The contemporary landscape of global conflicts is undergoing an evolution, particularly among developing nations and non-state actors, moving towards the utilization of low-cost weapon systems in multi-domain, multi-layered attacks, contrasting with more advanced nations like the U.S. These attacks, often launched as surprise assaults, are emblematic of a tactical shift aimed at maximizing impact despite limited resources.

The recent confrontation between Hamas and Israel in October 2023 epitomizes this shift. During the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, Hamas orchestrated a sophisticated surprise assault spanning across land, sea, air, and employing drones, targeting both military installations and civilian areas.

This surprise element significantly exacerbated the threat and caught Israeli defense systems off-guard, reminiscent of historical surprise attacks such as the Yom Kippur War. This paper analyzes the dynamics of this conflict, compares the military capabilities of Hamas and North Korea across these domains, draws lessons in preparing for a similar surprise assault by North Korea, and proposes strategic recommendations for South Korea to effectively counter such multifaceted threats. The comparative analysis and the lessons drawn from the Hamas-Israel conflict serve as a critical lens to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to the evolving nature of modern warfare, especially in the face of potential large-scale, surprise attacks from North Korea.
Analysis of Hamas’ Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks

In the recent conflict, Hamas showcased a variety of tactics utilizing low-cost weaponry to inflict damage and cause disruptions. Here are some specific examples based on recent incidents as reported:

Rocket Barrages:
Hamas orchestrated a massive barrage employing a mix of low-cost weapon systems and military-grade rockets in a multi-domain, multi-layered attack strategy. Utilizing home-made Qassam rockets alongside more advanced military-grade rockets like the Russian-made 122mm Grad, they exploited a spectrum of technological capabilities. While Qassam rockets are relatively crude, their small size and rapid launch capability make them challenging to counter. Conversely, military-grade rockets, being more accurate, can cause significantly more damage, although they are easier to locate and neutralize. During one notable assault, Hamas reportedly unleashed as many as 5,000 rockets within a 20-minute timeframe aimed at overwhelming Israel's Iron Dome defense system, thereby allowing a substantial number of rockets to penetrate the defensive shield.

Ground Assaults:
In the surprise attack on Israel, Hamas militants demonstrated a tactical employment of 'Low-Cost Weapon Systems in a Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attack' strategy. By opting for low-cost vehicles such as motorcycles, they were able to breach security barriers. This choice of economical and less sophisticated assets was strategic, as high-value or sophisticated ground force assets could be more easily detected and targeted by Israeli defense systems. Utilizing low-cost vehicles like motorcycles, which have a lower detection signature compared to more sophisticated or heavier assets, allowed Hamas militants to maneuver with a degree of stealth, thereby achieving their objective of breaching security barriers with reduced risk of detection. This tactic showcases a calculated approach to balancing operational effectiveness with resource economy while navigating the challenges posed by sophisticated defense and intelligence systems.

Aerial and Drone Attacks:
In a sophisticated display of 'Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks', Hamas leveraged small drones as a pivotal component of their aerial strategy to dismantle key defensive and surveillance assets of the Israeli forces. These drones were employed to neutralize sensors and armored vehicles, thereby blinding surveillance and impeding an effective response by Israeli forces. This tactic was a crucial part of their strategy to create a more permissive environment for subsequent operations.

Furthermore, Hamas deployed suicide drones, notably 35 Al-Zawari kamikaze drones, aimed at targets within Israel. Unlike conventional rockets that follow high-arching ballistic trajectories and are easier to spot, these drones, capable of flying close to the ground, presented a more elusive threat that is harder to detect and counter. This low-altitude flight capability augmented their stealth, thereby posing a significant challenge to defensive measures.

The drones were tactically used to deliver explosives on critical Israeli infrastructure including security towers, border posts, and communication towers. By disabling key surveillance systems, Hamas effectively reduced the resistance faced during ground assaults, thereby showcasing a multi-layered approach that intertwined low-cost aerial assets with ground operations. The utilization of drones, a relatively low-cost weapon system, in such a multi-domain offensive underscore a deliberate strategy to maximize operational impact while navigating through the defensive measures employed by the Israeli forces. Through this, Hamas illustrated a calculated blend of low-cost weapon systems in a multi-domain, multi-layered attack paradigm aimed at achieving tactical advantages and operational objectives.

Maritime Assaults:
In a strategic manifestation of 'Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks', the maritime domain was also exploited by Hamas, albeit not abundantly identified. The use of low-cost motorboats is indicative of Hamas’s tactical ingenuity to leverage economical assets across all domains to challenge and stretch Israeli defenses. These motorboats could serve multiple purposes such as transporting personnel, delivering waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs), or engaging in direct assaults against Israeli naval or coastal assets.

The choice of low-cost motorboats demonstrates a tactical preference for assets that are economical, readily available, and capable of operating under the radar of more sophisticated maritime surveillance systems. Unlike high-value or sophisticated maritime assets, low-cost motorboats are less likely to attract immediate detection and interdiction, thereby providing Hamas with the means to maneuver and possibly infiltrate or deliver ordnance across the maritime domain.
Hamas's 'Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks' strategy demonstrated a calculated use of economical assets across air, land, and sea domains to challenge Israeli defenses. Through this multi-domain, multi-layered strategy, Hamas showcased a tactically enriched and economical approach to asymmetric warfare, maximizing operational impact while navigating through defensive measures across multiple domains. This strategy underscores a nuanced endeavor to exploit low-cost weapon systems to achieve tactical and strategic objectives within a complex operational environment.

Possibility for North Korea Adopting Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Strategy

The possibility of North Korea adopting a strategy similar to Hamas' 'Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks', based on North Korea's capability, can be re-evaluated across rocket, ground, aerial, and maritime domains as follows:

Rocket Capability:
North Korea possesses a substantial arsenal of artillery, which could be utilized in a manner similar to Hamas' rocket attacks, especially given South Korea's defense system is primarily oriented towards ballistic missile threats. This could potentially allow for a strategy where a barrage of lower-tech artillery fire is used to overwhelm or distract the defense systems.

Ground Capability:
Given that much of North Korea's ground forces are outdated, a strategy that incorporates simultaneous attacks across different domains could help alleviate the burden on these ground forces. By engaging in multi-domain distractions or assaults, the effectiveness of North Korea's ground forces could potentially be maximized, mirroring the tactic employed by Hamas to reduce resistance to ground assaults.

Aerial Capability:
North Korea has shown consistent development in low-cost drone technology, particularly after incidents in March 2014 where two North Korean-manufactured small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were discovered following crashes in Paju and Baengnyeong Island, with an additional drone discovered in Samcheok in April 2014. Further, on December 26, 2022, around 10 AM, a drone believed to be from North Korea violated South Korean airspace south of the Military Demarcation Line. The South Korean military failed to intercept and track the drone, marking the first intrusion by a North Korean drone into South Korean airspace in about five years and seven months since May 2, 2017. These incidents indicate the persistent development and operational deployment of low-cost drones by North Korea, akin to the aural tactics employed by Hamas.

Sea Capability:
North Korea's substantial number of submarines and hovercrafts could potentially allow for a more potent maritime front compared to Hamas. By forming a strong maritime front, North Korea could disperse South Korea's retaliatory capabilities, similar to how Hamas utilized the maritime domain to diversify the operational landscape and challenge defensive apparatus.

Multi-Layered Attacks Potential Scenarios on the Korean Peninsula

Based on the analysis, if North Korea were to initiate a surprise attack employing a strategy akin to Hamas' 'Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks', the scenario might unfold across the rocket, land, air, and sea domains as follows:

Phase 1: Initial Barrage and Airspace Violation
As a precursor to ground operations, North Korea could initiate a massive artillery and rocket barrage aimed at South Korean military installations, particularly those equipped with anti-missile systems, to overwhelm and distract South Korean defenses. Simultaneously, a swarm of low-cost drones could invade South Korean airspace to engage key defensive infrastructure, including early warning and radar systems, to neutralize South Korea's ability to detect and respond to subsequent threats quickly. The combined effect of the artillery barrage and drone attacks would serve to blind and disorient South Korean forces, laying the groundwork for multi-domain operations in the following phases.

Phase 2: Ground Assault
With defenses distracted or engaged, a wave of North Korean ground forces, leveraging low-cost, readily available, or outdated equipment, could cross into South Korean territory. The objective could be to secure key positions or create a buffer zone, while the simultaneous attacks in other domains continue to distract South Korean forces and prevent reinforcements.

Phase 3: Maritime Disruption
North Korea could unleash a maritime assault employing a fleet of small submarines and hovercrafts...
targeting South Korean naval assets or attempting amphibious landings at key coastal areas. The aim would be to spread South Korean defensive resources thin across multiple fronts and perhaps secure maritime supply routes for sustained operations.

**Phase 4: Sustained Multi-Domain Operations**

As the conflict progresses, North Korea could continue to engage in multi-domain operations. Periodic artillery barrages, drone swarms, maritime disruptions, and ground assaults could become a pattern, aimed at exhausting South Korean defenses and achieving territorial or strategic objectives. Cyber operations could also be employed to disrupt communications, intelligence, and command and control systems, further complicating South Korean and allied response efforts.

The proposed scenario is highly speculative and simplifies the complexities of modern warfare and geopolitical considerations. Nonetheless, it outlines how a Low-Cost Weapon Systems in Multi-Domain Multi-Layered Attacks strategy might manifest in a hypothetical conflict instigated by North Korea based on its existing capabilities and past tactics.

**Implications to South Korea**

The Korean Peninsula presents a complex battlefield where threats across various domains can occur simultaneously. The potential vulnerability of South Korea’s advanced weapon systems to North Korea’s low-cost weapons, particularly under a hybrid-tactic scenario, necessitates a well-thought-out strategy and tactics to ensure robust defense and response capabilities. Here are some strategic and tactical advisements for South Korea to consider in preparing for North Korea's potential hybrid tactics:

- **Holistic Threat Assessment:**
  Conduct thorough assessments to understand the full spectrum of threats posed by low-cost and hybrid tactics, and how they could exploit vulnerabilities in advanced weapon systems.

- **Multi-Domain Awareness and Defense:**
  Enhance multi-domain awareness through integrated sensor networks and intelligence sharing, both nationally and with international partners. Develop multi-domain response capabilities that allow for coordinated response across land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains.

- **Adaptive Defense Systems:**
  Invest in adaptive defense technologies capable of countering a wide range of threats from low-cost weapons to more advanced systems.

  **Counter-Hybrid Warfare Training:**
  Develop and conduct training programs focused on countering hybrid warfare tactics, ensuring that military personnel are well-prepared to respond to a mix of conventional, irregular, and cyber threats.

  **International Cooperation and Coalition Building:**
  Strengthen international cooperation through alliances and coalitions to build a collective defense against hybrid threats, share intelligence, and conduct joint exercises to improve interoperability.

  **Scenario Planning and Wargaming:**
  Engage in extensive scenario planning and wargaming to explore various hybrid threat scenarios and refine strategies and tactics accordingly.

  By adopting a comprehensive and adaptive approach that encompasses these elements, South Korea can better prepare for, and effectively respond to, the challenges posed by North Korea’s potential use of hybrid tactics in a conflict scenario.

**Conclusion**

The analysis underscores a need for South Korea to bolster its defense mechanisms across all domains to mitigate the risks posed by multi-domain, multi-layered surprise assaults from North Korea with low-cost weapon systems. The surprise element in such assaults significantly escalates the threat, necessitating a high level of vigilance, enhanced intelligence, and robust early warning systems. The Hamas-Israel conflict provides a significant case study to understand the sophisticated coordination and the multifaceted nature of modern warfare threats, including the critical aspect of surprise. By drawing parallels with North Korea’s military capabilities and envisioning the potential modality of a similar surprise assault, this article outlines strategic recommendations for South Korea. These include enhancing surveillance, developing robust multi-layered defense mechanisms, fortifying civil defense preparedness, fostering international cooperation, maintaining military readiness, and investing in cutting-edge defense technology research. These measures are pivotal for South Korea to effectively anticipate, detect, and respond to a broad spectrum of threats, ensuring the safeguard of its national security and the stability of the Korean Peninsula in the face of advancements in North Korea’s multi-domain, multi-layered attack capability.
Ukraine, A Strange War in the 21st century

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Ukraine has evolved as a basis for competition between the United States, the former Soviet Union’s archenemy during the Cold War, and Russia. Among the 15 former Soviet republics, Ukraine is the most populous country after Russia. It was also a key military base that housed the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear weapons sites, as well as being a center for grain production and the defense industry. Therefore, when Ukraine separated from the former Soviet Union in 1991, it was a decisive blow to Russia, which was losing its influence as a great power.

Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 marks the culmination of an eight-year conflict and is expected to mark a historic turning point in European security. With increased support from the West, Ukraine has managed to fend off Russian attacks, putting the country in a desperate situation, but many of its cities have been devastated and 25% of its citizens have become refugees or internally displaced. It is still unclear whether there will be a diplomatic solution and, if so, what it will look like. It is also questionable how Ukraine will determine its future status along with regional organizations such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As the war approached its 18th month, predicting the outcome became more difficult. Russia has still not achieved military victory and is suffering enormous human and material damage. Even those who supported Putin predict that it will be difficult to exercise actual control after occupation, even if it is a territory occupied by Russia. Ukraine has also demonstrated remarkable national cohesion, and Volodymyr Zelensky’s unexpected leadership has earned praise at home and abroad. However, this cohesion and admiration are showing signs of changing over time. Experts suggest the division of East and West Germany after World War II, bilateral treaties such as those with Israel, and the ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War as the war-termination models, but considering Russia and Ukraine, which are unwilling to give up even an inch of land, this possibility is slim.

1. Confrontation between Authoritarianism and Nationalism

The War in Ukraine1) must begin with an examination of the following three basic

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1) Regarding naming of the War, an official name for the war has not yet been determined. Of course, just because a name is chosen by academia or the media does not mean it has public trust. Currently, the names that appear most frequently on the Internet are Russia-Ukraine War, Ukraine-Russia War, and Russia’s War in Ukraine, but these only depend on the tendencies of the media. In this paper, it is referred to as War in Ukraine.
propositions at the geopolitical and economic intersection: First, the proposition is that the Putin regime is a relic of another era or a harbinger of a new wave of authoritarianism. This can be weighed against the fact that Russia has accumulated considerable power internally through integration and growth in the international community.

Russia occupies a very large part of the international energy market, accounting for 40% of European gas imports. In the 2000s, Russia maintained economic stability by appropriately controlling oil exports and utilizing them as a strategic resource. According to data released by Russia’s Central Bank, bank debt increased from $6 billion to $394 billion in 2021. This strong fiscal balance has ensured that Putin’s Russia has never again experienced the comprehensive financial crisis that shocked the country in 1998. Foreign exchange reserves peaked in 2008, when Putin expressed his determination that Russia would no longer engage in ‘geopolitical retreat.’ This is the second proposition to be examined.

The third proposition is that the outcome could be very different depending on how Western powers ultimately respond to the reemergence and challenge of Russian power. Western powers, the United States, and the European Union created the post-Cold War order through the boundaries of different forms of power, such as hard power, soft power, and finance, according to their strengths and preferences. Western powers have pursued a strategy that combines financial pressure, soft power, and military force to achieve their goals. However, Putin’s challenge overshadowed the post-Cold War order created by the West and forced a change in strategy of diplomatic persuasion, soft power, finance, and ultimately military threats and coercion. This situation is shaking Europe right now.

It is not necessarily for geopolitical reasons that led Russia to target Ukraine; one must also look beyond the divisions in Ukrainian politics and elites and the failure of the economy. The end of the Soviet Union gave Ukraine independence. However, ultimately, it was an economic disaster for Ukraine. The key issue for Eastern Europe here is how Russia’s neighbors, whether formerly part of the former Soviet Union or members of the Warsaw Pact, emerged from the economic instability and social shocks of the 1990s. In this respect, Poland and the Baltic states rose from the crisis of the 1990s and transformed into highly functioning countries after the era of communist politics, riding the bandwagon of the early waves of expansion of NATO and the European Union and becoming members. But Ukraine is on the opposite side of the spectrum from these countries in every way.

Political dynamics within Ukraine are also complicating the resolution of the problem. Ukraine’s ambitious nationalist regime, encouraged by Western powers’ flexible stance on NATO membership, has signaled its intention to reintegrate the Donbas region by force. Then, in 2018, Putin publicly declared that he would mobilize military force if Ukraine attempted to regain control of the Donbas region. The general analysis of experts is that Ukraine’s attitude led to a large-scale military confrontation with Russia. Meanwhile, Zelensky, who won the 2019 presidential election overwhelmingly, showed that Ukraine will not tolerate any armed conflict in the Donbas region. However, Ukraine’s economic situation was already in serious decline.

2. Tactical Success vs. Strategic failure

At the beginning of the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian army stubbornly resisted and was able to halt the movement of Russian troops in a number of areas, including Kiev. Military experts assessed that the operation was not being carried out properly due to the Russian army’s low morale, lack of logistics support capabilities, and a military strategy that predicted that Ukraine would easily collapse. Through March 2022, Western analysts had been watching what was happening on the battlefield, and concluded that Russia was
scaling back its war objectives, limiting its targets to the Kherson region in southern Ukraine, as it did in the Donbas region in 2014, and ultimately occupying the region. It was expected that it would be occupied and negotiate a cease-fire agreement with Ukraine. However, the war continues to be a tedious war of attrition that tests the nation’s will and resources.

The War in Ukraine demonstrates important characteristics of contemporary interstate wars. In other words, it was once again confirmed that war is a contest in which both parties cross multiple domains and force their will on the other side through overwhelming maneuver, combat, and the pursuit of high adaptability. A nation’s military power is severely tested through war, and the War in Ukraine is no exception. In reality, only Russia and Ukraine are in direct military conflict, but many countries are involved politically, diplomatically, and economically, and are providing military and intelligence equipment to Ukraine.

In fact, it is difficult to predict the outcome or expected duration of the war at this point. But this war showed that a sophisticated Battle of the Narrative was a key element. This war also reminded us that strong military capabilities are the key to competitiveness, and that the number and quantity of military power on the battlefield and logistics base of each country involved still cannot be ignored. In the meantime, many of the latest precision weapons are limited in mass production due to cost, complexity, and lead time, and military power has become increasingly vulnerable to surveillance by satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles. In particular, unmanned aerial vehicles play an important role in ground warfare. Finally, battles often occur near urban areas, increasing the importance of urban warfare.

3. UN’s role as the international collective security institution

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, "This will be the saddest moment of my tenure as UN Secretary-General." He argued, "We must prevent this from becoming the worst war." Secretary-General Guterres, who has kept his distance from the conflict perhaps due to his lack of political experience, once again appealed to direct emotions, saying, "It is time to end this unreasonable war," one month after the outbreak of the war.

At a dangerous moment when a further war could break out in Ukraine, the United Nations spent the most dramatic days in its history making every effort to prevent conflict. However, the UN was unable to take concrete measures to end the war, and in the end, the UN’s stated purpose of ‘maintaining peace and security in the international community’ became more difficult to achieve. As the General Assembly ended, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield expressed her feelings, saying, "The United Nations is being challenged more than any other phase in recent human history."

Ahead of the NATO summit scheduled to be held in Brussels in June 2022, Poland proposed sending UN peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. Poland emphasized that this was a kind of ‘pre-preparation’ stage and argued that if peacekeeping forces are dispatched, a unit that can support humanitarian activities and is sufficiently equipped for self-defense in the current situation should be dispatched. However, Poland’s proposal was unconvincing due to the risk of direct confrontation with Russia.

In theory, as long as the war continues, there is little chance of successful deployment of peacekeeping forces to de-escalate the situation. Whatever value previous discussions of peacekeeping may have had, many of the assumptions surrounding the establishment of peacekeeping missions no longer support them. There is therefore a need to start from the most recent assumptions about the proposals for peace action in Ukraine. That is, 1) Will Russia support the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and will the price of approval be, for example, the lifting of sanctions, and will peacekeepers, at least in theory, avoid encountering potential
outside of Europe and North America, the war in Ukraine is not considered very important. Although few countries support Russia’s invasion, the argument that Ukraine’s struggle for freedom and democracy is the West’s struggle is not very convincing. “I am shocked that we have lost the trust of the Global South,” French President Macron said at the Munich Security Conference in February. As he argues, the Western world’s confidence in the importance of the war in Ukraine is met with skepticism and even outright contempt elsewhere.

Russia’s determination to occupy Ukraine at any cost has now escalated into a problem that goes beyond the relationship between Ukraine and NATO. Russia still has a chance to win the conflict, taking into account how well its military operations have performed thus far and the effects of international sanctions. But even in this case, the price for Russia will be enormous. Even if Russia maintains long-term control over Ukraine, every day will be a test. The ultimate outcome of the war will depend on the West’s response and, above all, on Putin’s readiness to fight for a nation he neither knew existed nor had any faith in.

4. Conclusion

It is often said that the war in Ukraine united the world. However, if such claims are true, the war clearly united the Western world, but at the same time divided the entire world. And that gap will only widen unless the Western world addresses the root causes.

The traditional transatlantic alliance of European and North American countries has mobilized in an unprecedented way for the protracted conflict in Ukraine. They have provided extensive humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian people and refugees fleeing Ukraine, and are preparing for large-scale reconstruction following the war. However,