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The Korean Journal of Security Affairs

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Toward Tripartite Civil-Military Relationship: Public Confidence in the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, 1982-2018

Hyun Woo Kim, Sang Keun Jung

Abstract

This study aims to explore the paradox of declining public confidence in the South Korean military despite a successful transition from subjective civilian control to an objective one. Previous literature adopting the classical civil-military relations framework, following Samuel Huntington, implicitly focused on the dyadic relations between the government and the military and ultimately failed to provide useful insight into the declining public confidence in the South Korean Armed Forces. We argue that a transition to objective civilian control does not necessarily accompany high public confidence in the military, particularly in contexts of South Korea, where the majority of civilians have had extensive military experiences due to the conscription system over the past seventy years. Instead, we emphasize the tripartite relations among the government, the military, and the heterogeneous civilians-at-large to better explain declining public confidence in the military. To support our perspective, we empirically test how civilians’ diverse demographic backgrounds, socio-political values, and voluntary association participations affect public confidence in the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. We finally discuss what our findings imply for policy and theoretical progress of the civil-military relations in post-authoritarian regimes and young democracies more generally.

Key Words: Civil-military relations, Public confidence, Military Sociology, South Korea, ROK Military, World Value Surveys
Introduction

In the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea), 2020 marks the tenth anniversary of the sinking of the ROK Navy Cheonan corvette. According to the official reports of the Korean government, the Cheonan corvette was sunk by a missile attack from North Korea.\(^1\) Despite a series of scientifically rigorous investigations and official report releases by the Civil-Military Co-investigation Committee consisting of thirty-eight international security experts, military cadres, congresspersons, and other professionals, public opinion in South Korea was deeply divided regarding the news authenticity. The official reports were overwhelmed by a number of false accounts such as “It happened due to stranding on reefs” or “The corvette collided into an American [or Israeli] submarine and sunk.” A significant proportion of Korea’s civilians cast a doubtful eye on the trustworthiness of the official reports and, more fundamentally, on the integrity of the South Korean Armed Forces. Why do Korean civilians so easily dismiss the military leadership?

Numerous military leaders and national security experts have warned of the dangerous domestic and international consequences (due to increasing military conflicts between the two Koreas) of rapidly declining public confidence in the ROK military. As the Cheonan incident implies, low public confidence damages civil-military relations and often involves growth in security risk. As Michael Howard argues, victory in a war hinges on how effectively the society can hold together around the military operations as a “social factor,” which has long been “a forgotten dimension of strategies.”\(^2\) In addition, high public confidence is inevitable for fourth-generation warfares where the lines between regular and irregular warfares become blurred, and military operations often trespass the traditional civil-military boundary. Despite its academic and practical importance, the declining public confidence in the South Korean Armed Forces has received little scholarly attention.

In this study, we argue that partisan controls over military leaders—or subjective civilian control according to Samuel Huntington—cannot simply explain South Korean civilians’ low confidence in the Armed Forces.\(^3\) Since 1987, with the introduction of direct presidential elections, South Korea has made a gradual but very successful transition toward objective civilian control after two consecutive military juntas. It seems apparent that the objective civilian control model became an irreversible principle in South Korea no later than 1987, yet public confidence in the military has waned since then. This empirical paradox motivates our research in

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contexts of South Korea and, more generally, other post-authoritarian societies and young democracies. We examine that the overall trends of “top-down” factors—such as bullying/human rights abuses, the frequency and scale of North Korean military aggressions, and political cronyism of the military-industrial complex—are not quite concomitant with public confidence in the military in South Korea. We argue that public confidence in the military should be primarily explained by the civilians’ “bottom-up” factors that modify and mediate any top-down factors’ impacts. To support our perspective, we empirically investigate how civilians’ diverse demographic backgrounds, socio-political values, and voluntary association participations affect public confidence in the South Korean Armed Forces using the World Value Surveys data from 1982 to 2018. We finally discuss what our findings imply for policy and theoretical progress of the civil-military relations in post-authoritarian regimes and young democracies more generally.

Background

Declining public confidence in the armed forces

Literature on civil-military relations has long struggled with a question from various contexts: “How can people-without-arms (civilians) control people-with-arms (military) in democracies?” Samuel Huntington first discussed the power relations between civilian governments and military leaders, contrasting objective and subjective civilian control in his classic analysis The Soldier and the State (1957). According to him, while subjective civilian control maximizes civilian power over military leaders, objective civilian control maximizes military professionalism with the political neutrality of military leadership. Although Huntington prescribed apolitical professional ethos of military leadership as a core condition for democratic control of the military, he did not explicitly discuss what objective civilian control implies about public confidence in the military. Is objective civilian control the prerequisite of the military in which the civilians are confident in young democracies such as South Korea? Historical studies on civil-military relations in South Korea showed that objective civilian control has gained irreversible momentum in South Korea in the twenty-first century.4) In the present day, most South Korean civilians and experts are no longer majorly concerned by the possibility of a coup d’état by the ROK military.5) Meantime, there is a significant amount of literature focused on

civilians’ growing mistrust of the South Korean Armed Forces. From a comparative analysis, Ronald Inglehart even found that South Korea experienced the fastest decline in public confidence among 32 countries.

Why have South Koreans lost their confidence in the Armed Forces? The previous literature focused mainly on one of three factors (or a combination thereof). Firstly, the majority of these studies stress that bullying, sexual misconduct, and human rights abuses still prevail in the military. Frequently mentioned and notorious examples include: (1) a lieutenant forced almost 200 recruits to pick up and ingest human waste in an army boot camp because someone failed to flush a toilet in 2005; (2) A private threw a grenade and shot to death eight comrades in a barrack near a guard post as a result of year-long bullying in 2005; and (3) six soldiers bullied a private for over a year and then killed him, and attempted to conceal the crime in 2014. These unprofessional incidents immediately drew negative media attention and likely contribute to a loss of confidence in the military.

Secondly, some argue that the increasing frequency and scale of military aggressions by North Korea, including the 2010 Cheonan sinking incident, have disillusioned civilians and caused them to question whether they can trust the Armed Forces to protect them. The bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea in 2010 was a striking event that foreshadowed numerous military aggressions involving North Korean projectiles against South Korea and the United States (potentially including Japan). Indeed, missile tests have increased sharply since Kim Jong-un’s grip on power began in North Korea; in fact, North Korea launched 109 missiles during the 2010s alone, while only 31 missiles were launched between 1984 and 2009. It is arguable that this unpredictable and ever-increasing national security risk, associated with the powerlessness of the South Korean Armed Forces to control North Korea’s next move, has resulted in a loss of public confidence in the military.

The third line of arguments points out the corruptions within the South Korean Armed Forces and/or in the military-industrial complex. Since the Korean War,

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8) See the CNS North Korea Missile Test Database, which is available from https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database.
defense acquisition programs have remained unmonitored; these programs are often viewed as a “sacred enterprise” defending the country. The \textit{Yulgok} Projects (later renamed the Military Force Maintenance and Improvement Projects) between 1974 and 1995, for example, caused major political turmoil. In fact, the \textit{Yulgok} Projects contributed to new equipment of the South Korean Armed Forces army in the forms of guided missiles, assault vehicles, airplane radar systems, and F-5 fighter planes. Unfortunately, the Project also provided opportunities for backstage deals among corrupt military cadres and unregistered/illegal military lobbyists. It had evolved into a nationwide political scandal, even involving the Lockheed Martin Corporation in the United States in 1993.\(^9\) Additionally, following the advent of an electoral government in 1987, the growing freedom of the press has helped to demystify the military-industrial complex. For example, former Navy Major Kim Young Soo’s whistle-blowing against similar practices in the ROK Navy in 2009 drew furious public attention when he alleged unfair preferential treatments in a series of military-industrial contracts involving about 800,000 U.S. dollars.

Overall, although these arguments point out several important correlates of a loss in public confidence, they do not fully explain the loss of confidence in the South Korean Armed Forces. Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of Korean citizens who are confident in their Armed Forces using the World Value Surveys. As a comparison, it also shows other OECD countries that have participated in the World Value Surveys. During the first wave (1982), South Koreans indicated strong confidence in their Armed Forces. This great confidence rapidly declined until the fifth wave (2005). In the seventh wave (2018), South Koreans’ confidence in the Armed Forces hit a deep plunge once again after some recovery in the sixth wave (2010), which is not observed in other OECD countries.

Does an uptick in bullying and human rights abuses within the military explain declining public confidence? It seems not. As discussed above, the military’s political neutrality as well as military professionalism have been arguably “hard-wired” principles of civil-military relations in South Korea since no later than the mid-1990s. Isolated incidents of bullying and human rights abuses still suffer the Korean military, but it is also well-reported that these unprofessional incidents have declined over the past three decades.\(^10\) The number of casual incidents (particularly “discipline” incidents) has accordingly declined since the mid-1990s, as shown in Figure 2. In short, human rights abuses in the military could cross-sectionally explain the loss of public confidence; however, declining human rights abuses cannot explain still declining public confidence over the past three decades.


<Figure 1> Comparative public confidences in the Armed Forces (Data: World Value Surveys, 1982-2018)

<Figure 2> The counts of casualty due to safety or discipline incidents (Data: Internal administrative data, the Ministry of National Defense ROK)
We must ask if governmental interventions tailored to prevent corruption within the military-industrial complex have proved insufficient, and whether this is a contributing factor in declining public confidence. Historically, defense acquisition procedures have been highly exclusive and fully controlled by a handful of policymakers and military elites in the Ministry of National Defense. In 2006, however, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration was established as the centralized oversight bureaucracy with the introduction of the Defense Acquisition Program Act. Since then, we have seen continuous reform efforts toward greater procedural transparency and an open, competitive bidding process. Effective in 2016, the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (or Kim Young-ran Act) has applied to most defense acquisition programs. It has been mandatory for bidders and buyers to comply with the conflict of interest disclosure and avoidance; information disclosure on military contracts has been much more frequent than ever before since then.\(^\text{11}\) It is also well documented that scandals involving defense acquisition programs have rarely erupted since 2000.\(^\text{12}\) In short, corruption \textit{per se} may be one reason, but not enough reason, to explain the secular decline in public confidence from 1990 to 2010.

Finally, it is worth noting that the increasing national security risk does not also necessarily lead to a loss of public confidence. Rather, these risks are likely “test beds” for the civilians to judge whether the military is effectively doing their job. If the Armed Forces respond to such crises properly, public confidence will increase; if not, it will decrease. Consistent with this point of view, Kim examined civilians’ fluctuating confidence in the military as the correlate of how properly and quickly the Armed Forces respond to incoming national security risks.\(^\text{13}\) Using a time-series of internal survey data, he empirically showed that successful managements of national security risks (e.g., the Naval Battle of Daecheong in which the South Korean Navy defeated an approaching North Korean patrol boat in 2009) actually increased public confidence, whereas the opposite (e.g., the 2010 \textit{Cheonan} Sinking incident) lowered public confidence. Overall, none of the above explanations provided in the previous literature is enough to account for why public confidence in the ROK military has declined secularly since 1980.


Accounting for institutional confidence “bottom-up”

An important missing point in the previous literature is that public exposure to the military and/or mass recruitment system in the civil-military relations in South Korea has quite significant implications on public confidence in the Armed Forces. In the previous literature, the civil-military relations often implicitly referred to the bipartite relations between the civil government and the military. When a representative government successfully harnesses the military power where a tiny proportion of the civilians are professionally recruited as soldiers, public confidence in the military likely increases along with the stable establishment of objective civilian control. In this context, the majority of the civilians likely have no direct contact point with the military. The civilians-at-large will remain confident in military leadership as long as military leaders have no trouble with their representative government. The civil-military relations literature necessarily focuses more on the bipartite relations between the Armed Forces and the civil government by implicitly regarding the civilians-at-large as a homogeneous social entity that is to be well-represented by their civil government. This perspective naturally stresses the “top-down” performance of the government-military relations and the dominant roles of top-down factors in accounting for changing institutional confidence.

South Korea is, however, one of the few countries where the conscription system has operated over many consecutive generations. The conscription system allows for the flourishing of extensive contact points between the military and civilians, resulting in a social landscape quite different from that of most countries. Korean civilians’ image of the military may be affected to some extent by the media, similar to other public institutions such as the Court or the National Assembly. However, what makes the Armed Forces truly distinct from other institutions is that a significant proportion of Korean civilians have garnered direct personal experience in the barracks. Each year in South Korea, approximately 30,000 civilians begin their military duty and are honorably discharged after about two years. They understand the inevitabilities, both good and bad, of life in the barracks through their previous experiences and everyday conversations. Essentially, South Korea’s military and civilians-at-large have shaped a unique axis of civil-military relations forged through involuntary military duties over the past fifty years. These relations are too strong to be simply mediated by the representative government or the mass media.

Democratic civil-military relations in South Korea have developed tripartite components beginning in 1987. Figure 3 illustrates these relations, in which the government (elected by the civilians-at-large) harnesses the power of the military (also served by the civilians-at-large). The South Korean civilians-at-large are not

only the electorates to their representative government but also the constituents of the Armed Forces. The civilians-at-large consist of numerous citizens with heterogeneous interests and diverse values, far from a tightly unified (or homogenous) entity. The South Korean civilians-at-large enact and interpret the information about incidents and national security risks in various ways, not uncritically accepting the government’s official reports or media coverage. The civilians-at-large’s “sensemaking”\(^{15}\) about the military does not easily allow the top-down factors (such as the government-military relations or national security risks) to account for the public confidence in the military. This context implies that any explanations on public confidence in the military remain unsatisfactory without taking into consideration the civilians-at-large’s heterogeneity.

Fortunately, there is a body of literature examining heterogeneous public confidence in public institutions within and outside of the U.S. civil-military relations, providing us with several theoretical and empirical implications to fill the blind spot.\(^{16}\) This perspective offers a critical insight into what role the

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heterogeneity of civilians-at-large plays in changing public confidence from the “bottom-up” perspectives. The bottom-up factors of the civilians-at-large’s heterogeneity will include cohort membership, socio-political value systems, or civic participations.

**Method**

*Data: South Korean Module in World Value Surveys, 1982-2018*

Based on the literature on institutional confidence from “bottom-up” perspectives, this study empirically investigates the civilians-at-large’s heterogeneity to account for public confidence in the South Korean Armed Forces. This study analyzes the World Value Surveys (hereafter, WVS) data set to empirically examine the hypotheses. The WVS has repeatedly collected (different) individual data regarding the connection between value shifts and individuals’ socio-political lives across almost 100 countries since 1981. A multi-stage territorial stratified sampling is employed to estimate diverse public opinions across all the residents over eighteen years of age in each country. The details regarding the survey procedure, codebook, and data set are publicly available from the official website of the WVS (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The WVS is particularly useful to this study because South Korea has never been absent throughout the entire seven waves (1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2018). More than eight thousand different South Korean residents responded to the WVS in total. It is not a panel data set, but rather a repeated cross-sectional data set, which is more appropriate for tracing “social changes” rather than “individual changes.”

*Variables*

The dependent variable and regression model. The dependent variable is whether or not the respondent is confident in the Armed Forces. The WVS originally asks respondents to self-report their confidence in the Armed Forces on a 4-score Likert scale (“none at all,” “not very much,” “quite a lot,” and “a great deal”). It is intentionally designed to encourage respondents to give a non-neutral

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answer whether confident or not. For a brevity of statistical analysis, we recode these scores into confident (“a great deal” or “quite a lot”) or not (“not very much” or “none at all”).

**Demographic factors.** For gender, we recode female as 1 and male as 0. The second to seventh variables are cohort membership, which is a set of dummy variables indicating cohort groups—(1) those born in 1939 or before, (2) between 1940-1949, (3) between 1950-1959, (4) between 1960-1969, (5) between 1970-1979, and (6) those born in 1980 or later. The eighth variable is marriage status, which is coded 1 if married and 0 otherwise. The ninth variable is educational achievement, varying between 1 (no formal education) and 8 (graduated college/university or higher). The tenth variable is income level, which is a continuous variable between 1 (the lowest in the distribution) to 10 (the highest).

**Socio-political values.** The first variable measures the respondent’s conservatism on a 10-score scale. The most liberal/left is coded 0 and the most conservative/right is coded 1. The second and third variables measure the individual’s sense of nationalism with two questions; the first one is dummy recoded 1 if positive for the question regarding how proud they are of their country, and the second one is also dummy recoded 1 if positive for the question of their willingness to fight for their country in case it goes to war. Those who possess this sense of nationalism likely derive their identity somewhat from a sense of belonging to the nation-state. In this mindset, the Armed Forces perform a “sacred duty” that protects not only life and property from wars but also the constituents’ national identity that is supposedly secured from potential external threats. We expect this sense of nationalism will increase ones’ confidence in the military. We also include a variable measuring political interest varying between 1 (the least interested) and 4 (the most interested). Finally, following Ronald Inglehart, we categorize post-materialist values into three groups—(1) materialists, (2) mixed, and (3) post-materialists. According to Inglehart, new self-expressive value systems (“post-materialism”) that concern more beautiful and livable cities and protected natural landscapes, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech have gradually replaced the older materialist-oriented value systems that emphasize the protection of life and body, law-and-order, and greater financial-material prosperity in many Western societies since the World Wars. A brilliant implication of Inglehart’s insights is that this transition in value systems towards post-materialism is not simply a change in personal traits or beliefs; it is also broadly associated with secular declines in traditional class identification, perceived legitimacy in the established authority, religious commitment, and, most of all, public confidence in social institutions. The respondents are asked to choose

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two important values that appeal to them the most among (1) law and order, (2) civic participation in national policy-making, (3) fight against inflation, and (4) freedom of the press. The respondents who chose (2) and (4) are classified as post-materialists and those who prioritized (1) and (3) are classified as materialists; other responses are classified as mixed.

Civic participations. In this study, we focus more on a general topic, that is, how civic participation in voluntary associations operating across various socio-political and economic issues is associated with confidence in the Armed Forces. Though many prior studies have measured the “intensity” of civic participation by counting respondents’ involvement in civic associations, there is a noteworthy criticism against this research practice, as participation in a higher number of civic associations has unclear implications on public confidence, and the various types of civic associations will lead to political socialization in different ways.\(^{20}\) We classified civic participations in voluntary associations into eight issue areas: (1) religious associations, (2) art/music/education associations, (3) labor unions, (4) political parties, (5) new social movement organizations (particularly, environmental/animal rights groups), (6) professional associations, (7) sports/recreation associations, and (8) others. Each issue area is coded 1 if the respondent has a membership; 0 otherwise.

We also control the total score of confidence in institutions other than the Armed Forces. The WVS asks how respondents are confident in various public institutions other than the Armed Forces (i.e., church, the press, labor unions, the police, the National Assembly, civil servants, and conglomerates). Each question is recoded to be assigned 4 if the respondent is confident in the corresponding institution “a great deal,” 3 if “quite a lot,” 2 if “not very much,” and 1 if “none at all.” The total number of public institutions surveyed in the WVS is 7. The total score of confidence in other institutions is standardized to vary between 0 and 1. By introducing this variable, we also potentially reduce a bias due to unobserved heterogeneity that may affect our main covariates and the confidence in the Armed Forces simultaneously. Finally, we include a series of dummy variable indicating regions (Seoul/Gyeonggi/Incheon, Gyeongsang/Daegu/Ulsan/Busan, Gangwon, Choongchong/Daejun, and Jeolla/Gwangju) and survey waves (1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2018).

Analytic Approach

The current study adopts a regression analysis to examine the individual-level determinants of confidence in the Armed Forces over four decades. This approach emphasizes the civilians-at-large’s heterogeneity to account for public confidence.

in the Armed Forces, independent of specific temporal conditions. Logistic regression models are fitted to our data set in order to explain this binary dependent variable with the selected independent variables. As with many other social surveys, the WVS also has a potential issue with missing values. Sample observations with missing values cannot be, however, safely dropped from the analysis without a concern as to bias unless missing values are completely randomly distributed across the observations, which is hardly likely in social science data. We utilize the multiple imputations method to replace missing values with the mean of the Bayesian posterior predictive distribution of the corresponding variable. 21) This imputation process involves a generation of multiple imputed data sets and takes into consideration the additional variation component that comes from multiple data sets following Rubin’s rule.

Result

Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analysis. Overall, between 1982 and 2018, the mean value of public confidence in the Armed Forces is .66 when it is measured between zero and one. In our sample, 51% reported that they are politically conservative, 77% reported that they are willing to fight for their country in case it goes to war, and 83% reported that they are proud of being a Korean. According to Inglehart’s post-materialist scale, approximately 47%, 47%, and 6% of our sample were classified as materialists, mixed, and post-materialists.

Some social and political values remain largely stable, whereas others change over time. In our sample, in particular, willingness to fight has constantly declined over time since the first wave (1982), as shown in Figure 4. The proportion of South Koreans being proud of their country has fluctuated over the years. More specifically, it increased between the first (1982) and third (1990) waves, then declined; a similar wave-like movement is observed between the fourth (2001) and sixth (2010) waves once again.

### Table 1: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident in the Armed Forces</td>
<td>0.66 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.51 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1939 or before)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1940-1949)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1950-1959)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1960-1969)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1970-1979)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1980 and after)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.67 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td>6.29 (1.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level</td>
<td>4.59 (2.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-political values</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically conservative</td>
<td>0.51 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in politics</td>
<td>2.48 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to fight</td>
<td>0.77 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>0.83 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialist values</td>
<td>0.47 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed values</td>
<td>0.47 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist values</td>
<td>0.07 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic participations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious associations</td>
<td>0.39 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art/music/education associations</td>
<td>0.2 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>0.07 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>0.06 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental/animal rights groups</td>
<td>0.09 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>0.1 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports/recreation associations</td>
<td>0.3 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.26 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in other institutions</td>
<td>0.5 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul/Gyeonggi/Incheon</td>
<td>0.44 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang/Daegu/Ulsan/Busan</td>
<td>0.27 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangwon</td>
<td>0.04 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choongchong/Daejun</td>
<td>0.11 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeolla/Gwangju</td>
<td>0.13 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey waves</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1 (1982)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2 (1990)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 3 (1996)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 4 (2001)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 5 (2005)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 6 (2010)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 7 (2018)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5 shows the declining trends of the average scores of political conservatism and overall confidence in public institutions other than the Armed Forces over the research period. The average scores of political conservatism were higher than .5 in the first and the second waves, but it declined drastically below .5. Similarly, public confidence in other institutions showed a big plunge between the first (1982) and the second (1990) waves, suggesting a strong effect of political democratization on people’s negative adjustment on overall confidence in public institutions.22)

Figure 6 presents how materialist, mixed, and post-materialist values have changed across six cohorts (1939 or before, 1940-1949, 1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, and 1980 and after). Although some literature argued that the overall relative proportions of people who have materialist, mixed and post-materialist values have remained largely stable in South Korea, it is clear that younger cohorts have greater post-materialist and mixed values and lesser materialist values than older ones, as shown in Figure 6.23)


<Figure 5> The historical trends of conservatism and public confidence in other institutions (Data: World Value Surveys, 1982-2018)

<Figure 6> The historical trends of materialist/post-materialist values (Data: World Value Surveys, 1982-2018)
Next, Table 2 reports the repeated cross-sectional logistic estimates (raw coefficients and robust standard errors) of public confidence in the Armed Forces regressed on the selected variables. Women are found to be less confident than men in the Armed Forces; this difference is statistically significant. Additionally, in comparison to the cohort who experienced two wars in their childhood (born in 1950-1959), younger cohorts are found to be less confident in the Armed Forces. This cohort effect actually increases in younger cohorts. More specifically, those who were born between 1960 and 1969 have a 78% public confidence level in the military compared with the reference group who were born between 1950 and 1959. The cohort one-step younger (born in the 1970s) scores 69% of the reference group’s public confidence level, and the youngest cohort (born in the 1980s) has only 70% of the reference group’s public confidence in the Armed Forces. The attainment of higher education is found to be negatively associated with confidence in the Armed Forces.

Politically conservative respondents are more confident in the Armed Forces. Those who reported they are more willing to fight if there is another war are found to be more confident in the military than those not. Similarly, respondents who are proud of their country are also more confident in the military than those not. Additionally, those possessing materialist values are more confident in the Armed Forces than those who have mixed values. Conversely, post-materialist values are negatively associated with public confidence in the Armed forces.

Even with other variables being controlled, those who belong to religious associations or music/art/education associations are less likely to be confident in the Armed Forces. On the contrary, membership in environmental/animal rights groups and sports teams/recreation groups is positively associated with public confidence in the Armed Forces. Finally, we found that the total score of confidence in institutions other than the Armed Forces is positive associated with the score of confidence in the Armed Forces. This implies that people who are confident in public institutions, in general, are also more likely to be confident in the Armed Forces in particular.
### Table 2: The repeated cross-sectional logistic regression estimates  
(Data: World Value Surveys, 1982-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.262***</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1939 or before)</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1940-1949)</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1950-1959) (Reference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1960-1969)</td>
<td>-0.245**</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1970-1979)</td>
<td>-0.372***</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (1980 and after)</td>
<td>-0.355**</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.323***</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td>-0.084**</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-political values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically conservative</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in politics</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to fight</td>
<td>0.585***</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>0.372***</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialist values</td>
<td>0.160**</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed values (Reference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist values</td>
<td>-0.682***</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic participations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious associations</td>
<td>-0.299***</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art/music/education associations</td>
<td>-0.131†</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental/animal rights groups</td>
<td>0.308*</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports/recreation associations</td>
<td>0.140*</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-0.150*</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in other institutions</td>
<td>0.271***</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.430***</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 8315  
-2LL: 8404.19  
Wald statistics: 1537.57

Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Regional and survey wave dummies are included in the model, but not reported for brevity.
Discussion and Conclusion

We found that public confidence in the Armed Forces has declined between the 1980s and the 2010s while objective civilian control has been institutionalized in South Korea. We argued that any reasoning in the bipartite relations between the government and the military, omitting the heterogeneity of civilians-at-large, cannot sufficiently explain this paradox. The civilians-at-large possess disparate values and interests that (re)shape different levels of public confidence in the military in response to what happens in the bipartite relations or within the military.

Our first finding suggests that females prove less confident in the Armed Forces than males. The majority of South Korean males who have already served in the Armed Forces have particular mixed sentiments toward the Armed Forces: on the one hand, they resent the Armed Forces because they were forced to involuntarily “waste their lives” for two years; on the other hand, they have a hidden, nostalgia-like feeling toward the military to which once they had belonged. Although servicemembers know when they are being mistreated, it is extremely difficult to resist authoritarian climates, as seen in the Stanford Prison Experiment. Conversely, the majority of South Korean females have never been recruited, and naturally would not develop esprit de corps in favor of the Armed Forces. Females could more easily form negative opinions about prevailing male-dominant climates in the Armed Forces.

We also found that younger cohorts are less confident in the military than older cohorts in general. Older cohorts in South Korea have endured more intense experiences related to wars (particularly the Korean War and the Vietnam War) and thus develop a strong anti-Communist sentiment, which is closely entangled with strong (often blind) confidence in the military, which they view as a firewall against the spread of Communism. Meanwhile, born in times of peace and greater economic prosperity, younger cohorts are also less likely to accept the fact that the armistice between the two Koreas could be broken at any moment.

The third finding suggests the importance of formal educational achievement, which is associated with a set of skills to critically reason the roles and functions of the Armed Forces. A more educated individual is more equipped to parse the multitudes of information available and more quickly identify relevant news about the military, including discipline incidents, allegations of abuse, and unsatisfactory national defense policies. Along with the increasing overall education level over the last three decades, this reasoning partially explains why South Koreans have lost

their confidence in the Armed Forces.

Next, as is often the case in other countries, one’s confidence in the Armed Forces as a public institution was found to be statistically significantly associated with one’s social and political values in South Korea—particularly having a conservative ideology, having a greater willingness to fight for country, having a greater national pride, and having post-materialist values. Political conservatism in South Korea features a strong anti-Communist sentiment (more specifically, an anti-North-Korean sentiment) in pursuit of national security and defense. Likewise, South Korean military leaders (although strongly refraining from personal involvement with political activities while in service) have developed an unspoken but deeply-rooted affinity for politically conservative ideology. The regression analysis suggested that conservatism, willingness to fight, and confidence in other public institutions are positively associated with confidence in the Armed Forces. However, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, the average scores or relative proportions of these values have consistently declined. These findings also explain why South Koreans have lost their confidence in the Armed Forces.

As such, we explored potentially different effects of civic participations by the issue areas, instead of the total count of participating associations. Robert Putnam suggested a similar classification through two Yiddish terms: machers (people who make things happen in their community through organization and leadership) and schmoozers (people who spend more time on informal gatherings and communication with friends, family, and neighbors). We broadly classified civic associations into eight categories and these civic associations will have a mixture of two different value orientations; however, arguably, religious associations and art/music/education associations often place a relatively greater emphasis on cognitive awareness and inward-looking values than socializing, whereas new social movement organizations and sports/recreation associations emphasize socializing over inward-looking values. The overall pattern of findings suggested that people who engage in specific civic associations emphasizing outward-looking social activities tend to have greater confidence in the military than those who engage in civic associations stressing reflective self-awareness or inward-looking values.

We argued that Korean civilians-at-large’s bottom-up factors fundamentally determine public confidence in the military. However, various bottom-up factors have also, to a certain extent, been developed along with the history of the government-military relations. Notably, the South Korean Armed Forces had a long history of political mobilization before 1987. Two former Presidents—Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan who led coup d’etats in 1961 and 1979, respectively—justified their “military revolutions” by contrasting “corrupted civilian politicians [who] pauperized us” and “a group [the Armed Forces] with bravery, passion as well

as power to emancipate the nation and citizens from the corruption and poverty.”

High public confidence in the military at the moment heavily reflected the civilians’ anger and distrust toward the poor performance of short-lived democratic governments in the early 1960s. The junta did not hesitate to use sensationalized and inflammatory rhetoric against civilian politicians (or the opposition party members, more specifically) and strictly control the right to assemble and speech that criticizes the military to further mobilize public confidence in the military. Military governments had repeatedly highlighted substantial national security threats from North Korea to justify their authoritarian ruling and call for unconditional confidence in the Armed Forces in the sacrifice of civil rights. Around the moment of the Soviet Union’s collapse and South Korea’s joining the ranks of young democracies along the third waves of democratization, South Korean civilians became quite fatigued by the inter-Korean relations and unresponsive to potential security threats. This was a seed of low public confidence not only in social institutions in general but also in the military eventually.

The emergence of newer generations—who have been highly educated, never experienced wars, participated in various voluntary socializing groups that have proliferated after 1987, and become accustomed to post-materialist values—was the most effective antidote against politically mobilized public confidence in the military, which had been a pivotal pillar that sustained subjective civilian control in the junta. Public confidence in the military that was once holy is profaned as the democracy grows in a post-authoritarian regime. People have lost their willingness to fight for their country, conservative values, and confidence in other public institutions since then. Therefore, we witnessed a paradox that public confidence in the military declines while the objective civilian model has been established in South Korea.

We believe that objective civilian control is harmful against politically mobilized, blind confidence in the military, but could be prolific for social contract ethics between the civilians-at-large and the ROK military. There is, however, a complex dilemma facing current military leaders, as the objective civilian control model—isolated professional leadership of the military from the general public and politics—is hardly acceptable for newer generations who suspect that such a model is merely a vehicle for operating without public monitoring and consequences. As Anthony Giddens pinpointed, trust is a prerequisite for professionalism; likewise, lack of public confidence has stifled the effectiveness of military professionalism in South Korea. From the perspective of civilians-at-large (who feel they have been

deceived for a long time), the Armed Forces should be more transparent and open to public discourse.

If ROK military leaders agree to recognize the civil-military relations as tripartite relations, their professionalization should hinge on earning public confidence. Just as elected governments regularly survey citizens’ evaluations of governmental performance, the Armed Forces should carefully monitor and provide feedback on public evaluations of civil-military relations. The Armed Forces should also invest greater resources to bolster positive relationships with the media and various voluntary associations that play critical roles in reshaping public confidence in the military. A greater supervisory role by the National Assembly and independent ombudsmen will also ultimately grow public confidence in the military and the effectiveness of military professionalism in South Korea.

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References


Civilian Aid Workers from Venus and Military from Mars in Humanitarian Response to Complex Emergencies in DPRK: Perception Gap of Humanitarian Crisis and Relief Operations

Goosoon Kwon

Abstract

As the discourse on civil-military relations has emerged as a major issue under the global humanitarian platform, this study aims to measure the difference in perceptions of ROK civil and military organizations regarding the awareness and humanitarian response to the emergency crisis in DPRK, surveying 210 civilian aid workers (CWAs) and 220 officers and NCOs (MIL).

As a result of the study, a significant difference in perception between civil and military organizations is verified. First, CWAs perceived natural disasters as the main cause of the crisis, whereas MIL viewed armed conflict. Second, CWAs considered the territory of DPRK and its borders for target areas whilst MIL targeted the DMZ and the rear areas for humanitarian action. Third, CWAs focused on direct supports to displaced North Koreans, but MIL took heed of indirect assistance. Fourth, CWAs unexpectedly showed a lower level of perception of intervention of post-crisis recovery than that of MIL. Finally, CWAs would not prefer cooperation with foreign militaries other than the ROK MIL while MIL demonstrated openness in cooperation with not only ROK civil humanitarian agencies, but also other civilian agencies in the U.S., Japan, and Australia.

Viewed in this light, it suggests that an alternative approach should be explored in creating humanitarian space in which ROK civil and military organizations coordinate for an effective emergency response to DPRK with fragility and vulnerability.

Key Words: complex emergency, civil-military relations, humanitarian action, and DPRK

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I. Introduction

The humanitarian emergency is generally subject to the scale of the hazards and violent conflicts, the degree of vulnerability, and the institutional capability of crisis management. Even with the same intensity of the crisis, countries with fragility and vulnerability, such as DPRK seem to lack the capability to mobilize various resources and quick response to catastrophes. In this case, an affected country, in general, makes an appeal to the international community for relief intervention. DPRK has illustrated a tendency to be more susceptible to the protracted crisis in that the food insecurity, poor water and sanitation system, and low access to basic healthcare services have been stagnant. In addition to this forgotten crisis, its resilience to the recurrent natural disasters and, in particular, the spread of pandemics that requires rapid humanitarian aid operations is still low\(^1\) as DPRK ranks one of the lowest based on a variety of global risk indexes, representing signs of humanitarian risks.

Taken the sudden collapse of the DPRK regime and internal armed conflicts into account, the ROK government has explored the contingency plan, mainly led by the public and military organizations. On the one hand, the ROK military will conduct humanitarian aid operation that provides emergency relief and essential public services to the affected North Koreans in accordance with the Operation Plan in Concept Format 5029 (CONPLAN 5029)\(^2\). On the other hand, the government established the Chungmoo Contingency Plan, the emergency control plan for stabilization in DPRK that indicates ROK officials will take control of provincial administration while ROK-US allied force will maintain security and order in volatile regions in DPRK.\(^3\) Both plans cannot but prioritize active military-led humanitarian intervention due to presumed destabilization and security threats.

Meanwhile, deterioration of the situation and worsening of complex emergencies in DPRK may lead to a huge influx of displaced North Koreans to the South, but not limited to cross borders to seek asylum in neighboring countries. This scenario will not exclude a large scale of resources to be used for massive displacement, nor will the capacity of the ROK military’s humanitarian aid operation be sufficient to respond to overwhelming demands. Therefore, it is inevitable that the ROK

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1) According to the UN’s global humanitarian response plan to cope with COVID-19 for the least developed countries, DPRK is categorized as “other priority countries” because it had not disclosed the number of the infected. As of November 2020, it was reported that only $3,600,000, or 9% of the official appeal of $39,700,000, was raised (see OCHA, 2020 Global Humanitarian Response Plan (Geneva: OCHA, 2020), p. 9).


government should consider civilian humanitarian agencies, mainly NGOs as potential and alternative partners of its contingency plan. In addition to the Korean Red Cross and member organizations of the Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCK)\(^4\) which have provided aid to DPRK for the past three decades, attentive is to development NGOs that have committed to international humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of displaced people in conflict and disaster-stricken countries throughout the global south.

Development NGOs have often mobilized rapid response teams to conduct relief operations, based on local need assessment so that they may fill the gap of the government’s official humanitarian aid. According to the survey, released in 2020, they disbursed approximately USD17 million for 166 humanitarian assistance projects to displaced populations, protecting affected communities in need, including emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction (RRR), and disaster prevention and preparedness.\(^5\) However, these NGOs have been excluded from the decision-making process, led by the ROK government on responding to humanitarian emergencies in DPRK. Likewise, NGOs value compliance with the humanitarian principle – humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, which succinctly refrains from compromise in interface or cooperation with military counterparts to maintain their identity and autonomy.

Considering rule-based coordination of multi-actors for efficient humanitarian action, it conceives of an integrated humanitarian action system among ROK private, public, and military actors in response to presumed complex emergencies that not only result from large-scale crises but also accompany security destabilization in DPRK. In reality, the legal framework, strategy, and implementation mechanism of overseas humanitarian assistance, participated by multi actors have been instituted in the initiative of the ROK government since mega-disasters occurred in the 2000s. In establishing such an integrated response system, analysis of the perception gap between aid workers of development NGOs and the ROK military should be preceded.

Therefore, this study sought to answer the following questions by the survey to 210 CWAs and 220 officers and non-commissioned officers: 1. How do CAWs and MIL perceive and understand types of humanitarian emergencies, threats to DPRK? 2. Where would be the most urgently to be intervened? 3. What types of humanitarian action are estimated to be in high demand? 4. Which donor’s counterpart would CAWs and MIL each prefer to collaborate with? In addition,


policy implications and recommendations are suggested based on the result of the study.

II. Literature Review

1. Global Humanitarian Action Regime

If multiple hazards and accompanying civil disturbance or unrest that will exceed the scope of DPRK’s capacity of emergency management occurs, a global level of humanitarian action may be called upon. Multilateral humanitarian agencies, such as UN agencies, bilateral donors, the international red cross and red crescent (RC/RC) movement and INGOs, and DPRK’s allies seem to engage in emergency relief unless the DPRK authority denies official appeal to the international community due to overwhelming humanitarian demands. The regime of international humanitarian assistance, which has evolved over the decades and has been agreed upon will become the criterion for defining situations in which involvement of various actors at the global level is required and the scale of response.

With regard to the definition of the level of response, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) replaced the rigid classification system – level I for the national response, level II for the regional response, and level III for the global response as the humanitarian system-wide scale-up activation in 2018. As the scale of crisis increases and the affected country’s capability and context become more complex, the emergency relief coordinator (ERC) of OCHA is authorized to issue the level of response in close consultation with members of IASC, and the UN humanitarian coordinator of an affected country, considering the extent of damage, the urgency, complexity, capacity to respond, sizes of affected population verse demand and severity.\(^6\)

Regarding sectors of humanitarian response, it may vary depending on the types of crisis and situations. The main considerations, however, include all supporting activities in order to alleviate the suffering of the affected and protect their dignity as human beings. According to the internationally agreed minimum standards for humanitarian assistance, it divides the four main sectors – water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion, food security and nutrition, shelter, settlement and non-food items, and health action.\(^7\) However, in addition to direct activities, various indirect supports are included in the field of humanitarian action. The emergency response units, deployed by the RC/RC movement are composed of eight types – basic health

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care, rapid deployment hospital, referral hospital, relief and water and sanitation for direct activities and logistics, IT & telecommunication, and base camp for indirect activities. In the UN, the cluster system which aimed at connecting sectoral response and key actors was adopted in 2005 after reviewing fragmented aid delivery. The cluster system was accordingly divided into eleven (11) sectors. The direct supports include food security, shelter, early recovery, education, health, nutrition, protection, water, sanitation, and hygiene, whilst the indirect supports set out logistics, emergency telecommunication, and camp coordination and camp management.


Civilian Aid Workers from Venus and Military from Mars in Humanitarian Response to Complex Emergencies in DPRK

for DPRK will be reviewed and analyzed comprehensively. As long as DPRK retains a certain level of control, it seems that the coordination structure will be established accordingly.

2. Discourse on Civil and Military Relations in Humanitarian Actions

Since the 1990s, violent threats to humanitarian action based on impartiality and neutrality have steadfastly increased. Recent armed conflicts reveal that separating combatants from civilians becomes more difficult.\(^{12}\) Moreover, a large scale of disasters prevents a single national actor from coping with huge damages. As the military, which had remained in a supplementary role in humanitarian aid, has expanded the scope of engagement, it became necessary to define roles and responsibilities between civil and military organizations. The discourse on civil and military relations in humanitarian action has been mainly formed by academia, humanitarian agencies, and military in the North America and Western Europe, ranging from relief operations to more comprehensive peace operations.

First of all, humanitarian agencies argue that the relationship between the

state-centric military and cosmopolitan humanitarian agencies inherently poses disparity and conflict in peace operations.\textsuperscript{13)} The dilemma that the cultural, organizational, operational, and normative difference between civil and military organizations has been rooted for centuries is how these polarized characteristics can reconcile in the process of joint operations.\textsuperscript{14)} Therefore arguments for redefining the relationship between the civil and military actors and pursuing mutuality and interdependence rather than conflict and competitive relationship have been explored. Concordance theory stresses that three partners – the military, the political elites, and the citizenry – should pursue a cooperative relationship based on cultural and organizational differences, and conflicted intervention can be avoided if tripartite agreement on key indicators based on institutional and cultural difference is made.\textsuperscript{15)} From the operational perspective, the process-based partnership model entails the six stages in civil and military cooperation in peace operations: the decision to cooperate, partner selection, partnership design, partnership implementation, transfer of tasks, and responsibility and partnership evaluation.\textsuperscript{16)} In addition, network-based public-private partnership highlights that intra-networks in civil humanitarian agencies and military organizations pave the way for interchangeability and collaboration in the field operations, which finally leads to the creation of inter-sectoral networks among multi-parties.\textsuperscript{17)} Within the framework of humanitarian aid operations, civil and military organizations may have more spaces for inter-organizational cooperation than other conflicted operations. Roberts argues military and civilians would have less friction in relief activities because both acknowledge their mutual dependencies and the complementarity in the high level of threats and domain consensus.\textsuperscript{18)} If both sides realize the counterpart’s comparative advantages accurately in recurrent interfaces, they would explore cooperation to increase efficiency and synergy for better performance.

Meanwhile, various factors may still act as an obstacle to the potential interaction between civil and military organizations. From a normative point of view, politics

\textsuperscript{16)} Sebastiaan, J.H. Rietjens, \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill}. Ph.D. Dissertation at the Univ. of Twente, the Netherland (2006), 57-64.
and strategy that the military rests on are hardly compatible with the humanitarian principle. This directly leads to the question of whether or not the military can support the affected regardless of gender, color, religion, or political stance, which civilian organizations epitomize the value of humanity. Moreover, the perception gap, derived from ignorance and mutual suspicion, limits coexistence in the theater of operation. For example, NGOs perceive the military with general disdain, nervousness, and philosophical opposition whereas the military often sees NGOs as hypocrites who demand autonomy under security threats and criticize the military while at the same time request various supports.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, differences in the culture and organizational structure have also made effective coordination challenging. Noted is that ROK civil-military relations in international humanitarian aid operations reveal different characteristics compared to other troop-contributing countries, such as the U.S. and member states of NATO. Considering the ROK military, they have consistently maintained an apolitical stance on the mission; they have a clear tendency to avoid a situation in which violent conflicts may occur and actively carried out humanitarian aid operations not only for force protection but also for the public cause of the host community.

Applying the discourse to the humanitarian crisis in DPRK, both civil and military organizations will be at the forefront of responses to emergencies, in particular the third militaries, UN missions or coalition forces and ROK armed forces seem to be mandated to enhance security in the movement of displaced people and for civilian’s aid operation, additionally providing logistic and telecommunication support for delivery of aid. The key issue is what principles, strategy, and implementation will be applied to ROK civil and military organizations in conducting operations in the environment of such complex humanitarian architecture. It is further worth considering how ROK humanitarian actors will explore relationships with external organizations such as UN agencies and INGOs, but not limited to DPRK authority if it will function to some extent.

III. Methodology

Participants

Participants included civilian aid workers (N=210) whose employers mainly affiliated with the KCOC, and also belonged to the Korean Red Cross, Seoul offices of international organizations whereas ROK army officers and non-commissioned officers (N=220) were recruited in Pocheon, Incheon, and Nonsan. Civilian aid

workers were between the 20s and the 50s (M=34) and the gender ratio is 65.6% women and 34.4% men. With regard to the length of development experiences, 49.3% of civilian respondents had more than 5 years whilst 17.4% of civilian participants answered that they had more than 3 years of humanitarian assistance experiences. Similarly, respondents from the ROK Army were between the 20s and the 50s (M=30) and the gender ratio is 3.2% women and 96.8% men. 47.5% of military participants had more than 5 years of experience whereas 45% had experiences of deployment to UN peace operations and multinational force stabilization operations. Levels of education were 1% junior college and 99% university among civilian participants while they were 23.5% high school, 6% junior college, and 70.5% university among respondents from the ROK Army.

**Procedures**

The study was part of the comparative analysis among ROK, Japan, and Australia, which was approved by the Research Ethics Board at the researcher’s institution. In addition, the recruitment of the ROK military was exclusively approved by the Ministry of National Defense for the confidentiality of respondent’s personal information and security clearance. Written informed consent was obtained from the survey questionnaire. Information about the sample group’s view on core questions was collected using narrative interviews and questionnaires at each group’s preferred locations.

**Measures**

**Types of Humanitarian Emergencies in DPRK**

As mentioned, DPRK has shown fragility and vulnerability to a variety of traditional and non-traditional security threats. Causes of complex emergencies include twelve (12) elements, six (6) major natural disasters derived through the analysis of the frequency of disasters in DPRK, four (4) scenarios of armed conflicts, partly illustrated in the COPLAN 5029 except natural disasters, and two (2) from pandemics and massive displacement respectively.

**Target Areas for humanitarian action**

If a complex emergency occurs in DPRK, the ROK government assumes a maximum of 200,000 displaced people of DPRK will cross the DMZ or navigate both seas to evacuate from the crisis, in accordance with the *Chungmoo Contingency Plan*. However, inevitably, a similar number of or more North Koreans who live in the northern parts of DPRK will move out to China, Russia, or Japan. Targeted areas that need rapid humanitarian action were subdivided into five (5) areas including the vicinity of the DMZ and the border areas of DPRK.
Sectoral Responses and Recovery

Aforementioned, the international humanitarian community adapted the cluster approach that includes the eleven sectors of humanitarian action so that multiple actors may enhance efficiency and avoid duplication through coordination. In this study, eight (8) sectors that would be relevant to the context of DPRK were selected. With regard to the transition from relief to early recovery, four (4) sectors were added to measure the perception of prioritization in post-crisis recovery and reconstruction.

Preference of Potential Counterparts

In addition to ROK, U.S.A., Japan, and Australia seem to intervene in humanitarian action as donors and major stakeholders who not only have the capability to mobilize human and financial resources but maintain the interest of regional stabilization in the Indo-Pacific region. With their civilian and military organizations in mind, four (4) questions were selected to assess the preference of ROK humanitarian actors including military counterparts that were deployed from the three countries.

Data Analytic Strategy

Each question was measured on a Likert 5-point scale, and scores were computed by summing the scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (absolutely). And the Cronbach alpha coefficient was used to verify the reliability, which was ensured ranging from $\alpha = 0.790$ to $\alpha = 0.943$. Using SPSS 25, frequency analysis and descriptive statistics for demographic analysis were firstly computed and an independent t-test was run to verify the correspondence of the research questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>CAWs</th>
<th>MIL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of Complex Emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Floods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Typhoons (Cyclone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Drought</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Volcano eruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Earthquake</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Tsunami</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflicts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Civil war resulting from a regime change or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coup d’état</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 The outflow of nuclear weapons or other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weapons of mass destruction (WMD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cronbach’s $\alpha$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAWs: 0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIL: 0.854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<Table 1> Measurement and Reliability
IV. Results

Perception on Types of Humanitarian Emergencies in DPRK

In general, the perception gap on types of humanitarian emergencies between civilian aid workers and ROK military was statistically verified as reported in Table 2.

With regard to natural disasters, CWAs rated higher in floods (CAWs=3.57, MIL=3.30), typhoons (CAWs=3.74, MIL=3.31), and earthquakes (CAWs=3.49, MIL=3.25), which are more likely to occur in DPRK than MIL. In addition, perception gaps in the causes of armed conflicts were explicitly identified in all four scenarios: civil war (CAWs=3.12, MIL=3.39), Outflow of NW or WMDs (CAWs=2.88, MIL=3.31), Inter-Korean armed conflict (CAWs=2.64, MIL=3.52), and Sub-regional armed conflict (CAWs=2.64, MIL=3.10). Specifically, MIL conceived of the probability of armed conflicts higher than that of CAWs. As for the outbreak of a pandemic, the difference in perception was significant: CWAs perceived that DPRK would be exposed to a pandemic more than did MIL.
Perception on Target Areas for Humanitarian Action

In the case of massive displacement in DPRK, a significant difference was statistically identified in the perceptions of CAWs and MIL about target areas where rapid humanitarian intervention would be required.

In this question, which allowed multiple answers, CAWs who have experienced in overseas humanitarian assistance and international development focused on the DMZ and the inland of DPRK as well as border areas of the neighboring countries (China=114 and Russia=51) whilst MIL assumed that the scope of humanitarian aid operations would be confined within the boundary of the Korean peninsula (China=66 and Russia=15). Notwithstanding, not only did both sides see less feasible in a mass influx of displaced North Koreans to the inland of ROK (CAWs=36, MIL=44), but they conceived of near the DMZ as the prioritized area for intervention (CAWs=109, MIL=90).
Perception on Sectoral Responses and Early Recovery

Among eight (8) sectoral humanitarian responses, the four (4) sectors – water, sanitation, and hygiene; protection of the vulnerable group; food security; and telecommunication – were disproportionately rated between CAWs and MIL.

Civilians were more attentive to meeting basic human needs, such as water, sanitation, and hygiene (CAWs=4.14, MIL=3.97) and food items (CAWs=4.09, MIL=3.90) and to the protection of children, woman, the elderly, and the people with disabilities (CAWs=4.30, MIL=4.07) than MIL were. Meanwhile, MIL significantly perceived telecommunication (CAWs=3.46, MIL=4.05) as the core sector in facilitating other humanitarian action efficiently while civilians regarded it as a complementary sector. Given that the military’s primary task is to provide indirect support and infrastructure assistance in humanitarian action, the ROK military’s perception corresponds to the relevant international guideline.20)

Although it is not statistically meaningful, it should be noted that MIL was aware of the importance of shelter than CAWs (CAW=3.98, MIL=4.05) and both sides similarly see the high need for logistics (CAW=4.08, MIL=4.08).

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Considering perception on the intervention of post-crisis early recovery, MIL scored the three sectors – livelihood supports (CAW=3.62, MIL=3.84), reconstruction of essential facilities (CAW=3.74, MIL=3.99), and community-based governance of early recovery (CAW=3.29, MIL=3.90) – higher than CAWs did, whilst there was no significant difference in psycho-social supports to the vulnerable group.

**Perception on Preference of Potential Counterparts**

Both ROK civil and military actors expressed they preferred the other party to other counterpart partners whereas the meaningful difference in preference for counterparts of the three donor countries was statistically verified. Regarding CAWs, they took a somewhat neutral or defensive position on cooperating with militaries, deployed from the donor countries (USFK=3.63, JSF=2.73, AUF=3.27),
compared to the ROK military (ROKF=4.13). On the other hand, the ROK military showed a higher willingness to cooperate with humanitarian agencies from the U.S. (4.10), Japan (3.57), and Australia (3.53) more proactively than the ROK CAWs did.

V. Discussion

In this study, ROK CAWs’ and MIL’s perception gap on types of humanitarian emergencies in DPRK; target areas for humanitarian aid intervention; sectoral response and early recovery; and preference on potential counterparts were quantitatively examined. Results suggest that there were significant differences in perception on multiple contexts of humanitarian action to DPRK in the event of complex emergencies, which would lead to massive displacement of North Koreans. Noted is that significant gap of perception on humanitarian emergency as to whether it may result from natural disasters or armed conflict between CAWs and MIL. Accordingly, CAWs see that non-traditional security – natural disasters and outbreak of pandemics are more likely attributed to destabilize DPRK. On the other hand, it shows that MIL conceived of armed conflicts as the factor of traditional security.

Regarding the target areas for humanitarian aid intervention, findings suggest that CWAs paid more heed to the border areas between DPRK and China, followed by inland of DPRK and near the DMZ as the main target areas. On the contrary, the military perceived the DMZ more than any other area, where the confrontation between ROK and DPRK has been maintained.

Result also illustrates differences in the perception of the imperative of sectoral relief response between the two sides. CAWs focused on direct assistance to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>CAWs M</th>
<th>CAWs SD</th>
<th>MIL M</th>
<th>MIL SD</th>
<th>t(p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROK Military</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK-based NGOs</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Forces in ROK</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NGOs</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN NGOs</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Armed Forces</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian NGOs</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
displaced North Koreans to meet basic human needs whilst MIL rated indirect assistance to support direct humanitarian actions. Rather, this difference is deemed desirable in terms of division of labor based on each side’s comparative advantage, alleviating tensions caused by duplication and blurring lines of duties as widely echoed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The study argues that the premise that MIL’s overall perception or attitude toward the principles and implementation of normative humanitarian assistance is in general conservative and exclusive is not necessarily plausible. It was hypothesized that CAWs would perceive early recovery as one of the core functions for interconnecting roles between relief and long-term development of which the military would not be aware. Meanwhile, the fact that the military rated higher awareness of early recovery including community-based governance than civilians explicitly reveals that it needs to revise the existing stereotype notion that the military has weakness in establishing mid-term reconstruction and long-term development plan and actual implementation. Kwon (2016) accordingly analyzes ROK contingents to UN missions had consistently engaged with a wide range of civil and military operations, ranging from humanitarian aid to reconstruction and development operations since UNOSOM-II was launched in 1993.21)

The study also argues that apolitical humanitarian action can inevitably be politicized in the geopolitical environment of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, which is partially confirmed in the preferences of civil and military actor’s potential counterparts, encountered in potential humanitarian spaces. More specifically, In the event of a large-scale humanitarian emergency in DPRK and concurrent humanitarian assistance within the target areas, civil humanitarian and military actors from major donor countries in the region as well as the western hemisphere will become closely intertwined. It thus investigated the perception of ROK civil and military actors’ preferences toward their counterpart partners of the U.S., Japan, and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region, which are expected to encounter in an initial stage of relief action. Interestingly, both sides conceived of the U.S. counterparts as favorable partners whereas they relatively took a less cooperative stance on Japan’s civil and military actors, which believed that recent political, economic, and diplomatic tension between the two countries stemming from unresolved indemnity claims for violation of human rights were implicitly reflected.

VI. Conclusion

The present study affirms that ROK civil and military organizations have a different perception of humanitarian action, responding to complex emergencies in DPRK. It argues that this difference, however, not only suggests the gap should be reduced through efforts of mutual understanding but also has meaningful implications in that the military’s perception, in particular, sectoral response and early recovery can serve as a starting point for efficient division of labor and civil and military coordination. In this regard, this study contributes to the new concept of humanitarian aid operations to DPRK in emergencies, reflecting current best practices of civil and military coordination by relevant policy recommendations.

Firstly, the ROK government should review the present contingency plan whether or not it reflects the institutions of global humanitarian assistance properly, in partnership with development NGOs who have retained extensive experiences of humanitarian and development aid in that various civil and military actors from neighbors and donor countries are likely to engage in relief operations, which may inevitably lead to the establishment of multi-partite coordination mechanism.

Secondly, as an alternative measure of existing public and military-centric robust and unilateral intervention, it is necessary to explore integrated governance of humanitarian aid system to DPRK, such as the Ministry of Reunification-led task force for humanitarian action to DPRK and Public-Private-Military combined humanitarian operation center. It will create a humanitarian space in which NGOs participate according to the norms of civil and military coordination, institutionalized in the regime of the global humanitarian platform. Even in a crisis, if the DPRK regime manages to take limited control like a failed state22), but appeal to the international community including ROK for immediate aid, ROK civilian agency led humanitarian action with auxiliary supports from the military cannot be excluded.

Thirdly, a regular interface of civil and military actors including information sharing and joint training programs and exercises should also be explored in accordance with the aforementioned integrated response system. Though ROK NGOs have built the capacity of humanitarian action through a variety of level, target, and theme-based training programs, they have never been invited to Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise that the ROK military has conducted and vice-versa. Of course, although open and extensive joint training and exercise are seemingly limited due to confidentiality and sensitivity, it is necessary to consider

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22) Failed state means “to lose control over the means of violence, and cannot ensure peace or stability for their population”, referred to as “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of international community” (see Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 Foreign Policy 3 (Winter 1992-93); Rosa Brooks, “Failed States, or the State as Failure,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.72, No. 4 (2005), p.1160.)
instituting an alternative and practical platform of exchange in line with emergency humanitarian action to DPRK.

The study is not without limitations. The first and foremost is humanitarian emergencies in DPRK are generally hard to define due to the complexity of inter-Korean relations. In such a situation, the role of the civil humanitarian agencies will remain at an auxiliary level. Secondly, MIL respondents were recruited almost exclusively from Pocheon and Incheon, drawn from a designated participant pool of the Ministry of National Defense, although efforts were made to increase the representativeness of the sample of the ROK military. Notwithstanding, the representativeness of civilian participants can be secured as deliberately selected from the pool of major civil humanitarian agencies as samples. Future research should explore these questions further with representative data from military respondents and if possible two different groups— one is those who have experiences of overseas deployment and the other is have not. Furthermore, since this study focused on the perception gap at the operational level, a future study on the difference in perception between civilian aid leadership and military commanders at the policy level is also required.

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Russia’s Defense Capabilities and Strategy: Development and Characteristics

Jiwon Yun

Abstract

The main aim of this article is to examine the purpose and structural features of Russia’s defense development and strengthening defense capabilities to promote President Vladimir Putin’s fourth term and the transition to a ‘multi-centric system.’ This system is seen as essential to making Russia strong again and providing a security strategy to counter America’s unilateralism. The vision and direction of defense capabilities, which conforms to the new battlefield environment in the 21st century, are Putin’s most important items of reform, focusing on reducing troops, supplying military personnel, reorganizing into a brigade-centered military system, modernizing the weapons system, increasing defense exports, and improving combat capabilities. With Putin’s strong leadership and the will of top military leaders for the reform, Russia preserves sovereignty and territory and achieves the transformation from large-scale defensive forces to offensive mobile forces to counter its military and security threats, the increase in its ability to fight hybrid warfare and the modernization of the advanced weapons with a steady rise in the defense budget. In particular, it also strengthens Sino-Russian cooperation and maintains an offensive security strategy against the expansion of the U.S. and NATO, expands the missile defense system and develops advanced precision weapons, addresses international terrorism by cyber and intelligence warfare and the Islamic States militants.

Key Words: Defense Capability, Defense Reform, Multi-Centric System, Hybrid Warfare, Assertive Security Strategy
Russia’s Defense Capabilities and Strategy

I. Introduction

In March 2014, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. In addition, it has experienced deteriorating relations with the U.S. and the West, including the Syrian air strike that took place in late 2015. These recent incidents sparked geopolitical competition, dubbed the ‘New Cold War.’ In early December 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared his candidacy for a fourth term as an independent, and in the 2018 presidential election on March 18, Putin was successfully re-elected for a fourth term for the next six years with a landslide victory of more than 76 percent of the votes. This will allow him to rule for a total of 20 years until 2024. Putin’s fourth term in office clearly revealed Russia’s unique ‘patriotic’ sentiment and national pride that calls for defending itself from the attacks from neighboring countries and its presence as a great power.1)

On July 1, 2020 (local time), in the face of severe suffering from the new Coronavirus (COVID-19), a constitutional amendment that would enable President Putin to effectively take power for his entire life was approved through a referendum. If Putin is elected president again in 2024, chances are high that he will serve two more terms in the six-year presidency until 2036, when he will turn 84 years old.2) What are the keywords associated with President Putin who has successfully regained power for a long time? Since taking power, Putin has achieved many results in building a ‘strong military’ with warfighting capabilities through vigorous military reform and modernization. Most experts in this regard selected keywords such as ‘Strong Putinism,’ or ‘New Putin doctrine,’ an authoritarian regime led by Siloviki,3) strong patriotism and sovereign democracy, Greater Eurasia, and New Look East policy.

There have been many studies on factors of the Russian defense reform for strengthening defense capabilities and its achievements and challenges, focusing

2) Putin, currently serving his fourth term, cannot run after his retirement in 2024, as Russia's revised constitution prohibits the same figure from running for president more than three times. But the Russian parliament, State Duma, included a clause in the revised constitution that “the existing term of office of a person who is currently serving as president or has already performed shall not be considered.” The constitutional amendment has amended 46 of the 133 constitutional clauses. TASS, 2020. 7. 1.
3) The term refers mainly to powerful figures from military and intelligence agencies, which are members of key political power groups in the Putin administration. Silo (сило), meaning power in Russian, is a political force organized by President Yeltsin after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They were from KGB or Special Forces and strongly controlled those who claim nationalization of state-owned enterprises, nationalization of energy, and separation of independence, under the banner of the Strong State in Russia. For a detailed discussion, see Yun, Yeongmi, Modern Russian Politics and International Relations (Seoul: Doonam, 2011).
on Putin from the first term to the third one. For example, Sung, Ilkwon (2012), Kim, Jeonggi (2011), Kim, Kyungsoon (2012), and Doo, Jinho (2012) focused on the diagnosis and problems of major security policies and Russian defense reform during Putin’s second office in power. Lee, Hongsub (2013) and Woo, Pyungkyun (2016) explore developments of military reform and Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) that is the center of modern wars. Margarete Klein (2015-16) and Kim, Kyuchul (2017) present the direction for defense reform for future war, strengthening joint, military modernization, Putin’s re-election, and the subsequent construction of a Strong Russia. Yoo, Youngchul (2019) concluded that the Russia-led multi-polar system was developing as Russia’s national strategy against the U.S.-centered unipolar system, analyzing Russia’s strengthened defense capabilities of securing strategic interests in Ukraine and Syria, and situation understanding of Northeast Asia.

Differently from previous studies, this article analyzes the impact of defense reforms on Putin’s building of a Strong Russia since taking power in the early 2000s and the success factors of defense reform. It then examines offensive strategic weapons development and military security strategies to transform into the ‘Multi-centric System’ based on the role of the Russian military and the status of strategic weapons development amid continued sanctions by the U.S. and the West. The structure of the article is as follows: Chapter II analyzes the

4) It is important to note here that in 2014 US counterinsurgency doctrine was characterized in 5-stages: Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition. As the execution of operations is somewhat transitional between these stages, for the purposes of this paper, operations have been characterized along the 2007 lines of clear, hold, build. While air operations do extend into these other stages, the author identifies that 1) the role of air in shaping is mostly undistinguishable from other military machinery in the pre-combat phase and that 2) by the ‘hold’ phase of operations, the role of air has stabilized to the maintenance of superiority and that both the final two stages represent a winding down of military presence.


characteristics of Putin’s fourth term in office and Putinism, while Chapter III focuses on the military’s modernization for the establishment of a multi-centric system and how to introduce state-of-the-art weapons against external threats. Chapter IV analyzes Russia’s perception of national security strategy and structural characteristics of defense reform, and Chapter V presents President Putin’s national security strategy and the challenges for strengthening national defense capabilities.

II. Characteristics of Putin’s Fourth Term and Putinism

Putin officially declared his intention to run for a fourth term as an independent candidate in front of his most loyal traditional supporters, blue-collar workers, on December 6, 2017, at a concert marking the 75th anniversary of the Nizhny Novgorod Gaz auto plant. To overcome internal and external criticism and fatigue of his long-term rule, as in the 2012 presidential election, it was important to secure the legitimacy of the election by winning the first round of transparent elections with overwhelming approval ratings in order to establish a stable fourth term.\(^{13}\)

In the end, Putin won 76.69% of the citizens’ vote through the democratic process, making him a 21st-century Tsar, the fourth Kremlin owner to serve a six-year term until 2024. Putin has set an overwhelming new record in this presidential election. The turnout was also 67.5% than the 65.3% in 2012. It showed that the Russian people’s support for Putin is considerable. In terms of political legitimacy, people have confidence in him building a stronger power foundation and running political affairs.\(^{14}\) Putin has made it clear that he would focus on addressing domestic issues such as economic difficulties and people’s livelihood for the next six years after his election. He mentioned the resolution of pending internal issues, such as national defense and national security, as well as economic growth and improving people’s living standards.\(^{15}\)

Despite the spread of anti-Putin sentiment expected by the U.S. and the West and the political fatigue against Putin in the face of the economic crisis caused by

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nose-diving international oil prices and sanctions by the West, he has instead won an overwhelming victory. The most important factor was Russia’s unique political culture and Putin’s ‘Patriotic Marketing’ that played the biggest role in voters’ choice. The Russian people are obsessed with a victim mentality that the West is always trying to seize, contain, and isolate Russia. This is due to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s continued progress toward the East, the spread of democratic color revolutions in post-Soviet regions such as Central Asia, the elimination of Ukraine’s Yanukovych pro-Russian regime, and the international isolation of Russia. Putin thus appealed for national unity to defend Russia against Western threats and succeeded in securing political support through the manipulation of symbols as the only leader capable of protecting his country.\(^{16}\)

In addition, Putinism representation worked again. Putin, in his third term in office, successfully restored some of the traditional spheres of influence by showing off his strong military power based on his strength and influence with his confidence in political stability and economic growth. It was sufficient to instill pride in the imperial syndrome, a kind of nostalgia for the superpower once held by the Russian people. For example, they are the incapacitation of the deployment of the U.S. MD in Poland and the Czech Republic, the annexation of Crimea, the expulsion of U.S. troops from Kyrgyzstan, the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),\(^{17}\) and the acquisition of military bases in the Middle East through the support of the Syrian Assad regime. This is an expression of strong leadership, described as national capitalism. With the Russian acceptance of market democracy, it pursues a rise to that of a global superpower through its Eurasian identity and independent national development model. It means that political and democratic civil rights can be temporarily reserved in the process of realizing domestic order, stability, and economic growth domestically, and securing the status of a great power externally.\(^{18}\)

Russia in the post-Cold War era has become one of the strongest military powers in the world by just following the U.S. through a successful defense reform. Even after Putin’s fourth term in office, Russia has been focusing on defense reform and military modernization with strong leadership and consistent commitment from its military leaders. In particular, President Putin and Russian political and military leaders are faced with the increased conflict with an international order led by the U.S., including Russia’s withdrawal from the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear

\(^{16}\) Hong, Wansuk (2018), pp. 1-2.

\(^{17}\) The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is the international organization established to realize the economic integration of former Soviet countries. Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a treaty in Astana, Kazakhstan on May 29, 2014, and, in addition to them, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined. It was officially launched on January 1, 2015, with these five members. Moldova is an observer country. The headquarters of the EEU is located in Moscow, the financial supervisory body has been set up in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and the judicial body in Minsk, Belarus.

Forces Treaty). The referendum on the constitutional amendments, scheduled for April 22, 2020, was postponed until July 1. Pre-voting has been allowed since June 25 to prevent the spread of COVID-19 during the election period. The large-scale ceremony, which was to be held on May 9 to mark the 75th anniversary of victory in World War II, was also postponed until June 24. Eventually, a referendum on July 1 legally guaranteed Putin long-term rule. Putin, who succeeded in taking office for such a long time, will continue to push ahead with military reform and modernization, develop and deploy new strategic weapons, strengthen nuclear deterrence systems, conduct groundbreaking operations, expand practical training, and introduce and deploy advanced strategic assets for future battlefields according to his plan.

III. Russia’s National Security Strategy and Build-up its Defense Capabilities

3.1 Perception of National Security and Strategic Environment

On March 1, 2018, President Putin presented his campaign platform and vision for Russia’s future in his first State of the Year address to the Russian State Duma ahead of the presidential election. He emphasized maintaining the status of being a military power through military buildup and military modernization externally, as well as economic development to dramatically improve people’s quality of life by reducing the existing levels of poverty as well as by increasing Russia's GDP by more than 50 percent by 2025. This re-emphasized the line of the “new omnidirectional” pragmatic powerhouse by declaring that it would stick to its existing foreign policy stance of pragmatism, being an independent power and maintaining offensive defensiveness.

In its national security strategy released in 2015, Russia’s awareness of threats was not different from that of 2009. However, it added the new threats of the pressure on the Russia-led Eurasian integration process by the West, including the United States and the EU, and the increased instability in the region due to the Ukraine crisis. Putin expressed his willingness to actively respond to the U.S. and

19) On August 2, 2019, the Russian Foreign Ministry declared the termination of the INF treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington, D.C., on December 8, 1987.
President Trump’s unipolar system of American First while maintaining a strategic and military rivalry between the two countries on major international issues. Russia stressed that the world order is shifting from a single U.S.-led hegemony system to a ‘Multi-centric System’ that replaces the U.S. with Russia, China, Europe, and the United Nations. To that end, it is focusing on fostering mobile forces that can immediately deploy modernized troops through defense reform to unite Eurasia, directly linked to Russian security, and to prevent the spread of anti-Russian propensity in Russia’s Near Abroad that occurred in Ukraine and Georgia due to NATO’s pivot Eastward. It is striving to increase its ability to carry out ‘Hybrid Warfare’ focusing on information warfare, propaganda, public opinion, and psychological warfare, which can be incredibly effective at a relatively low cost. This has already been proven through the Ukraine crisis. It has caused a considerable shock to the Western camp by inducing a response from NATO and is pushing for defense reform tailored to Russian conditions, including a reduction in potential military personnel. Russia has been sending a strong message to the international community that it will not hesitate to engage in military intervention to protect its national interests. It is also trying to secure its geopolitical interests by strengthening its defense capabilities following Putin’s fourth term in order to cope with the threats of proximity to the West by strengthening its defense capabilities and transform itself into the “multi-centric” system.24)

Russia is already actively carrying out advanced strategic weapons redeployment and military exercises against the deployment of the U.S. MD system in Eastern Europe. In late 2017, Russia deployed Iskander missiles capable of carrying conventional weapons or nuclear warheads at all times in Kaliningrad with an accurate range of up to 500 kilometers. In addition, Russia has completed deploying state-of-the-art weapons in Syria and Russia’s Far East in a move aimed at the U.S. After the deployment of Su-57 stealth fighters, the Russian military has deployed high-tech equipment and weapons since its involvement in the Syrian civil war in 2015. Two S-400 anti-aircraft/ballistic missile defense systems have been deployed at the Podnoziya Air Base in Vladivostok in the Far East.25)

On the other hand, Russia is actively strengthening its strategic partnership with China in terms of the Eurasian balance of power.26) Since his election, Putin has frequently sent congratulatory messages to Chinese President Xi Jinping to show off

26) Seo, Dongjoo (2018), p. 3.
their “cozy relationship.” The two countries agreed to further strengthen their strategic cooperative relations in the future. President Xi Jinping’s one-man rule and the rise of China, which is expanding its international influence, are the key ingredients of an essential relationship through which Russia can build its own strategic status. Putin is also seeking to play a role in establishing a ‘denuclearization and peace regime’ on the Korean Peninsula bordering Russia.\(^{27}\)

For a long time, Putin has expressed a great deal of interest in Russia taking part in the six-party talks while enhancing national interests in the process of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and establishing a peace regime. In this regard, to overcome the ‘Russia passing’ on the Korean Peninsula, Putin held a Korea-Russia summit in Moscow in mid-June 2018,\(^{28}\) followed by a North Korea-Russia summit in Vladivostok in April 2019. Putin is sticking to a firm principle of opposing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and sought to present himself as playing the role of a constructive mediator in resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

### 3.2 Direction and Driving Force of Defense Capabilities

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the launch of the Russian Federation, President Boris Yeltsin raised questions and discussed defense reform in the early 1990s to overcome the weakening of national power during the transition period. ‘Reorganization’ (1992), ‘Reform Plan’ (1997), and ‘National Security Concept’ (1993 and 1997) reflected and stipulated this change. However, due to worsening financial conditions and continued corruption in the military, they failed to achieve the desired results due to financial limitations and passive attitudes as well as the negative views of the defense ministers and military leaders’ vis-à-vis defense reform and implementation. In this regard, it was during Putin’s second term in 2004 when discussions on defense reform actually began to take place. On defense reform, Putin expressed his intention to push ahead with the reform, focusing on “modernizing the military, introducing a professional soldier system and improving military welfare.” Putin and the Russian government newly appointed Anatoly Serdyukov as defense minister in 2007 to reform defense. The reform measures included fighting corruption rampant within military officers and modernizing the

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27) On April 10, 2018, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho met his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. They agreed to further enhance the cooperative relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that Pyongyang and Moscow agreed to bolster ‘good-neighborly cooperative relations’ in various fields this year to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries. The Korea Herald, 2018. 4. 11.

28) South Korean President Moon Jae-in delivered a speech at the State Duma for the first time for the South Korean president. He called for trilateral economic cooperation among North Korea, South Korea, and Russia, and for Russia’s support and cooperation in advancing the denuclearization of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Russian military. Serdyukov was not from the military but instead a civilian defense minister and the first one to fill such a post.29)

The full-fledged defense reform occurred after the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008. Although Russia won the war, various needs for improvements and problems were revealed in the Russian military. Putin, who succeeded in his third term in May 2012, dismissed Serdyukov and Makarov in November of the same year and newly appointed Sergei Shoigu as defense minister and Valery Gerasimov as chief of general staff.30) With the 2004 revision of the National Defense Act, the General Staff Department allowed only limited military command to exercise ‘strategic planning task’ and ‘operational authority’ and subjugated it to the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the defense minister exercised a military administration, including the construction and maintenance of military power, while the military command was changed so as to be controlled by the president through the Chief of the General Staff.

The Russian military has shifted to fostering a constantly mobile military by reorganizing its system, including simplifying the order system and streamlining the military structure. Since taking office, Defense Minister Shoigu has conducted a full review of the reform agenda. In so doing, he abolished or partially restored various measures related to the reduction of personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff Department, the merger of bases, and the operation of training systems by services. Overall, he maintained its force improvement projects and financial management plans for military modernization.31)

Like most countries, a defense budget increase was an essential requirement for successful defense reform in Russia. Since he took power in 2000, Putin has steadily increased defense spending. In October 2010, Putin announced the 2010 Military Doctrine. With this doctrine, the plan to modernize weapons was established. The modernization of weapons under Russian defense reform has been carried out steadily through the National Armed Plan 2011-2020. Russia has spent about $700 billion over the past decade, thus focusing on developing nuclear forces capable of deterring the U.S. and NATO. In addition, 70 percent of each military unit's weapons have been replaced with new ones, and the development of new weapons has been steadily carried out in consideration of future warfare.32)

In February 2011, Russia announced a $650 billion plan to introduce new military aircraft, warships, missiles, and other weapons over the next decade. This was the Kremlin’s biggest budget spending plan since the Cold War.33) Russia

invested 3 trillion rubles between 2012 and 2020 to encourage the defense industry to modernize its military. The three-year (2013-2015) defense budget was drawn up in June 2012. At the same time, Russia has established the goal of increasing defense spending by more than 10 percent every year and set the ratio of defense spending to exceed 3% of Russia’s GDP. It also established a plan to modernize weapons and equipment under the military’s power improvement project. In doing so, it has set up a plan to modernize more than 30% of its weapons by 2015 and replace at least 70% with new ones by 2020. It then announced its push for the ‘National Armed Plan 2018-2025’ starting in 2018. Related budgets have been set at 20 trillion rubles. Of the total, 19 trillion rubles was allocated mainly for arms purchases and development, while 1 trillion rubles was assigned for military infrastructure construction.34)

Under the weapon modernization plan, about 30% of the goals were achieved in 2015, while about 50% were achieved by the end of 2016. An average of 600 armored vehicles, 200 aircraft, and 30 vessels were deployed each year. It plans to spend about $780 billion from 2011 to 2020. The budget will focus on the introduction and development of state-of-the-art new weapons, which will take into account future warfare, with military forces and weapons replacements capable of deterring the U.S. and NATO.35)

IV. Challenges and Development of Russia’s Defense Capabilities

4.1 Major Challenges of Defense Reform

The main focus of Russia’s defense reform, which has lasted since 2008, is to establish a military structure suitable for modern warfare, modernize weapons and strengthen practical training. Through defense reform, a military buildup based on Western rationality was the main goal. The distinctive feature of Russia’s military structure is that Putin, the president of the federal government, is the supreme commander of the country and significantly strengthens the power of the defense minister to exercise both military administration and military command. The military organization has shifted from an integrated military system in which the Chief of the General Staff directs the military to a joint force system in which the commander of the military district has a combined command for ground forces, the navy, aerospace forces, railway forces, Federal Security Departments, and Border Guard forces in the district. Under the defense minister, there were two

35) It is mainly used for the introduction of about 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight nuclear submarines, about 66 S-400 advanced air defense missile systems, 50 warships, and 600 fixed-wing aircraft. National Defense Daily, 2018. 1. 29.
first vice defense ministers and five vice defense ministers for each function. However, through the military reform of 2009, the number of the first vice defense ministers was reduced to one, while the chief of staff and vice ministers were reduced to three. Since October 2016, 10 vice defense ministers have been appointed and are now working.

The key tasks of defense reform have been to adjust the functions of military command control, reorganize military districts, reduce military personnel, transform the military service system, drastically expand the national defense budget and introduce modern weapons to improve the aging of the weapons system, thereby promoting the qualitative transformation of major forces as follows. Firstly, it is force reduction. Most advanced military countries are already moving from a force-oriented military structure to a high-tech one suitable for modern warfare. Russia is no exception. In the meantime, the Russian defense reform has carried out drastic restructuring to reduce the number of naval and air force units by 50% and army units by 90%, while reducing the number of officers by about 60%.36)

Through defense reform and military modernization, President Putin has broken away from the policy of expanding influence with the strong military power pursued by the former Soviet Union. To this end, he has focused on reducing the size of its troops as well as fostering troops with expertise in national defense for efficient defense management. In 2009, Russia reduced its estimated 1.15 million troops to about 1,027,000. Among these, the Army has 360,000, the Navy has 142,000, the Air Force has 160,000, and other military and military units have 365,000. The number was reduced to 1 million in 2012 through additional cuts. In particular, the size of the corps of officers was reduced from 335,000 to 150,000 in 2016. The existing 65 military schools were merged into 15 regional comprehensive education and research institutes. Central command and control organizations, including the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, have also reorganized and reduced the number of personnel from 22,000 to 8,500.37) The Navy, in particular, maintains the world’s second-largest force. The Navy’s main units are four fleets and one flotilla. Russia’s largest force, the Pacific Fleet, is known to be powerful enough that even the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet cannot guarantee an overwhelming victory. The main unit of the Russian Air Force has two functional air forces, including six regional air forces, long-range air command, and transport command. Major equipment includes 116 strategic bombers, 20 aerial refueling tankers, 757 tactical bombers, 1,095 fighters, 20 airborne early warning aircraft, and 980 trainers.38)

38) An analysis reports that the air force is overwhelmingly dominant due to its securing of aerospace technology and continued investment from the former Soviet Union. In addition,
Secondly, it strengthens the expertise of the military. As part of the troop management plan for the specialization of the military and the reduction of the size of the military at the same time, the ‘contracting military personnel system’ was established instead of reducing the number of soldiers. It was implemented to foster professional troops by abolishing the existing warrant officer system, establishing a non-commissioned officer system, and recruiting 425,000 contract soldiers and non-commissioned officers. The plan was to increase the number of contract soldiers to 400,000 by 2008 (147,000 for the standing immediate response unit). By 2008, however, the number of such troops had not reached 200,000. The number dropped to 150,000 in 2010. Suffering economic strain as a result of the global financial crisis at the time, the plan to recruit contract soldiers, which was insufficient in the initial process, gradually improved as social awareness of military service improved due to population reduction, military pay increase, the expansion of social security systems such as housing and official residence, and efforts to foster national patriotism.39)

Thirdly, it is the introduction of a partial volunteer military system. Russia shifted its existing conscription system to a partial volunteer military system as part of its efforts to guarantee social security and improve welfare for soldiers. Since January 2008, then Prime Minister Putin cut the length of military service from two years to one year in response to public opinion. In early April 2011, due to a decrease in population, Russia's Defense Ministry abolished some of the deferrals of conscription and strengthened the conscription system for men aged 18 or older.40) Currently, 384,000 of the 1 million troops have been converted to the volunteer military, and 90% of the troops will operate in the volunteer military system by 2020. The military system reform carried out the expansion of the number of recruits due to the need for skilled personnel such as airborne troops, strategic rocket forces, and submarine crew members by replacing equipment through defense reform. In 2001, it strengthened its mobilization function and introduced a reserve force system. As in other countries, Russia is actively promoting vocational education, job placement, and housing supply for those who are discharged from the military in order to improve military welfare.41)

Fourthly, it is the reorganization of the military command structure suitable for modern warfare. The reorganization of the standing units, which were mostly composed of brigades, revealed that the structure of the Russian ground forces was

39) For the detailed discussion, see Kim, Kyu-Chul, “Russian military is at the vanguard of realizing national interests,” The Institute of Russian Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2015 Russia Report: Quarterly Evaluation and Prospect (Seoul: Ehan, 2016).


not suitable for carrying out modern warfare in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. This resulted in the need for the reorganization of the unit structure, command structure, and force structure in line with modern warfare, which requires lightening and maneuvering. It abolished the under-organized units and reorganized all units into brigade-level standing units, and merged the existing six Military Districts into four in the western, southern, eastern, and central regions. It served as an opportunity for ground forces to move from the existing division system to the brigade system. The division, composed of existing armored units and armed infantry and basic infantry, faced limitations of shrewdness and flexibility in modern warfare because of its huge size, which called for rapid mobility in case of an emergency.42)

As a result, it abolished existing regiment-division forces and reorganized them into a brigade system. The ground forces sought to streamline the military’s operational command in three stages of the ‘military district command-military-brigade’ from the five-stage command system of ‘military district-military-corps-division-brigade.’ In 2009, the ground forces disbanded 23 divisions and established 85 brigades (40 joint brigades and combined army, 45 special brigades including missile and artillery brigades, defense brigades, special operations brigades, and reconnaissance brigades). Fourteen brigades were added in early 2011. The newly formed brigade has been reorganized into a mobile force with permanent readiness in line with the requirements of modern warfare.

Fifthly, it is the reorganization of the military district. The main purpose is to ensure the independent operational command centered on the commander of the military district and to strengthen the unity. Russia revised its defense act to reform the existing six military districts, which were reorganized in 1998, into four military district commands in 2010. Each of the four military districts has operational control over the police’s internal security forces, border guards, and subordinate units of the emergency department, including army, navy, and air force units in the region, and integrated various military intelligence, weapons acquisition, and military supplies. Each military district has assigned the role of a joint command of each service, including its own strategic command system (except for strategic space forces, rocket forces, and airborne units). They were given the authority to control the units of the Interior Ministry, the Emergency Department, and the Border Guard, and to oversee the naval and air assets within the area under the jurisdiction of the command.

To strengthen the unity of the services, the military districts have commanders in consideration of the characteristics of each military district. Given the importance of maritime operations, the Eastern Military District, where the Far East Fleet belongs, was transformed into a structure in which a Navy admiral

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served as the commander of the military district, while a two-star general from the Army concurrently served as the chief of staff and the first deputy commander, assisting the commander. The formation of the Western Military District, which controls the Baltic Fleet, is similar. On the other hand, the Central Military District, which is in charge of the vast land space on the continent, considered the importance of ground operations by requiring Army generals to serve as commanders and chiefs of staff.

Finally, Russia unexpectedly introduced the sudden inspection training system. In order to assess the level of war preparedness, the president has ordered troops in important strategic areas to be continually tested since 2013, and five to six units have conducted random inspection drills every year. The main training includes the integrated operation of all operational factors in the region, long-distance movement and cooperation between different services locally, mastering the know-how to use new weapons and live shooting. The war-fighting capability gained from this practical training is achieving good results on the battlefield.43)

4.2 Development of Strategic Weapons

Through this steady defense reform, Russian ground forces were reorganized into more than 1,000 units and educational institutions. The reorganization would be completed by 2020. In the first half of 2020, 46 brigades would be created and the reorganization of the ground forces will be completed. If the plan carried out smoothly, the corps would be completely abolished and the units would be organized into brigades. The ground forces would command the combined army (services, branches, and paramilitary units) in the military district. It is to command military actions at the operational level and conducts military actions at the strategic level under the control of the General Staff, if necessary. It includes maintaining the combat readiness of subordinate units and controlling educational training.44)

In addition, Russia has been focusing on maximizing its military strength by reorganizing its naval organization. Forty percent of the military buildup budget has been spent on enhancing its naval forces. Military experts said that Moscow would be strengthening its Pacific Fleet to regain its glory as the world’s finest navy. The Pacific Fleet has been focusing on promoting foreign cooperation, including enhancing relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors, expanding PKO activities, and increasing mutual visits to ships, mutual observation of maritime exercises, and joint exploration and research on the seas. It has been seeking to maximize the Navy’s nuclear force. It successfully deployed a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) called ‘Bulava’ that can be mounted on strategic nuclear

submarines. Recently, the Russian Navy has been pushing to install nuclear warheads on its Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) under the Russian defense reform 'National Armed Plan 2018-2027.'

It is also continuously pushing for reform of its air force and military buildup. An aerospace force was newly launched in August 2016 by integrating the existing air force and aerospace defense force. Since then, it has appointed commander-in-chief of the aerospace force and conducted a function adjustment of the General Staff Department. Its mission is to protect Russian territory from an intrusion of Russia’s airspace by enemy forces and to maintain a full-time combat readiness posture against all threats from both air and space. Based on the ‘State Armament Program 2020’ in Russia, the Air Force would deploy five S-500s to the field by 2020. If the plan is carried out successfully, it will purchase five additional systems by 2023 and eventually operate ten S-500 systems. The S-500 system in the future will perform similarly to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and is likely to be deployed near Moscow and other major cities.

Like other states, such military buildup has led to the expansion of ‘military training’ and increased defense exports. Russia conducted the ‘Vostok-2018’ exercise from September 11 to 15, 2018. China first participated in the largest Russian exercise, held for the first time in 37 years since 1981. Russia mobilized 300,000 troops, 1,000 military aircraft, 80 warships, and 36,000 tanks and armored vehicles, while China provided 3,200 troops, 900 various weapons and equipment, and 30 helicopters participate in the exercise. This was based on the Zapad exercise, conducted on a large scale in 2019. Russia is the world's second-largest exporter of defense, stepping up its exports. It is focusing on strengthening exports of its strongest point, the air defense and missile interception system. The current air defense systems are the S-300 and S-400, which have been deployed mainly in northwestern Russia and the Black Sea Crimean Peninsula to intercept U.S. ballistic missiles. The S-400 has already signed export contracts with Turkey, India, and Saudi Arabia, following sales to China in April 2018. Russia is negotiating S-400 exports with 15 countries. The advantages of Russian-made strategic weapons are as follows: first, they are cheaper than those of the United States and the West; second, the weapons purchase process is much simpler. Russia is focusing on defense exports by maximizing these advantages.

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45) TASS, 2018. 5. 17.
48) TASS, 2018. 7. 28.
V. Conclusion

As Putin stated in his 2015 National Security Strategy after his fourth term in office, Russia is focusing on expanding its influence and national interests vis-à-vis the international community based on increasing military power. Russia continues to push for the transition of the global hegemony structure to a multi-centric system in order to counter the unilateralism of the U.S. It considers the U.S. expansion of its MD system, NATO expansion, cyber and intelligence warfare, and Islamic States militants (IS) its biggest military and security threats. Since Putin’s fourth term in office, he has focused on modernizing the country’s nuclear capabilities through strong defense reforms, strengthening military capabilities suitable for hybrid war environments such as naval, air, and cyber warfare capabilities, and building up the military's ability to strengthen electronic warfare, air defense operations, and anti-terrorism, which was revealed in the intervention into the U.S. presidential election and the Ukraine crisis.

Based on strong leadership, such as the spending of substantial defense budgets on defense reform and military modernization, the push for strong defense capabilities under the banner of Putinism will continue. As discussed earlier, the National Armed Plan 2011-2020 was established under the national security strategy, and at the same time, the National Armed Plan 2018-2027 was announced in 2018. Based on this, military reform was carried out in order to solve the problems caused by the Russian-Georgia war in August 2008 and to seek ways to overcome the weaknesses of the Russian military. For the first time in history throughout the former Soviet Union and Russia, Putin appointed a purely civilian defense minister to implement civilian control over defense.

The Russian military’s operational capabilities, including their intervention in Syria and air strikes that have been underway since late September 2015, were regarded as achievements in the defense reform and military reinforcement policies that have continued since Putin took office. It has also focused on the transformation from a large-scale defensive military to an ‘offensive mobile force’ to preserve sovereignty and territory and counter external military and security threats under the strong leadership of President Putin. It has thus achieved tangible results.

Since Putin has recently succeeded in achieving long-term rule through a referendum beyond his fourth term, to prepare for potential threats from all directions, he will focus on increasing defense spending, modernizing the military, strengthening nuclear deterrence systems, expanding actual fight training, and introducing and deploying high-tech strategic assets. To counter these security threats, it will actively strengthen defense cooperation for its crucial allies, China, Iran, Syria, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including the reorganization of force structures, the modernization of weapons, the development and deployment of advanced strategic weapons, and actual combat training.

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A Study on the Improvement of Practical Martial Law Stability Evaluation System

Hongseob Eom

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present an improved method for practical evaluation of martial law stability, which is the basis for effective martial law enforcement. Although martial law is an important act of national rule, it contains institutional irrationality and redundancy and does not reflect the changes in the environment of the times. In particular, martial law stability evaluation is a key procedure for determining whether to continue or stop martial law, but there were many difficulties in applying it in the field due to the lack of objectivity of the evaluation system and insufficient evaluation method. Therefore, in order to resolve these limitations, related laws and research papers were previously studied, and similar systems (Integrated defense operations and Stabilization operations) were compared and reviewed. In addition, in order to present a practical evaluation method, the evaluation system was reestablished by applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Delphi techniques that reflect the opinions of relevant experts and deriving evaluation factors, indicators, and evaluation criteria. Based on the results of this study, it will be possible to qualitatively and quantitatively establish a practical martial law stability evaluation system for the efficient implementation of martial law.

Key Words: Martial law, Martial law stability evaluation system, Evaluation factors and indicators, Integrated defense operations, Stabilization operations, AHP, Delphi
I. Introduction

The key of martial law is to guarantee success by perfecting the performance posture of the national total war. But when analyzing the meaning of conditions and procedures for declaration of martial law under Article 77 (1) of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Martial Law Act, the martial law enforcement system based on Articles 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Martial Law Act, a comprehensive review is required for a fundamental understanding of the nature of martial law, the establishment of a mission execution system, and the establishment of specific plans for the execution of wartime martial law. In addition, when analyzing the contextual factors of martial law, it is difficult to enforce martial law under the leadership of the military. Thus, to induce national consensus and voluntary participation and enforce martial law successfully, it is necessary to supplement the system by concentrating the nation's total power during wartime and peacetime and establishing a system that evaluates martial law stability based on the linkage of martial law-Integrated defense operations-Stabilization operations.

To provide an improved evaluation method for martial law stability, this study will revisit evaluation factors and indicators, set priorities (weights), and detail evaluation methods. First, taking into consideration regional characteristics (urban area, farming and fishing village area) and operational environments (Integrated defense operation area, Stabilization operation area, forward-contacting area, increase in terrorism and cyber threats), this study will add, remove, and modify the evaluation factors and indicators of the martial law stability evaluation system that is currently in place. By comparing and analyzing the stability evaluation factors and indicators in the integrated defense operation area and the stabilization operation area, martial law stability evaluation factors and indicators in the relevant area are re-established. Second, this study weights the stability evaluation factors and indicators to calibrate the current evaluation index. The current evaluation indicators have been ranked. However, admittedly, a uniform evaluation index cannot accurately take into account the circumstances and conditions, and questions about its objectivity have been raised repeatedly. Therefore, collecting expert opinions and making adjustments through a qualitative method will help establish a practical evaluation standard. Last, this study will present an improved evaluation method concerning the evaluation factors and indicators. Since currently there is no method that assesses the evaluation factors and indicators of the current martial law stability system, practitioners have evaluated those factors and indicators according to arbitrary criteria during on-site evaluation; as a result, evaluation results vary across regions, and the accuracy of the stability evaluation accuracy suffers. Moreover, the evaluation results were hardly reliable because inconsistent evaluations were made due to limited cooperation with related organizations, frequent changes of evaluators, and differences in disposition. Therefore, it is believed that it is possible
to create a more accurate and consistent evaluation system by presenting an objective evaluation method.

Due to the specificity of the content and the limitations of the field of application, prior legal and institutional analysis was strongly required for this study. In addition, this study used the policy analysis data of the relevant institutions to remedy the lack of research data in the field that limited the scope of the previous studies. This study adopted Delphi through a survey of former and current experts to analyze select evaluation factors, indicators, evaluation grades, and evaluation methods and the AHP method to weight those factors and indicators.

II. The gap in the evaluation system between the situation of Martial law system and operations system

Stability evaluation can be understood as a procedure to determine whether a policy continues or not through assessment of the implementation results when a policy is implemented. In the case of martial law, there is a system that determines whether martial law continues through the evaluation of the stability of martial law, and there is a system similar to the integrated defense operation and stabilization operation. However, in consideration of the factors that change martial law in terms of the times and environment, an additional review is needed in the field of martial law. In consideration of regional implementation conditions, it is also necessary to analyze conditions for implementing martial law in the areas of integrated defense operations and stabilization operations that have similar characteristics as shown in <Table 1> and judge whether or not they are redundant.

<Table 1>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Martial law</th>
<th>Integrated defense operations</th>
<th>Stabilization operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basis for implementation</td>
<td>Article 77 of the Constitution, Martial Law and Enforcement decree</td>
<td>Integrated Defense Act and Enforcement Decree</td>
<td>Operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation timing</td>
<td>National emergency</td>
<td>Integrated defense situation occurred</td>
<td>Wartime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target of implementation</td>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Enemy soldiers and residents in the area where the integrated defense was declared</td>
<td>Enemy forces and residents in the operation area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Martial law and stability evaluation

Martial law is a type of national emergency right that aims to maintain public welfare and order with military power. It is divided into emergency martial law and security martial law. Emergency martial law is declared by the President to comply with military needs or to maintain public order in the event of war, incidents, or equivalent national emergencies; that is when the social order is extremely disturbed and it is remarkably difficult to perform administrative and judicial functions. Security martial law is proclaimed to maintain public order in the case of war, incidents, or equivalent national emergencies; in such events, social order is disturbed and security cannot be secured only by general administrative agencies. When the situation of martial law pursuant to the declaration of martial law is restored to its normal state, or the National Assembly requests the cancellation of martial law, the President shall cancel martial law without delay and announce it (Law No. 14839 Martial Law Article 11).

To determine whether or not martial law should be removed and the normal state should be restored, it is necessary to evaluate the result of martial law stability. Martial law stability evaluation determines whether martial law should continue to be enforced through evaluation of the five functions (Safety, Legal affairs, Mobilization, Press, and Aid) related to martial law in each region after the declaration of martial law; depending on the evaluation result, the enforcement of martial law or the cancellation of martial law is implemented. It is an activity that implements measures under martial law case by case. The Martial Law Command comprehensively evaluates the stability of martial law in each district and region by applying the operational evaluation method. The evaluation results are reflected in the results of the operational evaluation to achieve the JCS operational objectives. The goal of martial law is to support military operations and maintain public order. The enforcement effect is divided into the fields of Safety, Legal affairs, Mobilization, Press, and Aid in consideration of martial law missions. Evaluation is conducted at the level of the administrative units of cities and provinces. However, district and regional martial law commands are based on the “city” administrative units, but county administrative units may be added in
consideration of the conditions within the jurisdiction. The evaluation result is divided into 4 stages (stability(●), instability(●), serious(●), paralysis(●)), input using KJCCS and ATCIS-R or integrated defense information-sharing system. The martial law command will finally evaluate the stability of each martial law function based on the contents of the report of the operation and cooperation with the state agencies.

When considering the evaluation procedure, the following operational restrictions were derived along with structural restrictions that the military command and control systems (KJCCS, ATCIS-R) and the integrated defense information-sharing system cannot be interlocked. First, when martial law is declared, 15 evaluation factors and 46 indicators that evaluate the five functions of martial law in each region are subdivided. But battlefield areas (contact or rear areas, urban and rural areas), characteristics of administrative districts, and changes in new battlefield environments (terrorism warfare, cyber warfare) are not taken into consideration. Second, the district and regional martial law commands are required to evaluate the evaluation factors and indicators for each of the five functions in each city and county, but there is no quantitative or qualitative evaluation method for each indicator. Third, as the evaluation result is divided into only four stages (stability(●), instability(●), serious(●), paralysis(●)), it does not properly reflect the actual situation of the field and, thus, would this produce “false” results as it doesn’t take in account the situational variables. Fourth, it is difficult to grasp the key points for the conclusion, as the weights for each indicator within each evaluation factor are distributed evenly and assigned points. Therefore, overall supplementation of the martial law stability evaluation system is required to solve operational limitations as well as structural problems.

Research related to martial law was mainly conducted on the direction of improvement of the martial law and implementation plan, and studies related to martial law stability evaluation were limited. Regarding the development of martial law, Yun-seon Song (2016, pp. 553-554) suggested “emergency martial law, resetting of the standard for security martial law, and the effective implementation of martial” as “three directions”. In his article, he proposed four action items including setting the scope of command and supervision between martial law and government agencies. In particular, the importance of the martial law command's ability and system arrangement for cyberspace control was emphasized in consideration of the changing environment of the times. Moon-Hyun Ko and Moon-Cheol Ko (2020, pp. 117-118) considered martial law in Britain, the United States, France, and Germany, which have martial law systems as state emergency rights from a comparative perspective, said that there is a need to reorganize laws related to martial law to have a systematic consistency through a review of the unconstitutionality of martial law procedures and effects.
2. Integrated defense operations and stability evaluation

An integrated defense operation refers to a defense operation in which the head of the integrated defense headquarters or the commander of the regional armed forces, the commander of the fleet, the head of the local police agency integrates the elements of national defense to command and control in areas where the integrated defense situation is declared (Act No.17689 Integrated Defense Act Article 2, Paragraph 4). There is a fundamental difference from martial law in that it is a command system for integrated defense elements and there is an object of enemy.

The integrated defense situation shall be declared by classifying it as the Gapjong situation, the Euljong situation, or the Byeongjong situation. When an incident corresponding to a situation occurs, the person concerned shall immediately go through the Prime Minister and make a recommendation to the President to declare the situation of integrated defense. Upon receiving a recommendation, the President may declare a state of integrated defense after deliberation by the Central Council and the State Council. If the state of integrated defense is restored to its normal state or the National Assembly requests it to be canceled, the President will immediately lift the state of integrated defense, must announce that fact (Law No. 14839, Integrated Defense Law Articles 11-14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation factors</th>
<th>Evaluation indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maintaining government/local government functions</td>
<td>2, including the normal operating rate of the administrative organization of public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social confusion/crime occurrence</td>
<td>2, including preparing growth rate for peacetime, such as sabotage, strike, illegal demonstration, testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Securing ground, sea, and public transportation routes</td>
<td>Sea/port/airport normal operation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Local residents</td>
<td>3, including maintenance of economic order and stability of public sentiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mobilization of manpower and materials</td>
<td>5, including the increasing rate of illegal immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Maintain the function of social facilities</td>
<td>3, Electricity, gas, oil, communication utilization rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Medical support activities</td>
<td>3, including medical personnel, medical support facilities, and drug security rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. North Korean defectors, refugees management</td>
<td>2, including accommodation facilities and securing relief products</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<Table 2>
Even between integrated defense operations, it is necessary to evaluate the stability of the level of stabilization of the region only in the region where the operation is performed. This is because additional measures can be made in the area where the operation was conducted only after such stability evaluation. As for the stability evaluation factors and indicators judged by the rear area, there are 21 evaluation indicators in 8 evaluation factors as shown in <Table 2>.

The biggest problem with the integrated defense operation stability evaluation system is that there is no guideline for evaluation. Stability evaluation for martial law is included in the Guidelines for the Stability Evaluation of Martial Law, and for the stability evaluation of the stabilization area, guidelines for stability evaluation are included in the “Practical Guidelines for Civil-Military Operations. Although some parts of the guidelines need to be supplemented, it can be seen that there is a guideline, and the evaluation is concreted around the content.

In comparison, there is no accurate guideline for the stability evaluation of integrated defense operations. The relevant practitioner or person in charge of each element evaluates subjectively with only the evaluation factors and indicators and inputs the results. Although the guidelines must be clearly presented due to the characteristics of integrated defense operations carried out by the civil, government, and military together, the current system is inadequate. Therefore, the use and importance of martial law stability assessment will be enhanced only when there is a guideline on the part that is linked to it.

Research related to integrated defense operations is also limited and organized by research reports through research services provided by related organizations. Won-young Jung (2000, pp. 87-111) argued that to develop integrated defense functions in the era of local autonomy, integrated efforts of the private sector, government, and military are needed in 1) planning and budgeting, 2) mobilization and administration, 3) defense council operation, and 4) execution support. Jong-seop Choi and Young-do Kim (2017, p. 6) argued that it is very important to respond quickly to the initial situation in the event of a national crisis, and for this purpose, rapid information sharing among the various organizations is essential. Therefore, in order to ensure streamlined information-sharing and perform tasks for integrated defense, measures such as improvement of the organizational system, improvement of the operational execution system, improvement of the compatibility of resource operation, reorganization of laws, and reinforcement of practice training are necessary. In particular, to solve the problems of the current integrated defense system, it is necessary to make it possible to use it at all times when improving the system. In addition, it is said that an integrated disaster and safety information system is necessary because the redundancy at the national level should be minimized and a standardized system at the national level should be used.
3. Stabilization operation and stability evaluation

Stabilization operations are ‘all military activities in which the military cooperates with the government and the private sector to provide humanitarian assistance, restore infrastructure, and establish a civilian safety and control system in order to create a stable environment and establish a governing order in the liberalized zone.’ Stabilization operations are conducted in the region north of the military demarcation line, according to Korean standards, and rear region operations or integrated defense operations are conducted in the areas below it.

In order to convert the stabilization area to the government, as the first military-led stabilization operation, the stability evaluation system for stabilization operations evaluates whether or not stabilization has been achieved based on the evaluation field (task). The stability evaluation system is conducted at the level of the administrative unit in the liberalized area (by the unit responsible for stabilization operation), and the evaluation result is reported to the upper-level units using the KJCCS or the method available for each discharge. The final evaluation result is carried out by the stabilization operation team in the Joint Operation Front Office of the JCS.

The stability evaluation system for stabilization operations is divided into advantages and disadvantages as follows.

First, detailed tasks were selected for each task, and weights were applied. For example, ‘Elimination of brutal hostile activities in the region’ is awarded 9 points. Here, 5 points, 2 points, and 2 points were assigned again for each subtask 1 to 3, and weights were applied to determine which is more important between each subtask. This is a part that has emerged as a problem in the martial law stability evaluation system, and reference is needed to calculate the weight based on this. Second, the evaluation elements and criteria were set for each detailed task. Martial law and integrated defense operation evaluation systems calculated the results based on the judgment of the relevant business officer. However, the stability evaluation system for stabilization operations can be objectively judged to some extent by specifying the evaluation criteria.

However, in the case of stabilization operations, some supplements are needed. First, it is difficult to properly grasp the detailed reality by fixing the evaluation results in only three stages ( ). The stability evaluation system consists of a total of 84 detailed tasks, and it is difficult to express the actual details of the actual details by fixing the results to simply express them in three stages. Second, the difference in evaluation scores for each level is excessive (20 to 30 points), which limits accurate stability evaluation. If the difference in evaluation scores by level is not further subdivided, the JCS, which conducts a comprehensive evaluation, can determine that there is a high possibility of misunderstanding the situation of the relevant city and county.

Research related to stabilization operations has relatively many results
compared to martial law and integrated defense operations, but data related to the evaluation system are insufficient Bo-seon Jang (2017, pp. 149-150) referred to the occupation policies that North Korea and South Korea implemented on the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War, and outlined plans to conduct stabilization operations on the Korean Peninsula in the future.

III. Research design and method

The research concepts and procedures for conducting this study are shown in <Figure 1>, and detailed research was conducted as follows. First, the current martial law and martial law stability evaluation system are analyzed. For this purpose, laws and research papers such as the Martial Law Act and the Emergency Preparedness Resource Management Act, and guidelines for evaluating martial law stability were discussed. Second, it analyzes the current integrated defense operation, stabilization operation, and stability evaluation system. For this purpose, reference was made to the Integrated Defense Act, the Integrated Defense Operations Practice Guide, the US Army’s FM 3-07(Peace, Stability Operation), and the Civil-Military Operation Practice Guide. Third, to establish evaluation factors and indicators in consideration of changes in the operational environment and regional characteristics, research reports on laws such as the Martial Law Act, Integrated Defense Act, and Reserve Military Act, and measures for early restoration of public order in the war were examined. Fourth, to establish an evaluation system linked to other operations (Integrated defense operations, Stabilization operations), research reports such as understanding of laws and martial law such as the Reserve Army Act, Civil Defense Act, Road Traffic Act were referred to. Fifth, to establish the evaluation method of the evaluation factors and indicators, the information and communication network law, the e-government law, the electronic financial transaction law, ship control regulations, airport control center regulations, the Ministry of Justice foreigner's stay guide manual, and the standards of the blood management headquarters. General Broadcasting Facility Standards (EBS) were referenced.

The analysis methods applied to re-establish the evaluation factors and indicators for establishing the regional stability evaluation system and to derive weights and evaluation methods are the Delphi method and AHP method using experts.

To reset the evaluation factors and indicators, first, the direction of the experts is set through blind questions, and the research team's proposal is presented by synthesizing the survey results. Through the 2nd and 3rd questionnaires, evaluation factors and indicators are specified and confirmed, and a questionnaire that determines the weight of each variable is conducted. Since the weight is to reflect the relative priority of the evaluation factors and indicators to be compared, it is indexed using the AHP technique.
Since there is no evaluation method for evaluation indicators in the current system, there is a limit to conducting a questionnaire directly to experts. Therefore, a proposal for the research team is first derived by referring to methods in similar cases and evaluation methods for stability evaluation in stabilization operations in liberalized areas. Based on the derived proposal, the evaluation method could be specified through the 2nd and 3rd questionnaires.

An important factor in applying this research method is the composition of the expert group. In particular, since there is a shortage of experts on the subject of martial law including integrated defense operations and stabilization operations, both internal and external personnel with comparable experience were considered. The practitioners and supervisors who currently engage in related tasks are considered for the internal personnel while the external personnel consists of professors and graduate students who had previously worked in comparable positions or conducted research as reserve workers and civilians who had handled related research and regulations.

(Figure 1)
IV. Problems and improvement directions of the martial law stability evaluation system

1. Redefinition of evaluation factors and indicators of the martial law stability evaluation system

The absolute majority (89.7%) agreed on the need to improve the martial law stability evaluation system. This is because it is recognized as one of the most important matters to prepare for martial law, given that the Republic of Korea has maintained its division for 70 years since 1950, and tensions on the Korean peninsula remain in the Korean peninsula after the armistice agreement. However, although the importance of martial law is palpable, and the Korean Martial Law Act has been revised nine times since it was enacted, there were no more substantial revisions after the 1981 lift of martial law 1949 and it has been viewed as being easily abused as a political tool, losing its original purpose as a last resort for maintaining the state system.

65% of the respondents pointed to the lack of objectivity, generality, specificity, and reality of the current evaluation system as the need for the improvement while 35% thought a lack of connectivity with other operational evaluation systems called for the improvement. This is a pragmatic opinion that the current system should be supplemented so that the subjectivity of decision-makers should be excluded by reflecting the reality as it is rather than an abstract concept of martial law stability evaluation. It is believed that this is because they expressed sympathy for the need to supplement the evaluation factors and indicators in consideration of the operational environment and regional characteristics. Therefore, in this study, the evaluation factors and indicators reflecting the changes in the operational environment and regional characteristics were first supplemented. In addition, sequential analysis was conducted to improve the martial law stability evaluation system linked to other operations (Integrated defense operations, Stabilization operations).

a. Complement of evaluation factors and indicators in consideration of changes in the operational environment

The operational environment for martial law enforcement is rapidly changing. The representative ones are the expansion of urban functions, the development of transportation networks, and knowledge and information. The expansion of urban functions is a rapid increase in urbanization due to industrial development, and the population of urban areas is increasing rapidly, caused by the concentration of infrastructure. Such an increase in urbanization rate caused the concentration of urban infrastructure, industrial facilities, and information and communication systems in urban areas, and mass damage was expected, so successful execution of urban operations emerged as an important factor in the victory or defeat of the war.
The development of the transportation network is also playing an important role in the operational environment. With the roads that have been dramatically improved compared to the past, the whole country has become a daily living area, and the development of the transportation network leads to an increase in the threat of distribution lines, and changes to the existing distribution line management concept are required. Due to this phenomenon, it was necessary to analyze the increase of IED threat by enemy special operations forces and the effect of roads on operations in multiple dimensions. Knowledge informatization has its vulnerability in that the infrastructure is connected by a complex network and has high interdependence. Infrastructure facilities are monitored and operated by a remote monitoring and control system based on an information system, but they contain a vulnerability that can cause great confusion in the country when the systems and networks that control the infrastructure are destroyed.

In the analysis of the survey result, the need to cope with damages caused by recent major disasters (Covid-19, surprise heavy rain, etc.) and various threat changes (drone attacks, etc.) and the need to prepare for cyber and terrorist threats were noted. In particular, anticipating cyber and terrorist threats, the government should devise practical alternatives that consider the capabilities of martial law while recognizing the need to adjust evaluation factors and indicators that reflect the operational environment and the importance of definitions of concepts and terms. In addition, the analysis suggested the necessity of the system maintenance of military and local governments and the establishment of the scope of responsibility for a practical evaluation system.

When the expansion of urban functions, development of transportation network, knowledge information, and survey results, which are the factors of change in the operational environment, supplementation of evaluation factors and indicators according to the operational environment change is summarized as counter-terrorism and cyber threat as shown in <Table 3>.

<Table 3>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation factors</th>
<th>Evaluation indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Terrorist threat   | • Foreigners' inspection and search and arrest rate of suspect  
                    | • Domestically, the rate of inspection and search for illegal molecules
                    | • Maintenance of boundaries and protection systems for infrastructure, multi-facilities, and critical facilities  
                    | • Terrorist dangerous tools management (terrorism tools, chemical substances, etc.) |
| Cyber threat       | • Cyber-attack detection and blocking activities  
                    | • Cyber protection posture of major national infrastructure systems  
                    | • Cyber incidence rate and action |
In other words, the threat factors for terrorism include the rate of foreigners entering overseas, the rate of detection and detection of suspected persons, the rate of detection and detection of suspected persons, infrastructure, multiple facilities, critical facilities, and maintenance of a protection system, and dangerous tools (terrorism tools, chemical substances, etc.), and as for the evaluation index for cyber threats, three kinds of cyber-attack detection and blocking activities, cyber protection posture of major national infrastructure systems, cyber accident incidence rate and measures were set. The supplementation according to the development of the transportation network was reviewed in connection with the supplementation of evaluation factors and indicators in consideration of regional characteristics.

b. Complement of evaluation factors and indicators in consideration of regional characteristics

Along with changes in the operational environment, regional characteristics and environmental changes are also occurring. In particular, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, since the two Koreas are in a cease-fire state, it is necessary to consider regional characteristics that are incomparable with any other region in the world. The representative regional divisions are the contact area, the metropolitan area, the rear area, and the liberalized area.

When martial law is declared, martial law missions are performed concurrently with close combat in the contact area. Given the two specified tasks of supporting military operations and maintaining security order, the available capacity to perform parallel tasks may be limited. In addition, it is expected that cooperation with government agencies will be difficult due to the withdrawal of administrative and judicial institutions, changes in various martial law environments, changes in combat lines, and withdrawal of residents and administrative agencies in the contact area. As close combat progresses, the need to support military operations such as requisitions increases. The metropolitan area is a center of politics, defense, economy, society, infrastructure, and information, and important facilities are concentrated. In addition, the importance of strategic value is increasing day by day as it plays the role of a control tower, with about 34% of the mobilization resources for branch offices being concentrated due to the concentration of national industries and exhibition mobilization companies. Such an urban environment has a high concentration of population and infrastructure (urban infrastructure and industrial facilities, information and communication systems) due to the expansion of urban functions, and an advantageous military environment for conducting conflict due to the remarkable expansion of the transportation network (subway, road) is being built. In order to carry out the strategic and national task of ensuring integrated defense posture, stabilization of the rear area, and guaranteeing the ability to sustain war, the rear area must eradicate enemy infiltration and provocation, and maintain the functions of disaster and disaster recovery and social infrastructure normally. In
addition, it plays an important role in protecting industrial and military facilities, securing distribution lines, and supporting NEO and RSOI operations. However, in the rear area, major facilities are expected to be destroyed by enemy special warfare units, interfere with NEO and RSOI, and block supply lines. And it is an area that is highly likely to create social confusion and weaken the ability to sustain war due to paralysis of urban functions due to air and missile attacks, terrorism, and cyber-attacks by coordinating forces. Therefore, it is an area that requires close cooperation between the public, the government, the military, and the government to effectively control major cities and mountainous areas. In the liberalized zone, industrialization and communication and transportation systems are underdeveloped due to the prolonged period of the closed economy, and the road network is poor and uniform, and it tends to take too much time to recover in the event of destruction of major key points. C4I system and information sharing system are underdeveloped due to weakened information system technology competitiveness, and many difficulties are expected between friendly operations due to social and cultural heterogeneity. In addition, in the poor health and medical environment, there is a possibility that a large number of patients are caused by various diseases such as infectious diseases.

Complementing the evaluation factors and indicators that consider regional characteristics when the results of the division of the contact area, the metropolitan area, the rear area, and the liberalized area, which are the factors of change in regional characteristics, are supplemented by selecting the related evaluation factors and indicators as shown in <Table 4>.

In the security function, the evaluation factors of the land, sea, and air transport function security are divided into rear inland areas and coastal areas, and control airports and ports, and control of incoming and outgoing aircraft and ships, and the evaluation index was supplemented with the rate of securing means of transportation in rural areas.

In the factors of prevention of social confusion and security of people's livelihood, the indicators are divided into cities and rural areas and applied, and in the maintenance of the function of the correctional management institution of the legal function, the indicators for the protection of the accommodation facilities and the maintenance of the capacity were reinforced in the rear inland area. In the factors of immigration management and control, the detection rate of illegal immigration, such as troops and mobilization evacuees, and the registration rate and trend monitoring index of foreigners staying in the rear inland and coastal areas, are adjusted to be applied.
c. Establishment of evaluation factors and indicators linked to other operations

In conjunction with other operations (Integrated defense operations, Stabilization operations), the establishment of a system for martial law enforcement and integration of efforts are required. Currently, there is a system that assesses the stability of martial law and each operation, but stability is evaluated separately due to the characteristics and regional differences between martial law and other operations. However, in the case of operational elements performing missions in the field, the same or similar evaluation factors must be evaluated in the same manner and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation factors</th>
<th>Evaluation indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact area</td>
<td>Rear inland area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land, sea, and public transportation functions guaranteed</td>
<td>• Main road operation and control rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• City: Transportation network utilization rate, major airport utilization rate, entry/exit aircraft control rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rural and fishing villages: rate of securing means of transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social confusion prevention</td>
<td>• City: Residents/workplaces/groups Control rate compared to the occurrence of group activities such as protests and strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain the function of the calibration management agency</td>
<td>• Operation of a legal and civil complaints counseling center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintenance of prosecution function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration management and control</td>
<td>• The arrest rate of illegal immigration, such as troops and mobilization evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring of foreign resident registration rates and trends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reported to the top. Therefore, there was a possibility that due to the different evaluation methods for each evaluation factor, not only confusion but also errors could occur when making important decisions.

As a result of collecting expert opinions on the necessity of improving the martial law stability evaluation system linked to other operations (Integrated defense operations, Stabilization operations), the majority (89.7%) agreed. In the areas requiring improvement, the integration of evaluation factors and indicators with similar content and unification of evaluation methods were 75%, and 25% of the information sharing system was supplemented. To ensure favorable conditions for martial law enforcement in connection with other operations, the following directions were devised to establish a stability evaluation system based on the opinions of experts and the data studied so far.

First, currently the same or similar evaluation factors and indicators (detailed evaluation elements) match terms and concepts. In other words, as shown in <Figure 2>, the evaluation factors and indicators (detailed evaluation elements) for each operation are compared, divided into common indicators and classified and applied indicators. Currently, martial law stability evaluation concerns 5 functions, 15 evaluation factors, 46 evaluation indicators while integrated defense operation stability evaluation uses 12 evaluation factors and 22 indicators, and stabilization operation stability evaluation scrutinizes 18 tasks in four areas and 81 sub-tasks. Therefore, through the adjustment of evaluation factors and indicators, they are classified into common factors and indicators.

<Figure 2>
Second, the currently different or absent evaluation methods are complemented. Although the current martial law stability evaluation system weights the evaluation criteria, objectivity is insufficient and evaluation criteria are absent, and the integrated defense operation stability evaluation has no weights and evaluation criteria for evaluation. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the method for martial law stability evaluation by reviewing and adjusting evaluation weights and criteria, which are evaluation methods for martial law and other operations. Third, it is necessary to reorganize the method for inputting evaluation results. In the case of the same evaluation factors and indicators, by simplifying the procedure so that they can be commonly applied to the evaluation results of the related system by entering only once after evaluation in the subordinate unit, the quality of evaluation and efficiency can be improved. In addition, it is possible to include additional technical information along with a quantitative indication of the evaluation result.

2. Improving the evaluation method of the martial law stability evaluation system during integrated defense operations

a. Evaluation level setting

Martial law stability evaluation results must be presented by evaluating the values and status (●, ○, ●, ○) of evaluation factors and indicators (JCS, 2018, Martial Law Stability Evaluation Guideline). However, due to the difference in the application range of evaluation scores by level (20–30 points), accurate stability evaluation is limited. Therefore, it is expected that subordinate units will take situational measures without considering the field in the process of judging, deciding, and responding to the situation. In addition, as the Martial Law Command responded with the stereotype of quantitative evaluation, it was necessary to devise a stability evaluation method that can efficiently utilize quantitative and qualitative evaluation. In this study, based on the analysis of the survey results concerning the evaluation methods and various research reports that were conducted at public institutions, discrete evaluation grades (3, 4, 5, 7) were assigned as follows. Therefore, expert opinions were collected on matters deemed appropriate for the evaluation grade and review contents, and the results are shown in <Table 5>.

<Table 5>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Institution of use</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Survey (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Central Personnel Committee</td>
<td>Simple but limited accurate evaluation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Defense Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to this result, the judgment on the value and status of the evaluation factor/indicator is made into 4 grades, but the criteria for each evaluation grade need to be adjusted as shown in <Table 6> for the evaluation in connection with the alliance / joint operation that the majority agreed in the questionnaire.

---

**<Table 6>**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>level</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Now</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80% or more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79 ~ 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 ~ 30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90% or more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 ~ 75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 ~ 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

b. Resetting the weight of evaluation factors and indicators

---

**<Table 7>**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Evaluation factor</th>
<th>Weight from</th>
<th>Weight to</th>
<th>Rem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety (100)</td>
<td>Land, sea, and air transportation services guaranteed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>adj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention of social confusion and security of people's livelihood</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countermeasures against enemy threats</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security maintenance activities such as crime prevention and crackdown are guaranteed</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The weight of the martial law stability evaluation system is given in units of martial law functions. That is, the sum of the weights of the four evaluation factors of the safety function is 100, and the sum of the weights of the evaluation indicators for each evaluation factor is the weight of the evaluation factors. Since the martial law situation room of the Martial Law Command conducts stability evaluation for each martial law function, the weight of this evaluation system is valid. Therefore, when evaluating the stability of each martial law function, the weight of the evaluation factor and indicator can be an important factor. However, in the guidelines for evaluating martial law stability, the weights of evaluation factors and indicators are set without explanation. Therefore, institutions and units that are in charge of martial law stability evaluation in the field have consistently proposed to improve weights as well as the validity of evaluation factors and indicators. In addition, the necessity of re-establishing the weights for newly added cyber functions along with the supplementary contents of the evaluation factors and indicators reviewed previously.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Evaluation Factor</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal affairs (100)</td>
<td>Measures to identify signs of enemy terrorist threats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martial law military court's smooth execution of judicial affairs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain the function of the calibration management agency</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Management and control of outbound and entrants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization (100)</td>
<td>Effective implementation of manpower mobilization</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective implementation of material mobilization</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smooth requisition execution</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press (100)</td>
<td>Positive war situation reporting, public sentiment stabilization, and public relations implementation</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Censorship and control of unwarranted performances, reports, and publications</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid (100)</td>
<td>Seamless infrastructure damage recovery and function maintenance</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securing war box treatment facilities and medical support</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displaced people relief and accommodation management</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber (100)</td>
<td>Maintaining countermeasures against cyber attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blocking cyber incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
emerged. To this end, the contents of the correction of the summarized results by synthesizing the opinions of experts and analyzing them using the AHP technique are shown in <Table 7>.

c. Establishment of evaluation methods for evaluation factors and indicators

Martial law stability evaluation result should be presented by evaluating the evaluation factor \* indicator and divided into four grades (●, ○, ◯, ●), but there are only points for evaluation, and there is no evaluation standard or method for calculating the score. Therefore, it was necessary to establish a standard for evaluating the evaluation indicators and to suggest a method for calculating the score. Accordingly, the results of collecting expert opinions on how to enter the evaluation results for martial law stability evaluation by comprehensively analyzing the stability evaluation system and related research data included in the "Practical Guidelines for Civil-Military Operations" are shown in <Table 8>.

In addition, the evaluation method of the evaluation index was specified so that it could be applied by converting it into a specific score in the field as shown in "Example" below, and the evaluation criteria and weights were subdivided and presented.

---

**Table 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Survey results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>① Enter qualitative judgment results in all evaluation results</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>② Enter qualitative judgment results only for necessary evaluation results</td>
<td>58 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>③ Enter a qualitative evaluation in consideration of the importance of each evaluation factor in the comprehensive evaluation</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current evaluation method</th>
<th>Adjusted evaluation method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent and war crimes occurrence and arrest rate (10)</td>
<td>Violent and war crimes occurrence (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>35% or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>34~21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Violent crimes: crimes committed by violence or using weapons
* War crimes: Violation of laws and regulations on wartime battles crimes such as inhumane acts and wartime treason
V. Conclusion

The results of this study can be summarized by revisiting evaluation factors and indicators, setting priorities (weights), and concrete evaluation methods.

Re-selection of evaluation factors and indicators is to add and delete the evaluation factors and indicators of the martial law stability evaluation system currently in effect in consideration of regional characteristics (urban areas and farming and fishing villages) and operational environments (rear operation areas, contact areas). It was re-established as an evaluation factor and indicator of martial law stability in the relevant area by comparing and analyzing the stability evaluation factors and indicators in the integrated defense operation area and the stabilization operation area.

The priority of the stability evaluation factor and indicator was to adjust the current weight. Although the current priority indicators are designated, they are uniformly distributed without taking into account the exact environment and conditions, and since continuing questions have been raised about the feasibility, the opinions of experts have been collected and re-established through a qualitative method.

This study was particularly meaningful to summarize the evaluation system, a core field of martial law that has not changed for more than 60 years, from a realistic point of view, including related laws and regulations, and changes in the times, and it is judged that policy reflection is necessary. In addition, in a system where the criteria for evaluation are unclear and there is no evaluation method, the evaluation weight is objectively established, and the evaluation method is presented to enable realistic evaluation in the field. However, some follow-up measures are required for systematic execution in the future. First, it is necessary to present an evaluation method for each evaluation factor and indicator for the stability evaluation of stabilization operations. Most of the previous studies were the improvement of the stability evaluation system that should be implemented in connection with integrated defense operations. However, unlike integrated defense operations, stability evaluation in liberalized areas must be conducted by setting different weights and evaluation methods of evaluation factors and indicators in consideration of the characteristics of the North Korean region and the characteristics of stabilization operations. Therefore, additional research is required to reflect the characteristics of the stabilization operation and to establish an evaluation method suitable for the North Korean region. Second, it is a supplement to the guidelines for evaluating martial law stability. The current guideline lacked content and objectivity, and some essential content was omitted, which was insufficient as a practical evaluation guideline. Therefore, based on the results of this study, the martial law command should work to transform it into a decision support system that can make rational and timely decision-making. Third, it is complementary to the computerized system and
program to implement martial law stability evaluation. The process of evaluating martial law stability is carried out through a computerized system. However, the current system, such as KJCCS, ATCIS-R, and the government administration network, are inadequate for interworking and harmonization. Fourth is the preparation of education and textbooks for martial law officers. Martial law work plays a part in nationally important policy, and it requires quite specialized knowledge and insight from officers working in related fields. It is necessary to have the ability to understand and control both the military and the private sector. However, it is a serious concern that the field where professional insight and cooperation are required is rather neglected and perceived as a burden. Therefore, regular training is required for related organizations and officers, and a booklet that can be referred to in normal practice is needed as well as a role as a textbook for education.

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