatherland Liberation War" for freedom and independence from the "U.S. imperialist invaders" and the "traitorous Syngman-Rhee clique." North Korea claims to have won the Korean War.<sup>5)</sup> This claim is accepted as a historical fact in North Korea. The North Korean defectors testified that they had no doubts about it when they lived in North Korea (Jeong, 2015: 100). Even after leaving North Korea, the North Korean defectors were reluctant to admit that North Korea invaded South Korea because of their education along with persuasive propaganda in North Korea (Jung, 2015: 110).

This study examines why Kim Il-Sung is the most popular Supreme Leader in North Korea. Since it does not aim to review the historical facts surrounding the Korean War, it does not refute the claims made by the North Korean authorities about the Korean War but focuses on analyzing and assessing Kim Il-Sung's speeches.

Third, this study aims to assess whether Kim's speeches were persuasive by

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4) No consensus has formed among experts on the classification of the Korean War. Some may consider it a civil war while others treat it as a proxy war, international war, and so forth. This study classified the Korean War as a civil war after considering that the "North Korean" leader invaded southern territory in preparation for armed unification and that the Soviet Union did not directly intervene in the Korean War (Jeong, 2015: 93-95; Jeong, 2013: 15-18). In addition, this study sought to argue how Kim Il-Sung's legitimacy came from the North Korean residents, who were educated that South Korea attacked North Korea. More discussions on the subject are found in the later part of this article.

5) The realization of the armistice in Joseon is that our people's ...historical victory ...as a result of a heroic struggle against the "traitorous Syngman-Rhee clique," to defend the country's freedom, independence, and people's democratic system. (in Korean); Institute of History, Academy of Social Sciences (1981), *Joseon History 27: Modern Edition (History of the Fatherland Liberation War 3)*, Pyongyang: Science & Encyclopedia Publisher, p. 509.

comparing his speeches with globally recognized persuasive speeches. Pericles' speeches were selected to compare to Kim's because they were persuasive not only then but also they are in this day and age. Therefore, in this study, I will examine whether or not Kim's speeches were persuasive to North Koreans by comparing them to Pericles' speeches. In addition, this study aims to explain why Kim's speeches are or are not persuasive.

Kim Il-Sung's speeches could be compared with Stalin's or Hitler's because North Korea's political system resembled their political systems characterized by authoritarianism, socialism, and dictatorship. However, this study aimed to see how Kim Il-Sung was respected by North Koreans and some of the North Korean defectors even though he died 30 years ago. The reign of the Kims continued with his son and grandson for almost 80 years through Kim Il-Sung's halo. On the contrary, Hitler and Stalin neither had a successor since their death, and the regime that they created has also collapsed. Additionally, Hitler was a dictator for only 12 years, from 1933 to 1945, and Stalin maintained the position of supreme leader for about 29 years. Therefore, Hitler and Stalin do not appear to be good cases to study on political leaders' persuasiveness.


Considering these three reasons, I select and analyze four speeches known to have been given by Kim Il-Sung and Pericles before and after their respective war. Hence, this study analyzes Kim Il-Sung's public speeches in terms of political discourse and compares them with those of Pericles. Through this comparison, I examine whether or not Kim Il-Sung may have gained support from North Koreans as a leader through public speeches.

## **II. Analysis of Speech as a Political Discourse**

In this study, I aim to analyze Kim Il-Sung's speeches as a political discourse and compare them with speeches by Pericles, utilizing three persuasive elements, ethos, pathos, and logos, advocated by Aristotle (Aristotle 2020). Ethos is a method of giving confidence to listeners, usually the public, in a speech through the speaker's character or personality. Pathos intends to elicit emotions from listeners, while logos is used to reach an agreement with listeners through the speech's logicity (Kim, 2012: 30-33). The three methods are most convincing when used together (Kim, 2012: 27-30).

This study will analyze logos and pathos in the speeches, utilizing one of the widely used frameworks for analyzing political discourse in Figure 1 below (Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, 2012: 11). In addition, this study examines the ethos in the speeches because it is a powerful method for the speakers to gain the trust of the audience (Aristotle, 2020).

&lt;Figure 1&gt; Fairclough and Fairclough's Structure: Political Discourse



Source: Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, 2012

Figure 1 is significant because the framework helps confirm the values of speakers and audiences, as well as the solutions and arguments presented by the speakers through analysis of the goals, values, and situations in the speeches (Choe, 2022: 26). In a situation where the speaker knows the audiences' core value (V), the speaker can take certain actions (A) through speeches as political discourse. The speaker may speak to audiences to achieve goals (G) in the current situation (C: Circumstances), by certain actions (A) through speeches. In this case, achieving "G" depends on a certain action taken by the audience. The speaker may also tell the audience that in achieving "G," the audience will presumably achieve the "M-G" (Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, 2012: 44-47).

The circumstances (C) refer to natural, social, or institutional contexts. This study focuses on the social or institutional contexts only, such as the background and reasons for war, because natural contexts do not concern the circumstances surrounding the speeches delivered before and after the war. Through the previous study that analyzed the speeches of former U.S. presidents during the war, this research seeks to provide a more detailed definition of circumstance in the analysis framework in Figure 1 (Susan Stoudinger Northcutt, 1992: 124-128).

### **III. Analysis of the Kim Il Sung's Speeches Before and After the Korean War**

#### ***1. Analysis of the speech, "Go all out for victory in the war" (June 26, 1950)***

The speech North Korean authorities claim Kim Il-Sung delivered before the Korean War addresses the circumstances (C) surrounding the war as shown in Kim Il-Sung's remarks such as "the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique has launched a fratricidal war." In this speech, Kim asserts that "the traitorous Syngman Rhee" tried to "[sell] the southern half of your country to the U.S. imperialist for a colony" through the "civil war." Kim adds, "the traitorous Syngman Rhee" "stepped up preparations for an armed attack" through the "so-called UN Temporary Commission on Korea." To prepare for the attack, Kim continues, "the traitorous Syngman Rhee" received instructions from "the U.S. imperialist" and "did not even hesitate to begin colluding with the Japanese militarists."

Kim Il-Sung says in the speech that on June 25, "the puppet government of the traitor Syngman Rhee" launched against the northern part of Korea, but "the valiant Security Forces of the Republic," which refers to the North Korean People's Army, did "fighting fierce battles to counter the enemy's invasion." Thanks to "fighting [fiercely]," Kim said, "People's Army drove the enemy back from areas north of the 38th parallel and has advanced 10 to 15 kilometers to the south." These are all the progress of the war that Kim Il-Sung claims in his speech, including the background and cause of the Korean War.

Kim Il-Sung presents the values (V) in the speech to suggest that the North Korean army and Korean people take certain actions. The values addressed in the speech are "country reunification, national independence, freedom, and democracy," which Koreans, who were listening to Kim Il-Sung's speech, were deeply concerned about.


Kim Il-Sung says, "All the People's Army officers and men must fight to the last drop of their blood for the country and the people." He continues that the people in the northern half of Korea "must reorganize all their work to put it on a war." In addition, Kim Il-Sung claims that all the people, including the "rear of the People's Army," must build an "impregnable fortress" and "detect and wipe out spies and subversive elements." These actions (A) are suggested by the speaker to protect the values (V).

All the actions Kim Il-Sung suggests are aimed at the goal (G), which is to "win ultimate victory, at all costs." Kim Il-Sung says that by achieving the goal (G), the listeners could preserve their values. In other words, Kim Il-Sung argues that if North Koreans won the ultimate victory, they could preserve reunification, independence, freedom, and democracy.

In the current circumstances (C), what could be achieved secondary in the

process of taking action (A) to protect the values (V) is “to unite more closely around the Government of the DPRK (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).” This means they “liberate the southern half of our country from the reactionary rule of the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique.” This is the “Means-Goal, (M-G)” in the speech. By this unity, Kim Il-Sung asserts that North Koreans could not only win “the democratic liberties and rights” (V) but also maintain them.

<Figure 2> Analysis of Kim Il-Sung’s Speech Before the Korean War: “Go all out for victory in the war” (June 26, 1950)



## **2. Analysis of the speech, "On the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement" (July 28, 1953)**

The second speech is reported to have been delivered through radio to the "entire Korean people" on July 28, 1953. It is the day after the Korean War armistice agreement was reached. In this speech, Kim Il-Sung argues that the armistice agreement, which means truce, is the result of "our people's heroic struggle to safeguard national freedom and independence against the allied forces of foreign imperialism and the US imperialist stooges, the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique." He claims that this meant their victory in the war. This is one of the "current situations (C)" that Kim presents to his listeners.

Kim Il-Sung claims in the speech that the main factor contributing to their "victory" in the war against the "U.S. imperialist invaders" was "a firm alliance of our working class and working peasants and the warm support of the democratic forces of all strata for this alliance." He says that this could be achieved by the spirit of the "political and moral state of the army and the people, and the fighting spirit of the people at the front and in the rear." By exercising this spirit, Kim Il-Sung argues that they could achieve victory against the "U.S. imperialist invaders" despite the "superior military technique."


Furthermore, Kim Il-Sung adds that even though they concluded the armistice agreement, they should always keep "ready and on the alert," one of the actions suggested in the speech, because the agreement does not mean that "the U.S. imperialists have completely given up their aggressive plan against our country." Kim Il-Sung claims that "the U.S. imperialist" remains in the southern half of the country, and the "Syngman Rhee puppet regime" advocates a "northward expedition." An element of the circumstances (C), which Kim Il-Sung presented to the listeners, is that the armistice agreement is the result of a "historic victory won by our people" but not a "lasting peace."

Kim Il-Sung urges North Koreans to keep "ready and on the alert" (A) because "the enemy may unleash another war in violation of the Armistice Agreement and, accordingly, a war may break out again in our country at any moment." This "violation" could be hindered from achieving a "lasting peace, reunification and independence of the country," which is the greatest desire and value (V) of the listeners. Therefore, Kim Il-Sung urges his listeners, through the speech, to keep ready and alert to protect the values that are important to the listeners. Furthermore, these actions could be achieved by "a firm alliance of our working class and working peasants and the warm support of the democratic forces of all strata for this alliance."

In the speech, Kim Il-Sung also states that North Koreans could probably "expose continuously the colonial enslavement policy of U.S. imperialism towards Korea" while achieving the main goals. This is the "M-G" in the speech through which Kim Il-Sung suggests that they could expose the "evil nature of the idealized

American-style ‘democracy’ which the US imperialists had tactfully kept under cover for (a) long time” to the world.

<Figure 3> Analysis of Kim Il-Sung’s Speech After the Korean War: “On the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement” (July 28, 1953)



In this speech, Kim Il-Sung presents four main ways to “keep ready and on alert”: 1) “strengthen the fighting efficiency of the People’s Army in every way”; 2) “put the main stress on (the) industry in restoring the national economy”; 3) “against even the slightest degree of idleness and laxity” by tightening the state discipline; and 4) “(to) strengthen friendship and cohesion with peoples of the democratic camp and uphold the banner of internationalism” to obtain “international support and encouragement of the fraternal people.”

In particular, Kim Il-Sung argues that state discipline could be tightened by “struggle against counter-espionage” through “[sharp] revolutionary vigilance.” After the Korean War, Kim Il-Sung claimed that if the audiences wanted to protect the values of freedom, independence, and the like that concerned them, they should keep struggling against “counter-espionage.” It could be assumed that this “counter-espionage” struggle led to the anti-sectarian struggle led by Kim Il-Sung and influenced the consolidation of the Kim Il-Sung dictatorship.

### ***3. Preliminary Conclusion***

This chapter analyzed two speeches delivered on the radio by Kim Il-Sung before and after the Korean War through the political discourse analysis framework. The two speeches targeted the Koreans who had gone through the Japanese colonial era. This could be assumed that the audiences might be gravely concerned with the value of freedom and independence of their nation. Kim Il-Sung also knew that the audience was interested in certain values and urged them to take certain actions (A) to protect their values through his speeches. In his speeches, Kim Il-Sung claimed that “A” would help them protect their values and ultimately win the “lasting peace.”

Kim Il-Sung delivered two public speeches, urging his listeners to struggle to win the Korean War and rebuild the country. It is evident from the two speeches that Kim understood the values important to the listeners, who had survived the Japanese colonial era, and suggested actions to achieve and protect them. Kim's speeches were relatively effective in terms of logos and pathos, two of Aristotle's persuasive elements.

The ethos element is not apparent in the two speeches. Yet, it seems that instead of building trust by revealing his personality or character, Kim used an expression that emphasized the brutality of enemies who broke the “lasting peace.”

Although these two speeches were compelling to North Korean listeners at the time. However, it did not appear to appeal to those living outside North Korea. What explains the discrepancy between people's reactions to Kim's speeches? To answer the question, the study now turns to Pericles' speeches.

## **IV. Analysis of the Pericles' Speeches Before and After the Peloponnesian War**

### ***1. Analysis of Pericles' speech before the War***

Pericles delivered speeches to the public ahead of the war. Pericles urged in a speech that war should be started against Lacedaemonians, who were Spartans.

This is the action (A) that Pericles urged the listeners to do. The reason why they should go to war is the Lacedaemonians' unreasonable requirements. According to Pericles, although revoking the Megara decree might be seen as a "trifle" requirement and looked like too slight a cause to start a war, this "contains the whole seal and trial of resolution."<sup>6)</sup>

Knowing that the citizens, who are listening to his speech, are interested in maintaining what they have now and keeping their safety and freedom (V), Pericles mentioned them in the speech. He continues to say that the Lacedaemonians "wish complaints to be settled by war instead of negotiation,"<sup>7)</sup> which describes the current circumstance (C). Then, Pericles argues that they should make a decision to go to war before their possessions get harmed and they become slaves.<sup>8)</sup> Furthermore, he adds that if they refuse to fight back, Lacedaemonians might deem that they are frightened and make some greater demands.<sup>9)</sup>

Pericles also details the current state (C) of Athens and Sparta in his speech. Pericles claims that in terms of the military capability and individual citizens' abilities, Athens was superior to Sparta because most of the Lacedaemonians had not experienced long wars across the sea, and most of them were peasants. Pericles emphasized that Sparta's military funds were not enough, and their naval power was inferior. Therefore, he insists that they should not be afraid of starting a war against Sparta.

Furthermore, if they showed that they were not afraid of starting a war, they could achieve short-term and long-term goals. In the short term, they could win the war. In the long term, they could hand down their power to posterity, which

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6) "I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution." *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.140.4-5.


7) "Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command." *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.140.2

8) "Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery." *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.141.1-2.

9) "If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals." *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.140.5.

includes wisdom and strength.<sup>10)</sup> Additionally, he argued that Athens could provide more favorable conditions for Sparta to accept economically and politically. This corresponds to “M-G” in the analysis framework of the study, which encompasses incidental benefits obtained by showing a resolve to start a war.

**<Figure 4> Analysis of Pericles' Speech Before the War**



Thucydides, the author of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, deems Pericles' speeches effective. He wrote in the book, “the Athenians persuaded of the wisdom of his (Pericles’) advice, vote as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as he recommended... the complaints settled in a fair and

10) “Did not our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity unimpaired.” *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.144.3

impartial manner by the legal methods, which the terms of the truce prescribed.” This passage shows that Pericles’ speech delivered before the war was convincing to Athenians in those days as well as those at that time.

## ***2. Analysis of Pericles’ speech after the War: The Funeral Speech***

After the war, Pericles delivered a speech at a funeral. Funeral speeches in Athens at that time after the war usually offered praise for the dead, comfort for the families of the dead, and recommendations for citizens preparing for the future (Loroux, 1986; Ziolkowski, 1981; Bosworth, 2000). Unlike the previous funeral speeches at that time, Pericles’ funeral speech focused more on the current situation in Athens.

Pericles gave a funeral speech because he was nominated as the speaker. The funeral oration was given under the circumstances (C) of the funeral after the victory of the war. Pericles’ speech begins with praise for the excellence of the Athenas and Athenians, noting that these qualities were inherited values from their ancestors. He emphasized that their superiority was attributed to the freedom and equality they inherited from their ancestors.<sup>11)</sup> Since the Athenians valued freedom and equality (V), they fought with courage and honor to protect them and, thus, easily won the war.<sup>12)</sup>

The praise for the greatness of Athens is used for the “definite proofs established” for blessing loss and celebrating their heroism. Pericles also emphasized the honor of the dead and made concrete suggestions (A) for the families of the dead, such as giving birth to more children to maintain their excellence, before finishing his speech with a promise to take care of the families of the dead.

When they were winning the war (C), Pericles instructed certain actions (A) to the citizens who were listening to his speech. Pericles offered his praise for the ancestors and the deaths during the war. As they did courageously, Pericles prescribed detailed specific actions for the citizens to take.

Among the families of the dead, those “who are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead.” On the other hand, if someone has “passed (their) prime,” which means someone who is too old to get a child, it should be considered that their life was “fortunate,” and they should love


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11) “This is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; ...The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life.” *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.37.1-2.

12) “While we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. ...so that, wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the nation, ...we are still willing to encounter danger.” *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.39.2-4.

their honor and rejoice in the heart of age since the honor never grows old. Lastly, Pericles mentioned that for female excellence, widowhood should not be “talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad.”<sup>13)</sup> Pericles argues that all of the aforementioned actions are to protect the Athens (G) and offer them an opportunity to express respect for the dead and enhance their honor while taking actions (M-G).

**<Figure 5> Analysis of Pericles' Speech After the War: The Funeral Speech**



Pericles' funeral speech after the war was thought to be different from the other general speeches at the time. However, the speech was highly persuasive at the time in that it honored and paid respect for the dead while highlighting the values of honor and freedom that the listeners of the time were highly interested in. Pericles logically suggested in this speech that the Athenians should strive to protect the honor of Athens and its citizens with freedom, equality, and the courage that they inherited from their ancestors.

13) Extracted from the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.44.1-3, 2.45.1-2.

## V. Comparison between Kim Il-Sung's and Pericles' Speeches

The analyses of four speeches uncover the pathos and logos in Kim Il-Sung and Pericles' speeches. They reveal that both Kim's and Pericles' speeches delivered before the War accurately identified the values that were important to their respective listeners and offered a specific course of action to protect the values.

Unlike Pericles' speech, however, Kim Il-Sung's speech is not appealing to people who live outside North Korea. Pericles emphasized that they should not be afraid of war to keep their values, while Kim Il-Sung strongly suggested that they should "detect and wipe out" their "spies and subversive elements." This prescription appeared similarly in the process of establishing the Kim Il-Sung dictatorship.

In addition, Pericles tried to objectively describe Sparta's military and economic situations rather than criticizing them despite the Lacedaemonians being an enemy. On the other hand, Kim Il-Sung made a subjective criticism of its counterpart by labeling him as the "traitorous Syngman Rhee clique." This difference weakens the justification, rightfulness, and logical basis of Kim Il-Sung's speech.

Lastly, Pericles and Kim Il-Sung offered different reasons to start the war. Pericles proposes to Athenians that they should start the war to protect their interests including their values, even though there was no war yet. On the other hand, Kim Il-Sung laid the blame for the war on the "traitorous Syngman Rhee clique" even though Kim himself started the war. This is one of the main reasons why his speech is not convincing to those who are aware that Kim Il-Sung actually started the war and tried to blame the war on the enemy.

Kim Il-Sung's speech delivered after the war reveals that Kim had a clear understanding of the values in which his listeners were interested such as complete freedom and peace in reunification and independent Korea since the Koreans had gone through the Korean War and survived the Japanese colonial era. To protect their values, Kim Il-Sung argued for the firm alliance of the working class, urging North Koreans to be ready and on alert to prepare for war. However, in the process of protecting their values, Kim Il-Sung argued that they could presumably combat "U.S. imperialism's enslavement policy towards Korea." This rhetoric only persuaded the speaker himself and his supporters. Therefore, unlike Pericles' speeches, Kim Il-Sung's speeches had the elements of pathos, but those of the logos were lacking.

So, how do the two speakers differ in terms of ethos, which refers to gaining the trust of their audience? Thucydides evaluated Pericles as "the first man of his time at Athens," although there were "many speakers who came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the necessity of war."<sup>14</sup>) The

Athenians were persuaded by Pericles, not others; they subscribed to the wisdom of his advice, voted as he inspired, and followed his recommendations.<sup>15)</sup> Thucydides also argued that Pericles gained more respect after his death because his foresight kept Athens safe.<sup>16)</sup> For example, he urged them “to pay attention to their marine” and not “to expose the city to no hazards during the war.” Unlike the speakers in that era, Pericles’ bits of advice were not to take care of his interests but for Athens’ security.<sup>17)</sup>

Moreover, Pericles was regarded as a persuasive speaker with various speech techniques. For example, he made speeches with “dignified and restrained” positions with “high spirits.” As a result, Pericles was elected as a general every year, but he did not attempt to change democracy or covet greater power that he should not get (Donald Kagan, 2006: 33).

Pericles’ evaluation remains positive even now. Pericles is regarded as a reformer who established Athens’ democratic government from an early age. He is also seen as a person who is respected militarily and politically not only at the time but also nowadays (Bettany Hughes, 2012: 150-151). In addition, Pericles’ leadership and perspective are not easy to obtain or find in modern times, even though we are living in a more politically advanced system (Donald Kagan, 2006: 459). In other words, Pericles has enough ethos to be highly respected since his time.

On the other hand, Kim Il-Sung started the Korean War, as can be inferred from historical facts and speech analysis. Yet, he kept trying to blame the war on others. The ostensible goal of each action presented through the speeches is to defend and maintain the “freedom, independence, and peace” of Korea. However, Kim Il-Sung used the speeches to strengthen his dictatorship, since he emphasized strengthening antipathy against the enemy and spies who he defined. As a result, Kim’s speeches helped to establish a dictatorship that continued the three

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14) There were many speakers who came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of allowing it to stand in the way of peace.; *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.139.3

15) Among them came forward Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice.; *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.139.4; 1.145.1

16) He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death.; *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.65.6

17) He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war.; *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.65.6-7.

generations of succession till now. To this end, Kim Il-Sung also denied the fact that he started the Korean War to expand his political power on the Korean Peninsula, not for the everlasting Korean independence, freedom, and peace.

Additionally, Kim Il-Sung attempted to build trust in his speech by emphasizing the brutality of the “enemies,” rather than revealing his personality or character. As a result, it is challenging to find the elements of ethos in Kim Il-Sung’s speech. The only way to build trust was his brief “anti-Japanese struggle” experience in the past. If so, how did the North Korean authorities and Kim Il-Sung himself win the support of the North Korean residents? They blocked external information and deified Kim Il-Sung by exaggerating the anecdotes of Kim Il-Sung’s “anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle.”

First, North Korean authorities blocked information from the outside world and taught North Koreans that “the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique” launched the Korean War even though Korea could become a “U.S. imperialist” colony as a result of the war (Kim, 1950: 10-11). Due to inadequate education based on falsehood and no exposure to outside information, North Koreans believe that the Korean War began with the invasion of “the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique” forces. It also makes them think that the war could lead to a serious crisis that would deprive Koreans of the freedom and independence acquired after liberation.

Moreover, the North Korean authorities claim that Kim Il-Sung’s outstanding command led to victory in the War. Thus, they celebrate July 27 as the “Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War,” although July 27 is the day when the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed. The North Korean authorities had to propagate that thanks to his excellence, Kim Il-Sung was able to liberate North Korea from “the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique” and “the U.S. imperialist aggressors.”

To elaborate on Kim Il-Sung’s excellence, the North Korean authorities claim that Kim Il-Sung led the front line of the war with “firm conviction,” “great courage,” and “strong will” that helped him win the war.<sup>18)</sup> They argue that Kim Il-Sung had an “iron will and outstanding leadership” and this made their revolution, which included the “Fatherland Liberation War” continue (Kim, 1992: 7). Thus, the North Korean authorities are deifying Kim Il-Sung by exaggerating his ‘excellence.’<sup>19)</sup>

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18) *Kim Il Sung, Eternal Banner of Victory*, Explore DPRK; <https://exploredprk.com/articles/kim-il-sung-eternal-banner-of-victory/> (accessed on February 13, 2024)

19) President Kim Il Sung defeated the U.S. imperialist aggressors, who boasted of being the “strongest” in the world, to win a shining victory in the Fatherland Liberation War. ...The U.S. imperialists ...employed all the cruelest and brutal methods of war. It was unimaginable at that time for the young DPRK to fight against the formidable imperialist foe, ...the President ...led the war to victory with his *Juche*-based military idea, strategies and tactics and outstanding commanding art. ...The war methods advanced by him were entirely new and unique ones, unprecedented in the history of wars. ...Thanks to his rare military stratagem and wise

As a result, Kim Il-Sung's speeches were persuasive to the North Korean people who could not access external information, by harmonizing ethos, pathos, and logos. However, Kim Il-Sung's speeches were not convincing to most outsiders who could access more objective information.

## VI. Conclusion

North Korea is one of the countries where a leader's speech has absolute authority. What North Korea's "Supreme Leader" mentioned or is reported to have mentioned plays a crucial role in determining how the country operates (Kim & Kim, 2022: 1). Since North Korea maintains its regime based on the hereditary system starting from Kim Il-Sung, North Korea cherishes Kim Il-Sung's words and considers them more important rules than their law.<sup>20)</sup>

In this study, I evaluate and analyze Kim Il-Sung's speeches to examine if they are important enough for North Korean researchers to uncover the intentions of the North Korean authorities (Kim, 2021: 24-31; Park, 2019: 43-59; Park, 2015: 58-61; et al.). While the North Korean authorities do not disclose internal information, the North Korean "Supreme Leader's" speeches have a high political significance and must have contained the North Korean authorities' intention.

As this study reveals, the political use of speech is not unique to North Korea. Speech politics is also one of the old and effective political tools as evidenced in Pericles' speeches in the History of the Peloponnesian War. World history during and after the war was significantly influenced by pre- and post-war statements given by leaders. In this study, I selected and analyzed four speeches that were known to have been given by Pericles and Kim Il-Sung before and after the conflict.

This study focused on the three components of logical speech presented by Aristotle. Among the three components, pathos and logos were identified using the Figure 1 analysis frame. Considering the historical situation at that time, this study looked at the pathos in the speeches by determining whether the speeches contained the value (V) that the listener was interested in or should have been interested in. Furthermore, this study examined the logos in the speeches through

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leadership, the Korean people shattered the myth of "mightiness" of the U.S. imperialists and defended the dignity, honor and sovereignty of the DPRK and prevented a new world war to safeguard human peace, thus bringing about a great event to be specially recorded in the history of the Korean nation and the world history of revolution.; *Iron-willed Commander Who Led Fatherland Liberation War to Victory*, July 27, 2023, Uriminzokkiri; et al.

20) Kim Jong-Un's recent actions, for example, abandoning the unification goal with the South, have raised questions about the importance of the quotes by Kim Il-Sung, nowadays. However, since this study does not address this issue, it follows the previous perception of what Kim Il-Sung said.

the goals (G, M-G) that the speakers suggested and whether the action plan (A) for the goal was logical. Through this, it was possible to figure out whether the pathos and logos of each speech worked internally. Then, this study looked at information about the speakers and investigated whether they could earn the trust of the listener by examining the ethos of each speech.

The analyses of each speaker's speeches using the three components show that Kim Il-Sung's speeches lack logos when compared to Pericles' speeches. In addition, the ethos of the speeches was subject to the identity of the listeners. In other words, Kim Il-Sung's speeches are convincing to North Koreans who are presumed to have deified Kim Il-Sung because the ethos of the speeches could be found for them. However, Kim Il-Sung's speeches are not convincing for listeners who do not deify Kim, because Kim Il-Sung's ethos is lacking.

This study compared Kim Il-Sung's speeches with Pericles' speeches to examine why Kim Il-Sung's speeches were persuasive to North Koreans while they were not convincing to people living outside North Korea. The answer lies in individual listeners' attitudes toward Kim Il-Sung. The finding implies that if the ethos of Kim Il-Sung no longer works for North Koreans or if external information flows into North Korea, Kim Il-Sung's speeches' credibility and persuasive power will be weakened.

Some media reports show that negative perceptions of Kim Il-Sung have increased recently, especially among young intellectuals who do not remember the time when Kim Il-Sung was North Korea's Supreme Leader (RFA, 2013/04/15). Additionally, according to a report published on a survey of North Korean defectors in February 2024 by the Ministry of Unification in the Republic of Korea, the level of North Koreans' support for the hereditary succession of the Baekdu Bloodline, descendants of Kim Il-Sung, has decreased over time.<sup>21)</sup> This means the North Korean residents' evaluation of the "Supreme Leader" has changed.

In response, in December 2020, the North Korean authorities adopted the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act (Rodong Sinmun, 2020/12/05). The act was enacted to strongly punish those who consume or distribute external information and cultural contents of capitalist countries, especially South Korea

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21) According to the data, 57.3% of North Korean defectors who defected from North Korea before 2000 selected "Yes," 20.0% selected "Neutral," and 22.7% selected "No." On the other hand, the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes" continued to decrease until 2022, with 29.4% of North Korean defectors who defected from North Korea between 2016 and 2020 selected "Yes," 15.7% selected "Neutral," and 54.9% selected "No.;" The percentage of people who chose "Yes": 57.3% (defected before 2000), 52.0% (defected between 2001~2005), 45.6% (defected between 2006~2010), 38.8% (defected between 2011~2015), 29.4% (defected between 2016~2020); Lee, Woo Young et al. (2024), *North Korea's Economic and Social Perception Report: the reality of North Korea informed by 6,351 North Korean defectors*, Seoul: Ministry of Unification, p. 248.

and the United States (Han, 2022a: 10-21). North Korean authorities revealed that the act considers “viewing, listening to, or possessing South Korean movies, video recordings, books” as a crime and strengthens punishment.<sup>22)</sup> This proves that the influx of external information is considered an extremely dangerous situation for North Korean authorities to maintain their regime. Thus, ethos against Kim Il-Sung will become more challenging to fully function if North Korean residents' memory of Kim Il-Sung diminishes, and external information flows in, making it difficult to deify Kim Il-Sung. This could cause great difficulties in maintaining the North Korean regime.

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22) Referred to Chapter 4, *Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act*(2022); Han, 2022b: 132-134

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# Towards Sustainable Peace: Integrating Environmental Literacy in UN Peacekeeping Missions

Khalid Mahmood Shafi, Jung Pil Kim, Hamna Seyyed

## Abstract

*The intricate relationship between peacekeeping operations and the preservation of the environment has gained recognition in recent years. Conflict-affected regions, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have frequently witnessed environmental degradation and the exploitation of natural resources during conflicts. The peacekeepers deployed in these three nations constitute more than 62% of global deployments. Providing environmental education to these individuals could have a significant positive impact on the environment. It is crucial to address environmental literacy within UN peacekeeping missions to prevent further damage and rehabilitate affected ecosystems. Prolonged conflicts often cause severe ecological degradation, hindering long-term peace efforts. This article explores the strong connection between peacekeeping efforts and environmental issues, showcasing the influential role the environment plays in shaping conflict dynamics and the challenges faced during peacebuilding. There is a need for climate and environmental literacy and awareness among UN peacekeepers. This article aims to highlight the importance of climate and environmental literacy in UN peacekeeping operations and its potential to contribute to global peace and sustainable development.*

**Key words:** *UN Peacekeeping, Climate, Environmental literacy, Conflict, Global Security.*

## I. Introduction

Environmental literacy involves possessing the information, skills, and tactics to address ecological, economic, and social issues. This article will explain why climate literacy is important and needed and present case studies of three UN peacekeeping missions.

The case study of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan) offers insight into environmental literacy initiatives and outcomes compared to ongoing missions like MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic).

The initial environmental policies focused on minimizing the ecological footprint of the mission's operations, including guidelines for waste management, water usage, and energy consumption in UNMISS. However, there were implementation failures due to limited resources, inadequate local infrastructure, or insufficient personnel training.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and

### **The Number of UN Personnel deployed in the following regions:**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Missions</b>	<b>Number of UN Personnel deployed</b>	<b>%</b>
Western Sahara	MINURSO	469	0.5%
CAR	MINUSCA	18,420	21.2%
Mali	MINUSMA	15,779	18.1%
DRC	MONUSCO	17,753	20.4%
Golan	UNDOF	1,256	1.4%
Cyprus	UNFYCIP	1,011	1.2%
Lebanon	UNIFIL	10,365	11.9%
Abyei	UNSIFA	3,156	3.6%
Kosovo	UNMIK	352	0.4%
South Sudan	UNMISS	17,954	20.6%
Pak-India	UNMOGIP	110	0.1%
Middle East	UNTSO	380	0.4%
Total		87,071	

Source: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>



ecological and social consequences that can undermine the larger goals of peacekeeping operations.

UN missions have been accused of exploiting the natural resources in host nations, leading to direct and indirect exploitation, pollution, and environmental degradation. The lack of environmental literacy among UN peacekeepers is a primary reason for these negative effects. This underscores the importance of addressing environmental concerns in peacekeeping deployments to mitigate negative consequences and preserve long-term viability.

For example, insufficient waste management procedures in UNMISS led to local contamination while the movement and operations of vehicles and machinery contribute to air and noise pollution. These negative environmental impacts can undermine the mission's relationship with the host community and long-term sustainability, emphasizing the need for sustainable practices within peacekeeping operations.

Understanding the connection between the environment and peacekeeping requires comprehension of three main concepts: environment, natural resources, and cultural resources.

The environment encompasses physical surroundings like climate, geography, geology, resources, wildlife, and human beings along with their interrelations. Climate change is not solely a matter of human security; rather, it is fundamentally reshaping security dynamics.

Natural resources are essential sources of life and well-being, including renewable and non-renewable resources such as water, air, soil, land, trees, and minerals.

Cultural resources include tangible and intangible cultural heritage. Without protection of both natural and cultural resources, a peaceful environment cannot be sustained.<sup>3)</sup>

The environment affects humans and life. Conversely, human activities along with technological advancement affect the environment, leading to pollution, global warming, climate change, and resource scarcity, all of which can result in conflicts.

Many conflict worldwide have been fueled by competition for resources. For example, Sudan has faced civil conflicts and poor economic resource management, leading to current wars and insecurity.

The conflict in the Congo has been fueled by a complex combination of geopolitics, national and ethnic rivalries, and competition over the region's natural resources. The Central African Republic (CAR) has experienced frequent violence due to factors such as control of the diamond mines, disputes over livestock, dissatisfaction among minority groups, and the lack of a functioning<sup>4)</sup> government


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3) Forti, Daniel, and Emmanuelle Cousin. "Contingent-Owned Equipment and Environmental Considerations in UN Peacekeeping Operations." JSTOR, 2022. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43843>.

4) climate-laws.org. "National Environment Policy 2015-2025 - Climate Change Laws of the

since colonial times.

Many peacekeepers have been deployed in these Central Africa regions, often working in the world's most remote areas with minimal infrastructure. Most peacekeeping missions must generate their own electricity and manage supply chains, which can result in greenhouse gas emissions and potential soil pollution. These activities also produce significant solid waste, require both potable and non-potable water, and generate wastewater.



Source: Jacinth Planer, "Map Highlights Environmental and Natural Resource Crimes in Africa," The Enough Project, October 13, 2015, <https://enoughproject.org/blog/map-highlights-environmental-and-natural-resource-crimes-africa>.

World," n.d. [https://climate-laws.org/document/national-environment-policy-2015-2025\\_b36c](https://climate-laws.org/document/national-environment-policy-2015-2025_b36c).

If not managed properly, these practices can impact the host country's ecology, leading to adverse environmental conditions and influencing migration patterns. This is illustrated in the map below.

## II. Environmental Literacy

Environmental literacy, which refers to the ability to make sustainable decisions and grasp how environmental challenges relate to peace and stability<sup>5)</sup> is crucial in the context of peacekeeping and host state policies. Promoting environmental literacy among peacekeepers and indigenous populations is essential for enabling sustainable activities and minimizing environmental impacts. Peacekeepers who are concerned with the environment are better able to plan their activities sustainably, leave a smaller environmental footprint, and support local environmental initiatives.<sup>6)</sup> The environmental literacy of indigenous populations can make it easier for them to participate in embracing sustainable practices.<sup>7)</sup>

It is important to recognize that peacekeeping operations can have a significant impact on the environment more than on the local population. Peacekeepers operating in various regions must understand how environmental stressors, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, can escalate tensions and trigger conflicts. Climate and environmental literacy provide UN peacekeepers with the tools to recognize these connections and implement strategies to prevent, mitigate, and resolve such crises.<sup>8)</sup>

### *A. Preventing Resource Competition; Peacekeeping Missions and Sustainability*

Vulnerable populations, often disproportionately affected by climate change, are

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5) Reuveny, Rafael, Andreea S Mihalache-O'Keef, and Quan Li. "The Effect of Warfare on the Environment." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 6 (2010): 749–61. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20798961>.

6) Borel, Rolain, Erin McCandless, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. "Environment and Natural Resource-Related Conflicts: Moving towards Transformational Approaches." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 3, no. 1 (2006): 1–5. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48603332>.

7) Francis, Robert A., and Krishna Krishnamurthy. "Human Conflict and Ecosystem Services: Finding the Environmental Price of Warfare." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 90, no. 4 (2014): 853–69. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24538201>

8) "Developing National Sustainable Development Strategies That Promote Stability and Peacebuilding Development Account Project (ROA 105) Strengthening National Capacity for the Integration of Sustainable Development Strategies in Countries Emerging from Conflict United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs -Division for Sustainable Development," 2012. [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1040NSDS%20and%20Peacebuilding%20Training%20Manual%20\(ROA-105\)%20revised%20by%20Jenny%201104.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1040NSDS%20and%20Peacebuilding%20Training%20Manual%20(ROA-105)%20revised%20by%20Jenny%201104.pdf).

particularly at high risk in conflict zones. Peacekeepers need to be equipped with the knowledge to protect and support these communities. Climate and environmental literacy helps peacekeepers understand the unique vulnerabilities of these populations and tailor their responses accordingly to ensure their safety and well-being.

Peacekeepers should keep in mind that UN peacekeeping operations can impact the environment in ways such as their vehicles producing soil pollution and local people needing water from the same ground. The amount of water and food needed and wasted by civilians must be monitored by peacekeepers.

Resource competition is a driver of conflict and is closely linked to environmental factors. To prevent resource competition and promote sustainability, peacekeepers must be trained to manage and mediate disputes over resources effectively while promoting sustainable practices. Climate and environmental literacy empowers peacekeepers to address resource-related conflicts and work towards preventing conflicts triggered by resource scarcity, ultimately contributing to the protection of civilians.<sup>9)</sup>

### ***B. Sustainable Peacekeeping Operations***

Sustainable peacekeeping operations involve minimizing the ecological footprint and adhering to sustainable practices to preserve the environments in which peacekeepers operate. Climate and environmental literacy enable peacekeepers to understand the environmental consequences of their actions and adopt sustainable approaches that not only promote peace but also protect the planet.

Local communities are essential allies in efforts to maintain peace. Peacekeepers can foster trust and cooperation with these communities by displaying dedication to environmental preservation and sustainability. Climate and environmental literacy can improve the ability of peacekeepers to interact with and win the support of local residents, helping peacekeepers understand the local environment and the cultural value of natural resources.<sup>10)</sup>

### ***C. Armed Conflict and Environment***

Armed conflicts, which peacekeepers work to end, can cause significant environmental harm, including deforestation, pollution, and the eviction of local

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9) "ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY for PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS and FIELD-BASED SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS," 2022. [https://operationalsupport.un.org/sites/default/files/dos\\_2022.01\\_environmental\\_policy\\_for\\_peacekeeping\\_operations\\_and\\_special\\_political\\_missions.pdf](https://operationalsupport.un.org/sites/default/files/dos_2022.01_environmental_policy_for_peacekeeping_operations_and_special_political_missions.pdf).

10) "Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law." UNEP - UN Environment Programme, September 16, 2017. <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/protecting-environment-during-armed-conflict-inventory-and-analysis-international>.

residents. These environmental repercussions may last for a very long time and affect both the environment and people.<sup>11)</sup>

The maintenance of peace is essential for environmental sustainability, enabling the implementation of environmental regulations, conservation initiatives, and the reduction of the conflict's related negative effects on the environment.<sup>12)</sup>

### **III. Impact of the Host State Environmental Policies on Peacekeeping**

The environmental policies of the host states can have a significant impact on peacekeeping operations. Policies that promote resource management and sustainability can help in achieving mission objectives, address the root causes of resource conflicts and environmental deterioration, and assist in preventing and resolving conflicts. Following a conflict in the host states needing to rebuild their cultures and infrastructure, effective environmental rules can also control sustainable rebuilding operations, thereby reducing the environmental impacts of recovery.

However, the relationship between environmental sustainability, peacekeeping operations, and host state environmental legislation is intricate and interdependent. Peacekeepers often deal with issues of scarce resources, awareness, and coordination, and implementing environmental policy in peacekeeping operations may face challenges such as lack of funding, conflicting objectives, logistical difficulties, low awareness, quick deployment times, and an emphasis on pressing issues.

To overcome these challenges, peacekeepers can use environmental literacy to make appropriate plans and raise awareness of sustainable development. Since they will ultimately be in charge of everything after the conflict, involving the host state and the local population is crucial in maintaining peace and reintegrating them into society while maintaining environmental sustainability.<sup>13)</sup>

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11) Forti, Daniel, and Emmanuelle Cousin. "Contingent-Owned Equipment and Environmental Considerations in UN Peacekeeping Operations." JSTOR, 2022. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43843>.

12) Asiedu, Charlotte. "Environmental Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations for Sustainability, Kivu, DR Congo," 2010. <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1312150/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

13) "From Conflict to Sustainable Development: Assessment and Clean up in Serbia and Montenegro." UNEP - UN Environment Programme, September 16, 2017. <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/conflict-sustainable-development-assessment-and-clean-serbia-and-montenegro>.

### *A. Environment Policies by the Host States<sup>14)</sup>*

Firstly, CAR is a landlocked country in Central Africa with significant natural resources and ecosystems. Recognizing the importance of environmental conservation and sustainable development, the CAR government has implemented several national policies such as the National Environmental Policy, Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation laws, and Mining laws. It is crucial to remember that the implementation and efficacy of these policies may be limited.<sup>15)</sup>

- **National Environmental Policy:** There is a National Environmental Policy in effect in the Central African Republic. This policy offers a framework to address a range of environmental challenges, including biodiversity preservation, land use planning, and natural resource management.
- **Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation:** To preserve its distinctive ecosystems and wildlife, the CAR has established several protected areas and national parks. Threatened species are protected in these regions, and biodiversity is preserved. For instance, the Dzanga-Sangha Reserve is well-known for the diverse range of plants and animals it supports, such as gorillas and forest elephants.
- **Sustainable Logging Methods:** As a country with vast forests and wood resources, the government has enacted legislation to encourage sustainable logging methods and discourage illicit logging, aiming to address issues of forest degradation and deforestation.
- **Mining laws:** The CAR is well-known for its mining riches, which include diamonds and gold. Mining laws have been implemented to regulate the mining industry and minimize its negative effects on the environment and society.
- **Management of Water Resources:** The CAR recognizes effective management of water resources as crucial, particularly concerning waterways like the Ubangi River. The key issues include water quality, conservation, and management.
- **Climate Change Agreements and Initiatives:** The CAR has participated in international climate change agreements and initiatives, aligning with the Paris Agreement by submitting its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to combat climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The implementation and efficacy of these policies may be limited due to periods of political turmoil and conflict experienced by CAR, which can disrupt governance and hinder the enforcement of environmental regulations.<sup>16)</sup>

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14) ebin.pub. "Brings Together New 2023 Papers." Accessed October 22, 2023.

<https://ebin.pub/existential-risks-in-peace-and-conflict-studies-3031243145-9783031243141.html>.

15) reliefweb.int. "Reducing the Environmental Footprint of Peacekeeping Operations - Central African Republic | ReliefWeb," September 18, 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/reducing-environmental-footprint-peacekeeping-operations>.

Secondly, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has made efforts to establish environmental policies. The country is rich in natural resources, including vast forests, minerals, and water bodies. Some of the key environmental policies and initiatives in the DRC include the National REDD+ Strategy, Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation, and Forestry and Sustainable Logging.<sup>17)</sup> However, the effectiveness and implementation of these policies can vary. Preserving and sustainably managing these resources is critical for both environmental conservation and economic development.

- **National REDD+ Strategy:** The DRC has developed a National REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) Strategy to combat deforestation and forest degradation, aiming to enhance sustainable forest management and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the forest industry.
- **Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation:** A network of national parks and protected areas has been constructed to safeguard the DRC's distinctive and diverse ecosystems, including the well-known Virunga National Park, which protects endangered species like mountain gorillas.
- **Forestry and Sustainable Logging:** Initiatives to promote sustainable logging methods and regulate the forestry industry are in place to address the issue of illicit logging and ensure environmentally friendly logging practices.
- **Mining rules:** The DRC has implemented mining rules to manage the mining industry's significant mineral resources and mitigate its environmental impact, particularly in terms of soil and water contamination.<sup>18)</sup>
- **Water Resource Management:** The DRC acknowledges the importance of managing its extensive network of rivers and lakes, particularly in the context of hydropower projects, prioritizing water quality and conservation.
- **Climate Change Initiatives:** The DRC has also been involved in climate change initiatives and international agreements, submitting its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), under the Paris Agreement, that outlines its commitments to mitigate and adapt to climate change.<sup>19)</sup>

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16) Instituto Igarapé. "Central African Republic: Historical Roots and Immediate Causes of Conflict," December 21, 2017. <https://igarape.org.br/en/republica-centro-africana-raizes-historicas-e-causas-imediatas-do-conflito/>. International Crisis Group. "Crisis Group." Crisis Group, 2019. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/>.

17) reliefweb.int. "From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment - World | ReliefWeb," February 20, 2009. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-peacebuilding-role-natural-resources-and-environment-0#:~:text=Integrating%20environment%20and%20natural%20resources.>

18) United Nations Peacekeeping. "Mine Action," 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mine-action>.

19) Ifpri.org, 2021. <https://www.ifpri.org/topic/environment-and-natural-resources>.

It is important to note that the effectiveness and enforcement of these policies can vary across different regions of the DRC due to governance challenges, corruption, and infrastructure limitations.<sup>20)</sup>

Finally, Sudan had some environmental programs and policies in place, but their success and efficiency depended on factors, including political instability and resource shortages. Like many other nations, Sudan recognizes the importance of environmental preservation and sustainable growth.

Sudan has established environmental programs and policies, including rules for sustainable management of its natural resources such as water supplies and forests. The nation has struggled with deforestation, particularly in areas like Darfur, and has sought to combat this issue through legislation. Sudan has designated protected areas and wildlife reserves, such as Dinder National Park and the Dinder-Mareng Reserve, to safeguard its distinctive ecosystems and fauna.

However, political instability and transitions, including the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, can impact the development and implementation of environmental policies in Sudan. Integrating environmental considerations into peacebuilding efforts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR) is crucial due to the complex and interlinked conflicts in these regions.<sup>21)</sup>

- **Water Resource Management:** Sudan recognizes the importance of efficient water resource management given its extensive river systems. This comprises regulations and programs pertaining to hydropower, irrigation, and water quality. Sudan has participated in international climate change projects, such as the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), and is committed to combatting climate change as part of the Paris Agreement, submitting its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that outlines its pledges to combat climate change.
- **Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA):** To guarantee that environmental issues are incorporated into planning and decision-making processes, Sudan has adopted legislation for conducting environmental impact assessments for development projects.
- **Laws controlling wildlife protection and conservation:** Sudan has laws and regulations in place to preserve wildlife and prevent illegal wildlife trade and poaching.<sup>22)</sup>

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20) Environment, U. N. "African Ministerial Conference on the Environment." UNEP - UN Environment Programme, July 20, 2018. <https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/african-ministerial-conference-environment>.

21) Un.org. "UNMIS Background - United Nations Mission in the Sudan," 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmis/background.shtml>.

22) Planer, Jacinth. "Map Highlights Environmental and Natural Resource Crimes in Africa." The

Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) are crucial due to the complex and interlinked conflicts in these regions.<sup>23)</sup>

***B. Call for Action by the UN<sup>24)</sup>***

To prevent environmental degradation and achieve sustainable peace and security, the UN encourages governments, international organizations, and peacekeeping agencies to prioritize environmental literacy and policies in peacekeeping efforts. The UN also emphasizes the long-term benefits of a holistic approach to peace and security that includes environmental sustainability.

Incorporating environmental factors into peacebuilding efforts in these locations is crucial through a multifaceted strategy involving international organizations, local communities, particularly indigenous people, and governments.

Implementing environmental plans requires both bottom-up and top-down approaches simultaneously. The bottom-up approach means that the more peacekeepers are educated on the environment, the more awareness they can spread and control environmental degradation with the help of local bodies and the population.

In the post-conflict stage, it is important to sustain peace. That is where a bottom-up approach is needed. The local population at the grassroots level should be involved in decision-making and participate in devising solutions for sustainable development in the future. They have better knowledge about the environment, environmental policies, and challenges in that area. This will also prevent them from not following environmental policies and will further motivate them to sustain it. Environmental literacy of UN peacekeepers will help bring environmental awareness to the leaders of the host states.<sup>25)</sup>

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Enough Project, October 13, 2015. <https://enoughproject.org/blog/map-highlights-environmental-and-natural-resource-crimes-africa>.

23) Planer, Jacinth. "Map Highlights Environmental and Natural Resource Crimes in Africa." The Enough Project, October 13, 2015. <https://enoughproject.org/blog/map-highlights-environmental-and-natural-resource-crimes-africa>.

24) reliefweb.int. "From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment - World | ReliefWeb," February 20, 2009. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-peacebuilding-role-natural-resources-and-environment-0#:~:text=Integrating%20environment%20and%20natural%20resources>.

25) Unfccc.int. "Conflict and Climate," 2022. <https://unfccc.int/blog/conflict-and-climate>.

#### **IV. The Past Successful Incorporation of Environmental Concerns into Peacebuilding**

There have been instances where environmental concerns were successfully integrated into peacebuilding efforts. These instances highlight the benefits of incorporating environmental sustainability into post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping efforts:<sup>26)</sup>

- **Liberia's Environmental Governance Program:**

After years of civil war, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) established an Environmental Governance Program in Liberia. The program aimed to rebuild the country's environmental governance structures, which included policies, regulations, and capacity building. By supporting sustainable land use, forestry management, and wildlife protection, it successfully incorporated environmental sustainability into the recovery process and address resource rivalry, which was one of the core reasons for the war. This helped achieve long-term peace and stability.

- **Bosnia and Herzegovina's Landmine Clearing and Environmental Restoration:**

Following the Bosnian War, landmines and explosive munitions posed a significant environmental and safety risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Hazardous Area Life-support Organization (HALO) Trust, a demining organization, launched a program to eliminate mines and restore the ecosystem, making the area safer for local populations and enabling agricultural and commercial development. By integrating environmental considerations with post-conflict rebuilding, the program promoted long-term peace and stability.<sup>27)</sup>

- **Amazon Peace Park in Colombia:**

In Colombia, a struggle between the government, paramilitary organizations, and rebels caused severe environmental damage in the Amazon region, including deforestation and illicit mining. As part of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the creation of the "Amazon Peace Park" was proposed to protect the Amazon rainforest, engage local communities in conservation efforts, and address environmental damage caused by the conflict.

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26) UN Environment. "UN Recognizes 10 Pioneering Initiatives That Are Restoring the Natural World," December 13, 2022. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/un-recognizes-10-pioneering-initiatives-are-restoring-natural-world#:~:text=This%20World%20Restoration%20Flagship%20is>.

27) The HALO Trust. "The HALO Trust," 2019. <https://www.halotrust.org/>.

• **Iraqi Marshland Restoration:**

Following the Iraq War in 2003, efforts were made to restore the drained marshlands in the south of Iraq. The marshlands had been purposefully drained by Saddam Hussein's administration, with serious environmental and societal implications. Local communities and international organizations spearheaded restoration efforts to rebuild the marshlands and their ecosystems. This initiative not only helped the livelihoods of the local Marsh Arab inhabitants but also contributed to social stability.

• **Small Arms and Light Weapons Collection and Environmental Projects in Sierra Leone:**

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) combined small guns and light weapons collection programs with environmental activities in Sierra Leone. They provided disarmament incentives by offering tools and equipment for reforestation and agricultural initiatives. This approach reduced the availability of weapons while simultaneously supporting sustainable livelihoods, promoting post-conflict stability by connecting disarmament with environmental activities.

These examples present how incorporating environmental concerns into peacebuilding initiatives may successfully address the causes of conflicts, encourage the welfare of local populations, and promote long-term peace and stability. The cases highlight the significance of comprehending the relationship between environmental sustainability and peacekeeping and peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas.<sup>28)</sup>

“Greening the Blue Helmets”<sup>29)</sup> is the product of continued collaboration between UNEP, the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to improve natural resources and environmental considerations in UN peacekeeping activities. Peacekeeping operations have critical implications on natural resources and the environment; in turn, natural resources are frequently a crucial part of conflict resolution, livelihoods, and confidence-building at the local level.<sup>30)</sup>

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28) Tignino, Mara, and Tadesse Kebebew. “A Galaxy of Norms: UN Peace Operations and Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict.” *International Review of the Red Cross*, August 25, 2023, 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383123000322>.

29) U. N. Environment, “Greening the Blue Report 2023,” UNEP - UN Environment Programme, December 20, 2023, <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/greening-blue-report-2023>

30) Unfccc.int. “Conflict and Climate,” 2022. <https://unfccc.int/blog/conflict-and-climate>

## V. Examples of Successful Integration of Environmental Considerations in MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and UNMISS

### Central African Republic (CAR) (MINUSCA)

- Projects that promote reforestation and sustainable agriculture can help to alleviate deforestation and land degradation while also creating job opportunities. This can assist in lessening resource-driven conflicts in the Central African Republic.<sup>31)</sup>
- **Conflict Minerals Regulation:** The Central African Republic, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, confronts conflict mineral difficulties, notably gold and diamonds. Environmental issues may be integrated through regulating mining practices, developing traceability systems, and encouraging responsible procurement.
- **Community-Based Resource Management:** Involving local communities in the sustainable management of natural resources such as forests and animals can improve environmental protection while also increasing trust in government agencies.

### Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO)<sup>32)</sup>

- **Conflict-Free Mining:** The DRC has a history of conflict over minerals, with resource exploitation driving the war. Integrating environmental considerations might include the creation of ethical mining practices and certification systems that ensure minerals are conflict-free and extracted in an environmentally sustainable manner.<sup>33)</sup>
- **Virunga National Park Protection:** Conflicts have harmed the Virunga National Park, which is home to endangered species and essential ecosystems. Supporting park rangers, advocating anti-poaching measures, and including local populations in sustainable conservation and ecotourism activities are all examples of peacebuilding efforts.
- **Renewable Energy Initiatives:** Increasing access to clean and sustainable energy sources such as solar or hydroelectricity not only minimizes environmental effects but also improves living standards. Integrating renewable energy projects into peacebuilding initiatives can help to alleviate energy shortages while also fostering stability.

31) www.crisisgroup.org. "The CAR Crisis: Thinking beyond Traditional Peacekeeping," June 17, 2014. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/car-crisis-thinking-beyond-traditional-peacekeeping>.

32) United Nations. "MONUSCO." United Nations Peacekeeping, 2010. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco>.

33) www.genevaenvironmentnetwork.org. "Protecting the Environment in Armed Conflict." Accessed October 22, 2023. <https://www.genevaenvironmentnetwork.org/resources/updates/>

### South Sudan (UNMISS)

• **Darfur Water Management and Conflict Resolution:**

It's critical to address disputes over the region's limited water resources. Programs that support sustainable water management and distribution, maybe mediated by international organizations or peacekeepers, can become a part of a successful integration..

- **Land Use and Resource Sharing<sup>34)</sup>:** Conflict in Sudan has been significantly fueled by land rivalries over resources. Including environmental concerns might entail developing plans for fair land allocation and enhancing sustainable farming methods to ease conflict over scarce resources. Programs for post-conflict environmental rehabilitation can help restore ecosystems and open up prospects for agriculture and forestry. These programs address environmental harm while simultaneously providing viable economic alternatives, both of which are necessary for long-term peace.<sup>35)</sup>

Here is a structured list of "Dos" for United Nations peacekeepers.<sup>36)</sup>

#### Dos for United Nations Peacekeepers: Responsible Environmental Practices

- **Do No Harm:** Keep an eye that peacekeeping activities do not adversely affect the environment, surrounding communities, or local wildlife.
- **Respect Nature:** Show respect for the natural environment and local ecosystems.
- **Adhere to UN Environmental Policy:** Comply with the United Nations Environmental Policy (UNEP) and integrate environmental sustainability into all activities.

#### Active Resource Management<sup>37)</sup>

- **Take proactive measures to conserve and use water and energy resources efficiently.**

protecting-the-environment-in-armed-conflict.

34) [operationalsupport.un.org](https://operationalsupport.un.org). "Environment | DEPARTMENT of OPERATIONAL SUPPORT," n.d. <https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/environment>.

35) RAND. "Environmental and Natural Resource Management." [www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org), n.d. <https://www.rand.org/topics/environmental-and-natural-resource-management.html>. United Nations. "Maintain International Peace and Security." United Nations, 2023. <https://www.un.org/en/our-work/maintain-international-peace-and-security#:~:text=Under%20Chapter%20VII%20of%20the>.

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- Reuse items to minimize waste generation.
  - Ensure proper disposal of waste.
  - Implement recycling programs for materials.

Promote Sustainable Practices such as engaging in tree plantation and other environmentally friendly measures. Explore options to recover materials or energy from waste and promote recycling within the mission area.

Remember the 5Rs, emphasize the importance of the 5Rs

- **Realize:** The first and most important step is realization. Realize the relevance and necessity of environmental education and then spread its awareness to others.
- **Reduce:** Reduce resource usage and production of waste.
- **Reuse:** When possible, utilize goods for multiple uses.
- **Recycle:** Create recycling initiatives for items such as paper, plastic, and metal.
- **Recover:** Explore interest in recovering valuable materials or energy from waste using different methods.

By adhering to these guidelines, United Nations peacekeepers can play a significant role in promoting responsible environmental practices and contributing to the overall sustainability of their missions.<sup>38)</sup>

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36) UN Environment. "UN Recognizes 10 Pioneering Initiatives That Are Restoring the Natural World," December 13, 2022. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/un-recognizes-10-pioneering-initiatives-are-restoring-natural-world#:~:text=This%20World%20Restoration%20Flagship%20is>.

37) Odiniya, Agenyi Benjamin, Babila Julius Fofuleng, and Pheakavoin Vong. Strategic Sustainable Development as an Approach to Conflict Prevention in Conflict-Prone Societies. Bth.diva-Portal.org, 2014. <http://bth.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:829692>.

38) Tignino, Mara, and Tadesse Kebebew. "A Galaxy of Norms: UN Peace Operations and Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict." *International Review of the Red Cross*, August 25, 2023, 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383123000322>.

## **VI. Conclusion**

Climate and environmental awareness has become essential in UN peacekeeping operations due to the rising environmental issues. Protecting vulnerable civilians, managing resources, upholding operations sustainably, maintaining relationships with local communities, and adapting to the changing climate all rely on climate awareness. Therefore, empowering UN peacekeepers with ecological education can contribute to creating a more sustainable and peaceful world while aiding in conflict resolution.<sup>39)</sup>

The UN should consider integrating more climate and environmental literacy into its operations and training. In addition, there is a need for systematic reporting of environmental degradation and natural resource violations to promote accountability, transparency, and sustainable development. It is crucial to respect the host state's environmental policies and report environmental violations in order to support sustainable peace and development.

Implementing environmental policies in peacekeeping missions can be challenging for peacekeepers. To overcome these obstacles and promote environmental sustainability, raising awareness about these issues through training and providing resources is essential. In addition, building partnerships with host states, international organizations, and NGOs can help address some of the resource and coordination challenges.<sup>40)</sup> Successful integration of environmental considerations into peacebuilding efforts in these regions requires a comprehensive approach involving international organizations, local communities, and governments, as well as collaboration among stakeholders to address complex and interconnected challenges of environmental sustainability and peace.

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39) International Institute for Sustainable Development. "Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding," n.d. <https://www.iisd.org/topics/environment-conflict-and-peacebuilding>.

40) Sarfati, Agathe, Marco Donati, Regina Fitzpatrick, Annick Hiensch, Dan Mahanty, Baptiste Martin, Sophie Ravier, and Jenna Russo. "Toward an Environmental and Climate-Sensitive Approach to Protection in UN Peacekeeping Operations," 2022. <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Environmental-and-Climatesensitive-Approach-to-UN-Peacekeeping-Operations.pdf>.

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# *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* Call for Papers

*The Journal of East Asian Affairs* welcomes manuscript submissions that provide innovative analyses of contemporary issues and policies in East Asian international relations. The Journal, which is published biannually, aims to present a diversity of views on policy issues to promote debate and offer novel solutions to regional problems. It covers a broad range of topics related, but not limited to inter-/intra-regional conflict and cooperation; emerging security issues, including climate change, threats to public health, human rights, terrorism, and cyber-crimes; geopolitical transformation in the region; economic security, such as supply chains and energy competition; and inter-Korean relations. Authors are encouraged to engage both theoretically and empirically with their subject material and employ rigorous methodologies to establish sustainable conflict resolution for global society.



The submission deadline is November 30, 2024.

## ■ Guidelines

Manuscripts should:

- Be written in English
- Be 5,000-11,000 words in length (including all references)
- Include an abstract of 150-200 words and 3-5 keywords
- Be double-spaced, written in 12-point Times New Roman font, and submitted as two Word documents (no PDF or HWP files), one of which is formatted for anonymous review
- Follow the Chicago Manual of Style for all citations:  
[https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools\\_citationguide.html](https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html)
- Authors should also include a BRIEF CV with contact information
- The submission deadline is November 30, 2024, but manuscripts will also be accepted on a rolling basis

Manuscripts should not have been published previously and should not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. An honorarium will be provided for articles selected for publication, with the exception of research directly funded by other sources.

All manuscripts, together with the author's CV should be submitted via email. Please send inquiries and manuscripts to the following email address: [joeaa@inss.re.kr](mailto:joeaa@inss.re.kr)



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
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#### **1) Books**

Partha Bose, *Alexander the Great's Art of Strategy* (New York : Gotham Books, 2003), p. 98.

#### **2) Dissertations**

Joseph S. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1999), p. 21.

#### **3) Magazine or Newspaper articles**

Oona A. Hathaway, "Why do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, August 2007, p. 588.

Lucy Hornby, "China moves further into Africa," *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 9, 2012. p. A9.

#### **4) Use of *ibid.* and *op. cit.***

*Ibid.* can be used only when indicating the source immediately before the concerned footnote.

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#### **5) Internet**

Example: available at <http://www.dic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html> (accessed on Dec. 1. 2007).



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