On October 4, Kishida Fumio, former chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Policy Research Council, was elected the 100th Prime Minister of Japan. Prior to this, Kishida won the election for the LDP’s presidency on September 29; he defeated Kono Taro, who had earned more public support, by a large margin of votes. In the Japanese political system, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of government, the majority party’s president is usually elected Prime Minister by members of the Diet. Also, the LDP’s president is chosen not by public vote, but by its party members and LDP parliamentary members. This is why we often see a gap between a candidate’s popularity and a Prime Minister election result in Japan.

Kishida is not a politician with a high public affinity, but instead, is known as a politician who has a quiet and gentle personality; he also said that his own strength is to listen well to other people’s voices. When Kishida was chosen as the new president of the LDP, Japanese media reported about the influence of the three As: Abe Shinzo, Aso Taro, and Amari Akira. Abe is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Japanese history. Aso has served as the 92nd Prime Minister, and Minister for Finance and Deputy Prime Minister during the Abe and Suga administrations. Amari is another veteran politician, who has served as Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry between 2006 and 2008. According to Japanese media reports, the three powerful politicians whose family names
Kishida and Japan’s Security

start with A were the ‘king makers’ this time.

In the Japanese political system, faction politics still remain strong. Kishida himself leads Kōchikai, which is one of the oldest factions in the LDP and categorized as the centrists within the LDP. Kōchikai, the Kishida faction, has emphasized the US-Japan alliance and tends to be dovish in terms of security policy. Abe belongs to the Hosoda faction, the largest faction in the LDP, which is officially called Seiwa Political Analysis Council. Aso leads his own faction, which is the second largest one in the party, and Amari is also a member of the Aso faction. In his first cabinet appointment, it seems that Kishida has considered the balance between factions, careers, and ages very cautiously; Kishida appointed thirteen politicians who became ministers for their first time, and included other mid-career and young members of the Diet. Meanwhile, Kishida reappointed Kishi Nobuo, the younger brother of Abe Shinzo, as Minister of Defense, and kept Motegi Tōshimitsu in his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Suzuki Shunichi, who was appointed Minister of Finance, is Aso’s brother-in-law and belongs to the Aso faction. For party key posts as well, it looks like Kishida has rewarded the factions that supported him during the election; Aso is now Vice President of the LDP, and Takaichi Sanae, who also ran for the LDP president election and earned strong support from Abe, serves as chairwoman of the LDP Policy Research Council. Kishida had appointed Amari as the party’s Secretary General, but picked Motegi to replace Amari’s post later. Amari unexpectedly lost in his constituency in the October 31 general election.

In Japan, there is a term that refers to a situation where the LDP has an advantage over the government in terms of power, TōKō Seitei, meaning “party high, government low”. Looking back at the historical relationship between the LDP administrations and the Japanese government, the LDP has taken considerable policy initiatives in the areas of foreign affairs and ideology-related issues, but in other areas, the LDP has tended to let the government formulate actual policies. During the Abe administration, however, the power of the Kantei (meaning Prime Minister’s official residence) was considerable, almost like a centralized presidential system, and led the government. However, since Prime Minister Kishida came in, it has changed completely. Now, it can be expected that the LDP oligarchic leadership can exert influence over policy-making more than the Prime Minister himself.

Economic Security

Economics is absolutely the number one priority of the Kishida administration. Prime Minister Kishida spent most of his first policy speech to the 205th Session of the Diet emphasizing the importance of balance between growth and distribution and realization of “new capitalism”. Japan’s economic position is still the third largest next to the United States and China, but its long-lasting recession was a nuisance for Japanese policy makers. Abenomics, an economic policy initiative by Prime Minister Abe, therefore, aimed to boost the Japanese economy through the following three trajectories: (1) aggressive monetary policy/or quantity easing, (2) fiscal consolidation, and (3) growth strategy. However, economic polarization has gotten more severe in Japan as Abenomics was implemented, and the gap between the rich and the poor was widened even more, especially under the pandemic situation. Now, Kishida keeps emphasizing that his top priority is on how to create a virtuous circle between growth and distribution.

Regarding growth, Kishida suggested the following four goals in his first policy speech: (1) realizing a science and technology-based nation, (2) revitalizing regions and the Vision for a Digital Garden City Nation, which will link to the rest of the world, (3) economic security, and (4) putting to rest people’s anxiety about the era of hundred-year life-spans. In terms of distribution, he suggested the following four: (1) strengthening the functions for distributions to working people, (2) enlarging the middle class and addressing the declining birth rate, (3) increasing the
incomes of those working at facilities providing medical nursing, elderly care, childcare services and the like, and (4) correcting the harmful effects resulting from deciding public finances on a single fiscal year basis, which determines public distribution. In sum, the Kishida administration’s economic policy aims for creating further economic growth through backing up economically less advantageous groups of the society.

Here, we need to pay more careful attention to the term “economic security” in the Kishida administration’s policy context. It is intriguing to see a newly established position, called Minister for Economic Security, within his first cabinet, and Kobayashi Takayuki, a 46-year-old graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, was appointed for this position. Economic security is now more often and widely used as a trade war between major economies and this became more pronounced with the digital transformation that was accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In Japan, Amari was the politician who has kept emphasizing the importance of economic security. At a recent interview with Fuji TV, just one day before the Kishida administration was inaugurated, Amari said as follows regarding economic security- “Economic security secures Japan’s independence, survival and development. To that end, Japan needs to have independence and indispensability strategically. Independence identifies and covers Japan’s weaknesses. Indispensability means to have the weapon that can put the rest of the world in trouble without Japan, and to have the economic weapon. Innovation is important. Today, the world is undergoing social transformation using the means of DX (digital transformation) and digital technology.” Having said that, Amari, emphasized the importance of the semiconductor, which is indispensable in the digitalized economy, and contended that major parts of semiconductors should be made mainly in Japan, or in partner countries such as the United States and some European countries Japan can trust and cooperate with. Amari’s comment is related to how the current LDP leadership sees the economic competition between major powers, in particular, between the United States and China, and it reflects that they want to consolidate their international partnerships with like-minded countries while technology decoupling between the United States and China goes further.

**Enemy Base Attack Capability**

Together with economic security, we need to pay attention to the rise of the debate on having “enemy base attack capability”. During the LDP presidential election, Kishida expressed his opinion that “enemy base attack capability” could be a strong option in Japan’s missile defense. The “enemy base attack capability” theory suggests that a missile attack by an enemy must be preemptively responded to by the would-be attacked country. In his first policy speech, Kishida said as follows regarding Japan’s security. “With the security environment surrounding Japan becoming increasingly severe, I will resolutely defend our territory, territorial waters, and airspace, as well as the lives and assets of the Japanese people. Towards that end, we will undertake revisions to our National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines, and Mid-Term Defense Program. Within these revisions, we will boldly engage in a reinforcement of our defense capabilities, including our maritime security capabilities and missile defense capabilities that include further effective measures.” Furthermore, having observed North Korea’s ballistic missile launch, Kishida told reporters that his administration had reaffirmed that it would consider all possible options, including enemy base attack capability in a planned update of Japan’s national security strategy.

Of course, there will be strong opposition from groups who prioritize Article 9 of the current Peace Constitution, and no full-fledged discussion has taken place yet in Japan. However, it can be said that Kishida’s remarks on “enemy base attack capability” made during the election process, and since his administration’s inauguration, have already triggered
a shift in Japan’s security policy. Also, we need to remember that Japan’s policy is formulated by incrementalism. For example, the Abe administration revised the traditional interpretation of collective security. In principle, the right to collective self-defense is the right to counter-attack an attack on one’s allies, treating it as an attack on one’s own country. Japan’s traditional interpretation was that it also has the right to collective self-defense, but exercising it is unconstitutional, conflicting with the principle of Article 9, and therefore prohibited. However, in July 2014, the Abe administration argued that the fundamental change in the security environment had made it impossible for any country to maintain peace on its own and took the changed reality as the reason for practicing the right to collective self-defense.

Furthermore, Abe’s vision on a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” was adopted by the United States, and Abe’s idea on a “democratic security diamond” composed of India, Australia, the United States, and Japan evolved into the Quad. Suga, Abe’s successor, succeeded Abe’s foreign policy, and showed Japan’s strong commitment to the Quad; Suga went to Washington to attend the first-ever in-person Summit of the Quad, just a few days before the termination of his tenure. Having undertaken these previous changes, now Kishida shifted gears to “enemy base attack capability”. The maritime security partnership, together with missile defense (including enemy base attack capability), are highly likely to remain as the top priorities for the Kishida administration. The US-Japan alliance will be, therefore, continuously emphasized and prioritized more-so than any other relationship.

**Implications for South Korea**

The analysis above indicates the following two possibilities- first, the Kishida administration’s priority on economic security suggests that Japan may see South Korea as a competitor rather than a partner for cooperation. In August 2019, Japan decided to remove South Korea from its whitelist for countries which do not need tough screening when importing strategic items from Japan. The decision was specifically targeting South Korea’s semiconductor industry, and Japan explained that it cannot fully trust South Korea for its own security concerns. South Korea’s dependence on key materials imported from Japan has declined after the decision, followed by strong backlash from the Korean public; however, South Korea’s semiconductor industry is still deeply connected with Japan’s related industries and cannot be completely free from Japan’s unilateral decision. If Japan keeps trying to exert control over South Korea’s semiconductor industry under the purposes of its own economic security, South Korea’s economic security will be largely damaged too. It is necessary, therefore, for South Korea to manage the potential risks through restoring the relationship with Japan.

Second, Kishida’s view on missile defense and enemy base attack capability is deeply intertwined with North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. Whenever North Korea launches ballistic and cruise missiles, the Japanese government is highly sensitive; politicians of the Kishida administration and the LDP will keep arguing that Japan needs to strengthen its own missile defense capability to respond to threats from North Korea. In short, North Korea’s provocations will keep providing justification for the Japanese mainstream conservatives to sharpen their swords and revise the current Peace Constitution. The South Korean government, accordingly, should have a deep dialogue with the Japanese government, and constructively create some room for the two countries’ security cooperation. It is not for Japan’s sake, but for South Korea’s sake because Japan’s unilateral actions can undermine the efforts for building the Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula.
Introduction

Recently, the U.S. Congress issued a report, "U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress" on August 4. The report warns an increased risk of miscalculation or inadvertent action that could cause an accident or an incident that in turn could escalate into conflict or more. The report argues that the U.S. should prepare for the worst-case scenario with China at sea. This, at the time, was the same view of Vice-Admiral Thomas Rowden, then head of U.S. Surface Forces Pacific, when he announced the "Surface Force Strategy" subtitled "Return to Sea Control" in January 2017. It is one of indicators to verify a return from post-modern naval strategy to Mahanian navy strategy.

Few navies’ strategies fall exclusively within one or the other. Instead, analysts can place navies along a continuum between Mahanian and post-modern navies based on the extent to which they reflect the two approaches (See the table 1). Thus, this article delves into three indicators to analyze the U.S. Navy's returning to Mahanism in Indo-Pacific. First, the navy’s written guidance including military doctrine, white papers, or strategies can be analyzed for its ‘ends’ (Written Strategy). Second, analysts can assess the navy’s salient operations as its ‘ways’ (Maritime Operations). Third, analysts can consider the navy’s planned acquisitions for its ‘means’ (Future Capability). By analyzing these three indicators over the last two decades, we observe the U.S.N.’s shift from a post-modern navy toward Mahanian naval strategy.

Mahanism and the Post-Modern Navy

The Mahanian vs. the post-modern navy is one lens to analyze sea power and naval strategy. We can articulate the distinction between these two approaches based on different assumptions about globalization. These two approaches prioritize distinct naval interests, threats, methods, missions, and capabilities. The approach, summarized in Table 1, stems from diverging perspectives on globalization and its ramifications.

Globalization is a growing integration of economic, political, and social systems made possible by the flow of people, goods, and ideas across the world. The post-modern navy considers globalization as a beneficial phenomenon. This integration forms a relationship of interdependence in which states in the system become closely tied together. This creates powerful incentives for cooperation and disincentives for conflict.

On the other hand, Mahanism is based on realism which is a more pessimistic view of globalization, whereby it disrupts traditional economies, states’ sovereignty, and independence. This divergent view leads to different ramifications in interest, threats, orientations, naval missions, and naval capability.
This paper will show the U.S.N.'s paradigm shift from a post-modern navy strategy to a Mahanian naval strategy based on three criteria (ends, ways, means) and its implications for South Korea.

**Ends (Written Strategy)**

In 2007, the U.S. Navy released "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21)" reflecting the U.S. superiority at sea. There was no threat to sea control of the U.S. CS21. Thus, it emphasizes the importance of not only defending the homeland but also the interdependent system on which U.S. prosperity relies. The strategy focuses almost entirely on post-modern threats, listing terrorism, piracy crime, and failed states as major threats to U.S. interests.

Post-modern missions are particularly prevalent in the strategy’s six strategic imperatives, which include supporting the U.S. in ongoing limited wars ashore, creating and sustaining maritime partnerships, and quelling destabilizing disruptions driven by non-traditional threats.

In 2015, the U.S. revised the document to take into account changing strategic circumstances. This new document was widely regarded as closer to Mahanism in its outlook. Most notable, the document highlights the growing threat from China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and interstate maritime disputes in the South/East China Sea. The strategy prioritizes China’s naval modernization as a significant challenge for the U.S.N. To tackle these challenges, the document emphasizes the navy’s five “essential functions,” including deterrence, power projection, and sea control.

In 2020, "Advantage at Sea" gives much less weight to the post-modern naval mission and more towards Mahanian priorities. The document not only articulates much less on non-traditional threats, like terrorism and piracy etc., but also drops entirely CS21’s focus on cultivating a global maritime partnership. Additionally, the document emphasizes stronger partnerships for the sake of “long-term strategic competition” with China.

Advantage at Sea emphasizes that the U.S.N.’s primary missions and capabilities must be tailored to compete with China. Specifically, it clarifies that “sea
control” must take priority over other missions, while CS21 contained a more cooperative vision of sea control. Also, Advantage at Sea insists that the U.S. must put all of its emphasis on fighting and winning in high-intensity operations against its rivals. This includes acquiring more lethal, distributed, and survivable capabilities that will allow the U.S. to penetrate and degrade adversaries’ A2/AD capabilities.

**Ways (Maritime Operations)**

The U.S.N.’s operations have changed gradually from the mission of a post-modern navy to a Mahanian navy throughout the last two decades.

First, the U.S. was preoccupied with the decidedly post-modern task of supporting limited wars for the duration of the Global War on Terror. The U.S.N. played a key role in Operation Enduring Freedom in (recently withdrawn from) Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom, helping to project and sustain U.S. counterinsurgency and stability operations ashore.

Second, U.S.N. has also engaged in numerous multilateral operations to secure the freedom of navigation across the world. Beginning in 2009, the U.S. initiated a multi-national Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) to which South Korea Navy’s Chung-hae Unit belongs. The U.S. also has organized CTF-150 and CTF-152 in the western Indian Ocean for protecting commercial ships against terrorist and criminal threats.

Finally, the U.S. has frequently engaged in HA/DR operations. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 are just a few significant examples of the U.S. engaging in this post-modern mission.

On the other hand, recent U.S.N. operations indicate a growing focus on Mahanian naval priorities such as great power competition and deterrence. The U.S. has withdrawn its troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan so that the U.S.N. has steadily increased its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea to counteract China’s claim of entitlement within the nine-dash line. The U.S. has also continually expanded training operations alongside regional naval partners, including the ROK, Japan, Australia, and India, throughout the Indian Ocean and West Pacific for reinforcing the ability to deter traditional threats.

**Means (Future Capability)**

The transformation of the U.S.N.’s ends inevitably leads to a change of planned capabilities. As highlighted in Advantage at Sea, the U.S. is acquiring long-range strike capabilities including hypersonic missiles and unmanned surface and underwater vehicles against China’s large fleet. It is also seeking to upgrade its nuclear attack submarine fleet.

Furthermore, U.S.N.’s aspirations regarding the overall size of its fleet have grown steadily in recent years. In 2006, the U.S.N. set the goal of expanding itself to a 313 ship navy. By 2016, however, with the U.S.’s concerns about China’s naval acquisitions, the U.S.N. increased the goal to a 355 ship navy.

The most recently issued Congressional Research Service Report (August 3, 2021) analyzes the budget for the Navy’s long-range shipbuilding document (June 17, 2021) calling for 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large unmanned vehicles. Specifically, the U.S. will continue to bolster the size of its fleet, acquiring more Virginia-class SSNs and unmanned vehicles tailored to operate in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

The change in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is one of example as to how the U.S. has shifted further away from the post-modern naval mission. Acquiring the LCS, which is designed to be a small, nimble, and inexpensive vessel, began in 2005. The purpose of the LCS is tailored to maritime security
operations against asymmetric, low-intensity threats in littoral environments. The U.S.N. is already decommissioning four of the new vessels (the Freedom, Independence, Fort Worth, and Coronado) in advance. As Rear Admiral Randy Crites emphasized in 2020, “in great power competition they were less important”. The U.S.N. will more focus on fleet ships for high-intensity operations.

**Implications for South Korea**

Recently, South Korea unveiled her light aircraft carrier (CVX) program. There are pros and cons not just outside of South Korea, but also within the country. The major con is that the program is far more than what is necessary to defend ourselves from North Korea’s threats. I argue that the extent of the paradigm shift in the Indo-Pacific area warns us that threats come not just from the North. We need to take into account not only North Korea, but also emerging threats from the Indo-Pacific.